December 11, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In November 1999, the State charged defendant, JoshuaR. Calvert, with aggravated battery (of a police officer) (countI), possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of asubstance containing methamphetamine) (count II), and resisting apolice officer (count III) (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6), 570/402(c),5/31-1 (West 1998)). In March 2000, a jury found defendantguilty of counts II and III and not guilty of count I.

Following an April 2000 sentencing hearing, the trialcourt sentenced defendant to an extended term of four years inprison on count II, based on his prior felony convictions (730ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1998)), and 10 months in prison oncount III, with those sentences to run concurrently. The courtalso ordered that (1) defendant pay $1,930.30 in various fees,fines, and court costs, and (2) the Department of Corrections(DOC) withhold 50% of defendant's DOC wages and remit those fundsto the Adams County circuit clerk to be applied toward theamounts due in fines and costs.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court (a)committed plain error by allowing the State to impeach him withhis prior aggravated battery conviction without first conductingthe Montgomery balancing test (see People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 516, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1971)), and (b) erred bydenying his motion to suppress the evidence that was found duringan allegedly unlawful strip search of defendant; (2) theextended-term sentencing provision set forth in section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1998)) is unconstitutional pursuant toApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435,455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000); and (3) the trial courtlacked the authority to order that his DOC wages be withheld andremitted to the circuit clerk. Alternatively, defendant arguesthat he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel whencounsel failed to (1) object to the trial court's allowing theState to impeach him with his prior aggravated battery convictionwithout first conducting the Montgomery balancing test, and (2)specifically include in the motion to suppress evidence the claimthat police officers unlawfully strip-searched defendant. Weaffirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

In November 1999, the State charged defendant withaggravated battery of a police officer, possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of a substance containingmethamphetamine), and resisting a police officer.

In December 1999, defendant filed a motion to suppressevidence, alleging the following: (1) during the early morninghours of November 17, 1999, Quincy police officers stoppeddefendant in his truck; (2) the officers lacked probable cause tostop him; and (3) the evidence obtained by the officers as aresult of the unlawful stop and subsequent search of defendant'sperson should have been suppressed. At a February 2000 hearingon defendant's motion, Quincy police officer Gabriel Vanderboltestified that at around 2:40 a.m. on November 17, 1999, he andOfficer Anjanette Stovall saw a truck without a registrationplate light traveling on 8th Street in Quincy. Vanderbol activated the light bar on his squad car and pulled the truck over. Vanderbol then approached the driver of the truck (later identified as defendant) and told him the reason for the stop. Defendant told Vanderbol that he had just purchased the truck.

Vanderbol then informed defendant that the computercheck of the truck's license plates showed that the registrationwas suspended for lack of insurance. He asked defendant to shutoff the engine and step to the rear of the truck, but defendant"just sat there." Stovall opened the passenger-side door andtold defendant to get out of the truck, at which point defendantgot out and walked to the rear of the truck. Defendant asked whyhe was under arrest, and Vanderbol again advised him that theregistration was suspended. Defendant said he did not understandand showed Vanderbol his proof of insurance. Before Vanderbolcould say anything else, defendant hit him in the face.

After hitting Vanderbol, defendant attempted to runaway, but Vanderbol grabbed his shirt and jumped on him, knockinghim to the ground. Stovall and Jeff Nevin, another policeofficer who arrived following the stop, then assisted Vanderbolin handcuffing defendant. The officers transported defendant tothe Adams County jail, where a correctional officer strip-searched defendant and found a small bag containing a brown leafysubstance in defendant's underwear. (Inside the bag, theofficers found a smaller bag, which contained a white powderysubstance, later determined to be 2.3 grams of methamphetamine.)

After considering the evidence and counsel's arguments,the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

At defendant's March 2000 jury trial, Vanderbol'stestimony was substantially consistent with his testimony at thehearing on the motion to suppress. In addition, Vanderbol statedthat after he handcuffed defendant, he conducted a pat-downsearch but found nothing. He then placed defendant in his squadcar and transported him to the Adams County jail. Vanderbolexplained that officers routinely transport arrestees to thejail, instead of police headquarters, when they have beencombative during an arrest. Although Vanderbol was presentduring the strip search of defendant, he did not participate inthe search.

Stovall's testimony substantially corroboratedVanderbol's version of the incident. However, she acknowledgedthat she did not actually see defendant's fist make contact withVanderbol's face. After transporting defendant to the jail,Stovall stood outside a holding cell while a male correctionalofficer strip-searched defendant.

Nevin's testimony also substantially corroboratedVanderbol's version of the incident. During the strip search,Nevin stood at the door of the holding cell while a malecorrectional officer conducted the search. Vanderbol and Stovallstood behind him in the hallway.

Dan Steinway, an Adams County correctional officer,testified that whenever an arrestee is going to be incarceratedat the jail, a correctional officer conducts a strip search tocheck for contraband and weapons. After the police officersbrought defendant to the jail on the morning of the incident,Steinway and another male correctional officer took defendantinto a holding cell and conducted a strip search. During thestrip search, defendant first took off his shirt, shoes, andpants and handed them to the correctional officers, who inspectedthe clothing. As defendant was pulling down his underwear,Steinway saw a small plastic bag in the "crotch of hisunderwear." At Steinway's request, defendant handed him the bag.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and deniedhitting Vanderbol. He stated that after Vanderbol and Stovallpulled him over and he stepped out of his truck, one of theofficers grabbed his arm and he pulled away. At that point,other officers knocked him down and beat him up. Defendant alsodenied having a plastic bag in his underwear during the stripsearch.

Based on this evidence, the jury (1) found defendantguilty of possession of a controlled substance (less than 15grams of a substance containing methamphetamine) and resisting apolice officer and (2) acquitted him of aggravated battery. Thetrial court later sentenced him as stated.

This appeal followed.

A. Impeachment with Defendant's Prior
Aggravated Battery Conviction

1. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by
Allowing the State To Impeach Him with His Prior
Aggravated Battery Conviction

Defendant first argues that the trial court committedplain error by allowing the State to impeach him with his prioraggravated battery conviction. Specifically, he contends thatthe court erred by not recognizing its obligation to conduct theMontgomery balancing test to determine if the probative value ofthe conviction was substantially outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice (Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at698). We disagree.

Parties who agree to the admission of evidence througha stipulation are estopped from later complaining about thatevidence being stipulated into the record. People v. Baynes, 88Ill. 2d 225, 239, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (1981); see also Peoplev. Early, 158 Ill. App. 3d 232, 239, 511 N.E.2d 847, 852 (1987)(stipulations should be construed to give effect to the parties'intentions, and such stipulations are "binding and conclusive onthe parties"); People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 571, 736N.E.2d 1001, 1014 (2000) ("A criminal defendant cannot complainon appeal of the introduction of evidence which he procures orinvites").

In this case, at the close of evidence and outside thejury's presence, the following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: Back on record, ladies andgentlemen, I misspoke. Counsel did have afurther stipulation that I would permit [theprosecutor] to proceed with and then hear ifthat is in fact the agreement. Go ahead.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, thestipulation would be, as far as the Peoplepresenting an [e]xhibit No. 4, defendanthaving an aggravated battery conviction outof Adams County filed November 3rd of 1994. The conviction was entered March 31st of1995.

THE COURT: [Defense counsel]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct, yourHonor.

THE COURT: And that is receivedpursuant to stipulation by the parties."

Thus, defendant, through his counsel, stipulated to the admissionof his prior aggravated battery conviction for impeachmentpurposes. Accordingly, that stipulation is binding andconclusive, and defendant cannot now complain about the trialcourt's decision to allow the State to impeach him with his priorconviction.

Defendant concedes that he stipulated to the admissionof his prior conviction for impeachment purposes. Nonetheless,he claims that the trial court erred by making "no effort toconduct any balancing test whatever." We emphatically rejectdefendant's suggestion that the trial court must conduct theMontgomery balancing test when the parties have stipulated to theadmission of the defendant's prior conviction for impeachmentpurposes. A stipulation is "an agreement between parties ortheir attorneys with respect to business before a court" (Peoplev. Buford, 19 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770, 312 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1974)),and courts look with favor upon stipulations because "'they tendto promote disposition of cases, simplification of issues[,] andthe saving of expense to litigants'" (People v. Coleman, 301 Ill.App. 3d 37, 48, 704 N.E.2d 690, 698 (1998), quoting In re Estateof Moss, 109 Ill. App. 2d 185, 192, 248 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1969)). The only matters to which parties cannot stipulate are (1) theresults of polygraph examinations (see Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 239,430 N.E.2d at 1076) and (2) the waiver of a presentence report(see 730 ILCS 5/5-3-1 (West 1998)). In all other situations,parties may enter into stipulations, and such stipulations arebinding and conclusive on the parties. See, e.g., Buford, 19Ill. App. 3d at 769, 312 N.E.2d at 799, quoting People v. Polk,19 Ill. 2d 310, 315, 167 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1960). ("'an accusedmay, by stipulation, waive the necessity of proof of all or partof the [State's] case'" against him). Parties will not berelieved from a stipulation absent "'a clear showing that thematter stipulated is untrue, and then only when the applicationis seasonably made.'" Coleman, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 48, 704N.E.2d at 698, quoting Brink v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill. 607,609, 15 N.E.2d 491, 492 (1938). Defendant does not contend--norcould he--that the matter stipulated to (that is, his priorconviction) was untrue.

In light of the foregoing principles, defendant,through his counsel, and the State clearly could stipulate to theadmission of defendant's prior aggravated battery conviction forimpeachment purposes. To require the trial court to apply theMontgomery balancing test in this situation would negate theentire purpose behind stipulations and would make no sense.

2. Defendant's Claim That He Was Denied Effective
Assistance of Trial Counsel  

Alternatively, defendant argues that he was deniedeffective assistance of trial counsel in that his counsel failedto object when the trial court allowed the State to impeach himwith his prior aggravated battery conviction and stipulated tothe admission of that prior conviction. Specifically, hecontends that (1) no conceivable legitimate trial strategy wouldsupport counsel's failure to object; and (2) counsel's failure toobject severely prejudiced him.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judgedunder the now familiar standard set forth by the United StatesSupreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish ineffectiveassistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate thathis defense counsel's performance was deficient in that "counselmade errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at2064. In so doing, a defendant must overcome the strongpresumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel wasthe product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.at 2065. Second, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonableprobability that, but for defense counsel's deficientperformance, the result of the proceeding would have beendifferent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104S. Ct. at 2068. Both prongs of the Strickland test must besatisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim ofineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 397-98, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1079 (1998).

In People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 726, 550N.E.2d 284, 296 (1990), this court held that adjudication of aclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel is often better madein proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, where acomplete record can be made. In Kunze, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim turned on whether the defendant would havetestified had he known in advance that the State would use hisprior convictions to impeach him. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at725, 550 N.E.2d at 296. Because nothing in the record permittedsuch a determination to be made, this court declined to adjudicate defendant's claim. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26, 550N.E.2d at 296.

Similarly, in this case, the record contains nothing toreview with respect to why defense counsel stipulated to theState's use of defendant's prior aggravated battery convictionfor impeachment purposes--that is, (1) why counsel chose tostipulate to the admission of defendant's prior conviction; and(2) whether counsel's decision to so stipulate constituted atrial tactic or incompetence. Because the answers to thequestions pertinent to defendant's claim are currently dehors therecord, we decline to consider them. Instead, defendant may pursue his claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 1998)). See People v. Holloman, 304 Ill. App. 3d 177, 186, 709 N.E.2d 969, 975 (1999) (in whichthis court reaffirmed our decision in Kunze and declined toaddress on direct appeal whether trial counsel's failure to makea motion to suppress evidence constituted ineffectiveassistance); People v. Flores, 231 Ill. App. 3d 813, 827-28, 596N.E.2d 1204, 1213-14 (1992) (held, without an explanation fromtrial counsel, reviewing court cannot determine whether trialcounsel's omissions involved the exercise of judgment,discretion, or trial tactics, which are not reviewable matters;recommended postconviction petition as a better forum for adjudication of ineffective assistance claim); In re Carmody, 274 Ill.App. 3d 46, 56, 653 N.E.2d 977, 984 (1995) (noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains anyexplanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that, ifthose tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record shouldbe developed in which they can effectively be reviewed).

1. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by
Denying His Motion To Suppress

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion to suppress the evidence that the correctionalofficers found during their strip search of defendant at thecounty jail. Specifically, he contends that the strip search wasunreasonable and violated his constitutional rights because theofficers had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believethat he was concealing contraband or weapons on his person. Wedisagree.

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99S. Ct. 1861 (1979), detainees of a federally operated short-termdetention facility filed a class action lawsuit challenging theconstitutionality of numerous conditions of confinement andrelated administrative practices. The facility was primarilyused to house persons who had been charged with crimes but notyet brought to trial. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523, 60 L. Ed. 2d at458, 99 S. Ct. at 1865-66. In particular, the lawsuit challengedthe practice of submitting inmates to a strip search and visualinspection of their body cavities after every contact visit withsomeone from outside the facility. See McCloud v. Commonwealth,35 Va. App. 276, 282, 544 S.E.2d 866, 868-69 (2001) (a stripsearch generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual,without any scrutiny of his body cavities, while a visual body-cavity search extends to a visual inspection of the anal andgenital areas). In exploring the scope of permissible searchesincident to pretrial detention, the United States Supreme Courtbegan by discussing the following general principles, which theCourt's prior cases had established and which informed itsanalysis: (1) pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted ofany crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that areenjoyed by convicted prisoners, such as freedom of speech andreligion; (2) "[a] detainee simply does not possess the fullrange of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual" (Bell, 441U.S. at 546, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 473, 99 S. Ct. at 1878); (3)"maintaining institutional security and preserving internal orderand discipline are essential goals that may require limitation orretraction of the retained constitutional rights of bothconvicted prisoners and pretrial detainees" (Bell, 441 U.S. at546, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 473, 99 S. Ct. at 1878); and (4) because theproblems that arise in the daily operation of a correctionsfacility are not susceptible to easy solutions, prisonadministrators "should be accorded wide-ranging deference in theadoption and execution of policies and practices that in theirjudgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline andto maintain institutional security" (Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 60L. Ed. 2d at 474, 99 S. Ct. at 1878).

The Supreme Court in Bell ultimately held that underthe circumstances, the strip searches and visual inspections ofthe detainees' body cavities were not unreasonable under thefourth amendment, and, instead, were "reasonable responses *** tolegitimate security concerns." Bell, 441 U.S. at 561, 60 L. Ed.2d at 483, 99 S. Ct. at 1886. In so holding, the Court stated,in pertinent part, as follows:

"Admittedly, this practice instinctivelygives us the most pause. However, assumingfor present purposes that inmates, bothconvicted prisoners and pretrial detainees,retain some [f]ourth [a]mendment rights uponcommitment to a corrections facility,[citations], we nonetheless conclude thatthese searches do not violate that[a]mendment. The [f]ourth [a]mendmentprohibits only unreasonable searches,[citation], and under the circumstances, wedo not believe that these searches areunreasonable.

The test for reasonableness under the[f]ourth [a]mendment is not capable ofprecise definition or mechanical application. In each case[,] it requires a balancing ofthe need for the particular search againstthe invasion of personal rights that thesearch entails. Courts must consider [(1)]the scope of the particular intrusion, [(2)]the manner in which it is conducted, [(3)]the justification for initiating it[,] and[(4)] the place in which it is conducted. [Citations.] A detention facility is aunique place fraught with serious securitydangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons,and other contraband is all too common anoccurrence." Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-59, 60 L.Ed. 2d at 481, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.

In this case, following defendant's full custodialarrest for aggravated battery and resisting a police officer, theofficers took him to the Adams County jail, where he was to beplaced among the general jail population. At that point,defendant was subject to those measures adopted for themaintenance of internal security at the jail. Thus, his positionwas no different, for constitutional purposes, from the pretrialdetainees in Bell. If anything, the detainees in that case weresubject to more onerous conditions, given the greaterintrusiveness of a body-cavity search. As discussed above, theSupreme Court nevertheless upheld such searches "in the light ofthe central objective of prison administration, safeguardinginstitutional security." Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 60 L. Ed. 2d at473, 99 S. Ct. at 1878.

The two male correctional officers conducted the stripsearch of defendant in a holding cell, and defendant was allowedto remove his own clothes and hand them to the officers. Thecorrectional officers inspected defendant's items of clothing ashe removed them and then looked inside his underwear as he beganremoving it. The officers did not touch defendant's body orconduct a visual body-cavity search. In light of the substantialneed to ensure institutional security, good penal practices notonly permit, they require strip searches before placing detaineesinto the general jail population. Under these circumstances, weconclude that the justification for the strip search faroutweighed its invasiveness. Thus, the strip search of defendantwas reasonable and constitutional. Indeed, if correctionalofficers failed to conduct such searches prior to placingdetainees into the general jail population, other inmates as wellas correctional officers could be at serious risk. See Ashley v.Snyder, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252, 1259, 739 N.E.2d 897, 903 (2000)(where this court wrote that a prisoner's most important rightwas "the right to be free from violence and terror at the handsof other inmates"). Depriving jail and prison administrators ofthe power to conduct strip searches like that conducted in thepresent case would seriously impede such administrators as theyattempted to protect their inmate populations.

Defendant cites decisions of federal circuit courts ofappeal holding that strip and visual body-cavity searches must bejustified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the pretrialdetainee is concealing contraband or weapons. See, e.g., Swainv. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997); Kennedy v. Los AngelesPolice Department, 901 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1989). However,those decisions do not control our decision in this case. Because federal courts do not exercise appellate jurisdictionover state courts, this court is not bound to follow decisions byfederal courts other than the United States Supreme Court. SeePrior Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Hagins, 258 Ill. App. 3d 683,688, 630 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (1994).

Because we have concluded that the strip search ofdefendant was a reasonable search incident to defendant'splacement among the general jail population, we need not addresswhether the search was also lawful incident to defendant'scustodial arrest. See People v. Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d 24, 38, 416N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (1981) (holding that a strip search at a policestation, which was conducted incident to a custodial arrest, wasreasonable where the defendant had been arrested on a misdemeanorweapons offense and there existed a "potential for dangerinherent in the custodial arrest").

2. Defendant's Claim That He Was Denied Effective
Assistance of Trial Counsel  

Alternatively, defendant argues that he receivedineffective assistance of trial counsel when his counsel failedto "adequately include" the strip-search issue in defendant'smotion to suppress evidence. In light of our conclusion that thestrip search of defendant was reasonable and constitutional,counsel's inclusion of that issue in defendant's motion tosuppress would have been futile. Thus, even acceptingdefendant's contention that his counsel failed to adequatelyaddress the strip-search issue in the motion to suppress, weconclude that counsel's failure did not establish incompetentrepresentation. See People v. Robinson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 426,435, 701 N.E.2d 231, 240 (1998) ("trial counsel's failure to filea motion to suppress does not establish incompetentrepresentation, especially when that motion would be futile").

3. Defendant's Claim That the Strip Search Did Not
Comport with Illinois Law

Defendant also argues that the strip search did notcomport with Illinois law. Specifically, he contends that thecorrectional officers did not comply with (1) section 103-1(e) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedural Code), whichprovides that a strip search be conducted by an officer who isthe same sex as the person being searched; and (2) section 103-1(f) of the Procedural Code, which provides that an officer (a)obtain written permission from a commander before conducting astrip search and (b) prepare a written report following thesearch. 725 ILCS 5/103-1(e), (f) (West 1998)).

Defendant has forfeited this argument on appeal byfailing to raise it in the trial court or in a posttrial motion. People v. Davis, 319 Ill. App. 3d 572, 576, 746 N.E.2d 758, 762(2001). Moreover, to the extent defendant claims that thealleged violations of sections 103-1(e) and (f) of the ProceduralCode render the search a violation of his fourth amendment rightsunder the United States Constitution, we reject defendant'scontention on the merits. Assuming for the purpose of argumentthat a search violates section 103-1 of the Procedural Code, thatfact does not mean that the search also violates the UnitedStates Constitution. We agree with the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals that "just because Illinois chooses to regulate policebehavior in a certain way does not mean the police officersviolate the Constitution by transgressing those rules." Doe v.Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1993). The proper inquiryremains whether defendant's constitutional rights were violated.

C. Constitutionality of Section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) Under Apprendi

Defendant next argues that the enhanced sentencingprovision of section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1998)) is unconstitutional under Apprendi,530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. Wedisagree.

In People v. Dillard, 319 Ill. App. 3d 102, 109, 745N.E.2d 185, 191 (2001), we addressed and rejected this sameargument. We adhere to our holding in Dillard and thus rejectdefendant's contention that Apprendi renders unconstitutional section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code.

Last, defendant argues that the trial court lacked theauthority to order that his DOC wages be withheld and remitted tothe circuit clerk. The State concedes that the court lacked theauthority to enter such an order, and we accept the State'sconcession.

In People v. Watson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 140, 142-43, 743N.E.2d 147, 149 (2000), this court held that no authority existsfor a trial court to direct that DOC withhold wages earned whilea defendant is imprisoned. See also People v. Williamson, 319Ill. App. 3d 891, 900, 747 N.E.2d 26, 34 (2001) (reaffirming ourdecision in Watson). We adhere to Watson and Williamson. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court'ssentencing order directing DOC to withhold 50% of defendant's DOCwages and remand with directions to modify the written judgmentof sentence as stated.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant'sconviction and sentence, vacate that portion of the trial court'ssentencing order directing DOC to withhold 50% of defendant's DOCwages, and remand with directions to modify the written judgmentof sentence as stated.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part: cause remandedwith directions.

McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.