JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant, Breon P. Cameron, ofunlawful use of weapons, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), (b) (West 2000)), for transporting an unloaded semiautomatic pistol in the glove compartment of his vehicle. Defendantappeals, contending his conviction should be reversed because (1)the trial court erred by refusing his tendered jury instructionregarding the statutory exemption for unloaded weapons enclosed"in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container" (container exemption) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii) (West2000)) and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing torequest a jury instruction regarding the statutory exemption forweapons "broken down" in a nonfunctioning state (broken-downexemption) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(i) (West 2000)). We affirm.

The following evidence was presented at defendant's May2001 jury trial. In January 2001, Urbana police officer ShawnCook conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant. Cook arrested defendant after learning he had a suspendeddriver's license. Cook searched defendant's car and found in thedriver's door accessory compartment an ammunition magazine withsix live rounds in it. Cook also recovered an unloaded .32-caliber semiautomatic pistol in the glove compartment.Cooktestified the glove compartment was unlocked and within reachfrom the driver's seat. Defendant testified he unlocked theglove compartment after the traffic stop using a key from theashtray to get his driver's license from his wallet. Defendanthad a valid firearm owner's identification card.

Defense counsel tendered the following jury instruction:

"A person may lawfully transport a firearm in a vehicle if the firearm is unloadedand enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box,shipping box, or other container by a personwho has been issued a currently valid[f]irearm [o]wner's [i]dentification [c]ard. The defendant has the burden of proving by apreponderance of the evidence that at thetime of the offense charged the firearm wasunloaded and enclosed in a case, firearmcarrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued acurrently valid [f]irearm [o]wner's[i]dentification [c]ard."

See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 18.01A (4thed. 2000). The trial court refused this instruction, reasoningas follows:

"[W]hen they say a case, that's somethingthat we could pick up and carry it around. Acarrying box assumes that is something youpick up and carry it around. A shipping boxis something that you pick up and carryaround. When they say, or other container,they then mean some sort of container thatcould be picked up and carried around. If itis in a glovebox in *** a vehicle, *** Ihaven't seen too many vehicles someone couldpick up and carry around. You cannot takethe glovebox out. That's part of the car. It's not removable. *** [I]f they meantareas built into vehicles, the legislaturewould have put that in there. *** [W]hen youread this section, *** all of these are typesof cases that can be picked up and carriedaround. *** So there is no evidence that*** the weapon was in that type of containeror case."

The jury found defendant guilty of unlawful use ofweapons. In June 2001, defendant filed a motion for judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The trial courtdenied defendant's motion and sentenced him to 12 months' conditional discharge. This appeal followed.

Defendant was convicted of the offense of unlawful useof weapons under section 24-1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961(Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2000)), which applies when aperson knowingly:

"[c]arries or possesses in any vehicleor concealed on or about his person exceptwhen on his land or in his own abode or fixedplace of business any pistol, revolver, stungun[,] or taser or other firearm, except thatthis subsection (a)(4) does not apply to oraffect transportation of weapons that meetone of the following conditions:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioningstate; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in acase, firearm carrying box, shipping box, orother container by a person who has beenissued a currently valid [f]irearm [o]wner's[i]dentification [c]ard[.]" (Emphasesadded.)

Defendant first argues the trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction relating to the container exemption insection 24-1(a)(4)(iii) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii)(West 2000)). Defendant asserts he was entitled to this instruction because he transported the unloaded firearm enclosed in hisvehicle's glove compartment, which defendant contends qualifiesas an "other container" under the container exemption. Wedisagree.

Ordinarily, we use an abuse of discretion standard whenreviewing a trial court's decision to give a tendered juryinstruction. People v. Majors, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1034, 721N.E.2d 753, 763 (1999). However, to the extent our analysisinvolves an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is denovo. People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 368, 763 N.E.2d 306,308 (2001).

In regard to the specific statute at issue, the courtshave found the legislature did not intend the statutory exemptions should be given a broad interpretation, and thus, they mustbe strictly construed. People v. Bruner, 285 Ill. App. 3d 39,42, 675 N.E.2d 654, 655 (1996). Under the doctrine of ejusdemgeneris, when a statutory clause specifically describes severalclasses of things and then includes "other things," the word"other" is interpreted as meaning "other such like." People v.Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (2002).

Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis and strictlyconstruing the container exemption, we determine a vehicle'sglove compartment is not an "other container" under the containerexemption. A glove compartment is fundamentally different from acase, firearm carrying box, or shipping box because those receptacles are portable whereas a glove compartment is a fixed areain the dashboard of a vehicle. Therefore, a glove compartment isnot an "other container" similar to the ones enumerated in thecontainer exemption.

A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed onthe law applicable to the theory of his case, provided evidencein the record supports that theory. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 375, 739 N.E.2d 455, 491 (2000). However, defendant wasnot entitled to have the jury instructed on the container exemption because no evidence in the record suggests defendant'sfirearm was so enclosed. Therefore, the trial court did notabuse its discretion in refusing defendant's jury instruction.

Defendant next contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding theexemption for weapons broken down in a nonfunctioning state (720ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(i) (West 2000)).

We need not address this contention because no evidenceor argument concerning this exemption was presented to the trialcourt. The adjudication of a claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel is often better made in the context of a petition forpostconviction relief where a complete record can be made. People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 726, 550 N.E.2d 284, 296(1990).

The nature and operation of defendant's pistol were notaddressed at trial. We do not have the benefit of trial counsel's or the trial court's discussion of what "broken down" mightmean. We do not know why defendant's trial counsel did not raisethis exemption. We could speculate and reach a conclusion, butwe will not do so. We decline to address defendant's secondcontention.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

TURNER, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:

The legislature has provided in section 24-1(a)(4) ofthe Code that it is unlawful for a person to carry or possess apistol in any vehicle, except under certain conditions. 720 ILCS5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2000). Because defendant has not challengedthe authority of the legislature to so provide, this court's onlyrole in this case is to conscientiously carry out the legislature's intention to the best of our ability. As we do so, we areconstrained by the deference due to the policy-making body of theState of Illinois--namely, the General Assembly. The SupremeCourt of Illinois recently discussed this deference, as follows:

"'"The only legitimate function of the courtsis to declare and enforce the law as enactedby the legislature, to interpret the languageused by the legislature where it requiresinterpretation, and not to annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or readinto a statute exceptions, limitations, orconditions which depart from its plain meaning."'" People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563,568-69, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ (2002), quotingBronson v. Washington National Insurance Co.,59 Ill. App. 2d 253, 261-62, 207 N.E.2d 172,176 (1965), quoting Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d 293, 307, 134 N.E.2d 249, 256 (1956).

With the foregoing limitation in mind, I agree with themajority that the legislature, when it set forth the followingexemptions to the general prohibition on carrying a pistol in avehicle--that is, when an unloaded pistol is "enclosed in a case,firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container"--did notintend to include a vehicle's glove compartment. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii) (West 2000). To hold otherwise would be to distortthe clear meaning of that legislative exemption.