JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Linda M. Crawford, was charged with harassment of a witness pursuant to section 32-4a(a)(2) of the CriminalCode of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a)(2) (West 2000)) andconvicted after a bench trial. The trial court sentenced her to24 months' probation. Defendant appeals, contending the Statefailed to prove she harassed anyone who was a witness, or whomight have been expected to serve as a witness, in a pendinglegal proceeding. We disagree and affirm.

The facts are not in dispute. A 14-year-old girl,Stevie M., awoke on October 14, 2000, believing someone was inher bed. She felt an object enter her vagina. She rolled awayand turned and saw David Crawford leaving her bedroom.

Two days later she reported the sexual assault to hermother, Sherry. Sometime later during the month of October,Sherry accompanied her daughter, Stevie M., to the police station, where Stevie M. made a complaint about the incident to aCity of Decatur police officer, Jeremy Welker. On November 9,2000, David Crawford learned from the police Stevie M. had made acomplaint against him for the sexual assault.

On that same date, he told the defendant, who is hissister, and other family members about the complaint. Thereafter, on the same date, defendant and Nicole McKinnon went toSherry's residence, where defendant threatened physical harm toSherry if she did not stop talking about the incident. Defendantlater admitted to Officer Welker that she told Sherry to keep hermouth shut about the investigation of David Crawford, stating,"If it was your brother, you would try to get them to keep theirmouth shut too."

There were disputes at trial about what was said andwhether Sherry would fit the definition of "a witness," giventhat Stevie M. was the complainant. However, the trial courtresolved the factual disputes, applied the statute, and concluded(1) the State proved defendant communicated a threat to Sherry,(2) the threat was directly related to the charges pendingagainst defendant's brother, and (3) as the mother of a 14-year-old who has made a complaint of molestation, Sherry might well bea witness.

On appeal, defendant abandons the arguments made to thetrial court and essentially acquiesces in the trial court'sassessment of the evidence. The issue now presented--for thefirst time--is whether an essential element of the statute wasproved--that is, was a legal proceeding pending?

When defendant made the threat to Sherry, DavidCrawford had been interviewed by the police, but he had not beenarrested. He was first charged with aggravated criminal sexualassault by indictment on November 21, 2000--some 12 days afterdefendant threatened Sherry.

Section 32-4a(a) of the Code provides as follows:

"Harassment of representatives for the child, jurors, witnesses[,] and family members of representatives for the child, jurors, and witnesses.

(a) A person who, with intent to harass or annoy one who has served or is serving or whois a family member of a person who has servedor is serving (1) as a juror because of theverdict returned by the jury in a pendinglegal proceeding or the participation of thejuror in the verdict or (2) as a witness, orwho may be expected to serve as a witness ina pending legal proceeding, because of thetestimony or potential testimony of the witness, communicates directly or indirectlywith the juror, witness, or family member ofa juror or witness in such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress orwho conveys a threat of injury or damage tothe property or person of any juror, witness,or family member of the juror or witnesscommits a Class 2 felony." (Emphasis added.)720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a) (West 2000).

This case focuses our attention on the phrase "pendinglegal proceeding" in section 32-4a(a)(2) (720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a)(2)(West 2000)). Defendant contends the phrase "pending legalproceeding" must mean an active judicial proceeding, which beginswith the filing of formal charges against a criminal defendant. Because no formal charges had been filed against David Crawford,no legal proceeding was pending. The State argues a pendinglegal proceeding, for the purposes of this statute, began whenStevie M. and her mother reported the sex crime to the police andthe police began their investigation, which culminated in thearrest, prosecution, and conviction of David Crawford.

Defendant relies on the definition of "prosecution" tobolster her position. Section 2-16 of the Code provides: "'Prosecution' means all legal proceedings by which a person'sliability for an offense is determined, commencing with thereturn of the indictment or the issuance of the information, andincluding the final disposition of the case upon appeal." 720ILCS 5/2-16 (West 2000).

The defendant's reliance on this definition is misplaced. The word "prosecution" does not appear in section32-4a(a) of the Code, nor does the statute contain the phrase"any matter pending in any court"--the phrase found in the statute that prohibits communicating with jurors or witnesses. 720ILCS 5/32-4 (West 2000). This suggests "pending legal proceeding" is not limited to a prosecution, and it need not be a matteralready pending in court.

The purpose of the statute is to prevent a witness--orsomeone who may be expected to be a witness--from being harassedor threatened. Defendant's reading of the statute would permitsomeone to threaten a witness to a crime to discourage them fromtestifying as long as the threat is conveyed before a criminalcharge is filed. We do not believe the legislature intended toprovide a window of opportunity for miscreants to threaten orharass a witness after the witness has lodged a complaint withthe police but before the criminal prosecution begins.

A criminal investigation is a pending legal proceedingwithin the context of section 32-4a(a)(2) of the Code. To holdotherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute and lead to anabsurd result.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs.

APPLETON, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision, towit, that the term "pending legal proceeding" in section 32-4a(a)includes a police report or even a police contact. Defendantthreatened Sherry after Sherry complained to the police and thepolice interrogated David Crawford but before the filing of aformal charge or even an arrest.

Unless the statute says otherwise, we must give wordsand phrases in the statute their common, ordinary meaning. People v. Laws, 200 Ill. App. 3d 232, 236, 558 N.E.2d 638, 640(1990). Section 32-4a(a) does not specifically define "pendinglegal proceeding"; therefore, we must give the phrase its common,ordinary meaning. "Legal proceedings" are "proceeding[s] ***instituted in a court or tribunal." (Emphasis added.) Black'sLaw Dictionary 906 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, a police investigationis not a "legal proceeding." "Pending" means "[r]emainingundecided; awaiting decision." Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (7thed. 1999). When defendant threatened her, Sherry was not"expected to serve as a witness in a pending legal proceeding"(see 720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a) (West 2000)), because there was no"pending legal proceeding" at the time.

While arising in a different context, the term "pendingcourt proceedings" was defined in People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger,30 Ill. App. 3d 525, 332 N.E.2d 649 (1975). There, the defendants were charged with a violation of "An Act in relation toMeetings" (the Open Meetings Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 102,par. 42) for their participation in a closed meeting to discusswith the city council committee, its attorney, and others, thesubject of contemplated litigation, to wit, annexation of land. The court there said:

"We must agree with defendants' contentionthat 'pending' cannot be reasonably interpreted to include preliminary discussion with anattorney to secure advice on either thebringing of suit or the defense of a suitwhich is either threatened or likely to bebrought against the city. *** The traditional concept of litigation begins in termsof 'notice, pleading, trial[,] and appeal'[citation], and presumably it is at thatpoint that the litigation is 'pending.'" Barger, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 536-37, 332 N.E.2dat 659.

Cf. United States v. Ellis, 652 F. Supp. 1451, 1452-53 (S.D.Miss. 1987) (grand jury proceeding not "pending" until it hasactually begun); Johnson v. McCaughan, Carter & Scharrer, 672 P.2d 221, 222 (Colo. App. 1983) (action is "pending" after it iscommenced by either filing a complaint or serving a summons).

These facts disclose a pending citizen complaint to thepolice, not a pending legal proceeding. The majority reads intothe definition of the statutory term at issue the possibility ofa legal proceeding. What if the police were investigating acomplaint and, during the investigation, someone threatened apotential witness, but the State nevertheless determined, afterthe threat, that it would not prosecute because the complaint wasill-founded? The majority's unwarranted expansion of the statute's plain and ordinary meaning would make it applicable to suchconduct.

I agree with the majority that miscreants should not beallowed to threaten or harass a witness--either prior to or aftersuch a witness lodges a complaint with the police. Such conductis properly prosecuted as the offense of intimidation. 720 ILCS5/12-6 (West 2000). That is what this defendant did, on thesefacts, and she should have been charged with and prosecuted forthat offense, not for harassing a witness. I would reverse herconviction for harassment of a witness, an offense that ispatently inapplicable to her case.