On September 4, 2001, defendant, Robert Crowder, pleadedguilty to aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery (720 ILCS5/18-4(a)(3), 18-2 (West 2000)), in exchange for dismissal of anothercharge. Although defense counsel stated "there is no agreement as tosentence," the prosecutor, when later asked by the trial court if thesentences would run concurrently, responded, "[t]hat is correct, YourHonor."

On October 15, 2001, prior to the sentencing hearing,defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea, contendingdefendant did not understand the plea and was innocent of thecharges. On November 26, 2001, at the sentencing hearing, the trialcourt initially addressed the motion to withdraw the plea and deniedit. The court then sentenced defendant to concurrent 15-year prisonterms. Defense counsel filed a Supreme Court Rule 604(d) certificate(188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) the same day.

Although a timely motion to reconsider sentence was filed,the motion was not heard by the trial court before a notice ofappeal, prepared by the circuit clerk, was filed with this court. Onmotion of the appellate defender, we dismissed the premature appealand remanded for a hearing on the pending postjudgment motion. People v. Crowder, No. 4-02-0445 (November 6, 2002) (order allowingappellant's motion and dismissing appeal). After remand, the courtdenied the motion to reduce sentence, and defendant appeals anew.

On appeal, defendant contends the case must be remandedonce again because the trial court failed to properly admonish himunder either Supreme Court Rule 605(b) or (c) (Official ReportsAdvance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), Rs. 605(b), (c), eff.October 1, 2001) at the conclusion of the initial sentencing hearingand defense counsel failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 604(d)by failing to file a new Rule 604(d) certificate in conjunction withthe motion to reduce sentence. The State concedes the errors, and weagree.

After sentencing defendant and having previously deniedhis motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court's only admonishmentto defendant was that he had 30 days to appeal either or both thosedecisions. When defense counsel interjected that he intended to filea motion to reduce sentence, the trial court merely acknowledged thispossibility but did not offer defendant any further admonishmentsconcerning the nature of the postjudgment motion he was required tofile and the ramifications on appellate review of failing to file anappropriate motion or the consequences of the court granting such amotion.

Initially, defendant argues the record is ambiguous as towhether this was a negotiated plea, to which Rule 605(c) admonishments would apply, or a nonnegotiated plea agreement, in which caseRule 605(b) controls. Defendant contrasts defense counsel's statement that there was no agreement as to sentence with the prosecutor'slater affirmative response to the court's question of whether thesentences would run concurrently, contending that the latter statement might be construed as a partially negotiated plea. We need notdecide this issue, however, because in either case, the admonishmentswere insufficient.

Trial courts must strictly comply with the admonitionrequirements of Rule 605. People v. Taylor, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1064,1083, 804 N.E.2d 116, 130 (2004). Defendants who receive inadequateadmonishments are prejudiced in several ways because they riskforfeiting the right to raise sentencing issues on appeal. People v.Bagnell, 348 Ill. App. 3d 322, 327, 809 N.E.2d 753, 757 (2004). Likewise, in the case of a negotiated plea, no issues regarding thepropriety of the plea are preserved if the defendant fails to renewthe motion to withdraw the plea after being sentenced. People v.Collins, 328 Ill. App. 3d 366, 370-71, 766 N.E.2d 323, 326-28 (2002);People v. Ramage, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029-31, 595 N.E.2d 222,223-25 (1992).

The remedy for this error is to remand with instructionsthat the court properly admonish the defendant and allow him theopportunity to file an appropriate postjudgment motion. Taylor, 345Ill. App. 3d at 1083, 804 N.E.2d at 131. At that time, the partiescan explore the question of whether the issue of concurrent sentenceswas, in fact, negotiated as part of the plea agreement. See Peoplev. Economy, 291 Ill. App. 3d 212, 216, 683 N.E.2d 919, 922-23 (1997)(agreement to seek concurrent rather than consecutive sentences is anegotiated guilty plea).

Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the trial court forfurther proceedings.

Remanded with directions.

STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.