JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal involves five cases consolidated for thepurpose of appeal. The relevant defendants, James Patrick Daly,Jon P. Umphryes, Tracy M. Thompson, David J. Wickert, and LewisE. Jones, appeal the final orders of the Schuyler County circuitcourt convicting defendants of charges resulting from undercoverdrug buys accomplished by Schuyler County confidential informantBrian K. Jockisch. Similar issues are presented by the fivecases. We focus on the first case, involving defendant Daly.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to August 1999, Brian Jockisch was a paid informant in Fulton and McDonough Counties. Jockisch made his livingas a paid informant. In August 1999, Jockisch was charged, inSchuyler County, with unlawful possession of cannabis, a misdemeanor, and illegal harvesting of ginseng without a license. Attorney John Endres was appointed to represent Jockisch on thosecharges. On December 6, 1999, the charges were dismissed; fourdays later, Jockisch signed a written employment agreement withSchuyler County officials to make undercover drug buys. Underthat agreement Jockisch made buys at least between December 28,1999, and August 4, 2000.

In February 2000, domestic battery charges were filedagainst Jockisch in Brown County. Endres represented Jockisch onthose charges as well. On July 7, 2000, Jockisch's domesticbattery charges were dismissed.

On June 14, 2000, Jockisch's van was stopped in BrownCounty and cannabis was discovered, but the officer did notarrest Jockisch after learning that he was a paid informant forSchuyler County.

Jockisch testified that he purchased cocaine fromdefendant Daly in a controlled sale on July 24, 2000. Thesubstance Jockisch gave to police tested inconclusive for controlled substances. Jockisch testified that he purchased cocainefrom defendant in a second controlled sale on August 2, 2000. That substance tested positive for cocaine. Jockisch testifiedhe purchased cocaine from defendant in a third controlled sale onAugust 4, 2000. The substance tested positive for cocaine.

On November 28, 2000, defendant Daly was charged withtwo counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720ILCS 570/401(c) (West 2000)) and one count of unlawful distribution of a look-alike substance (720 ILCS 570/404(b) (West 2000)). Attorney Endres was appointed to represent defendant.

The State filed a motion in limine to bar evidence ofJockisch's misconduct, stating it was unaware of any convictionfor a felony or a crime involving dishonesty or false statementin the past 10 years. In response to the State's motion, Endresfiled an offer of proof, reciting that the Schuyler Countycharges against Jockisch were dismissed December 6, 1999, andthat within days of the dismissal--if not earlier--Jockischstarted purchasing drugs for the Schuyler County sheriff'soffice. The offer of proof also stated that Endres was advisedby the Brown County sheriff's office that Jockisch was doing somework for Brown County police and not to worry about the domesticbattery charge, which was then dismissed.

During the hearing on the motion in limine, the formerSchuyler County State's Attorney denied that the charges hedismissed on December 9, 1999, were dismissed in exchange for anagreement for Jockisch to purchase drugs. The State's Attorneytestified the charges were dismissed because (1) although anadditional charge, a domestic violence charge, had been contemplated, Jockisch and his then-wife had reconciled; (2) Jockisch'sfamily members asked for leniency; (3) one of Jockisch's familymembers was married to the State's Attorney's ex-wife, whointerceded on Jockisch's behalf; (4) Jockisch's father may havehad a permit to raise ginseng; and (5) because of Jockisch's"rather pathetic appearance," the State's Attorney felt sorry forhim. In response to the court's questioning, however, theState's Attorney admitted that he and Endres had advised thecourt at various times that Jockisch was working for law enforcement in other counties, and the State's Attorney was consideringdismissing the case as a result of that work. The State'sAttorney finally conceded that the work Jockisch had done inother counties may have been a consideration in the December 9,1999, dismissal. Endres then spoke of the work he had done asJockisch's attorney. Endres stated that his memory was bad, thathe may have known of Jockisch's work in other counties, but hehad no knowledge of the Schuyler County agreement until aboutmid-2000.

The trial court determined that, with the closeness intimes, the dismissal of the cases on December 6 and Jockisch'sbeginning to work for the Schuyler County sheriff's office onDecember 28 were "highly probative that, at least in Mr.Jockisch's mind, there was some kind of quid pro quo." The courtconcluded that Jockisch could be cross-examined about the connection between the cannabis dismissal on December 6, 1999, and thedrug purchases, but not the Brown County dismissal of the domestic battery charges "unless you can tie up something specificallythat there was a quid pro quo."

During his opening statement, the State's Attorney toldthe jury that Jockisch was a paid informant and may have possessed or used drugs. During the trial, Endres elicited testimony that the Schuyler County cannabis charge had been dismissed,but he did not introduce evidence that the dismissal was theresult of an informant deal between law enforcement and Jockisch. Endres also elicited testimony regarding the Brown County cannabis incident, but again made no connection between the officer'sfailure to arrest Jockisch and Jockisch's informant agreement. Nor did Endres impeach Jockisch with the financial arrangementmade in Schuyler County, whereby police paid Jockisch for successfully buying drugs from local residents and for his "time totestify," but reimbursed him only for expenses if he failed tomake a buy. Under the agreement, Jockisch had been paid $5,650plus $3,050 in living expenses. Another person had testifiedthat she had observed Jockisch using drugs in July and August2000, but Endres failed to call her as a witness, stating thathis calls to her "have not been answered, and I don't have herhere. I'm sorry *** that's my fault."

On the evidence presented, the jury convicted defendantDaly on all charges. On June 4, 2001, the trial court sentencedhim to 4 years' probation on the Class 1 felony unlawful deliverycounts (counts II and II) and 30 months' probation, including 6months' home confinement, on the Class 3 felony unlawful distribution of a look-alike substance (count I). This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel, Endres, labored undera per se conflict of interest created by Endres's prior representation of Jockisch, the State's chief witness. We agree. Wereview this issue de novo. People v. Miller, 199 Ill. 2d 541,544, 771 N.E.2d 386, 387 (2002).

The sixth amendment of the Constitution of the UnitedStates guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right entitles a criminal defendantto the undivided loyalty of counsel, free from conflictinginterests or inconsistent obligations. People v. Flores, 128Ill. 2d 66, 83, 538 N.E.2d 481, 486 (1989). Generally, tosucceed on appeal under the test for ineffective assistance ofcounsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), a defendant must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced. Defendants need notdemonstrate prejudice, however, if a per se conflict exists. Miller, 199 Ill. 2d at 545, 771 N.E.2d at 388. The per seconflict rule is designed to avoid (1) unfairness to the defendant, who may not be able to determine whether his representationwas affected by the conflict, and (2) putting the honest practitioner in a position where he may be required to choose betweenconflicting duties. People v. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d 104, 114, 545N.E.2d 654, 658 (1989).

In a situation where defense counsel has previouslyrepresented one of the State's witnesses, a per se conflict ofinterest exists if the professional relationship between counseland the witness is contemporaneous with counsel's representationof defendant. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d at 111, 545 N.E.2d at 657. Insuch a case, "'certain facts about the defense counsel's status,by themselves, *** engender a disabling conflict.' (Emphasisadded.)" Miller, 199 Ill. 2d at 545, 771 N.E.2d at 388, quotingPeople v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 211 (1994); People v. Moore,189 Ill. 2d 521, 538, 727 N.E.2d 348, 357 (2000) (defense counsel's simultaneous representation of the defendant and theState's witness creates a per se conflict of interest).

To determine whether a per se conflict exists, a courtshould "base the determination on a realistic appraisal ofdefense counsel's professional relationship to someone other thanthe defendant under the circumstances of each case." People v.Hernandez, 246 Ill. App. 3d 243, 249, 615 N.E.2d 843, 848 (1993). A court should not look to the technicalities of the law of offerand acceptance for guidance. Hernandez, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 249,615 N.E.2d at 848. Where defendant fails to make a showing of aper se conflict of interest, defendant has the burden to show anactual conflict of interest and to demonstrate prejudice. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 83, 538 N.E.2d at 487.

The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Enoch, 146Ill. 2d 44, 53, 585 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1991), held that defensecounsel's previous representation of the State's witness in aseparate felony matter four years prior to defendant's murdertrial did not establish a contemporaneous professional relationship. In Flores, the court found no contemporaneous professionalrelationship where defense counsel did not represent the State'switness at the time of the defendant's trial or "concerning"defendant's trial. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 83, 538 N.E.2d at 487. In Hernandez, the Second District held that a contemporaneousprofessional relationship did not exist between defense counseland the State's witness where counsel represented the witness inher divorce case, which terminated long before defendant's murdertrial. Hernandez, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 615 N.E.2d at 848. In these cases, the courts examined the time frame and relevancyof defense counsel's prior representation of the State's witness. The State argues that "contemporaneous professional relationship"means that defense counsel must be engaged in a simultaneousrepresentation of defendant and the State's witness. We disagree.

If Endres had represented Jockisch in a divorce casethat terminated long before defendant Daly's felony trial, itmight be possible to conclude there was no per se conflict ofinterest. That is not our situation, however. Unlike the casescited by the State, Endres's representation of Jockisch was in amatter that concerned defendant's trial, a matter of significantrelevance to defendant's trial. This relevance is shown by thefact that Endres, to properly represent Daly, needed to cross-examine Jockisch about matters that arose during the very timethat Endres was representing Jockisch--specifically, the chargesagainst Jockisch, the dismissal of those charges, and any agreement or arrangement Jockisch made with law-enforcement authorities to achieve dismissal. Clearly, given that Endres wasrepresenting Jockisch at the time, he could not properly cross-examine Jockisch about any of these matters. Thus, another wayof looking at this situation is to view Endres's professionalrelationship with Jockisch as continuing indefinitely, at leastto the extent that, in any subsequent case, Endres would ever becalled upon to cross-examine Jockisch about matters occurringduring the time Endres represented Jockisch. Further, wherecharges are dismissed on July 7 in the informant's case, and theinformant allegedly makes a purchase from the defendant on July24, resulting in charges being filed against the defendant onNovember 28, it is not accurate to say the informant's caseterminated "long before" defendant's felony trial.

Although it seems likely, especially given the difficulty the State's Attorney and Endres had in remembering thetransaction, that the December 10, 1999, agreement between theSchuyler County sheriff and Jockisch was in exchange for theDecember 6, 1999, dismissal of charges, that fact is not controlling. It is clear that the charges were dismissed, followingnegotiations by Endres, because of Jockisch's status as aninformant. Endres's negotiations resulted in Jockisch being outon the street, attempting to buy drugs from defendant. A successful prosecution of defendant would show the wisdom of dismissing the charges against Jockisch; an unsuccessful prosecutionwould cast doubt on the wisdom of that dismissal. Endres wasplaced in the position of attacking his work. A professionalrelationship is ongoing, even if formal representation has ended,if circumstances exist such that the attorney-client privilegemay be violated. Endres could not be expected to impeachJockisch with information that would void Jockisch's informantagreements and perhaps lead to retrial on the dismissed charges.

Endres's prior representation of Jockisch might affectEndres's performance in ways difficult to detect and demonstrate. People v. Woidtke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 399, 409, 729 N.E.2d 506, 513(2000). For example, there is a danger that Endres would fail toconduct a rigorous cross-examination for fear of misusing confidential information. An attorney who represented a witness islikely, in cross-examining that witness, to avoid areas where hehas personal knowledge, areas where an attorney-client privilegemight exist. The State also has an interest in preventingdefense counsel from cross-examining a critical State witness onmatters that were the subject of a prior attorney-client relationship. The situation is "too fraught with the dangers ofprejudice, prejudice which the cold record might not indicate,that the mere existence of the conflict is sufficient to constitute a violation of [defendant's] rights whether or not it infact influences the attorney or the outcome of the case." Peoplev. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443 (1968).

In a per se conflict of interest case, we will reversethe convictions unless defendant has been made aware of theconflict and has knowingly waived his right to conflict-freecounsel. Woidtke, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 409, 729 N.E.2d at 513. In this case, the record does not indicate and the State does notallege waiver. We are compelled to reverse the trial court andremand for a new trial. Accordingly, we do not reach defendant'svarious other arguments, including an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on actual conflict, failure to object to"recycled" jurors, failure to impeach Jockisch, failure to objectto hearsay, and eliciting damaging testimony.

III. CONCLUSION

The same issues that require reversal in the case ofdefendant Daly are also present in the cases of defendantsUmphryes, Thompson, Wickert, and Jones. In other words, Endreswas called upon in his representation of each of these otherdefendants, just as he was called upon in his representation ofDaly, to cross-examine Jockisch about matters occurring duringthe time Endres was representing Jockisch. For the reasons weearlier explained, this is not constitutionally permissible. Reversal and remand are required in all cases. The per seconflict of interest in these cases endangered defendants'constitutional rights. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courtand remand for a new trial with directions.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.