JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant, Richard J. Dea, of drivingunder the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)(West 2000)). He appeals his conviction, claiming the trialcourt committed reversible error when it allowed evidence that hefaced greater penalties for refusing the Breathalyzer test thanfor taking and failing it. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the evidence presented at trial, at 10:40p.m. on May 11, 2001, Mt. Pulaski police officer Jeremy Robertsstopped defendant for speeding. Officer Roberts approacheddefendant at the driver's side of the vehicle and noticed hesmelled strongly of alcohol. Defendant said he had two beersthat evening and gave Officer Roberts permission to conductfield-sobriety tests. The officer administered the horizontalgaze nystagmus, the turn-and-walk, and the one-legged-standtests. According to the officer, defendant failed all three. Officer Roberts placed defendant under arrest and transported himto the Logan County jail.

At the jail, the officer took defendant to the "Breathalyzer room" and read to him the warning to motorist. At defendant's trial, the prosecutor asked Officer Roberts to testify tothe content of the warning whereby the following exchange occurred:

"Q. Can you tell the members of the jurywithout really worrying about what the lengthof time is here, are the penalties for adriver[']s license suspension greater if youdon't blow than if you blow?

A. Yes."

After the officer read to defendant the warning tomotorist, he asked defendant to submit to the Breathalyzer test,and defendant refused. When cross-examining defendant, theprosecutor asked:

"Q. Okay. At any rate you yourself was[sic] asked to take a breath test?

A. Right.

Q. And you refused, correct, and youtold Mr. Markwell [defense attorney] thatsince you already had the ticket and it wasn't going to change anything that it didn'tmatter whether you took the breath test ornot?

A. Correct.

Q. That is not true, is it?

A. What do you mean?

Q. In fact, if you don't take the breathtest, it changes the length of your suspension?

A. It doesn't change whether I'm goingto be getting the ticket.

Q. The [w]arning to [m]otorist that youwere read that you ignored does warn you ofthe consequences of taking a test and failingand not taking a test, correct?

A. Yes."

In his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor said:

"[B]ut there is one thing that couldhave settled this whole matter and one thingand only person in this room who knows whatthat result would have been. It would havebeen to take a breath test. A breath testafter being warned pursuant to the [w]arningto [m]otorist that, on the one hand, if youtake a breath test and you flunk, your suspension is going to be this amount of time,and on the other hand, if you don't take abreath test, your suspension is this amountof time. That is what the testimony is,ladies and gentlemen. That defendant knewwhat that [w]arning to [m]otorist was, andyet what did he do? He refused the breathtest."

The jury found defendant guilty of DUI. Withoutraising the issue presented here, defendant filed a posttrialmotion claiming the evidence did not support the jury's verdict. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to a12-month term of conditional discharge, 30 days in the countyjail, attendance at a victim-impact panel, submission to analcohol evaluation, and payment of a fine and court costs. Thisappeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

For the first time on appeal, defendant argues thetrial court impermissibly admitted evidence of the civil penalties defendant faced for refusing to submit to the Breathalyzertest. And, he claims, the State compounded the error by againreferring to the penalties in its rebuttal argument. Citing theSecond District's opinion in City of Rockford v. Elliott, 308Ill. App. 3d 735, 721 N.E.2d 715 (1999), defendant contends hisconviction must be reversed.

Defendant's trial counsel failed to object to theadmission of the evidence (1) on direct examination of OfficerRoberts, (2) on cross-examination of defendant, (3) during theState's rebuttal argument, and (4) in a posttrial motion. Now,on appeal, defendant claims the evidence was inadmissible. Thefailure to raise an issue in a written motion for a new trialresults in the forfeiture of that issue on appeal. People v.Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (1988). Topreserve an issue on appeal, a defendant must object to thepurported error at trial and include it in his written posttrialmotion. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186, 522 N.E.2d at 1130. Defendant acknowledges his trial counsel's procedural error but claimswe should review the matter under the plain-error doctrinebecause the evidence presented at trial was closely balanced. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 199, 522 N.E.2d at 1136 (review ispermissible if the error affects a substantial right or if theevidence is closely balanced). We disagree that the evidencehere was closely balanced and decline to find plain error occurred.

"We are not triers of fact. Our function is to serveas a court of review." People v. Basler, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 549,740 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2000). Because (1) the trial court did not havethe opportunity to consider the issue (Soto v. Gaytan, 313 Ill.App. 3d 137, 140, 728 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (2000)), (2) the admissibility of evidence should not be initially determined by a courtof review (see Basler, 193 Ill. 2d at 549, 740 N.E.2d at 3), and(3) defendant does not raise an ineffective assistance-of-counselargument, we decline to excuse defendant's procedural error andfind the issue forfeited.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:

Because defendant did not raise at the trial level theissue that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of thecivil penalties he faced for refusing to submit to theBreathalyzer test, the majority correctly concludes that he hasforfeited this argument on appeal. I write separately to pointout that the Second District Appellate Court's decision inElliott, 308 Ill. App. 3d 735, 721 N.E.2d 715, which defendantcites in support of his argument on appeal, is wrongly decidedand should not be followed.

The Elliott court was presented with the same issuedefendant raises here. In that case, the defendant argued thatthe trial court impermissibly admitted evidence that thedefendant knew the civil penalties he would face for refusing tosubmit to a Breathalyzer test. The State replied that theevidence was admissible because (1) the defendant's knowledge ofthe consequences of refusing to take the breath test wascircumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and (2) suchconsciousness of guilt was both relevant and probative. Althoughthe appellate court appropriately discussed the general rulesgoverning relevancy--including that a trial court's determinationof whether evidence is relevant and admissible will not bereversed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifestprejudice to the defendant--the Elliott court went "off thetracks" when it wrote the following:

"We would agree that being advised as tothe civil penalties the defendant faced if herefused to submit to the breath test is ofsome probative value, in light of the factthat the defendant's refusal to take thebreath test was already admitted intoevidence. However, it is our opinion thatthe prejudice to the defendant by theadmission of evidence of the civil penaltiesfor refusal to submit to a breath testoutweighs the probative value of suchevidence. While we are reluctant to overturna trial court's ruling on the admission ofevidence, it is clear from the trial court'sremarks in this case that it admitted theevidence based upon relevancy but failed toweigh the relevance of this evidence againstits prejudicial effect on the defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the trial courtabused its discretion in admitting theevidence of the civil penalties the defendantfaced for refusing to submit to the breathtest and that such an abuse of discretionresulted in manifest prejudice to thedefendant." (Emphasis added.) Elliott, 308Ill. App. 3d at 739-40, 721 N.E.2d at 718-19.

As the above quote rather candidly concedes, theappellate court did not like the trial court's ruling and,substituting its discretion for that of the trial court, decidedthat the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed itsprobative value. This decision is clearly wrong, and we shouldidentify it as such and emphatically reject it.

As this court explained in People v. Garriott, 253 Ill.App. 3d 1048, 1052, 625 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1993), a driver'srefusal to take a breath test is relevant because it implies thathe believes he is intoxicated, something that he is clearly in aprime position to appraise. (Interestingly, the Elliott courteven cites the Garriott holding approvingly. Elliott, 308 Ill.App. 3d at 739, 721 N.E.2d at 718.) If a driver's refusal totake a breath test is relevant because it implies that hebelieves he is intoxicated, why would it not logically followthat the jury should be informed of the same factors thatdefendant considered--namely, the civil penalties that wouldresult from his refusal--when he decided to refuse the test? Areasonable inference under these circumstances is that defendantwas so afraid that the breath test would show he was intoxicatedthat he adhered to his refusal to take it despite having beeninformed of the severe civil penalties that would follow. Theobverse of this situation would be one where defendant was notinformed of any civil penalties for his refusal to take a breathtest and then testified at trial that, "I decided to refuse totake the breath test because I just don't like that process. ButI had no idea that the civil penalties for such a refusal wouldbe so severe. If I had known that, I would have taken the test."

Aside from this additional probative value, evidencethat a defendant refused to take a breath test after beinginformed of civil penalties possesses no countervailingprejudicial effect. Although the Elliott court opined that theprejudice of such evidence outweighs the probative value, itnever explained what that prejudice was. Instead, it is almostas if the Elliott court was concerned that the prosecutor wasjust not "playing fair" by presenting such strong evidence.

Typically, when one speaks of the "prejudicial effect"of certain evidence (or, as Federal Rule of Evidence 403describes it, "the danger of unfair prejudice" (Fed. R. Evid.403)), that means that the evidence in question will somehow casta negative light upon the defendant for reasons that have nothingto do with the case on trial. Examples of the kinds of evidencethat possess such "prejudicial effects" include (1) a defendant'sgang activities or gang membership, (2) a defendant's possessionof a gun, (3) a defendant's threat to harm (or his actuallyharming) some third party, or (4) defendant's commission of othercrimes.

Normally, none of the foregoing would be admissible ata defendant's trial because each would be viewed as harmful tothe defendant in the eyes of the trier of fact--that is, theevidence has a "prejudicial effect." However, in propercircumstances, the otherwise inadmissible evidence described ineach of the foregoing examples would be admissible if the trialcourt concluded that the prejudicial effect of such evidence didnot substantially overcome its probative value. Contrary to thequestionable analysis of the Elliott court, a trial court neednot engage in this balancing process until it determines thatotherwise relevant evidence has some prejudicial effect aboutwhich to be concerned. If that relevant evidence possesses noprejudicial effect, then the court should admit it unless thecourt otherwise determines that it is unnecessarily cumulative.

In this regard, Illinois law is very similar to FederalRule of Evidence 403, as explained by our distinguishedcolleague, Justice Warren D. Wolfson, of the First DistrictAppellate Court:

"Once the weighing process is begun,there is no simple right or wrong answer[regarding the admissibility of relevantevidence]. The judge is open to persuasion. Everyone involved in the decision willvisualize a balancing scale. That scale,however, is not evenly balanced. It startsout tipped toward admissibility because thereis presumptive admissibility of probativeevidence under [Federal Rules of Evidence]403. The opponent of the evidence bears theburden of tipping the scale towardexclusion." T. Mauet & W. Wolfson, TrialEvidence 5 (1997).

See also People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 102, 803 N.E.2d 405,433 (2003) (evidence of a defendant's gang affiliation "may beadmitted so long as it is relevant to an issue in dispute and itsprobative value is not substantially outweighed by itsprejudicial effect"). In People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329,651 N.E.2d 72, 83 (1995), the supreme court wrote the following:

"[E]ven when evidence is relevant, it may, inthe trial court's discretion, be excluded ifits prejudicial effect substantiallyoutweighs its probative value. [Citation.] Inthis context, prejudice means '"an unduetendency to suggest decision on an improperbasis, commonly an emotional one, such assympathy, hatred, contempt, or horror."'[Citations.]"

The Elliott court is simply mistaken when it assumesthat a trial court must constantly be asking itself, as itdecides whether offered evidence is relevant, whether theprejudicial effect of the evidence substantially overcomes itsprobative value. Given that the great majority of evidencetypically offered at trial contains no prejudicial effect, trialcourts should be allowed to await an objection by the opposingparty on the ground of the evidence's prejudicial effect beforebeing called upon to make a ruling.