JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 2001, after a remand, defendant, Steve A.Gilbert, filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court heardand denied on July 1, 2002, at which time the court also reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence and discharged himfrom probation. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred indenying his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.

On December 24, 1998, defendant was arrested andcharged with possession of a controlled substance, less than 15grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)). On March 9,1999, a jury convicted defendant, and on May 10, 1999, the trialcourt sentenced him to 24 months' conditional probation. Whileon probation, there was a dispute as to whether defendant hadfailed a drug test, and the court revoked his probation andresentenced him to an additional 24 months' probation on October26, 1999.

Defendant appealed both his underlying conviction forpossession (No. 4-99-0445) and also the revocation of probation(No. 4-99-0915). On August 17, 2001, this court reversed theconviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. People v.Gilbert, No. 4-99-0445 (August 17, 2001) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). We remanded the case to the trial courtso that defense counsel could file a motion to suppress. OnOctober 16, 2001, this court also vacated the revocation ofdefendant's probation, since the trial court had no jurisdictionafter the sentence was reversed. People v. Gilbert, No. 4-99-0915 (October 16, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23).

On November 7, 2001, defendant filed a motion tosuppress. At the hearing on the motion on July 2, 2002, OfficerBrian Gallagher of the Champaign police department testified thathe was on "directed patrol for narcotics investigation" in thenorth district of Champaign on the night of December 24, 1998. He stated that he observed defendant's car parked on the side ofthe road with only the driver in it and the engine running. Gallagher did not see anyone enter or exit defendant's vehicleand only observed the vehicle for about 30 seconds as he drovepast. However, Gallagher testified that this was a high drug-activity area, and although he could no longer recall the addressof the particular house defendant was parked in front of, orwhether it was a drug house, he stated that he was sure thatdefendant's car was parked near a suspected drug house.

Having worked in the north end of Champaign for severalyears, Gallagher had developed a pattern of drug-purchasingbehavior based upon his own observations:

"There would be a pattern where people would park their cars. A driver would most likely stay in the car. If they had a passenger, the passenger would exit the car, purchase narcotics, get back in the car and leave, and that would be done within a 10-minute, 15-minute period of time, a very quick transaction. That was the most significant pattern."

Based upon this pattern and his observation of defendant parkedin his car with the engine running, Gallagher formed the opinionthat defendant was buying crack cocaine.

Gallagher then parked his car in an area where he knewdefendant would have to drive past to leave the neighborhood andwaited for defendant to approach. After waiting for approximately two minutes, he saw defendant drive by with two additionaloccupants in the vehicle. When he observed that the righttaillight of defendant's car was not operational, he pulleddefendant over. He approached defendant, asked him for hisdriver's license and proof of insurance, and informed him why hehad been stopped. Gallagher stated that he saw nothing suspicious inside defendant's car, he did not smell any suspiciousodors, and he noted nothing suspicious about defendant's oreither of the passengers' behavior. Nonetheless, Gallagherimmediately called for a canine unit upon returning to his car torun a license and warrant check. In addition to running alicense and warrant check on defendant, Gallagher also ranwarrant checks on both of the passengers in the car, which hestated quite often causes a time delay.

After about three minutes, Officer Doug Martin arrivedon the scene with a canine unit. Gallagher spoke briefly toMartin and described the situation to him. Martin then walkedhis canine around defendant's vehicle. While Gallagher waswriting out a warning ticket for the taillight violation, Martinreturned to Gallagher's squad car and informed him that thecanine had alerted to the presence of drugs within the vehicle.

Gallagher completed the warning ticket for the taillight violation, then exited his car and approached defendant'svehicle. He informed defendant that the canine had alerted onthe vehicle and asked him to step outside of the car. Defendantcomplied, and Gallagher took him to the rear of the vehicle andsearched his person. During this search, Gallagher found severalrocks of what he suspected was crack cocaine in defendant's rearpocket.

The trial court found that the police had probablecause to stop the vehicle initially, and after the dog hadalerted, probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle andpassengers. The entire encounter took about 10 minutes, whichthe trial court said is about what a person would expect for atraffic stop, so no delay was caused by calling in the canine. The court then determined that because of Gallagher's experienceand his observations, he had a reasonable suspicion of criminalactivity supporting his decision to bring in a canine unit. Because of this, the court denied the motion to suppress. Thecourt then held that because the motion to suppress had beendenied, the language in the order from this court reversing andremanding the cause, "[w]e also find that were such a motion notgranted, the evidence was sufficient to convict [defendant]beyond a reasonable doubt," meant a new trial was not necessaryand upheld the result of the original trial convicting defendant. This appeal followed.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erredwhen it denied the motion to suppress and that defendant's rightto a trial by jury was denied when the court refused to hold anew trial after the original drug possession conviction had beenreversed. After a thorough review of the record, we find thatthe trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.

There is no question about the facts in this case. Where no dispute exists as to the facts or witness credibility,the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reviewedde novo. People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13, 796 N.E.2d 1024,1028 (2003). A de novo standard of review ensures that ourcourts of review maintain and clarify the legal principlesgoverning vehicle searches. This, in turn, allows our reviewingcourts to develop a uniform body of precedent that will enablepolice officers to determine, before attempting to search avehicle, what behavior is constitutionally permissible. In reG.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49-50, 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1010 (2000);Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98, 134 L. Ed. 2d911, 919, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996).

On appeal, the State asserts that the determination ofthe trial court denying the motion to suppress was correctbecause the search of defendant was valid on two separategrounds: (1) as a search incident to arrest for the trafficviolation, citing People v. Mendez, 322 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109-10,749 N.E.2d 391, 397 (2001) (driver who cannot produce driver'slicense subject to full custodial arrest and search incident tothat arrest), and (2) because the police had probable cause tosearch after the canine alerted on the vehicle. We find neitherjustification persuasive.

First, we are guided by the observation of the UnitedStates Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois that atraffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (seeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968)) than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.420, 439, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984);People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 226, 789 N.E.2d 260, 265(2003). The use of Terry principles applies to all trafficstops, including those supported by the higher standard ofprobable cause. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266. A Terry analysis includes a dual inquiry. We must consider (1)whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and(2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to thecircumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879;Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266.

Here, the vehicle stop was justified because one of thevehicle's taillights was inoperable. 625 ILCS 5/12-201(a) (West1996). However, we must next determine whether a custodialarrest and subsequent search would be reasonably related in scopeto the circumstances that justified the interference in the firstplace. The State's argument is similar to Justice Thomas'sdissent in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 477, 782 N.E.2d 275,284 (2002), in which he suggests that whenever the police havethe statutory right to arrest an individual, they may do so andmay also conduct a corresponding search incident to that arrestwithout violating the fourth amendment. Justice Thomas notesthat the police have statutory authority to arrest drivers forany violation of the law, including traffic offenses. See 725ILCS 5/107-2(1)(c) (West 2000) (police officer may arrest someonewhen he "has reasonable grounds to believe that the person iscommitting or has committed an offense"); Atwater v. City of LagoVista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 577, 121 S. Ct.1536, 1557 (2001) ("If an officer has probable cause to believethat an individual has committed even a very minor criminaloffense in his presence, he may, without violating the [f]ourth[a]mendment, arrest the offender"). In the majority opinion inCox, however, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

"When a police officer observes a drivercommit a traffic violation, the officer isjustified in briefly detaining the driver toinvestigate the violation. [Citations.] Theofficer may perform some initial inquiries,check the driver's license, and conduct aspeedy warrant check. [Citations.] If nofurther suspicion is aroused in the officerfollowing these inquiries, the traffic stopshould go no further. [Citations.] Theofficer should issue a warning ticket or acitation, as appropriate, and allow thedriver to leave. [Citation.]" Cox, 202 Ill.2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279.Because a traffic stop is only an investigatory seizure and isnot a custodial arrest, the detention must "'be temporary andlast no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of thestop.'" Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 279, quotingFlorida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion). To allow a fullcustodial arrest of a driver stopped for a minor trafficviolation without extenuating circumstances is not compatiblewith the temporary, investigative nature of a Terry stop.

In this case, other than the canine sniff, which wediscuss later, nothing occurred at the traffic stop that wouldraise the officer's suspicions or would justify a custodialarrest. Gallagher testified that he did not fear for his safetyand that nothing was suspicious about the driver's or thepassengers' behavior when he stopped the car. He did not observeany violations other than the taillight being broken. We do notconsider the facts from the perspective of analytical hindsight,but rather as they would have been viewed by a reasonable officerconfronting them in the performance of his duties. People v.Day, 202 Ill. App. 3d 536, 541, 560 N.E.2d 482, 486 (1990). Areasonable officer who did not fear for his safety and/or observeanything more suspicious than a taillight violation would nothave made a full custodial arrest.

Perhaps more importantly, the facts do not support afinding that defendant was arrested for the minor trafficviolation. The essential elements of arrest are (1) the intentof the police to make the arrest, and (2) the defendant'sunderstanding, based on an objective standard of reasonableness,that he is in fact under arrest. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d97, 116, 636 N.E.2d 485, 493 (1994). Gallagher wrote defendant awarning ticket, displaying his intent not to make a formal arrestfor the traffic violation. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Village ofHanover Park, 311 Ill. App. 3d 515, 532, 724 N.E.2d 132, 144(1999) (police officer has the discretion to issue a warninginstead of a uniform citation for traffic violation, which is anelection not to enforce the traffic law). Further, a reasonableperson, when stopped for a minor traffic violation, would notview himself as being under arrest but merely temporarilystopped. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226, 789 N.E.2d at 265. With neither the police nor the defendant viewing the situationat the time as an arrest for the traffic violation, neitherelement of an arrest is present, and we must conclude that therewas no arrest for the traffic violation.

Because the search of defendant was not valid as asearch incident to arrest, we next consider whether the caninesniff was proper in creating probable cause to search defendant. We note again that the original stop of the vehicle wasjustified, so we are only concerned with the second step in theTerry analysis, that the police officer's action be reasonablyrelated in scope to the circumstances that justified theinterference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879; Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228,789 N.E.2d at 266. In determining whether police investigationduring the course of a traffic stop satisfies Terry's scoperequirement, we first consider whether the investigation isrelated to the initial justification for the stop. Gonzalez, 204Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270. Clearly a canine sniff or anyinquiry about drugs is not related in any way to investigating abroken taillight.

When the investigation is not reasonably related to thepurpose of the stop, we must next consider whether the lawenforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion thatwould justify the investigation. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235,789 N.E.2d at 270. The trial court relied heavily uponGallagher's experience in determining that he had a reasonablesuspicion that defendant may have had a controlled substance inthe car. While this is certainly one factor to consider, we mustalso look objectively at what Gallagher actually observed: (1)it was late at night; (2) defendant was in a high drug-salesarea; (3) defendant was parked in a car by himself with the motorrunning for at least a few minutes; and (4) when defendant drovepast Officer Gallagher approximately two minutes later, he had anadditional two passengers in the car with him. The trial courtfound that these facts fit into the pattern of drug-purchasingactivity Gallagher described during his testimony. We disagree.

Gallagher testified that when people would buy drugs,quite often they would park their cars, a passenger would exitthe car, purchase the narcotics, get back into the car and leave,all of this within a short 10- or 15-minute period of time. Hedid not, however, witness anybody entering or exiting defendant'scar while it was parked. He only witnessed the parked car forabout 30 seconds as he drove by, not for the 10- or 15-minuteperiod he described in his pattern. It seems fairly evident thatOfficer Gallagher became suspicious of defendant's parked vehiclebecause of its location in a high drug-activity area, which doesnot create a reasonable suspicion under Terry standards. Brownv. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63, 99 S. Ct.2637, 2641 (1979) (location in a high drug-activity neighborhoodis not a basis for concluding that a defendant is engaged incriminal conduct when defendant's actions are not unusual). Thefacts used by an officer to assert a reasonable suspicion areinsufficient when they "'describe a very large category ofpresumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtuallyrandom seizures.'" People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 225,738 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (2000), quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.438, 441, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 894, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980). Gallagher could not tell if defendant's car had been parked for along time, or whether defendant had just started the car and wasallowing it to warm up on a cold winter night. While thebehavior described in Gallagher's drug-purchasing "pattern" mightconstitute a reasonable suspicion, he did not observe the moresuspicious activity contained in the pattern, the quick enteringand exiting of a suspected drug house that might suggest a drugtransaction to an officer with drug-enforcement experience. Instead, he only witnessed the rather innocuous behavior of aperson sitting in a parked car with the engine running. Theactual observations Gallagher made, even when viewed in totality,constitute nothing more than a vague hunch that defendant mayhave been involved in possible wrongdoing. See People v.Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d 504, 510, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (2003).

If there is no reasonable connection to the purpose ofthe stop or a reasonable articulable suspicion supporting theinvestigation, we must finally consider whether, in light of allthe circumstances and common sense, the investigationimpermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamentalnature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at270. In Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 469, 782 N.E.2d at 280-81, theIllinois Supreme Court examined whether a canine sniff wasreasonably related in scope to a traffic stop for a registration-light violation. The court concluded that when the officer thatmade the stop called a canine unit to the scene without havingany reason to suspect the vehicle contained a controlledsubstance, he changed the nature of the traffic stop into a druginvestigation. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 469, 782 N.E.2d at 280. However, the court's final decision in Cox rested on itsdetermination that the police had impermissibly prolonged thestop. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 471, 782 N.E.2d at 281. In Caballes,the court clarified that under the Terry analysis, a canine sniffimpermissibly broadens the scope of a traffic stop in the absenceof specific and articulable facts to support it, regardless ofthe timeliness of the stop. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509, 802N.E.2d at 204.

It is possible that Gallagher impermissibly prolongedthe investigative stop by running warrant checks on thepassengers in the car. See People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515,528, 802 N.E.2d 214, 228 (2003) (improper warrant check ofpassenger "could well have lengthened the duration of thedetention if the officer had to wait for the results of thewarrant check"). In any case, because there was no reasonablesuspicion supporting the canine sniff, it impermissibly broadenedthe scope of the traffic stop into a drug investigation. Therefore, the trial court should have granted defendant's motionto suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the searchfollowing the police dog's alert. Because this ruling requires anew trial on the merits, we need not consider whether the trialcourt erred by not granting a new trial after denying the motionto suppress.

We reverse the trial court's judgment.

Reversed.

APPLETON, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., dissents.

Although this is a close case, I conclude thatGallagher acted reasonably and appropriately. Accordingly, Irespectfully dissent.

The majority concludes (and I agree) that the initialtraffic stop was justified. Further, under Illinois law, anappropriately conducted canine sniff can lead to probable causeto arrest a vehicle's occupants. See People v. Staley, 334 Ill.App. 3d 358, 368, 778 N.E.2d 362, 369-70 (2002). Thus, the focusof this court's inquiry should be on whether Gallagher properlycalled for the canine unit to conduct a sniff of defendant's carafter it was pulled over for the traffic stop.

In Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509, 802 N.E.2d at 204, thesupreme court discussed its earlier canine sniff decision in Cox,202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275, and wrote the following:

"In Cox, we concluded that evidenceobtained by a canine sniff was properlysuppressed because calling in a canine unitunjustifiably broadened the scope of anotherwise routine traffic stop into a druginvestigation. [Citation.] We emphasizedthat the sniff was impermissible without'"'specific and articulable facts'"' tosupport the stopping officer's request forthe canine unit. [Citation.]"

Accordingly, the question before us is whether the informationGallagher possessed constituted "specific and articulable facts"to support his request for the canine unit. I believe the answeris yes.

The United States Supreme Court has recently providedsome guidance in this area. In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.266, 273-74, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 749-50, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750-51(2002), the Court wrote the following:

"When discussing how reviewing courtsshould make reasonable-suspiciondeterminations, we have said repeatedly thatthey must look at the 'totality of thecircumstances' of each case to see whetherthe detaining officer has a 'particularizedand objective basis' for suspecting legalwrongdoing. [Citation.] This process allowsofficers to draw on their own experience andspecialized training to make inferences fromand deductions about the cumulativeinformation available to them that 'mightwell elude an untrained person.' [Citation.] See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.690, 699, [134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct.1657] (1996) (reviewing court must give 'dueweight' to factual inferences drawn byresident judges and local law enforcementofficers). Although an officer's reliance ona mere '"hunch"' is insufficient to justify astop [citation], the likelihood of criminalactivity need not rise to the level requiredfor probable cause, and it falls considerablyshort of satisfying a preponderance of theevidence standard."

In Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 116S. Ct. at 1661, the Supreme Court wrote the following:

"Articulating precisely what 'reasonablesuspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is notpossible. They are commonsense, nontechnicalconceptions that deal with '"the factual andpractical considerations of every day life onwhich reasonable and prudent men, not legaltechnicians, act."' [Citations.]"

Here, the trial court found that Gallagher was acredible witness who was experienced and well-versed in drug-related behavior in the north part of Champaign, particularly thethree- or four-block area that harbored crack-cocaine activity,from which this case arose. The record supports this finding. Given the circumstances before Gallagher and viewing them--as wemust--with "the factual and practical considerations of everydaylife in which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,act" (Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 116 S. Ct.at 1661), I conclude that Gallagher was possessed with sufficient"specific and articulable facts" to support his request for thecanine unit. Once that unit arrived at the scene (only a fewminutes later) and the positive canine sniff occurred, the policeconduct that followed was entirely justified. Thus, the evidencethey seized should not be suppressed.