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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 1997, the State charged defendant, CarlGivens, with one count of burglary, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS5/19-1 (West 1996)). In July 1999, a jury found defendant guiltyas charged. In September 1999, the trial court found defendanteligible for Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of theUnified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1996) (effective until June 1, 1997)) and sentenceddefendant to 18 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant arguessection 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code is unconstitutional. Weaffirm.

On January 24, 1997, Keith Wilson, the victim and ownerof Wilson's Body Shop (Shop), arrived at the Shop and parked histruck across the street, leaving it unlocked. Later, Wilson noticed defendant standing by his truck. Wilson noticed defendanthad something in his hands and thought defendant had the cellularphone he kept in his truck. Wilson began walking toward histruck, and as he approached, defendant began running. Wilsonwent to the truck and discovered some cigarettes and his cellularphone were missing. Wilson got in his truck and proceeded tolook for defendant.

About one block away from the Shop, a neighbor informedWilson he had seen a man go behind a house near the city garage. Wilson then saw defendant near the city garage, got out of histruck, approached defendant, and asked for his cellular phone. Defendant denied having Wilson's cellular phone and told Wilsonhe had business at the city garage. Wilson stated he would waitfor defendant to finish his business, but defendant did not go tothe city garage. Instead, defendant started running, and Wilsonfollowed him. As Wilson was pursuing defendant, he saw a policeofficer and signaled the officer to apprehend defendant.

Danville police officers Joseph Crippin and RichardDicken responded to the burglary call. Employees of the Shopinformed Officer Dicken of Wilson's pursuit of the suspectedburglar. Officer Crippin drove to the area where Wilson was lastseen and saw Wilson chasing defendant. Officer Crippin apprehended defendant as Officer Dicken arrived at the scene.

After talking with Wilson, the officers traced the pathof the chase and found a cellular phone, two packs of cigarettes,and a cigarette lighter. Wilson identified all those items ashaving been taken from his truck. John Bunting, a forensicscientist with the Illinois State Police crime lab, found nofingerprints suitable for comparison on the cellular phone.

In February 1997, the State charged defendant withburglary, and in August 1997, a jury found defendant guilty ascharged. In September 1997, the trial court sentenced defendantto 10 years' imprisonment, and defendant appealed. This courtreversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case to thetrial court. People v. Givens, No. 4-97-1072 (March 10, 1999)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In July 1999, ajury found defendant guilty of burglary. Because of his criminalrecord, the trial court found defendant eligible for sentencingas a Class X offender as provided in section 5-5-3(c)(8) of theUnified Code and sentenced him to 18 years' imprisonment. InOctober 1999, the trial court denied defendant's posttrialmotion, and this appeal followed.

While this case was pending on appeal, the UnitedStates Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. __, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Defendant argues Apprendi renders section 5-5-3(c)(8) of theUnified Code unconstitutional because it does not require noticeof the State seeking to sentence the defendant as a Class Xoffender and does not provide for a jury determination beyond areasonable doubt as to whether the qualifying facts of section 5-5-3(c)(8) exist. The State argues defendant has waived, i.e.,forfeited, this issue on appeal because he failed to raise it ina posttrial motion. See People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393,686 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1997).

We first address the State's forfeiture argument. Because Apprendi was decided while defendant's case was pendingon appeal, defendant could not have raised Apprendi in aposttrial motion. Furthermore, a defendant can raise a constitutional challenge to a statute at any time. People v. Bryant, 128Ill. 2d 448, 454, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (1989). Accordingly, weaddress the constitutional challenge raised by defendant. Wereview the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v.Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (1998).

Section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1996) (effective until June 1, 1997)) provides,in relevant part:

"When a defendant, over the age of 21years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2felony, after having twice been convicted ofany Class 2 or greater Class felonies inIllinois, and such charges are separatelybrought and tried and arise out of differentseries of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraphshall not apply unless (1) the first felonywas committed after the effective date ofthis amendatory Act of 1977; and (2) thesecond felony was committed after convictionon the first; and (3) the third felony wascommitted after conviction on the second."

Thus, under section 5-5-3(c)(8) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West1996) (effective until June 1, 1997)), a trial court must sentence a defendant as a Class X offender when a defendant hasprior felony convictions satisfying the statutory requirements. See People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222, 664 N.E.2d 76, 84(1996) (Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of theUnified Code is mandatory). Section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the UnifiedCode does not elevate the class of the crime but merely setsforth criteria under which a defendant will be sentenced according to the guidelines for a Class X felony. People v. Thomas,171 Ill. 2d 207, 224, 664 N.E.2d 76, 85 (1996).

In Apprendi, 530 U.S. __, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, the United States Supreme Court held "[o]therthan the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases thepenalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum mustbe submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."(Emphasis added.) In support of the prior-crimes exception, theSupreme Court quoted its earlier holding in Almendarez-Torres v.United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-44, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 368, 118S. Ct. 1219, 1230-31 (1998), where the Court explained "'recidivism *** is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis fora sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence,'" andemphasized "'the fact that recidivism "does not relate to thecommission of the offense ..."'" (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at __, 147L. Ed. 2d at 454, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62, quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 118 S. Ct. at1231, quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629, 56 L.Ed. 917, 923, 32 S. Ct. 583, 588 (1912)). Furthermore, priorconvictions have been entered pursuant to proceedings withsubstantial procedural safeguards of their own. Apprendi, 530U.S. __, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453, 120 S. Ct. at 2361.

Those same reasons for the recidivism exception recognized in Apprendi apply here. The prior convictions providingthe basis of defendant's enhanced sentence under section 5-5-3(c)(8) were obtained through proceedings with substantialprocedural safeguards. Additionally, the dates of the actionsunderlying those convictions can be ascertained from thoseproceedings. Moreover, the factual findings required by section5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code do not relate to the commissionof the underlying offense. Accordingly, we find Apprendi doesnot render section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code unconstitutional.

Even if Apprendi applied, the error would have beenharmless error. Under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code, adefendant's sentence is enhanced based entirely on objective,historical criteria, one's record of criminal convictions, and nolimitations or restrictions are placed on its application basedon mental state or any other subjective matter. Thomas, 171 Ill.2d at 222, 664 N.E.2d at 84. At trial, defendant did not disputehe was more than 21 years old and his convictions meet thesection 5-5-3(c)(8) requirements. The evidence in the record wasoverwhelming both as to defendant's age and the dates of thecommission of the prior felonies. Thus, the failure to ask thejury to determine defendant's age and the dates the prior felonies were committed was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the alternative, defendant argues should this courtfind Apprendi does not apply, we should still find section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code unconstitutional because the statutedoes not require the trial court to make findings beyond areasonable doubt. Defendant contends Almendarez-Torres requiressentencing determinations that bear significantly on the severityof the sentence should be subject to a heightened standard ofproof. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Supreme Court inAlmendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 118 S.Ct. at 1233, stated: "[W]e express no view on whether someheightened standard of proof might apply to sentencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of sentence."

Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v.Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 492, 599 N.E.2d 913, 924 (1992), helda higher standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt shouldnot be imposed for sentencing factors when a trial court finds adefendant eligible for Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8). We fail to see why that holding would not also apply tofactors imposing Class X sentencing under the same statute.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt of Vermilion County.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.