In September 2001, defendant, Mario Granados, wasarrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) inviolation of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code)(625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2000)). Pursuant to section 6-208.1(a)(2) of the Code, defendant's driver's license was summarily suspended for a period of three months. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Defendant filed a petition to rescindthe statutory summary suspension, which the trial court granted. The State appealed (No. 4-01-1045). Defendant then filed amotion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which the trialcourt also granted. The State appealed (No. 4-01-1120). The twoappeals were consolidated herein.

The State argues that the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspensionand motion to quash and suppress. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2001, the Illinois State Police wereconducting a roadside check in Dwight, Illinois. Defendant andtwo passengers were traveling in defendant's pickup truck toStreator from Kankakee where they had been hunting that day. Mark L. Scott, a police officer with the Village of Dwight, wasassisting the Illinois State Police with the roadside check. Officer Scott stopped defendant's vehicle and asked for defendant's driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant produced the items. After checking the validity ofeach, Officer Scott returned the items to defendant and told himthat he was free to go.

As defendant was pulling away, Officer Scott toldTrooper Jordan, who was also working the roadside check severalfeet in front of Officer Scott, to stop defendant's vehicle. Officer Scott saw three shotgun cases in the bed of defendant'struck which, to the officer, appeared to contain shotguns. Officer Scott wanted the vehicle stopped again to obtain defendant's firearm owner's identification (FOID) card.

When Officer Scott approached defendant to request thecard, he smelled alcohol. When asked, defendant stated that hedid not have any open liquor in the vehicle. Officer Scott askedfor, and was granted, consent to search the vehicle, where hefound three open cans of beer. The officer asked defendant andhis passengers to exit the vehicle and requested defendant tosubmit to field sobriety tests. Officer Scott then confirmed thevalidity of defendant's FOID card and placed him under arrest forDUI. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered .114.

On October 4, 2001, defendant filed a request forrescission of the statutory summary suspension alleging thearresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe thatdefendant was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Defendant contends that the roadside check was complete at thetime the officer allowed defendant to drive away and any subsequent detention of the vehicle was improper. The State claimedthat the subsequent stop of defendant's vehicle was a continuation of the roadside check and was therefore proper.

On November 1, 2001, the trial court granted defendant's request finding that, at the time of the initial stop,Officer Scott did not have any suspicion or probable cause that acrime had been or was about to be committed. The trial courtfound that once defendant was told to proceed, the purpose of thestop had been completed. The court further found that becausethe officer testified that there was nothing that he observedthat would indicate to him that there was anything unlawful orillegal about the presence of the guns, the subsequent detentionof defendant's vehicle was unlawful.

On November 6, 2001, defendant filed a motion to quasharrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on defendant'smotion, the parties stipulated that the court should consider theevidence and argument from the hearing on defendant's petition torescind the statutory summary suspension. No new evidence waspresented. The trial court accepted the stipulation and granteddefendant's motion relying on its findings from the rescissionhearing. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the burdenof proof is on the motorist to establish a prima facie case forrescission, and to prevail, the trial court must find defendanthas satisfied his burden of proof by a preponderance of theevidence. People v. Huisinga, 242 Ill. App. 3d 418, 421, 610N.E.2d 168, 171 (1993). Whether a defendant has met this burdenof proof is a question of fact for the trial judge, and thisdetermination will not be overturned on review unless it isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence; that is, unless anopposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record. Huisinga, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 421, 610 N.E.2d at 171. A trialcourt's ruling on a motion to quash the arrest and suppressevidence will be disturbed only if the decision is manifestlyerroneous. People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 237, 522 N.E.2d1146, 1154 (1988). However, an issue is a legal one subject tode novo review when neither the facts nor the credibility of thewitnesses is questioned. People v. Mourecek, 208 Ill. App. 3d87, 91, 566 N.E.2d 841, 844 (1991). Nothing in the recordsuggests that the parties dispute the facts; therefore, ourreview is de novo.

On appeal, the State argues that the officers had theauthority to stop defendant a second time because the subsequentstop was still part of the roadside check. Defendant does notdispute the officers' authority to conduct the roadside check,but disputes the officers' authority to stop defendant withoutprobable cause once he was released from the roadside check.

Our supreme court has held that temporary roadblockswhich serve to apprehend or deter drunk drivers do not violatethe guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizuresas set forth in the fourth and fourteenth amendments of theConstitution of the United States. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 285, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1985). The court held that thepublic's interest of removing intoxicated drivers from theroadways outweighs the minimal intrusion of detaining a motoristtemporarily. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 285, 486 N.E.2d at 885.

However, the question posed here is whether the fieldofficers have the authority to recheck the motorist once thepurpose of the initial check has been completed and the officershave told the motorist that he is free to go. Upon the initialroadside check, the officers found nothing to indicate thatdefendant had committed or was committing a traffic or criminaloffense. The arresting officer testified that upon his initialstop of defendant's vehicle, he did not suspect defendant ofdriving under the influence. Because defendant produced a validdriver's license, registration, and proof of insurance andbecause the officer did not find any violations, defendant wasallowed to proceed through the roadside check. We find that atthat point, the purpose of the stop had been completed. Anydetention of defendant after that point required a reasonable orarticulable suspicion of illegal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).

The State cites People v. Ross, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1013,1018, 682 N.E.2d 87, 90 (1997), as support for its argument thatinquiry into the presence of a weapon in a vehicle is proper at atraffic stop. We find Ross clearly distinguishable from theissues presented here. In Ross, the defendant was stopped forrunning a red light. The only identification that the defendantcould produce was a FOID card. Based upon the presentation ofthis card, the officer asked the defendant if there was a gun inthe vehicle. The defendant said that there was, so the officerssearched the vehicle and found a pistol in the backseat. Thedefendant moved to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of thedefendant's motion, finding that the production of the FOID cardas identification created an independent basis to continue andexpand the initial Terry stop.

The court reasoned that the officer's safety during thestop justified the gun-related questioning and search. It wasonly reasonable for the officers to be concerned about thewhereabouts of any weapons especially since a passenger, who wassitting inside the vehicle during the stop, would have access towhatever weapon was inside. That is not the case here.

The arresting officer testified that he requesteddefendant be stopped again only after he saw what appeared to becased shotguns in the bed of the truck. However, the officeradmitted that the guns were completely out of reach of defendantand all passengers. He admitted that the guns were completelycased. He admitted that there was no indication of any illegalactivity. The safety of the officers was not an issue as theguns were not accessible to the driver or the passengers. Thus,Ross does not guide our analysis.

The State also cites People v. Edwards, 285 Ill. App.3d 1, 2-3, 673 N.E.2d 752, 753-54 (1996), to support its argumentthat the subsequent stop of defendant's vehicle was not improper. In Edwards, the police were conducting a roadside check similarto the one at issue here. The defendant in Edwards was notwearing a seat belt at the time he was stopped so he was directedto the second staging area. At the second staging area, theofficers obtained evidence that the defendant was driving underthe influence of alcohol. On appeal, the court reversed thetrial court's decision that the subsequent stop, which producedthe evidence of DUI, was improper. The appellate court held thatthe defendant was not stopped solely on the basis of a violationof the seat belt law, but was stopped on the basis of the roadside check; therefore, the arrest for DUI was the result of aproper seizure. Edwards, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 3, 673 N.E.2d at753-54.

Edwards is also distinguishable for two reasons. First, the defendant in Edwards was asked to proceed to a subsequent area within the same roadside check. He was not told thathe could go and then subsequently stopped like defendant here. The Edwards defendant was asked to pull forward to the secondstaging area. Edwards, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 2, 673 N.E.2d at 753. With that request, any reasonable person would understand thatthe roadside check was not yet complete. However, in this case,defendant received his driver's license, registration, and proofof insurance back from the officer and was told that he was freeto go. At that time, any reasonable person would understand thatthe roadside check was complete.

Second, the defendant in Edwards was observedly inviolation of the seat belt law. This violation justified theextension of the roadside check for further inspection. Therefore, the request to proceed to a subsequent area within theroadside check was justified. Edwards, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 3,673 N.E.2d at 753-54. Here, the officers found no violations tojustify an extension of the stop, nor a subsequent stop withinthe same roadside check.

The State also asks us to consider People v. Levens,306 Ill. App. 3d 230, 233, 713 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (1999), tosupport its argument that an officer is justified in requesting adefendant's FOID card when the officer discovers a weapon in thedefendant's possession. In Levens, the defendant was stopped bya conservation officer who, after seeing a shotgun lying in theseat of the vehicle, asked the defendant to produce his FOIDcard. The defendant did not have a valid FOID card, or a validdriver's license, and was cited for both. The trial court heldthat the stop was improper because the conservation officer didnot see the defendant commit any violation of traffic or huntinglaws. The appellate court reversed and held that the officer'sreason for stopping the vehicle (suspicion that the defendant washunting illegally from his vehicle) was proper. The officer hada reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegalactivity and was therefore justified in making the stop. Levens,306 Ill. App. 3d at 233, 713 N.E.2d at 1277.

The distinction between Levens and the case sub judiceis that the officer in Levens had a reasonable basis to stop thedefendant. As a result of the stop, the court found that it wasproper for the officer to then request the defendant's FOID card. Levens does not address the issue presented here--whether anofficer may stop a motorist upon seeing weapons solely for thebasis of verifying the motorist's possession of a valid FOIDcard. Thus, Levens is not dispositive.

The traffic stop here concluded when the officerreturned to defendant his driver's license, registration, andinsurance card and stated that defendant was free to go. SeePeople v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 514-15, 713 N.E.2d 556, 563(1999) (the Terry stop ended when the police decided not to issueany citation and any search thereafter was improper). Becausethe initial purpose of the stop (the roadside check) had beencompleted and because the officer lacked any reasonable suspicionof illegal activity, we find that the subsequent detention ofdefendant's vehicle without reasonable suspicion was improper. We find that the mere presence of cased shotguns in the bed of apickup truck does not constitute a reasonable or articulablesuspicion of illegal activity. Therefore, we affirm the trialcourt's orders granting defendant's request to rescind thestatutory summary suspension and defendant's motion to quasharrest and suppress evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sorder granting defendant's petition to rescind the statutorysummary suspension and defendant's motion to quash arrest andsuppress evidence.

Affirmed.

KNECHT and COOK, JJ., concur.