JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Jeremy Greer, is a prisoner in the custody of theIllinois Department of Corrections. In 1993, defendant pleadedguilty to one count of first degree murder and received a 60-yearprison sentence. This court affirmed defendant's conviction andsentence on direct appeal in People v. Greer, No. 4-95-0867 (June28, 1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

On December 12, 2000, defendant filed pro se a petitionpursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2000)). Defendant's petition beganwith an argument that his petition should not be dismissed asuntimely pursuant to section 122-1(c) of the Act because thedelay in bringing the petition was not due to his culpablenegligence. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000). Defendant thenalleged that he had been denied effective assistance of appellatecounsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntary. According todefendant, his trial counsel told him that he would be eligiblefor the death penalty if he went to trial and was found guiltyand that the State had agreed to a 45-year prison sentence inexchange for a guilty plea. Defendant further alleged that hewas not actually eligible for the death penalty, and there was noagreement to 45 years. Therefore, defendant argued, his guiltyplea was involuntary because he would not have pleaded guilty hadhe not been misinformed about a plea agreement or his eligibilityfor the death penalty.

Although defendant filed his petition on December 12,2000, the petition did not come to the attention of the trialcourt until July 10, 2001, more than 90 days later. The Actprovides that if a postconviction petition is not acted upon bythe trial court within 90 days of its filing, then the court mustdocket the petition for further consideration in accordance withsections 122-4 through 122-6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b)(West 2000). Section 122-4 provides for appointment of counselto represent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2000). Appointedcounsel is obligated to consult with the defendant to ascertainhis contentions of deprivations of constitutional rights, examinethe record of proceedings at trial, and make any amendments tothe petition that are necessary for an adequate presentation ofdefendant's contentions. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c); see alsoPeople v. Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d 571, 573-74, 561 N.E.2d 348,350 (1990) (finding a defendant receives sufficient representation of counsel in a postconviction proceeding under the Act whencounsel complies with Supreme Court Rule 651(c)). Section 122-5places an obligation and time frame on the State to either answerthe petition or file a motion to dismiss. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West2000). If the petition is not dismissed on the State's motion,then section 122-6 provides for an evidentiary hearing and finaldisposition of the petition in the trial court. 725 ILCS 5/122-6(West 2000). The trial court in this case accordingly entered adocket order on July 18, 2001, which appointed counsel to represent defendant with directions for counsel to prepare an amendedpetition within 60 days and for the State to respond to theamended petition within 30 days.

After a continuance, defendant's appointed counselfiled a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel and an Andersbrief on October 11, 2001. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In the motion,defendant's counsel alleged that he had consulted with defendantand reviewed the record and interviewed potential witnesses, buthe could not find any basis on which to present any meritoriousissue for review. The State never filed a response to defendant's petition. The trial court granted appointed counsel'smotion to withdraw at a hearing on December 18, 2001, and dismissed defendant's petition sua sponte. Defendant appeals theDecember 18, 2001, order.

Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First,defendant argues that he was deprived of his statutory right tocounsel when the trial court granted appointed counsel's motionfor leave to withdraw. Second, defendant argues that the circuitcourt erred in dismissing his petition sua sponte where the Statehad never filed a motion to dismiss. We address each argument inturn.

We begin with defendant's argument that he was deprivedof his statutory right to counsel. This court has held that adefendant receives sufficient representation of counsel in apostconviction proceeding under the Act when counsel complieswith Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), even ifappointed counsel moves to withdraw upon finding no meritoriousissues to present. Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 573, 561 N.E.2dat 350. Defendant does not allege that appointed counsel did notcomply with the requirements of Rule 651(c) or that appointedcounsel was incorrect in his assessment that there were nomeritorious issues to present. Therefore, under this court'sprecedent, defendant received adequate representation on hispostconviction petition. Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 561N.E.2d at 350; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,558, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 548, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1995 (1987) (findingthat defendants in collateral proceedings do not have a right tocounsel beyond that to which they are entitled under state law).

Defendant's argument that he was deprived of hisstatutory right to counsel is based upon the Third District'srecent decision in People v. McKenzie, 323 Ill. App. 3d 592, 752N.E.2d 1256 (2001). In McKenzie, the court held that counselappointed to represent a defendant in a postconviction proceedingmay never move to withdraw as counsel because such a procedure isnot provided for in the Act. McKenzie, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 595-96, 752 N.E.2d at 1260. The court reasoned that since the Actdoes not provide a method for withdrawal of counsel once one isappointed, the legislature intended for a defendant to be represented through the final disposition of the postconvictionpetition. The court concluded that "satisfaction of the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 651(c) cannot restrict or circumscribe the legislative grant of counsel." McKenzie, 323 Ill.App. 3d at 596-97, 752 N.E.2d at 1261. Therefore, defendantargues, regardless of whether appointed counsel complied withSupreme Court Rule 651(c), under the holding in McKenzie, thetrial court's order granting appointed counsel's motion towithdraw must be reversed.

We decline to follow McKenzie. When an attorney isappointed to represent a defendant in a postconviction proceeding, she has duties above and beyond the procedures set forth inthe Act. Rule 651(c) requires appointed counsel to make anychanges to the defendant's postconviction petition necessary toadequately present a claim. If the petition does not need to beamended, then counsel can say so. In either case, whethercounsel files an amended petition or signs off on defendant'soriginal petition, counsel is putting her signature on thepetition. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137, that signaturecertifies that the attorney believes the petition is "wellgrounded in fact and is warranted by existing law," and that thepetition "is not interposed for any improper purpose." 134 Ill.3d R. 137. If the attorney does not believe that the petitioncan be amended or presented to state a meritorious issue, thenthe attorney is legally and ethically required not to sign thatpetition. Under the holding in McKenzie, however, appointedcounsel would be forced to put her signature on a petition thatshe knew to be frivolous in order to comply with Rule 651(c)because she could not move for leave to withdraw. Such a requirement is simply untenable. We therefore reject it.

We next address defendant's argument that the trialcourt erred when it dismissed defendant's petition sua sponte. Defendant argues that regardless of whether the trial courtproperly granted appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, it waserror for the trial court to then dismiss defendant's petitionbecause the State had not filed a motion to dismiss. Thisargument has merit.

The fact that counsel has been granted leave to withdraw does not mean that the postconviction petition is dismissed. The trial court's power to dismiss a postconviction petition suasponte on the basis that the petition is frivolous or patentlywithout merit must be exercised within 90 days after the filingof the petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2), (b) (West 2000). After that, the trial court can no longer dismiss the petitionsua sponte. Instead, the State is required to file an answer ora motion to dismiss. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2000). In thiscase, the court had lost its power to dismiss the petition suasponte, and the State filed no motion to dismiss for the court togrant. The court therefore erred in dismissing defendant'spetition. See, e.g., People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 434-35,727 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1999) (finding it was error for trial courtto dismiss defendant's postconviction petition where the onlyissue before it was the breadth and necessity of discoveryrequests and the State had not filed a motion to dismiss).

In conclusion, we find that counsel appointed pursuantto the Act may move for leave to withdraw if he or she complieswith Rule 651(c) and can demonstrate that no meritorious issuescan be presented for review. Defendant does not argue that hisappointed counsel did not comply with Rule 651(c) or that appointed counsel was incorrect in the assessment that there wereno meritorious issues to present. We therefore affirm that partof the trial court's order granting appointed counsel's motion towithdraw. We also find that the trial court erred in dismissingdefendant's petition sua sponte because its power to do so hadexpired and there was no motion to dismiss on file for the trialcourt to grant. We therefore reverse that part of the trialcourt's order dismissing defendant's petition and remand forfurther proceedings.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.