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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 2002, a jury convicted defendant, RodneyHarris, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS5/24-1.1(a) (West 2000)). In May 2002, the trial court sentenceddefendant to a five-year prison term. On appeal, defendantargues (1) section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (CriminalCode) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2000)) violates due processbecause it potentially punishes innocent conduct withoutrequiring a culpable mental state, (2) the trial courterroneously refused his stipulation of a prior felony, and (3)the trial court improperly excused the transcribing of voir direby a court reporter. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

At trial, the State offered defendant's four priorfelony convictions, aggravated battery, intimidation, and twocounts of unlawful delivery of controlled substance, intoevidence to prove defendant's status as a felon. Defendantoffered to stipulate to the convictions and asked that thespecific felonies not be published to the jury. The Stateobjected to the
stipulation, and the trial court agreed with the State:

"THE COURT: I agree with you. But theSupreme Court doesn't. Aren't we supposed toidentify the crimes? We're no longer toallow the jury to speculate because of whatyou just said. They might think it's murder. Or do you think a different rule applies in aprove up of an underlying felony?

* * *

I'm going to name the offense. ***Although, I would agree there is some reasonlogically to think that it's different whenyou're just proving up a prior felony thanwhen you're impeaching."

To establish defendant knowingly possessed an operablefirearm, the State offered the testimony of officers and crime-lab technicians. Testimony relevant to this appeal follows.

Oliver Love, a Bloomington police officer, testified hewas the officer who made the initial contact with defendant onApril 2, 2001. At approximately 4:20 p.m., Love was driving onMarket Street, near Mason Street, when he saw defendant in agroup of six to eight men near the corner of Mason and MarketStreets. Love knew there was a warrant for defendant; he did notrecognize the others. After confirming the warrant was stillvalid, Love requested backup, exited his squad car, andapproached defendant.

Love testified defendant was wearing blue sweatpantsand sweatshirt, with a black baseball cap, and was holding a pitbull by a leash. Love told defendant to give the leash tosomeone and to come to him. Instead, defendant walked away fromLove approximately 10 feet north on Mason Street.

Love testified one of the men took the pit bull fromdefendant. In that time, Love's backup, including Officer ChadReeser, arrived. After Love gave the backup officers adescription of defendant, defendant began sprinting south throughthe intersection of Mason and Market Streets. Love yelled fordefendant to stop. Love and Reeser then chased defendant.

Love testified that as defendant ran through theintersection, he saw a handgun fall from defendant's waistband,at the small of defendant's back, and bounce in the intersectionof Market and Mason Streets. Love retrieved the handgun as heran. At Monroe Street, the next street they crossed, Love lostsight of defendant. Love called the canine unit and set aperimeter to watch for defendant. The officers found defendantin a large pine tree in the 600 block of West Jefferson. At thetree, Love saw what he believed might be a weapon in defendant'shand. Love told defendant to drop what was in his hand, whichwas a cellular phone. After defendant did not release theobject, Officer Richard Hirsch, the canine officer, released hisdog, which retrieved defendant from the tree by bitingdefendant's shoulder and pulling him from the tree.

Love testified defendant used vulgarities toward thepolice officers. Defendant repeatedly was "very much negativetowards the dog" and "continuously bringing the theme that wewould not have caught him without the dog." Love found cannabison defendant.

Love testified he wrote in his report the handgun fellon Mason Street approximately 30 feet south of Market, not in theintersection. Love believed the waistband on defendant'ssweatsuit was elastic. The handgun was approximately 6 incheslong, 4 1/2 inches wide and weighed 2 to 3 pounds. Love denieddefendant ran through two buildings on Market Street and notthrough the intersection.

Love further testified that after he lost sight ofdefendant, defendant could not have run north toward Econowashand then through the buildings to the location where he wasfound.

Defendant presented the testimony of four witnesses,who testified defendant did not run through the intersectionwhere Love testified the handgun was found. Yeakia Thompsontestified she was cleaning her tires at Econowash on MarketStreet when she noticed "the commotion." She watched defendantrun through two buildings, a small business and a house, next toEconowash on Market Street. She was "positive" defendant did notrun down Mason Street, and she did not see defendant dropanything. Thompson admitted she knew defendant, but only byname, because she had seen him at parties.

Toby Carlos III, who had known defendant for 15 to 20years, testified he was with defendant, defendant's brotherAzielis Phillip Harris (Phil), and Marcus Johnson on April 2,2001. For approximately one to two hours in the afternoon, theylifted weights in defendant's mother's garage. When defendant"was doing the above-head presses," Carlos could see defendant'swaistband. Carlos did not see a gun.

Carlos testified that after they lifted weights, thegroup went to Red Fox, a grocery store on West Market Street. After the police arrived, Carlos heard defendant say, "I got[marijuana] on me." Defendant then ran. Carlos watcheddefendant run between the small business and the house on thecorner. Carlos did not see a gun fall from defendant's pants.

Carlos testified after defendant ran, the officer randown Mason Street. Carlos saw the officer either drop somethingor bend over.

Marcus L. Johnson, defendant's cousin, testified he waswith Carlos, defendant, and Phil lifting weights on April 2,2001. During the workout, defendant had removed his shirt. Johnson could see the waistband to the pants, and he did not seea handgun. Johnson also did not see a handgun lying on a benchor car. Before they left the garage, Johnson did not seedefendant tuck anything into his pants. Johnson did not recallseeing defendant's cellular phone.

Johnson testified the group decided to walk to Red Foxat approximately 3:30 to 4 p.m. While on Market Street, a policeofficer arrived. Defendant whispered he had marijuana on him andhanded the leash to Carlos. Defendant then ran between twobuildings. One officer followed defendant. Other officers werealso in the area. Johnson did not see defendant drop anything inthe intersection of Mason and Market Streets.

Phil testified he was defendant's brother, and he hadbeen convicted of a felony nine years earlier. Phil confirmedthe testimony of Carlos and Johnson regarding the weight lifting. He did not see defendant in possession of a handgun, and hebelieved he would have noticed a weapon of that size if it hadbeen in defendant's waistband.

Phil testified that when the police arrived, defendantturned to him, said "I got [marijuana] on me," and startedrunning. Defendant ran between the house and the "broken downbusiness." Phil watched defendant run. Phil did not seeanything fall from defendant's pants.

Defendant also testified on his behalf. During theApril 2, 2001, workout, he was wearing a sweatsuit with anelastic waistband and a T-shirt. Defendant denied having thehandgun. At Red Fox, defendant waited outside with his dog whilethe others went inside. While waiting, he purchased $10 worth ofmarijuana and placed the marijuana in his sock. When the policeofficer arrived, defendant told his brother, "hold my dog, I got[marijuana] on me." Defendant took a step back and then ran. Defendant ran through the abandoned house on Market Street. Defendant further testified that when he was found in the tree,he did not hold his cellular phone in his hand.

Chad Reeser, formerly a Bloomington police officer,testified for the State in rebuttal. Reeser drove to theintersection of Market and Mason Streets after he heard on theradio that Love saw defendant. Reeser saw Love approachingdefendant and heard Love telling defendant to give someone hisdog and come to him. About the time Reeser opened his door,defendant fled. Defendant ran behind Reeser's squad car to theintersection of Market and Mason. Defendant did not run betweenthe two buildings.

As defendant ran through the intersection, Reeser ranbehind him and saw a handgun fall from the rear waistband of hissweatpants. When he saw the handgun fall, Reeser was four orfive feet behind defendant. When Reeser looked back to insurethe handgun was secured, he saw Love grab the handgun.

In closing arguments, the State referred to defendant,on more than one occasion, as a "four-time felon." In itsinstructions, the trial court repeatedly listed defendant's fourprior felony convictions. The court did instruct the jury toconsider the convictions only to the extent they establishdefendant was a felon:

"Ordinarily evidence of a defendant'sprior conviction of an offense may beconsidered by you only as it may affect hisbelievability as a witness and must not beconsidered by you as evidence of his guilt ofthe offense for which he was charged.

However, in this case, because the Statemust prove beyond a reasonable doubt theproposition that the defendant was previouslyconvicted of aggravated battery,intimidation[,] and delivery of a controlledsubstance, you may consider evidence of adefendant's prior conviction of the offensesof aggravated battery, intimidation[,] anddelivery of a controlled substance only forthe purpose of determining whether the Statehas proved that proposition."

The jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possessionof a weapon by a felon. On March 14, 2002, defendant filed aposttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or for newtrial, which the trial court denied. On May 7, 2002, the courtsentenced defendant as stated. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSISA. Constitutionality of the Unlawful-Possession-of-a-

Weapon-by-a-Felon Statute

Defendant argues the unlawful-possession-of-a-weapon-by-a-felon statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2000)) isunconstitutional because it requires no culpable mental state andpermits a felony conviction based on innocent conduct. Defendantasserts the following as an example of innocent conductunconstitutionally criminalized under section 24-1.1(a):

"A Good Samaritan, who has been convicted ofany felony but has not been granted reliefunder [s]ection [24-1.1 of the CriminalCode], is walking down the street and happensupon a gun. Not wanting the neighborhoodchildren to find the gun, the Good Samaritantakes the gun and is on her way to the policestation to turn it in, but gets stopped forspeeding before she can do so, and the gun isrecovered. Depending on the prior felony,she is guilty of at least a Class 3 felony,and a sentence of imprisonment of up to 14years, even though she had no culpable mentalstate."

In support of his argument, defendant relies on a number ofIllinois Supreme Court cases that overturned statutes that swepttoo broadly: People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 740 N.E.2d 755(2000); In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550, 714 N.E.2d 491, 495-96(1999); People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994);and People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985).

When we consider the constitutionality of a statute, wepresume that statute is constitutional. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at24, 740 N.E.2d at 766. The challenger to the statute has theburden of proving its invalidity. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550, 714N.E.2d at 495. Although "the legislature has wide discretion toestablish penalties for criminal offenses," its "discretion islimited by the constitutional guarantee that a person may not bedeprived of liberty without due process of law." Wright, 194Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 766-67. To determine whetherlegislation complies with substantive due process, we apply therational-basis test and will uphold a statute under this test ifit "'bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to beserved, and the means adopted are a reasonable method ofaccomplishing the desired objective.'" Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at24, 740 N.E.2d at 767, quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381,390, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (1991).

Defendant's case law demonstrates the Supreme Court ofIllinois has held "a statute violates the due process clauses ofboth the Illinois and the United States Constitutions if itpotentially subjects wholly innocent conduct to criminal penaltywithout requiring a culpable mental state." K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at551, 714 N.E.2d at 496; Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 25, 740 N.E.2d at767; Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42, 630 N.E.2d at 800. In K.C., thecourt held sections 4-102(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the IllinoisVehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-102(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) violatedue process. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Section 4-102 provided, in relevant part:

"'(a) It is a violation of this[c]hapter for:

(1) A person, without authority to doso, to damage a vehicle or to damage orremove any part of a vehicle;

(2) A person, without authority to doso, to tamper with a vehicle or go in it, onit, or work or attempt to work any of itsparts, or set or attempt to set it in motion[.]'" K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 545, 714N.E.2d at 493, quoting 625 ILCS 5/4-102 (West1996).

At argument in K.C., the State conceded the relevantsections made "criminals out of people who decorate the bride andgroom's car during a wedding ceremony, get in a traffic accident,or inadvertently hit a baseball through a neighbor's windshield." K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. The court concluded"[a]lthough the prevention of vandalism and malicious mischiefare undoubtedly laudable goals," the goal of protecting innocentconduct from prosecution is "an equally laudable goal." K.C.,186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Because these sectionspotentially punished innocent conduct with "wholly innocentmotives," the court held the statutes were unconstitutional. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497.

In Zaremba, the court found section 16-1(a)(5) of theCriminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(5))unconstitutional on similar grounds. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42,630 N.E.2d at 800. Section 16-1(a)(5) stated theft was committedwhen one does the following:

"'Obtains or exerts control over property inthe custody of any law enforcement agencywhich is explicitly represented to him by anylaw enforcement officer or any individualacting in behalf of a law enforcement agencyas being stolen.'" (Emphasis omitted.)Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 630 N.E.2d at798, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,par. 16-1.

The purpose of section 16-1(a)(5) was "to enable law enforcementofficers to conduct undercover operations aimed at breaking upfencing operations" (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42, 630 N.E.2d at800), but the statute criminalized "the actions of a policeevidence technician who took from a police officer forsafekeeping the proceeds of a theft" (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38,630 N.E.2d at 798).

In Wick, the court found a portion of the aggravated-arson statute violated due process. Under the relevant statute,aggravated arson was a Class X felony and was defined in relevantpart as follows:

"'(a) A person commits aggravated arson whenby means of fire or explosive he knowinglydamages, partially or totally, any buildingor structure, including any adjacent buildingor structure, and *** (3) a fireman orpoliceman who is present at the scene actingin the line of duty, is injured as a resultof the fire or explosion.'" Wick 107 Ill. 2dat 64, 481 N.E.2d at 677-78, quoting Ill.Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1.

The court found the statute was not reasonably related to itspurpose because it required no unlawful purpose in setting thefire, as the lesser arson statute did, and therefore subjectedinnocent conduct to a Class X felony conviction. The court citedas an example "a farmer who demolishes his deteriorated barn toclear space for a new one is liable for a Class X penalty if afireman standing by is injured at the scene." Wick, 107 Ill. 2dat 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678.

The purpose of section 24-1.1 is to protect the publicin "keeping firearms from convicted felons." People v. Jackson,269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (1995). We findthe statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils thelegislature has found to be a threat to public safety.

Section 24-1.1 does not attempt to punish "whollyinnocent conduct" without a culpable mental state. The conductof the Good Samaritan, although benevolent, is not innocent. Itis not analogous to the conduct of a lab technician who takescontrol of evidence from a police officer and thereby commitstheft (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38-42, 630 N.E.2d at 798-800) orto the conduct of a child who accidentally hits a baseballthrough the windshield of his neighbor's car and becomes acriminal (K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497).

The act of the Good Samaritan felon in knowinglypossessing the weapon is not innocent conduct. See People v.Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 806-07, 791 N.E.2d 100, 111 (2003)(rejecting a similar hypothetical and argument). If the GoodSamaritan has no other reasonable option, such as calling thepolice or asking another adult to secure the weapon, thenecessity defense serves the dual purpose of protecting thepublic both from a stray weapon and from felons possessingweapons. See generally People v. Roberson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 798,801, 780 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (2002) (applying section 7-13 (720ILCS 5/7-13 (West 2000)) and stating "conduct that wouldotherwise be an offense is justified if the defendant was (1)without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and (2)reasonably believed the conduct was necessary to avoid a publicor private injury greater than the injury that might reasonablyresult from her own conduct"); 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(b), (d) (West2000) (denying the necessity defense to only inmates inpossession of prohibited weapons).

Because section 24-1.1(a) is reasonably designed toachieve its purpose, defendant has not overcome the presumptionsection 24-1.1(a) is constitutional.

B. Stipulation of Prior Conviction

Defendant next contends the trial court erroneouslyrefused his request to stipulate his prior convictions inviolation of our holding in People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d961, 743 N.E.2d 689 (2001). Defendant acknowledges the error wasnot raised in his posttrial motion but contends (1) we may reviewthe trial court's decision under the plain-error doctrine, and(2) defense counsel was ineffective.

To convict a defendant for unlawful possession of aweapon by a felon, the State must prove, among other things, thedefendant is a felon:

"It is unlawful for a person toknowingly possess on or about his person oron his land or in his own abode or fixedplace of business any weapon prohibited under[s]ection 24-1 of this [a]ct or any firearmor any firearm ammunition if the person hasbeen convicted of a felony under the laws ofthis State or any other jurisdiction." 720ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2000).

In Peete, we determined the trial court erred when itrefused defendant's proposed stipulation to his prior felonyconvictions as proof of his status as a felon. The defendant,who was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon,offered to stipulate his prior felony convictions for residentialburglary and aggravated battery. The court refused thedefendant's stipulation and permitted the State to publish theresidential burglary conviction to the jury. Peete, 318 Ill.App. 3d at 964, 743 N.E.2d at 692. A jury found the defendantguilty, and the defendant appealed. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at964-65, 743 N.E.2d at 692.

We began our analysis in Peete by considering whetherIllinois courts should adopt the holding in Old Chief v. UnitedStates, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 584, 117 S. Ct.at 647, the defendant was charged with violating a federal lawthat prohibited a convicted felon from possessing a firearm. TheOld Chief defendant offered to stipulate to his prior felonyconviction, the government refused, and the district court agreedwith the government. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 175-77, 136 L. Ed.2d at 585, 117 S. Ct. at 648.

The Supreme Court concluded although the record of thedefendant's felony conviction was relevant, under Rule 403 of theFederal Rules of Evidence the "'probative value'" of the priorconviction was "'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfairprejudice.'" Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 587,117 S. Ct. at 650, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403. The Supreme Courtfurther concluded "the most a jury needs to know about the prior-conviction element is that the conviction admitted by thedefendant falls within the class of crimes enumerated in thestatute." Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 967, 743 N.E.2d at 694,citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-91, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 594, 117S. Ct. at 655.

After finding the laws in Old Chief were similar tothose in Illinois, we decided to adopt Old Chief's holding:"[T]he Supreme Court's approach in Old Chief regardingstipulations on prior convictions that are an element of thecrime charged is the proper procedure." Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3dat 969, 743 N.E.2d at 695.

In People v. Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 102, 112, 779N.E.2d 268, 276 (2002), the Second District opted to follow Peeteand adopted Old Chief. Currently, the issue is before theSupreme Court of Illinois. Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 102, 779N.E.2d 268, appeal allowed, 202 Ill. 2d 696, 787 N.E.2d 180 (No.95285).

The State first contends Old Chief, Peete, and Walkerhinge on the existence of unfair prejudice to the defendants. The State relies upon People v. Parker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 474, 781N.E.2d 1092 (2002), as establishing the "[f]ailure to accept adefendant's stipulation to his prior convictions to proveunlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is not error if it isnot unduly prejudicial." In Parker, the First District examinedOld Chief, Peete and Walker and concluded it need not decidewhether to follow Old Chief, because "[b]oth Peete and Walkermake clear that their respective analyses turn on the fact thatthe evidence against the defendants in those cases was notoverwhelming." Parker, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 781 N.E.2d at1103.

We disagree with the State's analysis and Parker. ThePeete and Walker decisions do not turn on whether the evidenceagainst a defendant is overwhelming. Both first held it is errorto refuse the defendant's stipulation to prior convictions toprove unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Peete, 318Ill. App. 3d at 969, 743 N.E.2d at 695; Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3dat 112, 779 N.E.2d at 276. Only after finding the trial courterred in admitting evidence of the prior convictions did thePeete and Walker courts consider the State's arguments thedefendants' convictions were nevertheless not harmed orprejudiced by the error. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 743N.E.2d at 695 ("The State's final contention is that, even if thestipulation should have been allowed, the error did not prejudicedefendant"); Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 779 N.E.2d at 277("Finally, the State argues that, unlike in Peete, no reversibleerror occurred because the evidence here was overwhelming").

Under Peete, the trial court erred by refusingdefendant's stipulation and admitting the four felonyconvictions. The error, however, is not reversible if it isharmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Wilkerson, 87Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1981).

The State, applying Parker, then argues defendant'sverdict was not harmed or prejudiced by the entry of theconvictions because (1) a limiting instruction "greatlydiminished" the prejudice, and (2) the evidence overwhelminglysupports defendant's convictions. We disagree.

The evidence is not so overwhelming and the limitinginstruction was insufficient to overcome the potential of unfairprejudice arising from the admission of defendant's four priorfelonies. Other than the testimony of two police officers, noother evidence, such as fingerprints, linked the handgun todefendant. The testimony of five witnesses, including one whoknew defendant by name only, testified defendant did not runwhere the officers testified the handgun was found. The decisionof whether reasonable doubt existed boiled down to a credibilitydetermination--a determination potentially affected by theadmission of defendant's convictions for aggravated battery,intimidation, and two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlledsubstance. Heightening the potential for prejudice were therepeated references to the four felony convictions in closingarguments and during the trial court's instructions. Forexample, the State, obviously aware of the stigma and influenceof the earlier convictions, twice called defendant "a four-timeconvicted felon." We cannot find defendant was not harmed orprejudiced by this error.

The State further argues the evidence was properlyadmitted for impeachment purposes. The State contends defendanttestified and each of the convictions was within the 10-yearlimit, and thus, the convictions were properly admitted. Wedisagree. This is not a People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510,268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), issue. Once a prior conviction isadmitted under a Peete and Old Chief analysis, that convictionmay be used for impeachment against a testifying defendant. People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d 954, 961, 649 N.E.2d 1351,1357 (1995). However, such impeachment would be limited to asingle felony conviction--the conviction required to provedefendant's status as a felon. The trial court admitted all fourconvictions based on a mistaken belief the Supreme Court ofIllinois had ruled that it must do so. This mistake wasexacerbated because four felony convictions are involved.

Defendant concedes he failed to raise this argument ina posttrial motion. He maintains, however, we may review andreverse under the plain-error rule. We agree. The plain-errorrule, a limited exception to forfeiture, may be invoked if (1)the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the error is sofundamental it may have denied the defendant a fair hearing. People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 511, 643 N.E.2d 789, 796(1994). We find plain error under both prongs. The evidence wasclosely balanced, and the error was fundamental. The jury shouldhave known defendant was a felon and could not possess a firearm. This jury should not have been informed of defendant's fourfelony convictions by name and reminded several times by theprosecution that defendant was a four-time convicted felon.

We therefore reverse defendant's conviction and remandthe cause.

C. Voir Dire

Having determined defendant is entitled to a new trial,we need not decide whether the trial court's failure totranscribe voir dire is reversible error. We address the issueonly to stress Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(9) (177 Ill. 2d R.608(a)(9)) ought to be followed. Perhaps using a court reporterat voir dire is not an efficient use of scarce resources, butthat is a decision to be left to the supreme court. The failureto provide a court reporter for voir dire should not be an issueon appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse defendant's conviction. We find theevidence permits retrial without offending double jeopardy. Weremand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.