PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In July 2002, Michael A. Hayes was found guilty ofresidential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)) and theft ofproperty having a value exceeding $300 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4)(West 2000)). In August 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 15 years in prison for residentialburglary and 3 years in prison for theft of property having avalue exceeding $300 with credit for 133 days served. Defendantappeals, arguing the court erred in (1) forcing him to walk infront of the jury and (2) crediting him only 133 days for histime spent in custody. We affirm as modified and remand withdirections.

On April 11, 2002, an individual entered Charles andJennifer Glass's home through an unlocked back door and removedjewelry, including a gold and diamond tennis bracelet, five goldrings, and other miscellaneous items. The tennis bracelet andrings were later found at a local pawnshop. Jennifer Glassidentified the bracelet and rings as the jewelry taken from herhome. Kathy Wynn, an employee of the pawnshop, informed thepolice that defendant pawned the jewelry on April 11, 2002. Thepawnshop also produced a receipt for the jewelry signed bydefendant.

One of the Glasses' neighbors, Monique Killion, toldthe police she saw an African-American man with an average buildin his late 20s to early 30s knocking on the front door of theGlasses' home on April 11. Killion told the police the manwalked with a limp.

The police arrested defendant for residential burglaryon April 16, 2002. In addition, the State later charged defendant with theft of property having a value exceeding $300. Defendant was tried in July 2002. At the trial, the Statepresented the following witnesses: Charles Glass, JenniferGlass, Monique Killion, Kathy Wynn, Officer Matthew Quinley,Investigator Bryan Seraphin, Tammy Prince, and Raulon Robinson. Killion and Wynn testified as set forth above.

Prince testified she was Jennifer Glass's sister. According to her testimony, she lived with the Glasses beforemoving to Tennessee in March 2002. Prince testified she startedhaving a sexual relationship with defendant in late February2002. During their relationship, defendant came to the Glassresidence. Prince testified she had not been back to Urbanasince moving to Tennessee.

Robinson testified he talked to defendant while theywere in the county jail. According to Robinson's testimony,defendant admitted his guilt to Robinson. Robinson testifieddefendant told him he entered the Glass residence through theback door. Robinson also testified defendant informed him anAfrican-American woman saw him before he entered the home.

After the State presented its last witness, the trialcourt ordered defendant to walk a short distance in front of thejury at the State's request. The court allowed this demonstration over defendant's objection. The defense then rested withoutputting on any evidence.

The jury found defendant guilty of both residentialburglary and theft of property exceeding $300. The trial courttreated defendant as a Class X offender pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2000)). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms in prison of 15 years for residential burglary and 3years for theft of property having a value exceeding $300. Thecourt also granted defendant credit for 133 days spent in custody. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in(1) forcing him to walk in front of the jury and (2) creditinghim for 133 days spent in custody instead of 134 days.

The State argues the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion by ordering defendant to walk before the jury. However, the State concedes the court should have crediteddefendant for 134 days. This leaves us to determine if the courterred in forcing defendant to walk in front of the jury.

A. Standard of Review

Trial courts have a wide degree of discretion indetermining the admissibility of courtroom demonstrations. People v. Summers, 202 Ill. App. 3d 1, 19, 559 N.E.2d 1133, 1144(1990). Absent an abuse of the court's discretion, the court'sruling whether to allow a demonstration will be allowed to stand.Summers, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 559 N.E.2d at 1144.

B. Walking Demonstration

Defendant argues the trial court should not haveallowed the walking demonstration because the demonstration'srelevance "rests on an unproven assumption." Defendant points tothe fact the State did not introduce any evidence defendantwalked with a limp on the date of the burglary. According todefendant, "[w]ithout a proper foundation to establish thatdefendant had a limp around the time of this offense, a demonstration that only proved he had a limp at the time of the trialwas irrelevant and should have been excluded."

Defendant relies on People v. Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d 228,290 N.E.2d 592 (1972), to support his argument. In Newbury, thedefendant was accused of murdering his fiancée. During thetrial, the trial court allowed the State to introduce a tornphotograph of the defendant found in a dresser drawer in thevictim's apartment after her murder. The defendant objected tothe admission of the photograph because there was no proof whotore the photograph or when it was torn. On appeal, in supportof the court's ruling, the State argued:

"'The torn photo found in the victim's apartment raises the inference and is consistentwith the prosecution's theory and, thus,tends to substantiate the fact that there wasa disagreement between the defendant and thevictim. *** The inference is that it belongedto the victim and that she tore it, and anyquestion with respect thereto was properlyfor the jury to consider.'" Newbury, 53 Ill.2d at 239, 290 N.E.2d at 598.

On review, the Supreme Court of Illinois held the photographshould not have been admitted into evidence because the relevanceof the photograph "depended upon unproved assumptions--that itwas torn recently and that it was torn deliberately and by thedeceased." Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d at 240, 290 N.E.2d at 599.

This case is distinguishable from Newbury. In thiscase, the relevance of defendant's gait did not depend on anunproved assumption. Unlike in Newbury where no one testifiedwho tore the picture or when it was torn, Killion here testifiedthe individual she observed outside of the Glass residence on theday in question walked with a limp. "Relevant evidence isevidence which makes the existence of any fact that is importantto the outcome of the case more probable than it would be withoutthe admission of the evidence." People v. Speirs, 231 Ill. App.3d 807, 811, 596 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (1992). As a result, whetherdefendant walked with a limp was relevant because of Killion'stestimony.

In addition, before the trial court determined it wouldallow the demonstration in this case, the court heard argumentsfrom defendant's attorney as to why the demonstration should notbe allowed:

"THE COURT: Mr. Rumley, let me ask youabout the identification question.

MR. RUMLEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is it your position that thedescription by Ms. Killian of the individualpounding on the Glass front door is sufficient in connection with the unexplainedpossession of recently stolen property to getthe State past a directed verdict? Was thatdescription of the perpetrator sufficientenough to get past directed verdict?

MR. RUMLEY: It's avery sly question, Judge.

Well--

THE COURT: 'Cause I'm wondering if yourargument would then change if I do not allowhim to walk.

MR. RUMLEY: Well, I guess you're sayingthat my argument is their identification wasplenty good enough, it doesn't need anymorehelp, and then I might be talking out theother side of my mouth if I say, well, youknow, you can't hook him up to the crime. And I guess my answer is, well, they're bothcorrect.

I think there's enough in their description that some jurors would infer or at leastdecide that it probably was [defendant] onthe doorstep.

And I am prepared to deal with that inargument.

On the other hand, the identification[,]let's look at the particulars. 5'7" to 5'8",of average build. Well, this gentleman isheavily muscled. [Defendant.] It appears tome. I wouldn't describe him as average.

I don't think he is 5'7". As he standsnext to me, he's a good deal shorter than Iam, and I'm 6'1".

So--But none of that's in front of thejury. They don't know how tall I am.

I had asked the witness--asked--I askedthe jury--Excuse me. I asked the witness howtall I was, and she said 5'7". I'm hoping,and I'm not gonna tell the jury 'cause I'mnot testifying, but I'm hoping the jury willunderstand that her perceptions are questionable.

No, Your Honor, her identification isnot sufficient to tie [defendant] to thecrime; although, I think some jurors couldthink it is."

After this exchange, the court ruled it would allow the demonstration because the issue of whether defendant limps was relevant and probative. Although the court does not say so anddefendant's attorney previously stated identification was not atissue, from this exchange it appears one of defendant's trialstrategies was to call into question whether the man Killion sawon the day in question was defendant.

In People v. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 126, 413 N.E.2d1254, 1260-61 (1980), the defendant argued the trial court erredin forcing him to model clothing before the jury. The defendantargued the "fit of the clothing was not at issue, that thedemonstration was not relevant to any other issue in the case,and that the demonstration would only serve to show that [the]defendant was one of many people whom the clothes would fit." Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261. However, one ofthe defense witnesses at the trial testified the clothing belonged to someone else and would not fit the defendant. Warmack,83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261. This testimony broughtthe fit of the clothing into issue. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126,413 N.E.2d at 1261. In explaining why the demonstration inWarmack was relevant, the supreme court stated:

"A demonstration that the clothing fit [the]defendant, though not of itself establishingthat [the] defendant wore that clothing atthe time and scene of the crimes, would beentitled to some weight, to be considered bythe jury in conjunction with other corroborative evidence from which the guilt or innocence of [the] defendant could bedetermined." Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413N.E.2d at 1261.

The same is true in the instant case. A demonstrationshowing defendant limps would not establish he was the manKillian saw at the Glass residence on the day in question. However, the demonstration was relevant for the jury to weighwith the other information it saw and heard during the trial todetermine if it believed defendant was the man Killion saw at theGlass residence on the day in question and if it believed defendant was guilty. As a result, we find the trial court did notabuse its discretion in allowing this demonstration.

Further, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the demonstration in this case, the error wouldhave been harmless. Even without the demonstration, the Statepresented overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's conviction but remand the case so the trial court can amend its writtenjudgment to give defendant credit for 134 days, not 133 days,spent in custody.

Affirmed as modified and cause remanded with directions.

TURNER, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:

Although I fully agree with the majority's opinion, Iwrite specially to commend the trial court for thoroughly exploring defense counsel's objection to the in-court demonstration ofdefendant's limp before ruling on the issue.

Several good reasons support engaging in the type ofdiscussion the trial court undertook in this case, including thefollowing: (1) the court is likely to become better informedregarding (a) precisely what is being offered, (b) why the partyoffering the evidence thinks it is appropriate, and (c) why theopponent thinks it is not; (2) if the State is offering theevidence, the defendant's objection thereto is overruled, and thedefendant is ultimately convicted, the defendant may challengethe court's ruling on appeal only on the basis of the groundsasserted to the trial court (see Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1,32-33, 787 N.E.2d 796, 813-14 (2003); People v. Williams, 193Ill. 2d 306, 347, 739 N.E.2d 455, 477 (2000); Ficken v. Alton &Southern Ry. Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 635, 644-45, 685 N.E.2d 1, 8(1996)); and (3) on appeal, as in this case, the reviewing courtwill have a much better record to consider when addressing theargument that the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling.

I commend the trial court for its extensive discussionwith defense counsel regarding the proffered evidence beforemaking the court's ruling, and I urge other trial courts to dothe same.