NO. 4-03-0836
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
| THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, | ) | Appeal from |
| Plaintiff-Appellee, | ) | Circuit Court of |
| v. | ) | Macon County |
| JEREMINE T. HUBBERT, | ) | No. 02CF1200 |
| Defendant-Appellant. | ) | |
| ) | Honorable | |
| ) | Theodore E. Paine, | |
| ) | Judge Presiding. |
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a stipulated bench trial on September 30,2003, the trial court convicted defendant, Jeremine T. Hubbert,of violation of bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2002)). Thecourt sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation. Defendantappeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motionto transfer the charge to juvenile court. We affirm.
On October 10, 2002, the State charged defendant witharmed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2002))(count I). On February 28, 2003, the trial court releaseddefendant on a recognizance bond. On March 17, 2003, defendantfailed to appear, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. On July 11, 2003, the State charged defendant with violation ofbail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2002)) (count II). Althoughdefendant was a minor, the State prosecuted defendant undercriminal law pursuant to sections 5-130(1)(a) and 5-130(5)(a) ofthe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS405/5-130(1)(a), (5)(a) (West 2002)).
On August 29, 2003, a jury found defendant not guiltyof armed robbery with a firearm. On September 26, 2003, defendant filed a motion to transfer the violation-of-bail-bond chargeto juvenile court, arguing that section 5-130(5)(a) of theJuvenile Court Act did not apply to defendant because a juryfound defendant not guilty of armed robbery with a firearm andtherefore defendant was no longer "subject to prosecution underthe criminal laws of this State." Following a hearing, the trialcourt denied defendant's motion. Following a stipulated benchtrial, the court convicted defendant of violation of bail bondand sentenced him to 24 months' probation. This appeal followed.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denyinghis motion to transfer the violation-of-bail-bond charge tojuvenile court. Specifically, defendant argues he was no longer"subject to prosecution" for armed robbery with a firearm when hewas tried for violation of bail bond and should not have been"excluded from jurisdiction of the juvenile court." This is aquestion of statutory construction. The fundamental rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County ofCook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). Thebest indication of legislative intent is the statutory language,given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v.Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (1994). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply thestatute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85,710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999). The construction of a statute is aquestion of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes,191 Ill. 2d 326, 330, 730 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (2000).
Section 5-130(5)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:
"The definition of delinquent minorunder Section 5-120 of this Article shall notapply to any minor who is charged with aviolation of *** Section 32-10 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [(720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West2002))] when the minor is subject to prosecution under the criminal laws of this State asa result of the application of the provisionsof Section 5-125, or subsection (1) or (2) ofthis Section. These charges and all othercharges arising out of the same incidentshall be prosecuted under the criminal lawsof this State." 705 ILCS 405/5-130(5)(a)(West 2002).
We find no ambiguity in the language of section 5-130(5)(a). Rather, the legislature could not have been moreclear. "[A]ny minor who is charged with a violation of ***Section 32-10 of the Criminal Code of 1961 when the minor issubject to prosecution under the criminal laws of this State""shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State." (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-130(5)(a) (West 2002). In thepresent case, the State charged defendant with violation of bailbond on July 11, 2003, when defendant was subject to prosecutionfor armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West2002)). Section 5-130(5)(a) required that defendant be prosecuted for the violation-of-bail-bond charge in criminal court. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motionto transfer the violation-of-bail-bond charge to juvenile court.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.
Affirmed.
TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.