3 August 2000

Defendant, Robert D. Jones, was charged with the firstdegree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1992)) of Dr. HenryDickerman, who disappeared from his home in Springfield on August12, 1992. Defendant was convicted at a jury trial in August1996, but this court reversed that judgment and remanded for anew trial. People v. Jones, No. 4-96-0855 (February 23, 1998)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Followingremand defendant was convicted of first degree murder at a jurytrial in June 1998 and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant had been doing some repairs and painting toDickerman's home at the time Dickerman disappeared. After thedisappearance, it was discovered that a number of Dickerman'schecks were missing and that checks totaling $6,845 had been madeout to defendant. Defendant eventually pleaded guilty to forginga $4,200 check and was sentenced to the Department of Corrections.

Defendant was interviewed a number of times: onOctober 6, 1992, by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent; onJuly 12, 1993, by various Springfield detectives; on July 27,1994, while in the Big Muddy Correctional Center, by Springfielddetectives; on August 3, 1994, while in the Franklin County jail;on August 15, 1994, while in jail; and on August 16, 1994, whenhe was served with an arrest warrant for first degree murder.

In Jones, defendant argued that the trial court erredin admitting the August 15, 1994, statement into evidence becauseit was made during the course of plea negotiations, in violationof Supreme Court Rule 402(f) (134 Ill. 2d R. 402(f) ("[N]eitherthe plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminalproceeding")). During the July 27, 1994, interview, defendanthad asked the detectives to inform the State's Attorney that hewould plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter in return for a10-year sentence. In the August 15, 1994, interview, the detectives asked defendant to write out exactly what deal he would bewilling to accept. Defendant wrote out a two-page statementsetting forth the deal he would accept and that statement wasultimately read into evidence at trial. Although the investigators had told defendant they could not negotiate a guilty plea,they did say they would relay the information to the State'sAttorney's office. We concluded that defendant's two-pagehandwritten statement clearly demonstrated his willingness toplead guilty in exchange for concessions and was a plea-relatedstatement inadmissible pursuant to Rule 402(f).

In his present appeal, defendant argues that the trialcourt erred on remand when it admitted into evidence the July 27,1994, and August 16, 1994, statements, which defendant assertswere also plea related. Defendant also argues that the courterred when it refused to reconsider its ruling in the first trialthat the two statements were admissible.

In July 1994, while defendant was serving his prisonterm for the forgery conviction, a detective told defendant'smother to tell defendant that if he thought his crime was lessthan first degree murder, he should speak with detectives. Defendant subsequently requested to meet with Springfield detectives regarding Dickerman's disappearance.

During the interview, defendant sought to make a deal,but the detectives advised him they did not have authority tonegotiate a plea. Defendant asked the detectives to inform theState's Attorney that he would plead guilty to involuntarymanslaughter in return for a 10-year sentence to run concurrentlywith his federal sentence. The detectives indicated they wouldtake the message to the State's Attorney.

Defendant told the detectives he knew they did not havethe murder weapon, even though he had not been previously advisedthat Dickerman's disappearance was being investigated as amurder. (Dickerman's decomposed remains had been found inSeptember 1992, at the bottom of a 20- to 25-foot-high bluff in afishing and hiking area southwest of St. Louis.) Defendant alsoinquired about the blood found in the bathroom even though he wasnever told blood was found there.

Defendant told the detectives that earlier in the weekof August 11, 1992, Dickerman had discovered his forgeries. Bothmen agreed that defendant would do additional work around thehouse in return for Dickerman's not pressing charges. On August11, 1992, after returning from purchasing supplies, defendantfound Dickerman dead in his living room with a spot of blood onthe top of his head. Defendant was unable to resuscitateDickerman, so he left the house but returned later that eveningto place the body on the couch.

During an August 15, 1994, interview, defendant wroteout the deal he would be willing to accept, the two-page writtenstatement we held was erroneously admitted in Jones. The nextday, detectives returned and served defendant with an arrestwarrant for first degree murder. A detective told him that ifthe crime was less than first degree murder it would behoove himto speak to the detectives and tell them what happened. Becausedefendant had earlier told the detectives he was guilty only ofinvoluntary manslaughter and concealing a homicide, one of thedetectives brought a copy of the Criminal Code of 1961 to showdefendant the statutory definitions of the crimes and to specifically show him the elements of first degree murder. The detective had interviewed defendant on July 12, 1993, August 3, 1994,August 15, 1994, and August 16, 1994. On each of those occasions, defendant indicated that he would like to work out a dealand asked that his proposal be communicated to the State'sAttorney, and on each occasion the detectives said they would doso.

After being given his Miranda rights (Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)),defendant made a new statement to the detectives. This time,defendant stated that on August 11, 1992, he was at Dickerman'shome when Dickerman confronted defendant about the forged checks. During the confrontation, Dickerman grabbed his chest, fell intothe fireplace, and hit his head on a brick in the fireplacehearth. Defendant left the house with the door unlocked, hopingsomeone else would find the body. When defendant returned to thehouse the next day, he noticed blood on the top of Dickerman'shead. He placed the body in Dickerman's car, took a shovel andDickerman's personal effects, and drove the body to southernIllinois to bury it.

The State argues that defendant should have attackedthe July 27, 1994, and August 16, 1994, interviews in his firstappeal and that the trial court properly refused to reconsiderits decision in the first trial to admit those interviews, on thebasis of collateral estoppel. Certainly a trial court should notbe forced to start over, after a case is remanded, and rule againon every motion. However, principles of collateral estoppel donot bar relitigation of a pretrial ruling after remand, wherespecial circumstances are present. People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d367, 386, 645 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1994). A trial court retainsjurisdiction to reconsider an order it has entered, even afterremand, as long as the cause is pending before the trial court. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 387, 645 N.E.2d at 865. Viewing the matterin terms of the doctrine of law of the case, there is no bar tothe trial court conducting a new hearing. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at387, 645 N.E.2d at 865; see also People v. Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d1046, 1049, 721 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (1999), appeal allowed, 188Ill. 2d 574 (2000).

Special circumstances were present in this case thatrequired the trial court to reexamine its rulings on these twointerviews in the first trial. Our decision in Jones addressedthe precise issue that was raised after remand as to these twointerviews. It was not necessary for us to address the other twointerviews when we decided Jones. The trial court, which knewafter remand that its ruling was erroneous as to the one interview, should have reconsidered its ruling as to the other twointerviews to make certain that ruling did not suffer from thesame infirmities.

Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion tosuppress evidence is subject to reversal only if it is manifestlyerroneous. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 286, 718 N.E.2d131, 141 (1999). This clearly erroneous or manifestly erroneoustest is based on the understanding that suppression motionsusually raise mixed questions of law and fact. People v. Gray,305 Ill. App. 3d 835, 837, 713 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1999). Whereneither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is atissue, de novo review is appropriate. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d at286, 718 N.E.2d at 141; see also In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 46-47, 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1008-09 (2000) (motion to suppress involuntary confession should be reviewed de novo so that appellatecourts may maintain control of and clarify the legal principles). Even where the facts are undisputed, where reasonable personscould draw divergent inferences from those facts, any question offact should be resolved by the trier of fact. Jackson v. TLCAssociates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 424, 706 N.E.2d 460, 463(1998); Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213,241, 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1274 (1996). The inquiry is whether onlyone conclusion may be drawn from the undisputed facts. Reynoldsv. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 277 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84, 660 N.E.2d235, 238 (1996). We will reverse the trial court's ruling hereonly if it is manifestly erroneous.

To accomplish its purpose of encouraging the negotiateddisposition of criminal cases, the boundaries of Rule 402(f) mustbe delineated in relation to the reasonable expectations of theaccused at the time the statement was made. Did the accusedexhibit a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea, and wasthis expectation reasonable under the totality of the circumstances? People v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341, 352, 403 N.E.2d229, 235 (1980) (rejecting the State's argument that the statement be made "'as an integral part of a bona fide negotiation'"). In Friedman, defendant spoke to an investigator for the office ofthe Attorney General. Defendant inquired about "making a deal"and stated, "'If I'm convicted, I would rather go to a Federalprison as opposed to a State prison.'" Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at350, 403 N.E.2d at 234. The investigator responded, "'I have nocontrol over that, talk to Mr. Rosenberg.'" Friedman, 79 Ill. 2dat 350, 403 N.E.2d at 234. Defendant's statements were excluded,but the supreme court indicated that defendant may have believedhe was dealing with a prosecutor rather than with a policedetective. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 350, 352, 403 N.E.2d at 234,235 ("[The investigator] testified that it was a practice of hisoffice to answer all calls with the introduction, 'AttorneyGeneral's office'"). The court also recognized it was the offerto make a deal that had been admitted. "[T]here is a distinctionbetween a statement made in the furtherance of a plea discussionand an otherwise independent admission [that] is not excluded byour rule." Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 353, 403 N.E.2d at 236.

Every guilty person who voluntarily speaks to a detective probably hopes to benefit from the conversation, either byconvincing the detective that he did not commit the crime or byobtaining leniency for his cooperation. We should resist anapproach that characterizes every conversation between a defendant and a detective as a plea negotiation. The police have aninvestigatory function that the courts and even the State'sAttorney do not have. For that reason, Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 11(e)(6) (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6)) was changed so asto cover only statements made by the defendant in court when aplea was tendered or during plea discussions with the prosecutor. 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure