JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

On March 10, 2001, the State charged defendant, Chad A.Junior, and codefendant, Aaron Settle, by information with two countsof burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2000)) and one count of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)). Settle pleadedguilty to all charges. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and a jurytrial was held in December 2001. The jury found defendant guilty oftwo counts of burglary. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdicton the residential burglary count, and the trial court declared amistrial. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the courtrejected. On February 21, 2002, Judge Lisa Holder White sentenceddefendant as a Class X offender to concurrent 10-year prison sentences on the burglary convictions. On the State's motion, the courtalso dismissed the residential burglary charge. Defendant petitionedthe court to reconsider his sentence. The court denied the motionand held his sentence was appropriate.

Defendant appeals, arguing (1) his due-process rights wereviolated when the State used and failed to correct Settle's perjuredtestimony, (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel becausePublic Defender Jon Baxter represented both him and Settle at theirjoint preliminary hearing, and (3) his trial counsel, AssistantPublic Defender David Massey, labored under a conflict of interestbecause his law partner, Baxter, represented both Junior and Settleat their joint preliminary hearing. We reverse and remand for a newtrial.

At approximately 1 a.m. on March 5, 2001, Skyler Kaufman,Sebastian Santos, and Daniel French were sitting on Kaufman's frontporch waiting to catch some of their friends who were supposed to"prank" French's house down the street. The boys noticed a whitevehicle they initially thought belonged to their friends drivingslowly in the neighborhood. They hid but continued to watch as thevehicle drove around the neighborhood and parked.

The boys saw two men get out of the vehicle. At trial,they testified one man was wearing a red-hooded sweatshirt and theother had a long ponytail. At trial, none of the boys could identifydefendant as one of the men who got out of the vehicle.

The boys watched the men break into a black Jeep thatbelonged to a neighbor and try to break into garages in the neighborhood. The boys awakened Kaufman's father, Tom Kaufman, who calledthe police and then went outside to wait with the boys. Before thepolice arrived, Tom saw the two men walking down the street. One manwas carrying what looked like a bag, and the other was pushing anobject. When the two men noticed Tom, they dropped what they werecarrying and ran in between some houses.

Tom and the boys remained outside until the police arrived. The boys told Officer Steve Young what they had witnessed andtook him to the white car. As they were talking, Settle approachedthe white car. Kaufman and Santos identified Settle as one of themen they saw break into the Jeep. Officer Young approached Settle,who initially said his wife had car trouble and he was looking forher car. Settle then admitted he and defendant had been burglarizingvehicles and garages in the area.

Officers recovered and returned a coat, compact discs, anda camera taken from Christian Sassano's Jeep, a power washer andchain saw taken from William Shorter's detached garage, and a plasticgas can taken from Kathy Powell's attached garage.

Both defendant and Settle were charged with the countsoutlined above. At their arraignment, Settle told the trial court,"[t]his man was with me earlier this day. At the time of the offense, it was a different person that was with me." At their jointpreliminary hearing, defendant and Settle were represented by Baxter. After the State had presented its evidence, the following exchangetook place between Settle and the court:

"SETTLE: I want to make a statement. Thismy co[]defendant. He wasn't even there.

COURT: Sir, you have asked to have a lawyer appointed and we have done that. You mustspeak through your lawyer. If you want to represent yourself, we will take away your lawyer. Can't have it both ways. Do you want a lawyerin the case?

SETTLE: Yes."

The trial court found probable cause to believe defendant and Settlecommitted the burglaries. Both men pleaded not guilty. The courtappointed Massey to represent defendant and Assistant Public DefenderThomas Wheeler to represent Settle.

On July 25, 2001, Settle and the State's Attorney's officeentered into a plea agreement. In exchange for Settle's guilty pleason all three counts and his testimony against defendant, the Statepromised to seek concurrent, not consecutive, sentences.

On December 10, 2001, defendant's trial began. Settletestified defendant was with him on the morning of March 5, 2001, andtogether they burglarized the Jeep and two garages. He testifieddefendant owed him money and they went out that night to get thatmoney. Settle recanted earlier statements, including a writtenstatement, where he indicated defendant was not involved in theburglaries. He testified he made the statements because he had beenthreatened by his brother and defendant.

When questioned on direct, Settle testified he had notbeen promised anything in consideration for his testimony. Duringcross-examination, when defense counsel challenged this assertion,Settle claimed he was testifying only because he was subpoenaed. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued if Settle and theState's Attorney's office had made a deal, the deal was not a verygood one for Settle as he anticipated being sentenced to the penitentiary.

Tina Hutchinson testified for the defense. She testifieddefendant lived with her at the time of the burglary. On March 4,2001, Settle was at her home until 10 p.m., but he left alone. Defendant went to bed shortly after Settle left. Hutchinson went tosleep in the same bed as defendant at about midnight.

The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of burglarybut could not reach a unanimous verdict on the residential burglarycharge. The State later moved to dismiss the residential burglarycharge. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 10-year prisonsentences. This appeal followed.

The State's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain acriminal conviction violates a defendant's due-process rights. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 680 N.E.2d 321, 331 (1997). Where a reasonable likelihood exists that the perjured testimonycould have affected the jury's verdict, the conviction must be setaside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2d at 331. The sameprinciples apply where the State does not solicit the testimony butallows it to go uncorrected, even if the testimony concerns only thecredibility of the witness. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2dat 331.

Fundamental fairness requires that a jury be truthfullyinformed about all matters going to the credibility of a witness andhis motives for testifying known by the prosecutor or an agent of theprosecutor. See People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223, 652 N.E.2d278, 284 (1995). The "'jury's estimate of the truthfulness andreliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt orinnocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life orliberty may depend.'" Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2d at331, quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217,1221, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959).

In this case, defendant claims the State elicited testimony from Settle that he received no promises from the State inreturn for his testimony when the State actually promised to seekconcurrent, not consecutive sentences. On July 25, 2001, beforeSettle pleaded guilty to the three charges arising out of thisincident, the prosecutor, Assistant State's Attorney Richard Current,explained the plea agreement to the trial court judge, TheodorePaine, as follows:

"Basically, the defendant is going toplead to the charges. The matter will be setfor [s]entencing [h]earing. He is also willingto agree to cooperate being a [witness] in thecase against the co[]defendant[,] which I believe is set for tomorrow. The People haveagreed that any sentencing would be served concurrently and there would be no consecutivesentences."

Defendant asserts, despite this knowledge, the State here allowedSettle's false testimony to go uncorrected and actually misled thejury during closing argument, violating his due-process rights.

Defendant's claims are supported by the record. At trial,Settle testified he was promised nothing in return for his testimony:

"[PROSECUTOR DAVID SPENCE]: [Settle], youhave pled guilty to the burglary of the Jeep,to the burglary of the garage, and to residential burglary; haven't you?

SETTLE: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: You are currently awaitingsentencing in those matters, is that correct?

SETTLE: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: At the time of your plea, wasthere any promises made to you regarding anexchange for your testimony here?

SETTLE: No."

During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you think that bycoming in here and telling these stories, it'sgoing to help you somehow?

SETTLE: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You don't think it'sgoing to help you?

SETTLE: No. I just had a subpoena. If Ididn't come today, I had to go to jail for notobeying the subpoena."

The State's redirect included the following:

"[PROSECUTOR SPENCE]: Yes. Thank you. Sir,I think you indicated that you think you knowwhat to expect with regard to the criminalcases that you're involved in. Do you recallmaking that statement earlier?

SETTLE: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: What is it that you expect?

SETTLE: Well for the residential, it'smandatory 4 to 7 years [in the Department ofCorrections].

PROSECUTOR: So, you're expecting to go tothe Department of Corrections?

SETTLE: Yes."

Throughout his testimony, Settle's testimony suggested hewas testifying because he was subpoenaed, not because it was acondition of his plea agreement. Further, he stated he was promisednothing for his testimony when in fact the State made a sentencingconcession promising it would not seek consecutive sentences. Duringclosing arguments, the prosecutor implied Settle received no consideration for his testimony:

"Is there anything here that suggests toyou that Mr. Settle had a reason to tell thepolice that it was [defendant] when it wasnot[?] This is his long[-]time friend. Theguy that he spent nearly the entire day with byall of the evidence in this case. He also toldyou that he plead [sic] guilty to all of theseoffenses, and he also told you that he has anexpectation of what the outcome is going to befor him as a result of these burglaries; andhis expectation was that he's going to prison.

Now if he is identifying someone inexchange for helping the prosecution, he didn'tget a very good deal; did he[?] There's nocommitment as to the sentence that he's goingto receive. His expectation is he's going tothe penitentiary. So[,] did he tell you that[defendant] did this, [sic] because he's notgoing to have to go the penitentiary[?] Ofcourse not. Nobody had told him anything."

Knowledge on the part of any representative or agent ofthe prosecution that a witness's testimony is not truthful issufficient to create an obligation to correct false testimony. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 348, 680 N.E.2d at 332. Here, Settle made anagreement with the State's Attorney's office in July 2001, monthsbefore he testified in defendant's December 2001 trial. Whenexplaining to Judge Paine the conditions of Settle's plea, AssistantState's Attorney Current stated, "[h]e is also willing to cooperatebeing a [witness] in the case against the co[]defendant[,] which Ibelieve is set for tomorrow. The People have agreed that anysentencing would be served concurrently and there would be noconsecutive sentences." Settle's original sentencing hearing was setfor September 14, 2001, but was continued five times, by both theState and Settle, until after defendant was tried and sentenced. Defendant's prosecutor herein, David Spence, represented the State atone of Settle's continuance hearings, the one held December 10, 2001.

The State disagrees with defendant's contention that theprosecution misled the jury about the inducement for Settle'stestimony. It further maintains any error was harmless beyond areasonable doubt and did not contribute to the jury's verdict. According to the State, even though Settle denied receiving anypromises from the prosecution, the jury was still aware of Settle'sself-serving motive to cooperate while awaiting sentencing in hiscase in the expectation of leniency.

In considering the particular facts and circumstances ofthis case, we conclude that evidence of Settle's deal with theprosecution could have affected the jury's verdict. The State's caseagainst defendant depended almost entirely on Settle's testimony asit was the only evidence linking defendant to the burglaries. Noneof the other eyewitnesses could identify defendant as the man theysaw burglarizing the black Jeep. Maintaining Settle's credibilitywas therefore crucial to the State's case against defendant. Truthful evidence about the conditions of his plea agreement couldshow Settle had a motive to testify falsely. Had the jury beeninformed of such information, it could reasonably have concluded thatSettle's testimony was not credible.

The fact that the jury was aware Settle was awaitingsentencing for his involvement in the crimes does not alter ourconclusion. Throughout its case, the State characterized Settle as awitness who had "no reason to lie" because he was already going toprison. Settle told the jury he was testifying because he wassubpoenaed and he had received "no promises" from the State inexchange for his testimony. Settle and the State's Attorney's officemade an agreement, the conditions of which were known to Judge Paine. After Settle testified to the jury about the conditions of his plea,the State was required to correct the false information. Olinger,176 Ill. 2d at 347, 680 N.E.2d at 332. The State did not do this. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the merits; although notbinding on retrial, we find the evidence here sufficient to provedefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so double jeopardy doesnot bar retrial.

Because we have remanded this case for a new trial, weneed not address defendant's remaining claims of ineffectiveassistance of counsel.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

TURNER and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.