JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2003, at a trial in absentia, a jury convicteddefendant, Samuel Kelly, of unlawful possession of cannabis (morethan 30, but less than 500, grams), a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS550/4(d) (West 2002)). The trial court later sentenced him,again in absentia, to five years in prison. Upon defendant'smotion, the court found defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he was in custody in another county at thetime of his initial sentencing hearing. At the rehearing, thecourt sentenced defendant to 4 years in prison with credit for 63days for time served. The court recommended defendant for impactincarceration. The court denied defendant's other posttrial andpostsentencing motions.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed toprove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the statute (730ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)) requiring convicted felons to submitblood, saliva, or tissue samples to the Illinois Department ofState Police (State Police) is unconstitutional; (3) the trialcourt abused its discretion by ordering the reimbursement ofattorney fees without determining defendant's ability to pay; and(4) he is entitled to an additional day of sentencing credit. Weaffirm as modified and remand with directions.

The charges against defendant grew out of the factsprimarily testified to at trial by Daniel Davis, a Pontiac policeofficer. He testified that on the evening of March 21, 2003, heparticipated in the execution of a search warrant conducted at937 North Mill Street. The house was believed to be owned byNathaniel Strong. Davis and other members of the tacticalresponse team (TRT) approached the residence and, before officerscould knock on the door, Roanna Donaldson opened it. The officers entered the house and observed defendant and ReginaldWilliams in the bedroom. Davis noticed a "strong odor of burntcannabis in the air." Once the suspects were transported tojail, Davis noticed a backpack lying on the living room floor. The backpack had protruding from it a plastic bag containing whatappeared to be cannabis. Davis had not seen the backpack when heentered the house, and it was not in the bedroom with defendantand Williams.

Donaldson testified that she lived at the North Millresidence with her boyfriend, Strong. She was not at home whendefendant and Williams arrived. When shown a photograph of thebackpack with the plastic bag lying on top, Donaldson said shedid not recognize the backpack--it did not belong to her orStrong. She said the backpack was not at the house when she hadleft for work that morning. She said Williams and defendant weresmoking a "blunt" (cannabis rolled in cigar paper) in her housebefore the police arrived.

On cross-examination, Donaldson said she knew Williams,whom she identified as Strong's "main [drug] supplier," but shedid not know defendant. She said Strong sold drugs out of theNorth Mill residence. Donaldson was not charged with any offensethat evening and was not fingerprinted.

Kerry Nielsen, a forensic scientist with the StatePolice, testified that he analyzed the substance found in thebackpack and confirmed the plastic bag contained 90 grams ofcannabis.

Daron Bagnell, a Pontiac police officer, testified thathe was part of the TRT. Like Davis, Bagnell noticed the odor ofburnt cannabis in the house and found a partially burned blunt inthe bedroom where defendant and Williams were first located. Bagnell said he first saw the backpack after the residence wassecure and defendant, Williams, and Donaldson were detained. Hesaid Williams was sitting on the floor in the living room and"kept his attention focused over to this one corner of the livingroom where this backpack [w]as sitting." When Bagnell approachedthe backpack, he saw a plastic resealable bag containing whatappeared to be cannabis sticking out of the top.

On cross-examination, Bagnell estimated that the bluntcontained three to four grams of cannabis.

Mike Willis, a detective with the Pontiac policedepartment, testified that he was executing a warrant on Strongat the time the TRT executed the warrant at the North Millresidence. After he arrested Strong, Willis went to the residence to assist in the search. Bagnell pointed out the backpackto Willis, saying they "ha[d] got quite a bit of cannabis rightthere in plain view." Willis field-tested a small portion of thecontents of the plastic bag and found the presence of cannabis.

Willis indicated he seized from the residence the bluntfound in the bedroom, the backpack with the plastic bag containing cannabis found in the living room, and a box of Swisher Sweetcigars found on defendant's person. The blunt was rolled inSwisher Sweet cigar paper.

Later in the evening, with defendant's consent, Willisinterviewed defendant. Defendant told Willis he rode to Pontiacwith a friend of his who had planned to meet Strong. They firstwent to Strong's house, the North Mill residence. When Willisasked defendant about the plastic bag, defendant denied seeing itor knowing it was there. Willis said he asked defendant if afingerprint analysis conducted on the bag would reveal thepresence of defendant's prints. Willis said defendant "then puthis head down and said, 'okay, I will be honest with you.'"

Willis then testified as follows:

"He [(defendant)] then said, yes, he wasfamiliar with the bag of cannabis, that theyhad been smoking from the bag, that he himself had rolled a blunt of cannabis with theSwisher Sweets from that bag. And he saidthat he was smoking the actual blunt that hehad just rolled from that bag when the TRTteam [sic] came into the front door. He saidhe discarded the blunt on the floor in thebedroom which I later recovered."

Willis said the plastic bag was sent for fingerprint analysis andonly an unidentified latent print was found.

At the close of its evidence, the State offered fourexhibits that were admitted without objection and then rested. Defendant rested without presenting any evidence. After deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession ofbetween 30 and 500 grams of cannabis.

On July 28, 2003, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing in absentia and imposed a five-year prison term withcredit for two days for time served. The court then noted thatdefendant had an outstanding bond in the amount of $2,000,subtracted court costs, and awarded the remainder to the publicdefender as reimbursement for attorney fees.

On July 29, 2003, defendant appeared before the trialcourt in custody and reported he had been in the Cook County jailsince July 5, 2003. Defendant said he did not appear at histrial because he did not have a ride to Livingston County.

On August 11, 2003, the trial court conducted a statushearing at which private counsel appeared on defendant's behalf. Upon entry of that attorney's appearance, the court vacated theappointment of the public defender. The parties agreed defendantwas entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he had been incustody in Cook County at the time of his sentencing hearing.

On September 2, 2003, defendant filed a motion for anew trial, alleging primarily that the State failed to prove himguilty beyond a reasonable doubt and it was error for the trialcourt to conduct the trial in absentia. He also filed a separatemotion to vacate the trial in absentia, pursuant to section 115-4.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure) (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(e) (West 2002) (defendant'sfailure to appear was not his fault and was due to circumstancesbeyond his control)), alleging he had no personal knowledge ofthe date scheduled for trial.

On September 5, 2003, the trial court conducted ahearing on defendant's motions. In support, defendant testifiedthat he did not appear at his trial because he was unable tosecure transportation to Livingston County. The court denieddefendant's motions and sentenced him to 4 years in prison withcredit for 63 days served. Defense counsel moved instanter toreconsider the sentence, and the court denied defendant's request. The court neither vacated nor amended the reimbursementorder. This appeal followed.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The State prosecuted defendant for the constructivepossession of more than 30, but less than 500, grams of cannabis,a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2002). The centralquestion at trial was whether defendant possessed the plastic bagcontaining cannabis found inside the backpack. Defendant claimsWillis's testimony that defendant had told him he personallyrolled a blunt using the cannabis from the bag was not sufficientto convict him. We disagree.

"It is the jury's function to determine the accused'sguilt or innocence, and this court will not reverse a convictionunless the evidence is so improbable as to justify a reasonabledoubt of defendant's guilt." People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d326, 359, 589 N.E.2d 508, 524 (1992). "When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry iswhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have foundthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470, 828 N.E.2d 247, 257(2005). "The requirement that a defendant's guilt be provedbeyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that inferences flowingfrom the evidence should be disregarded." People v. Schmalz, 194Ill. 2d 75, 81, 740 N.E.2d 775, 778 (2000).

The Cannabis Control Act provides in part that "[i]t isunlawful for any person knowingly to possess cannabis." 720 ILCS550/4 (West 2002). Possession may be actual or constructive. Here, the jury was instructed on both. For actual possession,"the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of thepresence of the controlled substance and that he or she also hadimmediate and exclusive possession or control of the narcotics." Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 466, 828 N.E.2d at 254.

On the other hand, "[c]onstructive possession may existeven where an individual is no longer in physical control of thedrugs, provided that he once had physical control of the drugswith intent to exercise control in his own behalf, and he has notabandoned them and no other person has obtained possession." People v. Adams, 161 Ill. 2d 333, 345, 641 N.E.2d 514, 519-20(1994). "Constructive possession exists without actual personalpresent dominion over a controlled substance, but with an intentand capability to maintain control and dominion." Frieberg, 147Ill. 2d at 361, 589 N.E.2d at 524. "[W]hether there is possession or control [is a] question[] of fact to be determined by thetrier of fact." Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d at 81, 740 N.E.2d at 779.

Defendant was not in actual possession of the cannabis,and no contraband was found on his person. Although there was noevidence indicating who owned the backpack or who carried it intothe residence, there was evidence connecting defendant to theplastic bag. According to Willis, defendant said he had rolled ablunt using the cannabis in the plastic bag and was smoking thatblunt at the time of the raid. Despite the fact that defendant'sfingerprints did not appear on the bag, the evidence presented attrial was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to convictdefendant of possession. The evidence indicated that defendant,at least temporarily, had physical and intentional control anddominion over the cannabis and had not attempted to abandon thebag to the exclusion of someone else's control. After viewingthe evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, weaffirm defendant's conviction.

B. Constitutionality of the Statute

Compelling Extraction of DNA From Convicted Felons

Defendant claims the ordered extraction of his deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) violates his right to be free from unreasonable searches pursuant to the fourth amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution and article I, section 6, of the IllinoisConstitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,