JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In August 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant, Gary D. Kimble, pleaded guilty to aggravated battery ofa child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 2000)), and the trialcourt sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment. After an October 2001 hearing, the court denied defendant's motion to withdraw hisguilty plea. In March 2003, defendant filed a pro sepostconviction petition. In April 2003, the court summarilydismissed defendant's petition, finding his claim wasfrivolous and patently without merit.

Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erredin summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. Weaffirm.

In July 2000, the State charged defendant with aggravatedbattery of a child in relation to a June 24, 2000, incident. On thatdate, defendant's daughter, Alexis C., sustained permanent injuriesthat doctors diagnosed were the result of shaken-baby syndrome.

Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement, under which defendant was to plead guilty to aggravatedbattery of a child, and the State would dismiss other pendingcharges and recommend a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. At the August 2001 guilty plea hearing, defendant denied severaltimes that he intended to harm Alexis, and the trial court refused toaccept his guilty plea. Defendant eventually approached the courtand admitted "knowing that I shook and that would cause great bodilyharm to Alexis [C.]" The court asked defendant if his plea wasvoluntary, and defendant replied in the affirmative. Thecourt also asked if defendant was satisfied with the performance of his hired attorney, John Alvarez, and defendant againreplied in the affirmative. Defendant then pleaded guilty toaggravated battery of a child.

In August 2001, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In October 2001, Robert Scherschligst, defendant's counsel on the postplea motion, filed an amended motion towithdraw defendant's guilty plea, asserting (1) the factual basis forthe guilty plea was insufficient, (2) the guilty plea was not knowingand voluntary, (3) the guilty plea was based on a misapprehension offact and law, (4) defendant's trial counsel coerced him to pleadguilty, and (5) defendant's trial counsel was ineffective.

The trial court held a hearing on the amended motion. Defendant testified Alvarez did not (1) provide him with discoverymaterials, (2) accept his collect calls, and (3) discuss the facts ofthe case or the nature of the offense with him. According to defendant, Alvarez kept telling him to accept the plea agreement or hewould get 15 to 20 years' imprisonment.

The State presented the testimony of Alvarez who testifiedthat, while he was not sure if he provided defendant copies of thediscovery materials, he was certain he went through and discussed themedical reports with defendant. Based on those reports, Alvarezinformed defendant he expected a guilty verdict if they went to trialand recommended defendant accept the plea agreement.

After the hearing, the trial court denied defendant'smotion. Defendant appealed the court's judgment, alleging the courterred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In October2002, this court affirmed that judgment. People v. Kimble, No. 4-01-0912, slip order at 11 (October 31, 2002) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23).

In March 2003, defendant filed a pro se postconvictionpetition, asserting he was denied effective assistance of appellatecounsel because his appellate counsel did not argue he was deniedeffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he argued histrial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty, and despite hisrequest, his counsel did not provide him with the victim's medicalreports that indicated she had been injured prior to having contactwith defendant. Defendant also attached to his petition two medicaldocuments regarding his daughter's injuries.

In April 2003, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous and patently without merit because theissue of trial counsel's effectiveness was raised in both the trialand appellate courts. This appeal followed.

Defendant alleges the trial court erred in summarilydismissing his postconviction petition. This court reviews denovo a trial court's dismissal of a postconviction petitionwithout an evidentiary hearing. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d348, 360, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1105-06 (2000).

Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2002)), the trial court must first,independently and without considering any argument by theState, determine whether the petition is "frivolous or ispatently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West2002). To survive dismissal at this first stage, the petition need only present "the gist of a constitutional claim,"which is "a low threshold." People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996).

Additionally, a petition brought under the Act isnot a direct appeal but rather is a collateral proceeding thatpermits inquiry only into constitutional issues that defendantdid not raise and could not have raised on direct appeal. Thus, issues defendant raised on direct appeal are barred fromconsideration by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues thatdefendant could have raised, but did not, are consideredforfeited. People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 233, 807N.E.2d 448, 452 (2004). A defendant cannot avoid the bar ofres judicata by simply rephrasing issues previously addressedon direct appeal. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 360, 736 N.E.2d at1105. However, the doctrines of res judicata and forfeiturewill be relaxed in the following three circumstances: (1)where fundamental fairness so requires, (2) where the waiverstems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or(3) where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on theface of the original appellate record. Williams, 209 Ill. 2dat 233, 807 N.E.2d at 452. A first-stage dismissal can bebased on res judicata where the facts are undisputed as to anissue that has in fact been raised and adjudicated. People v.Etherly, 344 Ill. App. 3d 599, 613, 801 N.E.2d 99, 112 (2003).

In this case, while defendant uses different terminology and some additional allegations to assert he was deniedeffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant's claim ofineffective assistance of trial counsel has already beenraised, and the trial court has already held a hearing on thatclaim. Thus, defendant was given an opportunity to litigatefully his ineffective-assistance claim. As stated, the bar ofres judicata cannot be avoided by simply rephrasing issuesthat have already been raised. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 360, 736N.E.2d at 1105. A defendant also cannot avoid res judicata byadding an additional allegation that is encompassed by apreviously adjudicated issue. To hold otherwise would encourage defendants to not state all of the allegations in supportof an argument so they could avoid summary dismissal of theirpostconviction petition based on res judicata. Since defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-trial- counsel argument hadalready been addressed, the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant's postconviction petition.

Additionally, we note this case is distinguishablefrom this court's decision in People v. Campbell, 345 Ill. App.3d 810, 814, 803 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (2004), which was limited tothe unique situation presented by the facts of that case.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.