JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we review the trial court's decision toclose hearings on certain motions in limine to suppress evidencein this criminal case. For the following reasons, we reverse.

In September 2003, Amanda Hamm's three young childrendrowned in Hamm's car when it sank into Clinton Lake. The Statelater charged Hamm's boyfriend, defendant, Maurice LaGrone, Jr.,and Hamm with the first degree murder of the children. At somepoint early in the proceedings, the trial court transferred venuefrom De Witt County to Champaign County.

In February 2005, defendant filed (1) a motion inlimine to bar testimony from minors D.F. and M.F. and (2) amotion for leave to file proffers of evidence under seal. Laterin February 2005, the intervenors, the Associated Press, ThePantagraph, and the Herald & Review, filed petitions to interveneand for access.

In March 2005, defendant filed (1) a motion in limineto bar Hamm's statements to police, (2) a motion in limine to barcertain opinion testimony by lay witnesses, (3) a motion inlimine to bar certain hearsay statements of Austin Brown andChristopher Hamm (two of the victims), (4) a motion in limine tobar testimony of Shane Senters, and (5) a motion to seal defendant's motion to bar certain evidence as to his "characterattributes." Later in March 2005, defendant filed a motion toclose the following proceedings to the public: (1) the hearingon his motion to bar the testimony of D.F. and M.F., (2) thehearing on his motion to bar Hamm's statements, (3) the hearingon his motion to bar evidence as to his character attributes, and(4) the hearing on his motion to bar Austin's and Christopher'sstatements about him. Later that month, the trial court grantedthe intervenors' petition to intervene.

At the May 2005 hearing on defendant's motion to closeproceedings, the only pretrial issues that defendant sought toadjudicate in closed proceedings were (1) the admissibility offour statements made by Christopher and Austin and (2) theadmissibility of certain evidence of defendant's characterattributes. After hearing counsel's arguments, the trial courtannounced its decision, as follows:

"Okay. I have read the motions, together with the motions that were tendered. Some information regarding the nature of thestatements that the motions relate to, naturenot only of the statements, but also as faras the motion relating to character attributes, some of the attributes and some of theevents that have occurred to cause this motion to arise. We are not in this instancelooking at broad categories of statements. We are looking at[,] as counsel has indicated[,] two or three specific statementsfrom the victims in this case, and as I review the second motion, we are looking at acouple of character attributes which willneed to be determined as to whether or notthose attributes can be admitted in thiscase. Admittedly, if the nature of those getout to the press and they are not admitted,then I think it does tend to present a problem in selecting a jury--more than a potential problem. I have over the past year anda half read a number of accounts--certainlynot every account of events that have occurred during the course of pre[]trial proceedings in this case and in virtually everyone of those, there is a synopsis of eventsthat has taken place up until this point, soI don't, I think that the problem comes inthe constant repeat of evidence or mattersthat a jury won't hear but does so hear ifthis is a public hearing. It is a matter asto these two issues that I believe wouldjeopardize the fair trial rights of the defendant in this cause. There has been by wayof proffer sufficient evidence presented tome to show me the facts that are going to beargued here. I recognize that these facts--Idon't know all of them, myself; I know generally, general information about them, but Idon't know everything there is to know aboutthem. I will probably learn some of thatduring the motion and probably not all of ituntil the trial takes place. I think thatthis would jeopardize the selection of ajury. At this point, I see no alternativeother than at least for these two motions tohave a closed hearing. It is not going to bea practice that will take place on a consistent basis, but in these two instances, itwould be appropriate. I know that there issome information that the State[,] at leastaccording to counsel here today[,] has indicated that the State will confess and so Ithink in relation to the remaining evidenceor the remaining matters that will be discussed during the course of these motions,that closure is essential to preserve thehigher value of a fair trial of the defendant. For these two motions relating tothese very specific issues, I will allow themotion and the matter will be closed, aclosed hearing. I will indicate[,] however,that upon selection of the jury, thetranscript of this hearing will be released."

In June 2005, following the closed hearings, the trialcourt entered an order which, in pertinent part, granted in parteach of defendant's two motions in limine.

This interlocutory appeal followed.

The intervenors argue that the trial court erred byclosing the hearings on defendant's motions in limine to suppress(1) the statements of Austin and Christopher and (2) evidence ofcertain character attributes of defendant. Specifically, theycontend that the court failed to comply with the requirements setforth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 92L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II), byfailing to make specific on-the-record findings (1) demonstratingthat closure was essential to preserve defendant's fair-trialrights and (2) showing that no reasonable alternative to closurewould adequately protect defendant's fair-trial rights. Weagree.

Initially, we acknowledge that an argument could bemade that the issue before us is moot, given that the closed inlimine hearings have already been held. However, we concludethat the issue qualifies for review because (1) it involves aquestion of great public interest and (2) the restrictions thetrial court imposed are capable of repetition and evading review. See In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257-58, 537 N.E.2d 292, 296(1989).

Open criminal proceedings play an important role in oursociety, and "[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutelyprecluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighsthe value of openness." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,464 U.S. 501, 509, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 638, 104 S. Ct. 819, 823(1984) (Press-Enterprise I). When balancing the right of thedefendant to a fair trial against the public right of access tocriminal proceedings, "[i]t is *** important to remember thatthese interests are not necessarily inconsistent." Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 106 S. Ct. at2739. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognizedthat opening the process to neutral observers is an importantmeans of assuring the fairness of criminal proceedings. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 106 S. Ct. at2739. Accordingly, a high threshold must be crossed to justifythe closure of criminal proceedings.

In Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106S. Ct. 2735, the trial court had granted a murder defendant'srequest to exclude the public and press from his preliminaryhearing. The Supreme Court held that the first amendment rightof access to criminal proceedings applied to preliminary hearingsin California. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13, 92 L. Ed. 2dat 13, 106 S. Ct. at 2743. In defining the right of access, theCourt relied on the same analysis it had used in Press-EnterpriseI to determine the propriety of closing voir dire in a criminaltrial, explaining as follows:

"[T]he proceedings cannot be closed unlessspecific, on[-]the[-]record findings are madedemonstrating that 'closure is essential topreserve higher values and is narrowlytailored to serve that interest.' [Citations.] If the interest asserted is theright of the accused to a fair trial, thepreliminary hearing shall be closed only ifspecific findings are made demonstratingthat, first, there is a substantialprobability that the defendant's right to afair trial will be prejudiced by publicitythat closure would prevent and, second,reasonable alternatives to closure cannotadequately protect the defendant's fair[-]trial rights." Press-Enterprise II, 478U.S. at 13-14, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743.

Although the Court in Press-Enterprise II held only that thisstandard applies to California preliminary hearings, "it has beenviewed as the appropriate standard for 'fair-trial' closures ofall parts of the criminal process to which the [f]irst[a]mendment [r]ight of access applies." W. LaFave, J. Israel &N. King, Criminal Procedure