On March 15, 1999, a jury convicted defendant, SolomonL. Ledbetter, of retail theft (subsequent offense) (720 ILCS5/16A-10(2) (West 1998)); and in August 1999, the trial courtsentenced to an extended-term sentence of 4 years in prison forstealing less than $10 worth of cold medicine. This courtaffirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal in anunpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2dR. 23). People v. Ledbetter, No. 4-99-0943 (April 16, 2001)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal denied,195 Ill. 2d 588, 755 N.E.2d 480 (2001).

On May 19, 2000, defendant filed a petition for reliefpursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS5/122-1 through 122-8(West 2000)). In an order dated June 8,2000, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant's postconviction petition as "frivolous and/or patently without merit." See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(2) (West 2000). Defendant appeals thisorder. We reverse and remand.

To survive summary dismissal, a postconviction petitionneed only present a "gist" of a constitutional claim. People v.Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001). The"gist" standard is a low threshold, needing only a limited amountof detail and not requiring legal arguments or citations to legalauthority. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at 445. Ourreview is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89,701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998)

In his petition, defendant alleged and included exhibits that showed that the police officer who testified thatplaintiff confessed to him was under investigation for corruptionwhen he testified and that this officer was eventually convictedof multiple felonies and fired. Defendant further alleged thathe could have impeached the officer's testimony if he had knownabout the investigation. Presumably, the State should have knownthat one of its main witnesses was being investigated on felonycorruption charges. Although not articulately done, defendanthas raised the gist of a Brady violation. See Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) (findingthat the prosecution has a constitutional duty to produce knownexculpatory evidence to a defendant). If the State was aware ofthis police officer's impeachability, it had a duty to disclosethis potentially exculpatory evidence to defendant. See Peoplev. Sharrod, 271 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688, 648 N.E.2d 1141, 1143(1995) (the State must disclose evidence with potential impeachment value such as prior convictions, probationary status,pending criminal charges, and juvenile adjudications). Defendanthas therefore raised the gist of a constitutional claim in hispetition.

The State argues that defendant's Brady argument madeby his appellant counsel should be considered forfeited becausedefendant did not make this argument in his petition. See 725ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2000) (any claim not raised in the originalpetition is waived). The State claims that defendant's petitioncomplained that it was not disclosed that the police officer hadbeen indicted and fired. On appeal, defendant argues that it wasnot disclosed the police officer was under investigation. Therefore, the State argues, defendant's argument on appeal issubstantially different from the one he made in his postconviction petition and should be considered forfeited.

We find that defendant's argument is not forfeited onthis basis. The argument is not substantially different, andeven if it were, defendant's petition did allege that the investigation had not been disclosed.

The State also argues that defendant's Brady argumentshould be considered forfeited because defendant did not make itin his direct appeal. See People v. Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d 472,478, 651 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1995) (issues that defendant could haveraised on direct appeal, but did not, are considered waived).Defendant filed his direct appeal in December 1999. The Stateclaims, without citation to the record, that defendant's petitionindicated defendant knew the police officer who had testifiedagainst him had been indicted in April 1999. This court's Rule23 order in the direct appeal filed on April 16, 2001, showsdefendant did not raise any Brady issue. Therefore, the Stateargues, defendant could have raised this issue in his directappeal, but did not, and the argument is forfeited.

This argument by the State would have merit, exceptthat a review of the record does not support the State's claims. Nowhere in defendant's petition is there any indication that heknew about the investigation of the police officer before hefiled his direct appeal. There is a newspaper article attachedto the petition that says that this officer had been indicted inApril 1999, but that does not prove that defendant knew about itat that time. Defendant's argument is not forfeited on thisbasis.

The State next argues that even though defendantattached a copy of a newspaper article to his petition thatshowed that the police officer had been indicted on eight countsof official misconduct in April 1999, defendant's petition shouldbe dismissed for failure to attach an affidavit, record, or otherevidence supporting defendant's allegations as required bysection 122-2 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000). Sincedefendant attached evidence supporting his allegations, we willnot dismiss defendant's petition for failing to attach evidencesupporting his allegations.

The State finally argues that, assuming all of defendant's factual allegations are true, any error was harmless. This may ultimately prove to be true. However, at the summarydismissal stage of a postconviction petition, the only relevantinquiry is whether the petitioner has presented the "gist" of aconstitutional claim. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at445. Defendant's petition presents the "gist" of a constitutional claim. We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissalof defendant's petition and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.