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JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1998, the State charged defendants MarceloLedesma, Guadalupe Jose Perez, Richard W. Roth, Jr., and JeremyA. Edwards with the following crimes: (1) possession of morethan 5,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(g) (West 1998)) and(2) delivery of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 1998)). InJanuary 1999, defendants jointly filed a motion to suppress,arguing that officers improperly stopped defendants based solelyon a tip an anonymous informant received by illegally intercepting a cellular telephone conversation in violation of state andfederal law.

In February 1999, the trial court held a hearing on themotion to suppress. In March 1999, the trial court granteddefendants' motion. The State filed a certificate of impairmentand now appeals the trial court's ruling. We reverse and remand.

In September 1998, the State charged defendants withpossession of more than 5,000 grams of cannabis and delivery ofcannabis. In January 1999, defendants jointly filed a motion tosuppress, arguing that the initial stop of defendants was improper because it was based solely upon information an informantreceived by illegally intercepting a cellular telephone conversation.

In February 1999, the trial court held a hearing on themotion to suppress. At the hearing, an officer of the Tiltonpolice department testified that, on the evening of September 18,1998, he was on duty and received a dispatch regarding a possibledrug transaction. An anonymous informant had called 911, alerting authorities that a drug deal was about to take place in theparking lot of the Aldi store on Georgetown Road in Tilton,Illinois, involving one teal-colored automobile. The informantindicated that he learned of this transaction when his scannerintercepted or "picked-up" a cellular telephone conversation.

This officer requested assistance from other officerson duty that evening. Officers positioned themselves in aparking lot across from the Aldi parking lot. Not long afterthey arrived, officers witnessed a teal-colored automobile driveinto the empty Aldi parking lot. The teal-colored car then droveout of the Aldi parking lot and stopped in the Speedway parkinglot adjacent to Aldi's. Next, officers witnessed a purple-colored automobile drive into the Aldi parking lot, exit the Aldiparking lot, and drive up alongside the teal-colored car. Afterbeing stopped next to each other momentarily with their headlights off, both vehicles switched on their lights and left theSpeedway parking lot, following each other north on Route 1. Theofficers, stationed in separate vehicles, stopped both the teal-and purple-colored automobiles. Officers testified that the stopwas based solely upon information received from the anonymoustip. The officers testified that they observed no trafficviolations by either car prior to the stop and that no search orarrest warrants had been issued prior to the stop.

Defendant Ledesma was driving the teal-colored vehicle. Perez was a passenger in that vehicle. Defendant Roth wasdriving the purple-colored vehicle. Edwards was a passenger inthat vehicle. After stopping Ledesma, the officer asked him ifthere were any drugs or alcohol in his vehicle. Ledesma deniedhaving any drugs or alcohol. The officer asked to "take a look"in Ledesma's vehicle. Ledesma indicated that such a search was"no problem," but asked the purpose of the search. The officerresponded that he had reason to believe that Ledesma's vehiclecontained drugs, after which Ledesma became "unsure" about thesearch. Despite his uneasiness, Ledesma never limited or withdrew his consent to search his vehicle.

The officers then asked Ledesma and Perez to step outof the vehicle. Officers then walked a canine unit aroundLedesma and Perez. The canine indicated on Perez's pants. Officers then walked the canine around the vehicle and the caninealerted on each side of the vehicle, at each door. Officers thenopened the vehicle to the canine, which alerted on the passenger's seat and on a black cloth bookbag lying on the floorboardon the passenger side of the vehicle.

While the officer searched Ledesma's vehicle, otherofficers placed Roth under arrest for driving with a revokedlicense. Roth indicated that his "bond" was under the front seatof his vehicle. Officers retrieved approximately $5,000 in cashfrom underneath the front seat of Roth's vehicle.

After the suppression hearing, the trial court took thematter under advisement. In March 1999, the trial court issuedits ruling, granting defendants' motion to suppress evidence,stating:

"Although[] the defendants' positionregarding the intercepted communication ispersuasive and not rebutted with any authority from the State, there is further reasonto question the stop in this case. Basedupon the totality of the circumstances inthis case, the so-called Terry stop [Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)] was not justified. In thiscase, there were no activities to show areasonable and articulable suspicion of criminality to justify the stop. There has to besomething more concrete than a vague andanonymous informant's tip. There was insufficient independent corroboration of the'tip' in this case to justify the initialstop. [Citations.]"

The trial court also found that the search exceeded the consentgiven by Ledesma. This appealed followed.

A. Propriety of the Anonymous Tip

Initially, defendants note that officers based theirdecision to stop defendants' vehicles solely on the informationreceived from the anonymous tip. Defendants argue that theinformant's information was obtained in violation of both Illinois and federal law and was properly suppressed as a result ofthe unwarranted stop. Our appellate court has previously foundthat both Illinois and federal law are applicable to eavesdropping cases. See generally People v. Wilson, 196 Ill. App. 3d997, 554 N.E.2d 545 (1990).

A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court'sdetermination at a suppression hearing unless it is manifestlyerroneous. People v. Alvarado, 268 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463, 644N.E.2d 783, 786-87 (1994). Such a judgment will not be found tobe against the manifest weight of the evidence unless it appearsfrom the record that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 206 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555, 564N.E.2d 929, 930 (1990). Where there is no factual dispute,however, we review the decision de novo. Alvarado, 268 Ill. App.3d at 463, 644 N.E.2d at 787. Here, there is no dispute as tothe facts, and we review the case de novo.

1. Federal Law

Federal law prohibits the use of intentionally intercepted wire or oral communications as evidence in criminal orcivil proceedings. 18 U.S.C.