NO. 4-03-0677

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                   )          Appeal from

           Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )          Circuit Court of

           v.                                          )          Macon County

JAMIE A. LEIGHTY,                                      )          No. 02CF947

           Defendant-Appellant.                        )

                                                       )          Honorable

                                                       )          Timothy J. Steadman,

                                                       )          Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

                        PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the

court:

                        On August 6, 2003, defendant, Jamie Leighty, wasconvicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine-manufacturingchemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (720ILCS 570/401(ii) (West 2002)) and criminal drug conspiracy (720ILCS 570/405.1 (West 2002)). The trial court sentenced defendantto concurrent sentences of 7 1/2 years in prison. Defendantappeals, alleging the court erred by denying defendant's motionto quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

                        On August 10, 2002, defendant drove approximately 2 1/2hours from his home in Lawrenceville, Illinois, to a Wal-Mart inDecatur, Illinois, and purchased two packages of pseudoephedrinepills.

                        Wal-Mart security officer Mike Catrell contacted DeputyJames Root and informed him that defendant had just purchased twoboxes of pseudoephedrine pills and possibly some lithium batteries. Catrell provided a physical description of defendant andhis vehicle.

                        Around the same time, Officer Brian Allison and OfficerPruitt received a dispatch report that a suspect purchased"amounts" or "a large quantity" of pseudoephedrine, and that thesuspect was proceeding to the neighboring Walgreen drug store,less than a block away. Allison and Pruitt located defendant'svehicle in the Walgreen drug store parking lot. They watcheddefendant leave Walgreen drug store with purchased items contained in a white plastic bag, get in his car, stop briefly atMcDonald's restaurant, and return to the Wal-Mart parking lot. All of this occurred within 10 minutes time.

                        Allison and Pruitt proceeded to the Wal-Mart parkinglot and initiated a stop on the car. During the stop, defendantprovided identification upon request and told the officers thathe was so far from home because he "had gone for a drive" after afight with his wife. Allison informed defendant that he wasbeing stopped because they received a complaint that defendantwas purchasing pseudoephedrine, possibly to manufacturemethamphetamines.

                        Upon request, defendant consented to a search of hiscar and his person. Allison found nothing suspicious on defendant's person but found items typically used in a methamphetaminelab in the vehicle, including a Wal-Mart sack with two boxes ofpseudoephedrine pills on the front passenger side floorboards,two boxes of pseudoephedrine pills in the Walgreen sack, twoadditional boxes of pseudoephedrine pills, some glass containers,a plastic container and a small hand pump in the trunk. Policealso found lithium batteries inside a Power Rangers toy and a mapof Illinois with a clear highlighted portion from Lawrencevilleto Decatur.

                        James Root then arrived on the scene, and Allison andPruitt told him what they had found. The officers then arresteddefendant. Defendant was ultimately convicted of unlawfulpossession of methamphetamine-manufacturing chemicals with theintent to manufacture methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(ii) (West2002)) and criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405.1 (West2002)).

II. ANALYSIS

                        The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred bydenying defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppressevidence. In reviewing a court's ruling on a motion to quasharrest and suppress evidence, we may reverse the court's findingof fact only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d 182, 188, 817 N.E.2d 489,492 (2004). We review de novo the ultimate questions of whetherreasonable suspicion existed and whether the evidence should havebeen suppressed. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d at 188, 817 N.E.2d at 492(regarding de novo review for suppression of evidence); People v.Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (2001)(regarding de novo review for reasonable suspicion).

                        Defendant alleges on appeal that all evidence resultingfrom the police stop of his vehicle should be suppressed becausethe police did not have reasonable suspicion under the fourthamendment to make the stop. "[T]he 'essential purpose' of thefourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness uponthe exercise of discretion by government officials, including lawenforcement officers, to safeguard the privacy and security ofindividuals against arbitrary invasions." People v. Jones, 215Ill. 2d 261, 269, 830 N.E.2d 541, 548 (2005), quoting Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667, 99 S. Ct.1391, 1396 (1979). Reasonableness does not always require awarrant supported by probable cause; rather, reasonableness isdetermined by balancing the legitimacy of government interestsagainst the degree of intrusion on fourth-amendment interests. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 269, 830 N.E.2d at 548-49, citing Prouse,440 U.S. at 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 667-68, 99 S. Ct. at 1396. Asearch is reasonable under the fourth amendment where (1) theofficer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) thesearch was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances thatjustified the interference in the first place. People v.Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 241, 798 N.E.2d 91, 99 (2003), quotingTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). The officer is justified in initiating aninvestigatory stop where he reasonably believes the person hascommitted or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22,20 L. Ed. 2d at 906-07, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Reasonable suspicionneed not rule out innocent conduct. United States v. Arvizu, 534U.S. 266, 273, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 749, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750(2002).

                        Although consent to a search generally vitiates fourth-amendment concerns, "[w]here an officer's detention of a personexceeds his authority under Terry v. Ohio, a subsequent consentto search can be tainted by that illegality." People v. Lomas,349 Ill. App. 3d 462, 469, 812 N.E.2d 39, 44 (2004). The factsof the present case, however, do not indicate an overreaching onthe part of the officers.

                        In deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, a lawenforcement officer may rely on training and experience to drawinferences and make deductions that may well elude the untrainedperson. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 749-50, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51. Allison had received specialized training regarding methamphetamine. He knew that pseudoephedrine and lithiumbatteries were precursors to methamphetamine, suspects may drivelong distances to purchase precursors, and suspects often go tomultiple stores to purchase the precursors so as to avoid raisingsuspicions with store employees. Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was underfoot. Prior tothe stop, Allison and Pruitt had (1) a physical description ofthe suspect and his vehicle, (2) information regarding thesuspect's purchase of "large quantities" of pseudoephedrine, and(3) a chance to observe further behavior. Given Allison'straining, the above information was more than enough to arousereasonable suspicion.

                        The facts of the present case are in direct contrast tothose in Lomas, which found that the officer did not have areasonable or articulable suspicion that the suspects were aboutto manufacture methamphetamine. Lomas, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 472,812 N.E.2d at 47. The officer in Lomas relied on an anonymoustip that four individuals had purchased Sudafed at a local Wal-Mart. Lomas, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 812 N.E.2d at 41. Theofficer in Lomas, however, did not provide any evidence toconnect the defendants with the individuals implicated in theanonymous tip; notably, the court in Lomas stressed that theofficer did not even mention whether the unknown tipster had lefta physical description. Lomas, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 812N.E.2d at 41. Additionally, the officer in Lomas did not labeldefendants' behavior as out of the ordinary before he stoppedthem. Lomas, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 465, 812 N.E.2d at 41. Unlikethe officer in Lomas, the officers here were able to articulate areasonable suspicion based on the physical description of defendant and his vehicle, as well as defendant's suspicious behavior.

                        Despite the fact that information regarding defendantavailable to the officers prior to the stop could also indicateinnocent conduct, the information was enough to lead to more thana hunch that criminal activity was afoot. The officers' actionsin stopping defendant to confirm or dispel their suspicions weretherefore appropriate. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2dat 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85.

                        Because the investigatory stop was justified at itsinception, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion toquash his arrest and suppress evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

                        For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

                        Affirmed,  

                        TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.