People v. McClain
State: Illinois
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-96-0277
Case Date: 09/11/1997
NO. 4-96-0277
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
WILLIE L. McCLAIN, ) No. 92CF1142
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Harold L. Jensen,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In March 1996, defendant, Willie L. McClain, was
serving a sentence of natural life in prison upon his conviction
of two counts of first degree murder when he filed pro se a post-
conviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)). Because defendant
filed his petition late under section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West Supp. 1995)), he also filed a motion to file a late
petition for postconviction relief. In that motion, defendant
alleged that his delay in timely filing his postconviction
petition should be excused because it was not due to his culpable
negligence, but was due instead to a "lockdown" at the Pontiac
Correctional Center (Pontiac), where he was incarcerated.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to file his
late postconviction petition. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 1993, a jury convicted defendant of two
counts of first degree murder stemming from the deaths of two
victims, and in March 1993, the trial court sentenced him to
natural life imprisonment on each conviction. He appealed, and
this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. People v.
McClain, 269 Ill. App. 3d 500, 645 N.E.2d 585 (1995). He filed a
petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois,
which was denied on April 5, 1995. People v. McClain, 161 Ill.
2d 535, 649 N.E.2d 422 (1995).
On March 18, 1996, defendant filed his postconviction
petition and accompanying documents (which included his motion to
file a late petition for postconviction relief instanter, an
affidavit in support of that motion, an affidavit in support of
his postconviction petition, a document entitled "memorandum of
law/finding of facts," a motion for appointment of counsel, and a
motion to proceed as a poor person).
In defendant's motion to file a late petition for post-
conviction relief, he asserted that Pontiac, where he was incar-
cerated, was on "lockdown" for reasons unknown to defendant
during the following times: 16 days of January 1995; five days
in February 1995; 17 days of March 1995; three days of April
1995; 12 days of May 1995; 13 days of June 1995; 24 days of July
1995; no days of August 1995; 12 days of September 1995; all of
October 1995; 12 days of November 1995; 21 days of December 1995;
20 days of January 1996; all of February 1996; and March 1
through 14 of 1996. Defendant further alleged that during such
"lockdowns," the prison severely restricted the movement of
inmates, including prohibiting them from using the prison's law
library. Defendant also asserted that continuous "lockdowns"
adversely affected his ability to investigate aspects of his
postconviction petition and to prepare it. As a result, he
sought assistance from a prominent Chicago law firm which--defen-
dant alleges--"held on to petitioner's transcripts given [sic]
the petitioner the false belief that they was [sic] going to
assist him only to tell him six-months [sic] later that they
wouldn't help him."
After defendant learned the law firm was not going to
assist him, he "finally got assistance from [a] jail house
lawyer." He concluded the motion by asserting that he had put
forth his best good-faith effort to file a timely petition and
the delay was not due to his own culpable negligence.
Defendant attached to that motion a letter dated
September 26, 1995, from the pro bono coordinator of the Chicago
law firm, which informed defendant that the law firm would be
unable to handle his case due to the large number of similar
requests it receives. Although the letter indicated that the law
firm was returning defendant's "documents" to him (without speci-
fying what those documents were), the letter did not indicate how
long the law firm had possessed those documents.
II. ANALYSIS
Resolution of defendant's argument that the trial court
erred by dismissing his postconviction petition on the ground
that it was not timely filed requires a careful analysis of
section 122-1 of the Act, which reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"No proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months after the denial
of a petition for leave to appeal or the date
for filing such a petition if none is filed
or more than 45 days after the defendant
files his or her brief in the appeal of the
sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court
(or more than 45 days after the deadline for
the filing of the defendant's brief with the
Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed)
or 3 years from the date of conviction,
whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner
alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West Supp. 1995).
The supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave
to appeal on April 5, 1995. Therefore, he had six months from
that date--or until October 5, 1995--in which to file his post-
conviction petition. (Note that this October 1995 deadline is
"sooner" than February 1996, which would be three years from the
date of defendant's conviction.) However, defendant filed his
postconviction petition (and its accompanying documents) on March
18, 1996, approximately 5
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