JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Johnnie C. Miles, moved to suppress theState's evidence against him because the police had acquired itby violating the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The State appeals, arguing that by requesting identification fromdefendant, a passenger in a car legally stopped for a trafficviolation, the police did not violate the fourth amendment.

The trial court found the police had no probable causeor articulable suspicion that defendant had committed any crime. We accept that pivotal finding because it is not against themanifest weight of the evidence. Efforts to identify defendantextended an otherwise routine traffic stop to as long as half anhour. We hold that the police impermissibly prolonged the stopand increased its confrontational nature, thereby violating thefourth amendment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

The information charged that defendant committed theoffense of obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2002))in that with the intent to prevent his apprehension, he lied to apolice officer, Troy Wasson, about his identity.

Two witnesses testified at the suppression hearing onJuly 31, 2002, Wasson and another Danville police officer, AmyBurns.

Burns testified she was patrolling Danville in hersquad car on January 16, 2002, at 11:20 p.m., when she pulledover a car driven by Trudy Lott. Defense counsel asked Burns:

"Q. Why did you stop the vehicle?

A. The rear registration light was notfunctioning."

The car had two occupants, Lott and a passenger, and they startedto get out. As Burns approached, she ordered them back into thecar. It was dark outside, and Burns did not recall if the insideof the car was illuminated.

Burns spoke with Lott first, asking for her driver'slicense and proof of insurance. Then she asked defendant, thepassenger, for identification. He replied he did not have anyidentification "on him," whereupon she asked him for his name anddate of birth. According to Burns, the stop had lasted, at thatpoint, "[m]aybe not even a minute." Defendant told her his namewas David Miles and his date of birth was December 10, 1972. Defense counsel asked Burns:

"Q. Why did you ask the passenger toidentify himself?

A. He didn't have a seatbelt on."

According to Burns, Wasson arrived "almost immediately"to back her up. By conferring with headquarters over the radio,Wasson learned that a man named Johnnie C. Miles, with a physicaldescription resembling that of defendant, was wanted on a warrantin Fountain County, Indiana. The prosecutor asked Burns:

"Q. *** From the time you stopped thecar until the defendant is actuallyidentified as Johnnie Miles, how long wouldyou say that took?

A. I don't recall. It's been a longtime. Maybe five minutes.

Q. Okay. Could it have been as long ashalf an hour?

A. Could have. I don't know. It tooka while for us to get the information fromInvestigator Hogren and to match him up, andthen we requested his [s]ocial [s]ecuritynumber[.] [A]ll that had to happen."

Wasson testified he heard on the radio that Burns hadstopped a vehicle and he went to assist her. When he arrived,Burns was speaking with Lott, the driver. Burns asked Wasson tohelp identify defendant, the passenger, because she "had [run][the] information [she had obtained from him] and he had comeback [as] [']no record on file.[']" "[A]t that point she wasoccupied with the driver[,] [and] I went ahead and took overquestioning Mr. Miles as far as his identification was." Wassonasked him for his date of birth and social security number. "Iran that [information] *** a different way through [DanvillePolice] Communications, [and] it still came back [as] [']norecord on file,['] and at that point I was contacted over the[handheld] radio by Detective Troy Hogren."

Wasson learned from Hogren that Fountain County hadissued an arrest warrant for a Johnnie C. Miles. Hogren gaveWasson the details of the warrant via radio. The physicaldescription in the warrant seemed to match that of defendant. The warrant also stated a social security number, which differedfrom the one defendant had given by only the two middle digits. Wasson told defendant to get out of the car because he was underarrest. Defendant got out, fled on foot, and the police chasedand arrested him.

Wasson estimated that from the moment he arrived untilthe moment he told defendant to get out of the car, "at the verymost 20 minutes" elapsed. "And during the entire time[,] we werecontinually checking information that he was providing[;] it wasan ongoing investigation."

Defense counsel asked Wasson:

"Q. Did you know why Officer Burnsstopped the vehicle?

A. She told me that he wasn't wearinghis seatbelt. He was cited for that later."

In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded thatthe "light over the license plate" was "out" and the policetherefore had "probable cause to talk to the driver and ask forinformation." He contended, however, that the police lackedprobable cause to question defendant. Just because defendant hadno seatbelt on when Burns was questioning him, it did not followhe had no seatbelt on at the time of the stop; for, as Burns hadtestified, Lott and defendant had started to exit the car, and todo so, they obviously would have had to unbuckle their seatbelts. Defense counsel cited People v. Gonzalez, 324 Ill. App. 3d 15,753 N.E.2d 1209 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 204 Ill. 2d 220,789 N.E.2d 260 (2003), for the proposition that a traffic offenseby the driver gives the police no probable cause to requestidentification from a passenger.

The prosecutor argued "the stop obviously [was] valid"and Burns had "probable cause [to ask defendant foridentification] based upon her sighting and observing [hisfailure] to wear a seatbelt." He argued the Second District'sdecision in Gonzalez, though not yet reversed, was unsound. According to him, the police "took it one step at a time" and"eventually" discovered defendant's true identity "after a fairlyshort period of time."

After hearing these arguments, the trial court reasonedas follows:

"Here's the problem as I see it. Thequestion to *** Burns was why she asked thepassenger for identification. Her responsewas he didn't have a seatbelt on. No follow-up question on cross or on redirect toindicate at what point he didn't have aseatbelt on. The testimony is they both[exited] the vehicle and then are told to getback in. Officer Wasson is then asked oncross-examination about his conversation withOfficer Burns as to why she stopped thevehicle[,] and he indicated that she saidthat she stopped the vehicle because hewasn't wearing a seatbelt ***. *** Now, Ithought back then, [N]o, wait a minute. Ithought the reason for the stop was thelight['s] being out. Either way[,] there'sno testimony that Mr. Miles is not wearing aseatbelt during the time that the vehicle isbeing driven. He may not be wearing aseatbelt when he's told to get back into thevehicle[;] that's not a basis for asking him[for] his identification."

The trial court also noted: "I have to look at whatevercircumstances under which she can tell me that a passenger in acar at 11:20 p.m. doesn't have [a] seatbelt on ***."

Quoting the appellate court's holding in Gonzalez, 324Ill. App. 3d at 20, 753 N.E.2d at 1214, that "generally, a policeofficer may not ask for and run a warrant check on theidentification of a passenger[] without reasonably suspecting thepassenger of criminal activity," the trial court granteddefendant's motion to suppress.

This appeal followed.

To the extent a trial court must make findings of factor assess witnesses' credibility when ruling on a motion tosuppress, we will not disturb the ruling unless it is against themanifest weight of the evidence. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 223,789 N.E.2d at 263. "Against the manifest weight of the evidence"means "all reasonable and unbiased persons would agree that theopposite conclusion is clearly evident." National City Bank ofMichigan/Illinois v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d1038, 1042, 780 N.E.2d 691, 695 (2002). If the facts areundisputed, we review the ruling de novo. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2dat 223, 789 N.E.2d at 263. In short, we defer to factualfindings that a reasonable trier of fact arguably could make fromthe evidence, but we do not defer to the trial court'sapplication of the law to those factual findings. People v.Jones, 337 Ill. App. 3d 546, 551, 786 N.E.2d 243, 247 (2003).

Whether Burns saw defendant had no seat belt on whenshe pulled the car over was a disputed issue of fact. The trialcourt resolved that issue against the State, and its finding wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence. A reasonabletrier of fact would not necessarily have to believe that Burnssaw defendant had no seat belt on while Lott's car was in motion. Burns testified that defendant "didn't have a seat belt on," but,as the trial court noted, it was unclear whether she meant at thetime of the stop or when she reached the driver's side window andlooked inside the car. According to Burns, Lott and defendantstarted to exit the car as she approached. Naturally, then,their seat belts would have been unbuckled when, after orderingthem back into the car, she spoke with them at the driver's sidewindow. Just because they were wearing no seat belts at thattime, it does not necessarily follow that they were wearing noseat belts earlier, when she pulled them over. Moreover, it wasnighttime, and Burns could not recall whether the interior ofLott's car was illuminated. Without any clarifying testimony,one might wonder how Burns could have seen, from the vantage ofher squad car, that defendant was wearing no seat belt.

In Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 222, 789 N.E.2d at 262, apolice officer asked a passenger for identification during avalid traffic stop, even though he had no reason to suspect thepassenger of any wrongdoing. The passenger gave him a trafficticket in lieu of other identification. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at222, 789 N.E.2d at 262. The officer ran a criminal history ofthe passenger. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 222, 789 N.E.2d at 262. "The ensuing encounter *** resulted in a search of defendant'sperson, revealing a packet of cocaine." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at222, 789 N.E.2d at 262.

The supreme court held that as a practical matter, thepassenger was "stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle" and,therefore, was "seized" within the meaning of the fourthamendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225-26, 789 N.E.2d at 264-65. The reasonableness of the seizure depended on a twofoldanalysis derived from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968): (1) "'whether the officer's actionwas justified at its inception'" and (2) "'whether it wasreasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justifiedthe interference in the first place.'" Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at228, 789 N.E.2d at 266, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. The stop was justified in itsinception because the police officer had witnessed a violation ofthe traffic law. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227-28, 789 N.E.2d at265-66.

In deciding whether the officer's action was"reasonably related in scope," the supreme court used thefollowing analysis:

"[W]e must consider, as an initial matter,whether the question is related to theinitial justification for the stop. If thequestion is reasonably related to the purposeof the stop, no fourth amendment violationoccurs. If the question is not reasonablyrelated to the purpose of the stop, we mustconsider whether the law enforcement officerhad a reasonable, articulable suspicion thatwould justify the question. If the questionis so justified, no fourth amendmentviolation occurs. In the absence of areasonable connection to the purpose of thestop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion,we must consider whether, in light of all thecircumstances and common sense, the questionimpermissibly prolonged the detention orchanged the fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at270.

Even though "the request for identification was notdirectly related to the initial justification for the stop andwas not otherwise supported by a reasonable, articulablesuspicion of criminal activity," the supreme court found noviolation of the fourth amendment, only because of the followingfacts:

"The request for identification was madeduring the course of the stop while thedriver was being questioned by the otherofficer and did not impermissibly prolongdefendant's detention. Further, we cannotsay that the question changed the fundamentalnature of the stop. A simple request foridentification is facially innocuous. Itdoes not suggest official interrogation andis not the type of question or request thatwould increase the confrontational nature ofthe encounter. We note, too, that defendantwas under no obligation to answer or comply." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at270.

The trial court in this case obviously could not haverelied on the supreme court's rationale in Gonzalez because thesupreme court had not yet issued its decision. Nevertheless, wecan affirm the trial court's judgment for any reason that therecord supports, regardless of whether the trial court relied onthat reason. People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 158, 565N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1990).

It is undisputed that the rear registration plate onLott's vehicle was unilluminated, that this deficiency violatedsection 12-201(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (see 625 ILCS5/12-201(c) (West 2002)), and Burns therefore had probable causeto stop the vehicle (see Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227-28, 789N.E.2d at 265-66). The stop was justified at its inception. SeeGonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228-29, 789 N.E.2d at 266.

We must next consider whether the police officers'interrogation of defendant "'was reasonably related in scope tothe circumstances which justified the interference in the firstplace,'" namely, the failure to illuminate the rear registrationplate. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266, quotingTerry, 392 U.S. at 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. The questions Burns and Wasson asked defendant--what is yourname, date of birth, and social security number--had nothing todo with Lott's failure to illuminate her rear registration plate. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235-36, 789 N.E.2d at 270.

Burns never said she saw defendant riding in the carwith his seatbelt unbuckled, and neither she nor Wasson had anyobjective reason to suspect him of wrongdoing. Thus, they had no"reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify" theirquestioning of defendant. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789N.E.2d at 270. Even if we assume, despite the lack of anygrounds for suspicion, that it was permissible for Burns to rundefendant's information through "Danville Police Communications,"neither she nor Wasson offered any explanation of why the resultof "no record on file" was inherently suspicious. We will notfill that gap by judicial notice. See People v. Fisher, 184 Ill.2d 441, 455, 705 N.E.2d 67, 75 (1998) (courts may take judicialnotice only of matters that are commonly known or, if notcommonly known, verifiable from sources of indisputableaccuracy). A court should not find reasonable grounds forsuspicion from the mere fact that the officers' suspicions werearoused. Like probable cause, "reasonable, articulablesuspicion" is an objective standard. People v. Avant, 331 Ill.App. 3d 144, 157, 771 N.E.2d 420, 431 (2002).

In Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at 270, apolice officer made a single request to a passenger foridentification "while the driver was being questioned by theother officer"; therefore, the request for identification "didnot impermissibly prolong" the passenger's detention. (Emphasisadded.) By contrast, in the present case, the officers' repeatedrequests to defendant for identifying data and their efforts todiscover his identity substantially prolonged the traffic stop. Burns testified, "It took a while"--as long as half an hour--"forus to get the information from Investigator Hogren and to matchhim up, and then we requested his [s]ocial [s]ecurity number[.] [A]ll that had to happen." The record does not appear to containany evidence that issuing Lott a ticket for a missing rearregistration light took half an hour--or, if it did, why it tookso long. "While we will not impose a rigid time limitation onthe duration of a traffic stop, we are concerned with theduration of the traffic stop in the present case." People v.Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 469, 782 N.E.2d 275, 280 (2002) (policeofficer impermissibly extended a routine traffic stop for amissing rear registration light to 15 minutes to make time forthe arrival of a drug-sniffing dog).

In Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at 270, the"simple request for identification" was "facially innocuous" and"[did] not suggest official interrogation." It was "not the typeof question or request that would increase the confrontationalnature of the encounter." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789N.E.2d at 270. Further, as the supreme court noted, thedefendant in Gonzalez "was under no obligation to answer orcomply." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at 270. Although he might not have known it at the time, defendant wasunder no obligation to answer the police officers' questions. InGonzalez, however, the supreme court rejected the line of casesholding that the police can ask a passenger any question providedthat the passenger has no obligation to answer. Gonzalez, 204Ill. 2d at 232, 789 N.E.2d at 268. Thus, it is clear fromGonzalez that the mere right not to answer does not necessarilysave a question from falling afoul of the fourth amendment.

Burns ordered defendant to get back into the car andstay there, and then she asked him for identification. When hestated he had none, she asked him for his name and date of birth. She radioed that information to headquarters, and when thecomputer check turned up nothing, Wasson took over. He askeddefendant again for his name and date of birth, and also for hissocial security number, so he could run the information throughthe computer a second time. Under these circumstances, thequestioning "suggest[ed] official interrogation" and "increas[ed]the confrontational nature" of what should have been a routinestop for a minor traffic offense. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at236, 789 N.E.2d at 270. The interrogation of defendant "changedthe fundamental nature of the stop" from an investigation of amissing rear registration light into an investigation of apassenger whom the officers had no reason to suspect of anywrongdoing. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at 270.

The police seized defendant when stopping Lott's carfor a missing rear registration light. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2dat 225-26, 789 N.E.2d at 264-65. Because the duration and mannerof the seizure were unreasonable, the officers' actions were not"'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances whichjustified the interference in the first place.'" Gonzalez, 204Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20,20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. Therefore, we find aviolation of the fourth amendment.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, J., concurs.

TURNER, J., dissents.

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The officers' conduct did notviolate defendant's fourth amendment rights.

Like Gonzalez, the officer asked defendant for hisidentification during a valid, ongoing traffic stop. The simplerequest for identification was facially innocuous and did notprolong defendant's detention or fundamentally change the natureof the stop. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at270. When defendant responded he did not have any identificationon him, the officer requested his name and birth date. Thatquestion is also facially innocuous and did not fundamentallychange the nature of the stop. Defendant replied with falseinformation, which yielded a "no record on file" result.

Based on defendant having provided false information,the officers continued to question defendant to obtain his trueidentity. If defendant had provided the correct information, thequestioning would not have exceeded the length of the validtraffic stop as in Cox. See slip op. at 13. Thus, the extendednature of this stop is attributable to defendant's providingfalse information, not the officers' conduct.

Additionally, I disagree with the majority's conclusionthe officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion ofcriminal activity once the warrant check yielded the "no recordon file" result. See slip op. at 12. The "no record on file"indicated defendant had lied about his identity and gave theofficers reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant hadobstructed justice.

Regardless of whether the officers violated defendant'sfourth amendment rights, the exclusionary rule of the fruit ofthe poisonous tree doctrine does not extend to suppressdefendant's conduct that formed the basis of his obstructing-justice charge.

Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, theconstitutional violation is considered the "poisonous tree" andany evidence that the State obtains by exploiting thatconstitutional violation is subject to suppression as the "fruit"of that poisonous tree. People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414,448, 645 N.E.2d 923, 940 (1994). However, our supreme court hasdeclined to extend the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence ofcrimes that arise from and are in reaction to an illegal searchor seizure. People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446, 455-57, 271 N.E.2d37, 43-44 (1971). Thus, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrinedoes not require the suppression of evidence of a defendant's ownunlawful conduct in response to police conduct that was inviolation of the fourth amendment. See People v. Santana, 121Ill. App. 3d 265, 270, 459 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1984).

This case is similar to Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at266, 459 N.E.2d at 656, where the defendant sought to quash hisarrest and suppress evidence of his actions that formed the basisof his resisting-a-peace-officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38,par. 31-1) and battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12-3)charges. There, the defendant spit in a police officer's faceand engaged in a scuffle with the same officer after severalofficers had entered the defendant's apartment even though he haddenied them access. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67, 459N.E.2d at 656-57. The court held that even if the officers'entry was unlawful, the evidence of defendant's conduct thatformed the basis of his resisting-a-peace-officer and batterycharges should not have been suppressed because the exclusionaryrule did not extend to cause suppression of the defendant'sunlawful actions that were in response to unlawful policeconduct. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 459 N.E.2d at 659;see also People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 378-79, 604N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992) (refusing to extend the doctrine toexclude evidence of the defendants' actions directed against thepolice officers after they entered defendants' home, regardlessof the illegality of that entry).

For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trialcourt's grant of defendant's motion to suppress.