JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged defendant, William A. Miller, withunlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis (720 ILCS550/5(c) (West 2002)) and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2002)). Defendant filed a motionto quash the arrest and suppress evidence. At the conclusion ofan evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Onappeal, the State argues the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's motion and suppressing evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2002, the State charged defendant by information with one count of unlawful possession with intent todeliver cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 2002)), alleging heknowingly and unlawfully possessed, with intent to deliver, morethan 10 grams, but not more than 30 grams, of a substance containing cannabis. The State also charged him with one count ofunlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a)(West 2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed a gold metalsmoking pipe with the intent to use it to smoke cannabis.

In October 2002, defendant filed a motion to quash thearrest and suppress evidence. He alleged that at the time of thestop, neither he nor any of the car's occupants had committed acrime or violated any traffic laws. Further, he argued thepolice officer had stopped and detained him without probablecause.

In November 2002, the trial court held a hearing ondefendant's motion. Defense counsel called Daniel Davis, apolice officer with the Pontiac police department. Davis testified he stopped a car driven by defendant at approximately 3:56p.m. on August 24, 2002. Approximately an hour before the stop,Davis was advised of an anonymous tip that defendant had beenparticipating in illegal activity involving cannabis. Davis wastherefore "looking to speak" with defendant, whose vehicle he sawparked at a residence in Pontiac. After following defendant,Davis pulled him over because of "a defective muffler, loudexhaust system." He characterized the muffler as "abnormallyloud, and when the vehicle accelerated, it was even louder, alower guttural sound."

After stopping defendant's car, Davis approached andspoke with defendant regarding the muffler. He obtained defendant's driver's license and insurance card and returned to hissquad car, while another officer spoke with two passengers in thecar. Having determined that defendant had a valid license, Daviswrote a warning for the muffler, returned to defendant's car, and(according to Davis's testimony) handed those documents todefendant.

Defense counsel asked Davis:

"Q. *** So, traffic stop completed atthat point, you're giving him the warning andgiving him his insurance card and his licenseback?

A. That is correct.

Q. At some point, did someone ask [defendant] to remove himself from the vehicle?

A. Yes, I did, so I could speak with himregarding the earlier complaint.

Q. *** Was this after you had given himthe insurance card and license and warningticket?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was your motivation in asking him to remove himself from the vehicle?

A. Just so I could speak with him separate from his two passengers regarding theinformation that we had received."

Davis testified that Sergeant Hugh Roop was observingthe stop in a separate vehicle approximately 200 feet away. Whendefendant got out of the car and walked toward Davis, Roop warnedDavis, over the radio, that he saw "some type of shiny objectsimilar to a knife, a large knife, in [defendant's] pocket." Davis asked defendant about the object, which, defendant admitted, was a knife. Davis removed a "large sheath knife" and setit on the hood of the car "for officer safety." Davis askeddefendant if there was anything else on him he should know about,and defendant told him "about the cannabis and other paraphernalia in his pocket." Davis then searched defendant for otherpotential weapons and found a bag of cannabis and a gold smokingpipe. He placed defendant under arrest. A search of defendant'scar revealed a "large amount of cannabis."

Defense counsel then played a videotape, shot fromDavis's squad car, showing the traffic stop. Davis narrated theevents up to when he pulled defendant's car over. The videotapeshowed Davis approaching the driver's side of the car and anotherpolice officer, Adam Fulkerson, on the passenger side. Thereafter, defense counsel fast-forwarded the tape to when Davisreturned to defendant's car, because the trial court wanted tohear that conversation. Upon watching that sequence, the courtremarked that Davis appeared to say, "'[W]ould you step on out,would you step on out for a second[?']"

The court continued, in part, as follows:

"Not wanting to cut anybody short, butthe [a]ppellate [c]ourt when they get thiswill say, at that instant he was seized, it'san absolute seizure of the defendant. The[a]ppellate [c]ourt will say, this was a goodstop, if you have excessive or unusual noiseout of your muffler, the police can stop. The [a]ppellate [c]ourt will say the trafficstop was *** 100[%] completed. *** *** But, I mean, we've got a good stop,we've got the traffic stop completed, we'vegot the defendant in the car. The otherofficers didn't add a lot other than in hismind, of the defendant or anybody else, thislooks like it's pretty serious. But thisamounts to an instruction by the officer toget out of the car. He is seized at thatpoint, and it's at that point that the stopis tainted."

The trial court granted the State permission to cross-examine Davis. Davis agreed it appeared, from the videotape,that he said to defendant, "Hey, William, could you hop on outfor me for a second?" He testified that if defendant had statedhe did not want to get out of the car, the stop "would have beencompleted" and he would have let him go. The videotape showedthat after Davis asked defendant to "hop on out," Davis walkedaway from the car. Davis did not open the door or order defendant out of the car. Davis testified that defendant exited hiscar, after which Davis removed the knife from defendant's beltand asked him if he had anything else he should know about,whereupon defendant "voluntarily told [him] that he had a pipeand a bag of weed in his left pocket."

Watching the videotape, one can see Davis approachingthe driver's window of defendant's car, collecting documents fromdefendant, and returning, documents in hand, to his squad car. Then, after a few minutes, one can see Davis walking back todefendant's car, documents in hand, and, without handing defendant anything, asking him to get out. As defendant gets out ofthe car and follows Davis to the rear of the car, Davis still hasthe documents in his hand.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress,characterizing this situation "as a direction to get out of thecar." The State filed a certificate of substantial impairmentand appealed the trial court's ruling pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 604(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)).

II. ANALYSIS

The State argues the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. Wedisagree.

A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

The appeal of a ruling on a motion to suppress presentsmixed questions of law and fact. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). We will not disturb the trial court's factual determinations and assessment of witnesses'credibility unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v.Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). We review de novo the trial court's ultimate decision of whetherto suppress the evidence. See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42,51, 743 N.E.2d 555, 562 (2001).

On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has theburden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful. 725 ILCS5/114-12(b) (West 2002). "However, once the defendant makes aprima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burdenshifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion." People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d1011, 1018 (2000).

B. The Traffic Stop

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, theIllinois Constitution affords citizens with "the right to besecure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessionsagainst unreasonable searches, [and] seizures." Ill. Const.1970, art. I,