The State of Illinois appeals the May 25, 2001, orderof the Moultrie County circuit court granting defendant BradleyR. Montgomery's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant had been charged by information with operating a motorvehicle in violation of gross weight restrictions (625 ILCS 5/15-111(b) (West 2000)). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2001, Officer Rick McFarland of theIllinois State Police was on "scale duty" in Moultrie County. The State Police had set up portable truck scales in the City ofSullivan in Moultrie County, and it was Officer McFarland'smission for the day to drive around looking at any truck he sawand see if he could tell if the truck was overweight. OfficerMcFarland stopped trucks that he suspected were overweight andordered them to drive to the scales in Sullivan to be weighed.

On this date, Officer McFarland was driving southboundon Route 32 in Moultrie County as part of his scale duty. Heobserved an approaching northbound international semitractortrailer truck turn west off of Route 32 onto Findlay Road. Defendant was driving this truck. Officer McFarland turned westas well and followed the truck for one-half to three-fourths of amile before activating his lights and stopping the truck. Theright rear tires on the trailer appeared to be "bulged out alittle bit." It was Officer McFarland's experience from 50 or 60prior cases that overweight trucks have bulging tires. This wasthe only indicator that the truck was overweight which OfficerMcFarland observed. Officer McFarland ordered defendant todrive to Sullivan, which was about five miles from where the stopoccurred, to be weighed.

Defendant's truck weighed in at 78,500 pounds, whichwas 5,220 pounds in excess of the maximum allowed by statute. 625 ILCS 5/15-111(b) (West 2000). The State subsequently chargeddefendant with operating a motor vehicle in violation of grossweight restrictions.

The State later dismissed the charge. OfficerMcFarland contacted the prosecutors on his own initiative afterlearning of this, and the charge was reinstated. The prosecutors had apparently misapprehended some of the facts in the case,i.e., defendant's truck was licensed to carry a load of up to80,000 pounds, and defendant's truck was in compliance withweight limits for Route 32. However, defendant's truck wasoverweight for Findlay Road, where it was stopped.

Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence, arguing that Officer McFarland did not have sufficientreason to believe defendant's truck was overloaded to justify thestop. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Stateappeals.

II. ANALYSIS

We must first note that defendant has not filed anappellee's brief. However, the record is simple, and the claimederrors are such that we can decide them without the aid of anappellee's brief. We therefore reach the merits of the appeal.See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.,63 Ill. 2d 128, 131, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).

When Officer McFarland stopped defendant and orderedhim to drive to Sullivan to be weighed, he was acting pursuant tosection 15-112(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS5/15-112(a) (West 2000)). Section 15-112(a) states:

"Any police officer having reason to believe that the weight of a vehicle andload is unlawful shall require the driver to stop and submit to a weighing of the same either by means of a portable or stationary scales ***. If such scales are not available at the place where such vehicle is stopped, the police officer shall require that such vehicle be driven to the nearest available scale that has been tested and approvedpur-suant to this [s]ection by the Illinois Depart-ment of Agriculture." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/15-112(a) (West 2000).

The determinative issue in this case is whether Officer McFarlandhad "reason to believe" defendant's truck was overloaded, justifying stopping defendant and ordering him to drive to the nearestavailable scale to be weighed. What exactly "reason to believe"means is not defined by the Act.

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erredwhen it granted defendant's motion to suppress on the basis thatOfficer McFarland did not have "probable cause," rather than"reason to believe," thereby equating the stop with an arrest. The State suggests that a stop pursuant to section 15-112(a) ofthe Code is actually a Terry stop, which need only be supportedby a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. People v.Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311 (1990); seeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968). Therefore, the State suggests that the "reason tobelieve" standard is equivalent to the "reasonable suspicion"standard, and the trial court erred by applying the more onerous"probable cause" standard. The State further argues that underthe "reasonable suspicion" standard Officer McFarland did havereason to believe defendant's truck was overweight because of hisexperience with 50 or 60 overweight vehicles where all of themhad tires that appeared to be deflated.

No other case we have found has specifically equatedthe "reason to believe" standard with the "reasonable suspicion"standard of a Terry stop. However, we agree with the State onthis point and find that a stop made pursuant to section 15-112(a) is equivalent to a Terry stop. We therefore also findthat an officer having "reason to believe" a vehicle is overweight means the same thing as an officer having "reasonablesuspicion" that a vehicle is overweight.

Our analysis of the nature of a stop made pursuant tosection 15-112(a) begins with the three theoretical tiers ofpolice-citizen encounters recognized by the Illinois SupremeCourt: (1) an arrest that requires probable cause, (2) a Terrystop, which requires reasonable suspicion, and (3) the"community-caretaking" function which involves no coercion ordetention and therefore no seizure. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 387-88, 560 N.E.2d at 311-12. There is also a fourth kind of encounter: "suspicionless, administrative searches that [are] conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme to ensure publicsafety, not as a criminal investigation to secure evidence ofcrime." People v. Parker, 284 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862, 672 N.E.2d813, 816 (1996).

Looking at the four types of police-citizen encounters,we note that a stop pursuant to section 15-112(a) of the Code isnot an arrest or search that requires probable cause. People v.Lumpp, 54 Ill. App. 3d 235, 237, 369 N.E.2d 323, 324 (1977); cf.People v. Ruth, 170 Ill. App. 3d 623, 625, 524 N.E.2d 1254, 1256(1988) (no distinction between "reason to believe" standard and"reasonable person" standard of probable cause).  A stop pursuantto section 15-112(a) is not a community-caretaking functioneither because an officer uses a show of authority to detaintruck drivers suspected of committing a crime, i.e., beingoverloaded. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 388, 560 N.E.2d at 312(community-caretaking function is "totally divorced from thedetection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating tothe violation of a criminal statute"). Nor can this type of stopbe classified as an "administrative search" that does not requireany individualized suspicion at all, because the police arelooking for evidence of a crime. Parker, 284 Ill. App. 3d at862, 672 N.E.2d at 816; see also People v. Franks, 72 Ill. App.3d 940, 942, 391 N.E.2d 574, 575 (1979) (an officer does not needany reason to believe trucks are overweight when every truck ofthat class is systematically stopped at a roadside check, but arandom stop of a particular truck is not authorized withoutindividualized reason to believe that a particular truck isoverweight). Therefore, by process of elimination, a stop madepursuant to section 15-112(a) is equivalent to a Terry stop.

We next determine whether the trial court erred ingranting defendant's motion to suppress.  We first point out thatthe trial court did not actually use a "probable cause" standardas the State argues. The trial court stated that it thought"reason to believe" was a "hybrid" between reasonable suspicionand probable cause. In any case, we review de novo whether thefacts found by the trial court constituted "reasonable suspicion"supporting a Terry stop. People v. Ross, 317 Ill. App. 3d 26,29, 739 N.E.2d 50, 54 (2000). The trial court's findings of factwill not be reversed unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 704 N.E.2d 375. 379(1998).

Defendant's defense in the trial court was basedprimarily on challenging the credibility of Officer McFarland'stestimony that he did in fact observe a slight bulge in the rightrear tires. Defendant produced testimony and exhibits to demonstrate that the tires on his truck and trailer were not underin-flated when he was stopped and that the load the tires were underwould not have caused any bulging of the tires. The trial courtdid not make any specific factual or credibility determinations. The trial court implicitly accepted Officer McFarland's testimonyas true by ruling that what Officer McFarland testified heobserved was not reason to believe defendant's truck was overweight.

The trial court based it ruling on one legal proposition: "whether or not a police officer who sees one indicator [ofa truck being overweight], as he testified that being the case,low tires on one side, is a sufficient indicator to rise to thelevel of [']reason to believe.[']" Some examples of recognizedindicators that a truck is overweight include a trailer ridinglower in the back than the front with tires that appear deflated,but after testing at the scene of the stop the tires are found tobe properly inflated (Lumpp, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 369 N.E.2dat 324); compressed springs and tires that appear low but arefully inflated (People v. Johanson, 28 Ill. App. 3d 82, 85, 328N.E.2d 331, 333 (1975)); strained engine noise, black smokecoming from the exhaust, and lack of acceleration (Ruth, 170 Ill.App. 3d at 625-26, 524 N.E.2d at 1256); and a load that is highup over the sides of the truck (People v. Lafin, 59 Ill. App. 2d489, 492, 208 N.E.2d 105, 106 (1965)). The trial court ultimately held that, in this case, the single indicator of theslightly bulging tires on one side, without more, was not enoughto give Officer McFarland reason to believe the truck was overweight. We agree.

What the evidence in this case demonstrates is that itis apparently very difficult to determine that a semitractortrailer is overweight just by looking at the tires. We first notethat tires that appear deflated have been recognized as giving anofficer reason to believe the truck is overweight, but only whencombined with other indicators that the truck was overweight andwhen the officer checked the tires' pressure and found them to beproperly inflated. Lumpp, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 369 N.E.2d at324; Johanson, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 85, 328 N.E.2d at 333. OfficerMcFarland did not check the tires' pressure in this case, andthere were no other indicators that the truck was overweight. Also, the tires in this case were radials, and Officer McFarlandhimself testified that radials will appear to have a slight bulgeeven if the trailer is empty. There was testimony from defendant's employer, who had been a truck driver for 24 years, thathe had seen a semitractor trailer like the one in this caseoverloaded to 95,000 pounds and there was no noticeable bulgingof the tires. Finally, defendant introduced into evidencephotographs of the trailer's rear tires from a rear and side viewunder loads from 70,420 pounds to 81,000 pounds. There was nodiscernible difference in the tires.

It is also significant that in this case defendant'struck was within its licensed weight capacity of 80,000 pounds. Defendant's truck was overweight solely by virtue of what road hewas on, not because his load was heavy enough to have an effecton his truck, such as overburdening the tires. Whatever bulgewas observed was not caused by an excess load on the tires. Admittedly, Officer McFarland did not know these facts at thetime he made the stop. However, it is relevant to further pointout how little one can determine about a truck's weight by simplylooking at the tires without checking whether the tires areproperly inflated.

Although Officer McFarland testified that in every casein which he had been involved with overweight trucks the truckshad bulging tires, it does not necessarily follow that everybulging tire means an overweight truck. This accords withOfficer McFarland's testimony that in his experience he usually noticed bulging tires only after seeing some other indicator thata truck is overweight. A slightly bulging tire combined withsome other indicator of a overweight vehicle would give anofficer reason to believe the vehicle is overweight. Also, ifafter the initial stop the bulging tires were checked and foundto be fully inflated, that is reason to believe the bulge isbeing caused by an excessive load. However, slightly bulgingtires on one side, without more, is not enough to give an officerreason to believe a truck is overweight.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the May 25, 2001, order of the MoultrieCounty circuit court granting defendant Bradley R. Montgomery'smotion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and APPLETON, J., concur.