JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 2000, a jury convicted defendant, ManuelMoreno, of cannabis trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000))and manufacture or delivery of more than 5,000 grams of a controlled substance containing cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West2000)). The trial court later sentenced him to 13 years inprison for cannabis trafficking and 6 years in prison for manufacture or delivery of cannabis, with those sentences to runconcurrently. The court also awarded defendant 219 days' creditfor time served prior to sentencing and ordered him to pay a $25Crime Stoppers fee.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) as a matter of law,he cannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking because (a) thatoffense is "complete" when the cannabis enters Illinois, and (b)the State presented no evidence connecting him to the cannabisat, or prior to, that point in time; (2) the prosecutor misstatedthe law on accountability during rebuttal closing argument; (3)the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ofmanufacture or delivery of cannabis; (4) he is entitled to anadditional day of sentencing credit; and (5) the trial courtlacked authority to order him to pay $25 to Crime Stoppers. Weaffirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

The evidence at defendant's July 2000 trial showed thatin March 2000, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol informed the IllinoisState Police that (1) in the course of a traffic stop, they haddiscovered approximately 450 pounds of cannabis stowed in a U-Haul truck en route to Springfield, Illinois; and (2) the couriers had agreed to cooperate in making a controlled delivery. Oklahoma authorities then transported the U-Haul, the cannabis,and the two couriers, Javier Chavez and Reuben Corona, to Illinois State Police headquarters in Springfield.

After interviewing Chavez and Corona, Illinois authorities rented two adjoining rooms at the Ramada Limited hotel(Ramada) on Toronto Road in Springfield. One room was used asthe couriers' hotel room and the adjoining room was used bysurveillance personnel. Audio and video recorders were placed inthe couriers' room, and Chavez wore a microphone. The U-Haulcontaining the cannabis was parked in the Ramada parking lot andwas equipped with an electronic "kill switch," which enabled thepolice to control whether it would run.

Illinois State Police trooper Michael Luster testifiedthat at around 10 or 11 a.m. on March 22, 2000, Chavez called hiscontact in Texas and told him that he had arrived in Springfieldand rented a room at the Ramada. Between 4:30 and 5 p.m.,defendant and Manuel Leyva arrived at the hotel room. Lusterobserved the room via video monitor. After about 45 minutes ofdiscussion, Chavez, Leyva, and defendant left the room and wentto the U-Haul. Luster could not see what happened at the U-Haul,but he could hear that they were trying to start it. They thenreturned to the hotel room and decided that they would have toreturn with a different vehicle. Leyva and defendant then lefttogether.

Later that evening, Luster saw Leyva return to thehotel room alone and instruct Chavez and Corona to unload thecannabis from the U-Haul into a Dodge Caravan (Caravan) that wasparked next to the U-Haul. After they loaded the Caravan, Chavezwas to walk to a nearby McDonald's, at which point Leyva wouldhave someone else drive the Caravan away. At some point, Coronaleft the room, ostensibly to get a Coke, and met with Luster, whogave him the key to the U-Haul.

After Chavez and Corona moved the cannabis, they wentback inside the hotel and gave the Caravan keys to Luster. Luster instructed Chavez to go to McDonald's. Luster was theninformed via radio that as Chavez walked toward McDonald's,Justin Moon approached and entered the Caravan. At that time,the arrest signal was given.

Springfield police detective George T. Bonnett testified that he was conducting surveillance outside the Ramada onMarch 22, 2000. He saw a black Mustang and a green Yukon arriveat approximately the same time. He saw the people in the Mustang(later identified as defendant and Leyva) get out of the car andtalk "for a bit" with the people in the Yukon. Then defendantand Leyva went back to the Mustang and left the area.

Bonnett learned via police radio that both vehicles"went over to the Hardee[']s parking lot, met over there," andthen the Mustang returned to the Ramada and the Yukon drovearound the parking lot of the Ramada and the surrounding businesses.

Leland Grove police sergeant Mark Gleason testifiedthat he was a member of the arrest team on March 22, 2000. Heidentified Michael Mohan as the driver of the Yukon and Moon asthe passenger. About 45 minutes after the Mustang and the Yukonarrived at the Ramada, Gleason saw Chavez and Leyva try to startthe U-Haul. He did not see defendant near the U-Haul.

Chavez testified that prior to March 22, 2000, he livedin El Paso, Texas. In March 2000, he made an agreement with aman identified in the record only as "Manny" pursuant to whichChavez would be "in charge" of getting 400 pounds of marijuanafrom El Paso to Springfield in exchange for $40,000. AfterChavez and Manny made this agreement, Chavez called Corona, whomhe had known for several years, and asked him to rent a U-Haultruck for him. Chavez and Corona picked up the U-Haul and metLeyva at an El Paso supermarket. Chavez turned the U-Haul overto Leyva and a couple other people who drove it away to load it. They returned the loaded U-haul to Chavez, who left for Springfield with Corona and one other passenger, a female friend ofCorona's.

In Oklahoma, police pulled the U-Haul over for atraffic violation and discovered the cannabis. Chavez and Coronaagreed to cooperate with the police, and Chavez called hiscontact in Texas to explain that they were delayed in Oklahomadue to a mechanical problem with the U-Haul. Oklahoma authorities then transported Chavez and Corona to Illinois State Policeheadquarters in Springfield. Chavez told Illinois police that hehad been instructed to rent a hotel room and call his contact inTexas when he arrived in Springfield.

At around 11 a.m. on March 22, 2000, Chavez called hisTexas contact from the Ramada and told him that they had arrivedin Springfield. Several hours later, Leyva called Chavez andtold him that he was on his way to the Ramada. When Leyvaarrived at the hotel room, defendant was with him. Chavez andLeyva began discussing the delivery of the contents of the U-Haul. During the conversation, Chavez referred to the contentsof the U-Haul as "mota," which is slang for cannabis. Chavez andLeyva disagreed on the amount Chavez was to be paid, and Leyvainsisted that the amount agreed upon was $30,000. Leyva also wasnot satisfied with where the U-Haul was parked. Defendant waspresent during the entire conversation, which lasted under anhour. Corona left the room "from time to time."

While Leyva was there, Chavez went out to try to movethe U-Haul. He returned to the room and told Leyva that it wouldnot start. Leyva accused Chavez of being afraid to move the U-Haul, and they went outside together. After Leyva tried andfailed to start the U-Haul, they returned to the room and discussed what to do. Chavez and Leyva ultimately agreed that theywould get a "Caravan" and return after sundown to be less conspicuous. Chavez first testified that defendant was presentduring this conversation, but he later testified that he couldnot recall whether defendant was in the room after he and Leyvahad tried to start the U-Haul.

A couple of hours later, Leyva returned to the hotelroom, handed Chavez the keys to the Caravan, which was parkedoutside, and told him to transfer the contents of the U-Haul intothe Caravan. Leyva also told Chavez that he would be at theMcDonald's across the street when everything was ready. Afterretrieving the padlock for the U-Haul from the police, Chavez andCorona went out to the parking lot. Chavez arrived at the U-Haulbefore Corona. When Corona arrived, he was carrying "somedrinks," and he told Chavez not to move anything because thepolice were at a nearby gas station.

After loading the Caravan, Chavez went into the hotel,gave the Caravan and U-Haul keys to the police, and walked toMcDonald's. As he reached the dining area, "everybody wasarrested."

Corona testified that on March 21, 2000, he used hisfather's credit card to rent a U-haul truck with Chavez, who didnot have a credit card. His testimony regarding what happened inEl Paso and his cooperation with Oklahoma and Illinois police waslargely consistent with that of other witnesses.

Corona further testified that Leyva and defendantarrived at the hotel room at around 4:30 p.m. When Leyva cameinto the room, he introduced defendant to Chavez and Corona butdid not explain who he was. Discussions were primarily betweenChavez and Leyva. They discussed whether "all the mota wasthere." Corona heard the word "mota" used a couple of times. The word "marijuana" was used "at least once." Chavez and Leyvaargued about whether Chavez was to be paid $30,000 or $40,000. Corona was not present for the entire conversation because heleft the room a few times to confer with the police officers inthe next room.

At one point, Chavez gave Leyva the keys to the U-Haul, and Leyva attempted to start it. Defendant went with them to theU-Haul and looked under the hood. Back in the hotel room, theydiscussed how they would transport the cannabis, and Leyva anddefendant then left to get another vehicle.

Later that evening, Leyva and defendant returned withthe Caravan, and they both stopped at the hotel room before goingto McDonald's. After they left, Corona left the hotel to getsome chocolate milk from the convenience store, and on his wayback to the hotel, defendant, who had walked back over fromMcDonald's, approached Corona and said, "Don't move the pot rightnow because there is a cop car right there," referring to apatrol car at the gas station. The patrol car pulled away aboutfive minutes later, and Corona and Chavez transferred the cannabis from the U-Haul to the Caravan. After they loaded theCaravan, Corona saw Moon get behind the wheel of the Caravan, andthe arrests began.

The jury heard audiotape recordings of the conversations recorded by Chavez' microphone and the recording devicesplanted in the hotel room. The jury also watched videotape ofthe hotel room. Because the recordings were primarily in Spanish, the jury was allowed to follow translated transcripts of thetapes while the tapes were played. Maria Velasco and SofiaStanford prepared the translation. Velasco and Stanford bothtestified that in preparing the transcripts it was sometimesdifficult to determine who was speaking. Stanford testified thatshe was responsible for the speaker identification in the transcripts and explained that after viewing the videotape to identify each individual's voice, she was able to distinguish thevoices on the audiotapes. Where she could not identify thespeaker she inserted a question mark instead of a name. Althoughthe tapes were admitted in evidence, the transcripts were notallowed in the jury room. Chavez testified that he had reviewedthe transcripts and noted that many statements were attributed todefendant that were not made by him.

The transcript of the recorded conversation thatoccurred in the hotel room when Chavez, Corona, Leyva, anddefendant were present is included in the record on appeal. Thattranscript shows that during the argument between Chavez andLeyva regarding how much Chavez was to be paid, Corona said "thatin El Paso the other Manuel had said they were going to give us$40,000."

Defendant testified that on March 22, 2000, he wasliving in Beardstown with his wife, her brother, and her parents.He was scheduled to work at AutoZone at around 2 p.m. and had todrop his son off with his son's mother in Springfield. Before heleft for Springfield, he received a phone call from EfraimEbarra, a former coworker. Ebarra asked defendant to "helpsomebody translate on some things." Ebarra "said that he had afriend that--that was coming to Springfield that had some problems with the truck on the way up" and Ebarra's friend did notspeak English. When asked if he was given any other instructionsregarding helping Ebarra's friend, defendant replied, "He justasked me to help him give him a ride maybe if needed." Ebarratold defendant that the man's name was Manuel Leyva and thatLeyva would meet him at the home of defendant's brother, MikeMoreno. Ebarra told defendant that he would be paid "somewherein the vicinity of $10, $15 an hour maybe." At some point in themorning, defendant called in sick to work because he was notfeeling well.

After defendant dropped off his son, he went to Mike'shouse, where he met Leyva for the first time. Leyva told himthat he wanted defendant to take him to the Ramada. Leyva didnot know his way around Springfield very well. They did notdiscuss what they would do at the Ramada, whether defendant wouldbe paid, or whether defendant was a mechanic.

They left Mike's house in Leyva's black Mustang andproceeded to Mohan's house. When asked why, defendant testified,"He just said to ask him to translate I guess." When theyarrived, Moon was also there. Defendant did not know either Moonor Mohan well, although he had gone to school with Mohan. Defendant translated a conversation in which Leyva told Moon andMohan to follow them to the Ramada to help unload something. Defendant then drove Leyva (in Leyva's Mustang) to the Ramada,and Moon and Mohan followed in a green Yukon. Leyva and defendant did not converse much on the way to the Ramada. When theyarrived, Leyva told Moon and Mohan to wait and asked defendant togo inside with him.

Leyva and defendant went to a room number that Leyvahad written on a piece of paper. Leyva knocked a couple oftimes, but no one answered. Leyva tried to make a call on hiscell phone but was unable to make a connection. They left thehotel and went to Hardee's so that Leyva could use a pay phone. Moon and Mohan also went to Hardee's. Defendant was not presentwhen Leyva made his phone call. After the call, Leyva askeddefendant to take him back to the Ramada. They went back to adifferent room at the Ramada, Leyva knocked on the door, and theywere let in.

Once inside the hotel room, defendant saw Corona andChavez, whom he had never met before. Leyva did not introducedefendant to Corona, and Chavez and did not explain to defendantwhy defendant was there. Leyva started talking to Chavez. Whenasked what they talked about, defendant testified as follows:

"A. *** [T]hey were talking about 40 and30 and 40 and 30 and something to do with thetruck. I really--I was kind of paying attention but yet I wasn't. I was trying to figure out--

Q. Did the conversation strike you asodd?

A. Yes it did.

Q. Did it make any sense to you?

A. At times it did and times it didn't.

Q. What did you think they were talkingabout?

A. Furniture.

Q. Okay. And did it strike you as oddthat they would have this weird discussionabout furniture?

A. Not really. Not at the time.

Q. Okay. The--While they were havingthis discussion, did you say anything?

A. I might have said a couple of things.

Q. And what--what did you say when yousaid anything?

A. I told them to do whatever he wasgoing to do so I could get out of the room.

* * *

Q. How did you feel at that point?

A. Mostly nervous really.

Q. Okay, why were you nervous?

A. It was just odd being in the hotelroom with three other people and then discussing things that I wasn't understanding."

Defendant further testified that during the time he wasin the room, he did not hear anyone mention the word "marijuana"or "mota." Defendant "had suspicion that something was going on. [He] wasn't for sure whether it would be marijuana or some kindof drug or something." After about 25 minutes, defendant, Leyva,and Chavez left the room. Because defendant felt "odd," he toldLeyva he was going to sit in the Mustang and he did not "want todo whatever [Leyva] was doing." Leyva said "fine," and defendantwaited in the Mustang for 20 to 25 minutes. During that time, hecould "kind of hear" that Leyva and Chavez were trying to start avehicle. Leyva then went to the Mustang to get something, left,and returned 5 or 10 minutes later. Leyva said "that he needed avehicle, a truck or van of some sort." Defendant told Leyva thathe did not personally have a truck or a van but that his sisterowned a van.

They then drove to Mike's house. There, defendantasked Amber Welinski (a friend of Mike's) if they could borrowher green Mazda because Leyva did not want to go back to theRamada in the same car. Defendant admitted that he thought thatwas "odd." Defendant then testified as follows:

"Q. But you went ahead and asked her?

A. Well, there was four other people. There was three other guys with them.

Q. That were with Mr. Leyva?

A. When I pulled into the house, Mr.Leyva was there, and when I got out, exitedmy vehicle, there was Mr. Leyva and fourother Hispanic males."

Defendant later testified that once they were at Moreno's house,he went along with Leyva's suggestions because he was "afraid[of] something maybe happening to [him] or something."

Moon and Mohan arrived about an hour later. Afterthat, defendant called his sister and asked to borrow the Caravan. She agreed. Defendant and Leyva drove to defendant'ssister's house in someone else's car, and Moon and Mohan tookWelinski's Mazda. When they got there, defendant's sister gavehim the key to the Caravan, and he drove it to the Ramada. Atthe Ramada, defendant got out of the Caravan, left the keys inthe ignition, and told Leyva he did not want anything to do withwhat he was doing. He then walked over to McDonald's, where Moonand Mohan were already waiting. They did not discuss what washappening at the Ramada. About 10 minutes after defendant leftLeyva at the Ramada, Leyva arrived at McDonald's. Defendanttranslated for Leyva when he asked Moon to drive the Caravan overto McDonald's. Moon walked over to the hotel, and everyone wasarrested.

During cross-examination, defendant admitted that heused to own Mike's home, lived there "off and on," and receivedhis mail there. He also admitted that (1) Leyva, Corona, andChavez all spoke Spanish and there was no need for a translatorin the hotel room; and (2) before defendant volunteered theinformation, Leyva did not know that defendant's sister had aminivan.

Welinski testified that on March 22, 2000, she was atMike's house at around 5 p.m. When she arrived, Mike and "threeother guys" were present. They were Mexicans who did not speakEnglish, and she had never met them before. Later, defendant andLeyva arrived, and shortly thereafter, Mohan and Moon arrived. Defendant asked Welinski if he could borrow her car, and sheagreed.

Based on this evidence, the jury found defendantguilty, and the trial court later sentenced him as stated. Thisappeal followed.

Defendant first argues that as a matter of law, hecannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking because (1) that offenseis complete when cannabis enters Illinois; and (2) the Statepresented no evidence connecting him to the cannabis at or beforethat point in time. We disagree.

Because the interpretation of a statute is a questionof law, our review is de novo. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001). The cardinal rule ofstatutory interpretation requires us to ascertain and give effectto the intent of the legislature. The language of the statuteitself is the best indicator of the legislature's intent and thuswe look first to the language of the statute to determine itsmeaning. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348, 747 N.E.2d at 346.

Section 5.1(a) of the Cannabis Control Act (Act)defines the offense of cannabis trafficking as follows:

"Except for purposes authorized by thisAct, any person who knowingly brings orcauses to be brought into this State for thepurpose of manufacture or delivery or withthe intent to manufacture or deliver 2,500grams or more of cannabis in this State orany other state or country is guilty of cannabis trafficking." 720 ILCS 550/5.1(a)(West 2000).

We reject defendant's contention that the offense ofcannabis trafficking is absolutely complete when the cannabiscrosses Illinois state lines. Rather, we hold that the deliveryof cannabis to a recipient within Illinois is a contemplated partof the offense of cannabis trafficking.

To be clear, we recognize that delivery is not requiredto sustain a conviction for cannabis trafficking. If authoritiesapprehended cannabis couriers after they crossed state lines butbefore they reached their intended destination or transferred thecannabis to an intended recipient or distributor, they wouldstill be guilty of cannabis trafficking under section 5.1(a) ofthe Act (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)). However, when lawenforcement authorities allow such a criminal endeavor to playout, the delivery to the intended recipient does not constitute aseparate criminal offense. Rather, it constitutes the completionof the cannabis trafficking enterprise.

This construction of the cannabis trafficking statutereflects the legislative intent behind its enactment. Putbluntly, the evil the legislature sought to address by enactingthat statute was not preventing persons from entering Illinoiswith large quantities of cannabis and, once over the state line,dropping it in some garbage dump or culvert, never to be found orused by anyone. Instead, the legislature wanted to prohibitpeople from entering Illinois "with the intent to manufacture ordeliver" (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)) large quantities ofcannabis and, in fact, delivering it, as occurred in the presentcase.

Resolution of this case requires that we furtherconsider the interplay between the criminal accountabilitystatute, section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (CriminalCode) (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2000)), and section 5.1(a) of theAct (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)). Under section 5-2(c) ofthe Criminal Code, a person is legally accountable for theconduct of another if "[e]ither before or during the commissionof an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate suchcommission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid,such other person in the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2000).

For the sake of analysis, consider the followinghypothetical. An individual in El Paso (the loader) loads alarge quantity of cannabis onto a truck bound for Springfield. Although the loader did not make any of the arrangements for theshipment, he knew he was loading cannabis, that it would bedriven to Illinois, and that someone in Illinois would be receiving this shipment. Clearly, once the cannabis crossed theIllinois state line, the loader would be guilty of cannabistrafficking in Illinois under sections 5-2(c) of the Code and 5.1of the Act even though he was at all times 1,000 miles away fromthis state. He would be guilty of that offense because, with theintent to facilitate its commission, he knowingly aided others inthe commission of cannabis trafficking by assisting the shipperwho caused the cannabis to be brought to Illinois.

Let us further assume that the truck is driven from ElPaso to Springfield by a third individual (the driver). Afterthe driver enters Illinois, he stops for lunch and then proceedsto Springfield where the truck is unloaded by another individual(the off-loader). The off-loader knows he is unloading cannabisfrom outside Illinois but is doing it at the request of another(the recipient) and did not make any of the arrangements for theshipment or delivery. Under defendant's theory that the offenseof cannabis trafficking is complete when the cannabis entersIllinois, the off-loader cannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking. We conclude that this is an absurd result and one notintended by the legislature. The reasonable result--and what weconclude the legislature intended--would be for the individualwho knowingly and intentionally assists in the completion of thecriminal enterprise to be guilty, just as is the person whoknowingly and intentionally assists at its inception.

We therefore hold that (1) the offense of cannabistrafficking can encompass the delivery of the cannabis; and (2)when the requirements of section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code areotherwise satisfied, one who (with the intent to promote orfacilitate the commission of cannabis trafficking) solicits,aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another person in thecommission of that offense at any point in that enterprise,including its delivery component, is guilty of cannabis trafficking.

In support of our conclusion that defendant is criminally accountable for cannabis trafficking under section 5-2(c)of the Criminal Code, we note again that the conversation in theRamada Inn in which defendant either participated or was presentcontained Corona's statement "that in El Paso the other Manuelhad said they were going to give us $40,000." (Emphasis added.) This statement shows that defendant either knew--or was chargeable with knowing--that the marijuana originated from out ofstate.

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated thelaw of accountability during rebuttal closing argument when hestated that defendant was accountable for the criminal acts Leyvacommitted prior to collaborating with defendant in Illinois. Wedisagree.

During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutorstated, in pertinent part, as follows:

"I told you in opening statements the[d]efendant didn't do anything personally, hedidn't drive it across state lines. He wasn't the one down in Texas. [Leyva] was theone down in Texas. He is accountable, he isresponsible for [Leyva] because he is[Leyva's] accomplice. They are working together, consequently he is responsible forthe things that [Leyva] has done.

Since he's involved during the commission of the offense, he's responsible for thewhole thing, just like every other defendant. That's the law. It's very simple. It's verysimple. Simply look at the accountabilitystatute. If the [d]efendant knowingly participated during the course of events, he'sresponsible for his codefendants.

In this case it's [Leyva]. [Leyva] isthe person responsible for causing thosedrugs to be brought into Illinois.

El Paso to Justin Moon, if the[d]efendant knowingly participates duringthat time period, he's on the hook for whathis accomplices do. That's what accountability law is all about."

Defendant concedes that by failing to raise a timelyobjection at trial, he has forfeited this issue on appeal. Nevertheless, he urges us to review it under the plain errorrule, which allows for review of issues that are otherwiseforfeited when either (1) the evidence is closely balanced; or(2) the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that thedefendant was denied a fair trial. People v. Johnson, 317 Ill.App. 3d 666, 668-69, 740 N.E.2d 457, 459 (2000), appeal pending,No. 90678.

In light of our previous conclusion--that one who, withthe intent to promote or facilitate the commission of cannabistrafficking, aids another in the commission of any aspect of thatcriminal enterprise is also guilty of cannabis trafficking--wefurther conclude that the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal werenot error at all. As earlier stated, Leyva was still committingthe offense of cannabis trafficking when he accepted delivery ofthe cannabis from Chavez and Corona. Thus, the prosecutor'sinartful statement of the law of accountability did not unfairlyprejudice defendant. See People v. Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d 984,993, 728 N.E.2d 669, 677 (2000) ("Improper remarks requirereversal only if they substantially prejudice defendant").

Defendant next argues that the State failed to provehim guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of manufacture or deliveryof cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2000)) because neither he,nor anyone for whom he was accountable, ever possessed thecannabis. Specifically, he contends that once the cannabis wasconfiscated in Oklahoma, it was in the possession and control ofthe police, not defendant's accomplices. We disagree.

This court will not set aside a criminal conviction ongrounds of insufficient evidence unless "the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of thedefendant's guilt." Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 353, 747 N.E.2d at349. "[T]he relevant question is whether, after reviewing all ofthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubtthe essential elements of the crime." Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at353, 747 N.E.2d at 349. It is the jury's responsibility to"determine the witnesses' credibility and the weight given totheir testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and todraw reasonable inferences from the evidence." People v. Ortiz,196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001).

Pursuant to section 5 of the Act, "[i]t is unlawful forany person knowingly to manufacture, deliver, or possess withintent to deliver, or manufacture, cannabis." 720 ILCS 550/5(West 2000).

"To support a conviction for unlawfulpossession of cannabis, the State must provethat the defendant had knowledge of the substance and that it was under his immediateand exclusive control. [Citation.] Possession may either be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Constructive possession existswhen there is no personal present dominionover the drugs, but there is an intent and acapacity to maintain control and dominionover them. [Citation.] Possession may bejoint or shared and yet still be exclusive. [Citation.]" People v. Wells, 241 Ill. App.3d 141, 145-46, 608 N.E.2d 578, 582-83(1993).

Our review of the record shows that the State presentedsufficient evidence of Leyva's possession of the cannabis. TheState's evidence showed that (1) Leyva orchestrated the loadingof the cannabis onto the U-haul in El Paso; (2) Leyva was theintended recipient of the cannabis and was responsible forarranging the transfer of the cannabis from the Ramada to anotherlocation; and (3) Leyva attempted to drive the loaded U-Haul whenit was parked at the Ramada. Although the cannabis was notalways in Leyva's actual physical possession, the evidenceclearly showed he had the "intent and capacity" to maintaincontrol over it. The fact that law enforcement authorities alsohad the intent and capacity to maintain control over the cannabisdoes not negate Leyva's culpability. See Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3dat 146, 608 N.E.2d at 583 (possession may be joint or shared andstill be exclusive).

The State also presented sufficient evidence of defendant's culpability as Leyva's accomplice. Pursuant to section 5-2(c) of the Code, defendant's conviction of manufacture ordelivery of cannabis must be sustained if the State proved beyonda reasonable doubt that (1) defendant aided Leyva in the planningor commission of the offense either before or during Leyva'scommission of the offense, and (2) defendant intended to promoteor facilitate Leyva's commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2000). We emphasize that when, as here, we areconfronted with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,we need not accept all of the evidence that constitutes thedefendant's innocent explanation. Rather, given the jury'sguilty verdict, we look to the evidence in the record supportingthat conclusion.

The evidence that defendant aided Leyva in possessingthe cannabis is overwhelming. Thus, the only colorable challengeto the sufficiency of the evidence lies in the element of defendant's intent. Evidence of criminal intent is not usuallydirect; rather, intent is proved circumstantially by inferencesreasonably drawn from the circumstances of the defendant'sconduct. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 354, 747 N.E.2d at 349. Whilethe record contains some conflicting evidence and defendant'sdenials, the following evidence was before the jury and servessufficiently as a basis for its conclusion that defendant intentionally aided Leyva: (1) defendant drove Leyva to the Ramadaand accompanied him to meet with Chavez and Corona; (2) there wasno need for a translator in the hotel room; (3) Leyva and defendant reconnoitered with Mohan and Moon at Mike's home, which wasalso defendant's home "off and on"; (4) defendant asked Welinskiif he could borrow her car; (5) defendant volunteered the use ofhis sister's Caravan; (6) defendant drove the Caravan back to theRamada; and (7) defendant warned Corona not to unload the "pot"while a police car was parked nearby.

Defendant next argues that he is entitled to an additional day of sentencing credit under section 5-8-7(b) of theUnified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2000)). The State concedes that defendant was in custody for 220 daysprior to sentencing and that the trial court erroneously awardedhim credit for only 219 days. We accept the State's concessionand remand with instructions to amend the sentencing order toreflect one additional day of credit for time served prior tosentencing.

Last, defendant argues that the trial court lacked theauthority to order him to pay $25 to Crime Stoppers. CitingPeople v. Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d 829, 837, 763 N.E.2d 925, 931(2002), the State concedes that the court lacked such authority,and we accept the State's concession. Accordingly, that part ofthe court's sentencing order imposing the $25 fine for CrimeStoppers is void and set aside.

For the reasons stated, we affirm in part, vacate inpart, and remand with directions to modify the sentencing orderas stated.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remandedwith directions.

KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.