JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Defendant Anthony M. Olivieri appeals his juryconviction for three counts of aggravated criminalsexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) through (a)(4)(West 1998)) and his sentence of 3 consecutive 10-yearprison terms. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged by information with fivecounts. Counts I and II were counts for home invasion(720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 1998)). Counts III, IV, andV alleged three separate statutory violations for aggravated criminal sexual assault. Count III allegedthat defendant caused bodily harm to his victim (720ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 1998)); count IV alleged thatdefendant threatened or endangered the life of hisvictim (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(3) (West 1998)); and countV alleged that defendant committed the sexual assaultin the commission of another felony, home invasion (720ILCS 5/12-14(a)(4) (West 1998)).

At trial, defendant admitted that in the earlymorning hours of November 27, 1999, he forced his wayinto the victim's home, battered her rather severely,and then committed at least four acts of sexual penetration, including oral, vaginal, and anal penetrations. Defendant claimed that the sex, which cameafter the beating, was consensual. The victim anddefendant had been in a long-term sexual relationship,and defendant had lived with the victim up until a fewdays before the assault. The victim testified that thesex was not consensual, defendant had threatened tokill her, and she feared for her life.

The jury found defendant guilty on all threeaggravated criminal sexual assault counts, and at thesentencing phase the State filed a sentencing memorandum recommending the trial court enter verdicts on eachof the three aggravated sexual assault counts basedupon three different acts of penetration. The Statealso recommended that the two counts of home invasionmerge because only one entry resulted in injury to thevictim. Defendant argued that the three aggravatedsexual assault counts should be merged because thecounts were charged in the alternative and, therefore,the charging instrument did not afford him notice thatthe State was prosecuting each act of penetration as aseparate offense.

The trial court merged the remaining count ofhome invasion into count V, aggravated sexual assaultduring a home invasion, because home invasion was anincluded offense in that charge. The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years for each count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, to be served consecutively. Defendant's posttrial motions were denied. Defendant now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) theevidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond areasonable doubt, and (2) he was denied a fair trialbecause he was charged for one offense under threedifferent theories, yet was sentenced for three separate offenses. We address each issue in turn.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidenceon appeal, the test on review is whether, after viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found theessential elements of the crime beyond a reasonabledoubt. People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 203, 582N.E.2d 690, 697 (1991). Where no factual or credibility dispute is involved and the question on appealinvolves only the trial court's application of the lawto the undisputed facts, the appellate court's standard of review is de novo. People v. Rockey, 322 Ill.App. 3d 832, 836, 752 N.E.2d 576, 580 (2001).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant first argues that the evidenceagainst him was insufficient to support a convictionfor aggravated criminal sexual assault because thevictim's testimony was not corroborated. The requirement that a sex-offense victim's testimony be corroborated was specifically abandoned by the Illinois Supreme Court a decade ago in Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 202,582 N.E.2d at 696-97. Defendant's argument is withoutmerit.

In sex-offense cases, as in all criminal cases,when the issue is the sufficiency of the evidence, thetest on review is whether, after viewing the evidencein the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essentialelements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203, 582 N.E.2d at 697. Thevictim's testimony, if believed by the jury, proved theelements of each count of aggravated criminal sexualassault beyond a reasonable doubt. We will not substitute our judgment of the credibility of the witnessesfor that of the jury. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d91, 132, 718 N.E.2d 88, 111 (1999).

C. Sufficiency of Notice That the State Intended Treat

Defendant next argues that he was deprived of afair trial because the charging instrument charged himin the alternative and did not provide notice that theState was proceeding on three separate acts that wouldsupport three separate convictions. We disagree.

As defendant points out, the State's Attorneyhas exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of criminal prosecutions, including the right tochoose what charges to bring (People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 113, 643 N.E.2d 762, 772-73 (1994)) and in whatmanner the charges can be brought. Further, prosecutorial intent, as indicated in the wording of the charging instrument, has been regarded as a significantfactor for determining whether defendant's conductshould be treated as a single act. People v. Crum, 183Ill. App. 3d 473, 490, 539 N.E.2d 196, 207 (1989). Inthe case sub judice, the State clearly charged defendant with three separate counts of aggravated criminalsexual assault, and defendant was on notice of his needto defend against all three counts. Moreover, andcontrary to defendant's assertion, defendant was notcharged alternatively with three counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault.

The record reflects defendant was clearly charged byinformation with three separate sexual assaults: (1) by threatening the victim, (2) by causing bodily harm, and (3) by actingduring a home invasion:

"COUNT III - AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL SEXUALASSAULT, in that he, in committing a CriminalSexual Assault[,] caused bodily harm to[R.Y.], in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) [(West 1998)].

COUNT IV - AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL SEXUALASSAULT, in that he, in committing a CriminalSexual Assault, acted in such a manner as tothreaten or endanger the life of [R.Y.], inviolation of 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(3) [(West1998)].

COUNT V - AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL SEXUALASSAULT, in that he, in committing a CriminalSexual Assault[, committed the assault] during the course of the commission or attemptedcommission of another felony by the accused,Home Invasion, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(4) [(West 1998)]."

These three offenses were not charged in the alternative.

Further, in addition to the clear language inthe charging instrument, the evidence presentedthroughout the preliminary hearing, trial, and sentencing consistently references three separate assaults, inkeeping with the manner in which defendant was charged. At the preliminary hearing, the State presented thetestimony of Investigator Kirk Miller, who testified tothree separate sexual acts perpetrated against thevictim. During direct examination of Miller, the Statewas specific in inquiring whether the victim had consented to "any type" of sexual activity, e.g., intercourse, oral sex, or anal sex.

"MR. BRINEGAR [(Assistant State's Attorney)]: Did you question her about whether atany time that she consented to any type ofsexual activity with him on that day?

KIRK MILLER [(Investigator)]: Yes, Idid.

Q. And what is her answer to that question?

A. She stated she did not consensuallyengage in any sexual activity with Mr.Olivieri.

Q. Specifically what type of sexualactivity did he force her to engage in?

A. Oral sex, anal sex, and sexual intercourse."

Further, at trial the State presented and arguedthe case--without objection--to the jury as five separate crimes. In the statement of the case, the State argued:

"The People further charge that on orabout November 27, 1999, the defendant incommitting a Criminal Sexual Assault causedbodily harm to [R.Y.] in violation of statute.

The People further charge that on orabout November 27, 1999, the defendant, incommitting a Criminal Sexual Assault, actedin such a manner as the [sic] threaten orendanger the life of [R.Y.] in violation ofstatute.

The People further charge that on orabout November 27, 1999, the defendant, incommitting a Criminal Sexual Assault [, committed the assault] during the course of thecommission or attempted commission of anotherfelony by the accused, Home Invasion, inviolation of statute."

The State also argued three separate acts in opening and threeseparate sexual penetrations in closing.

"Two days later Anthony Olivieri in theearly morning hours of November 27 aftercalling [R.Y.'s] house several times, gettingno answer, started knocking on [R.Y.'s] door. She refused to answer the door, so he brokeit in. He knocked the glass out of the door.

She tried to call--she was running. Shetried to call the police. Before she couldget to the phone, she is grabbed, and she ischoked. She is choked to the extent that shepasses out for a short period of time, wakesup, is choked again, is struck, is raped, isforced to suck on his penis. He places hisfinger in her rectum. He leaves marks. ***

The [d]efendant caused bodily harm to[R.Y.]. That's one of the three differentways. There are three different ways tocommit aggravated criminal sexual assault. Two issues are the same in those charges. One is different. The difference is wherethe bodily harm is called, another aggravatedfactor that makes it more serious than criminal sexual assault.

Whether the [d]efendant acted in a manner as to threaten or endanger the life ofthe victim, another aggravated factor thatmakes it more serious than criminal sexualassault.

And the last one, committing it during ahome invasion. As to all three of those[,]you have to prove first the [d]efendant committed the act of sexual penetration; second,that he committed the act by the use of forceor threat of force; and then one of thosedifferent aggravating factors.

Again, no question we have bodily harm. Two, there's no question he threatened orendangered her life. I would suggest anyonewho knocks your head into a wall to the extent that you are knocked out, in addition tothreatening you, has threatened or endangeredyour life.

And, third, the home invasion we'vealready talked about. He's committing thissexual assault during home invasion.

Ladies and [g]entlemen, I ask you to useyour common sense here. Look at the evidenceyou saw, and from that evidence that youheard from the stand there and see in thephotos here and seeing the [d]efendant's ownsignature about where he was living on November 27, the only appropriate verdicts, theonly verdicts called for, screamed for, bythe evidence that you heard are guilty on allfive counts."

Defendant himself also testified to five separate penetrations.

In addition, the jury was instructed without objectionand returned verdicts on three separate crimes of criminal sexualassault: (1) by threatening the victim, (2) by causing bodilyharm, and (3) by acting during a home invasion. (Unfortunately,this record contains only the jury verdicts, not the completeinstructions or a transcript of their reading to the jury.)

Finally, we disagree with defendant's argumentthat the State was required to reference the specificpenetration in each count. For purposes of review, theindictment was sufficient if it apprised defendant ofthe precise offense charged with enough specificity toallow him to prepare his defense and allow pleading aresulting conviction as a bar to future prosecutionarising out of the same conduct. People v. DiLorenzo,169 Ill. 2d 318, 323, 662 N.E.2d 412, 414 (1996). Further, Illinois case law provides that the type ofsexual penetration is not an element of the offense,and its inclusion in the indictment is merelysurplusage. People v. Carter, 244 Ill. App. 3d 792,803-04, 614 N.E.2d 452, 460 (1993). Therefore, if thestatutory language used describes specific conduct, itis unnecessary for the indictment to specify the exactmeans by which the conduct was carried out. The Stateneed only prove that a type of sexual penetration occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Foley, 206Ill. App. 3d 709, 718, 565 N.E.2d 39, 45 (1990). Moreover, to the extent that defendant may have desired toknow more of the details of the charge, he could havefiled a request for a bill of particulars. DiLorenzo,169 Ill. 2d at 324, 662 N.E.2d at 414.

In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish theIllinois Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Crespo,No. 86556 (February 16, 2001), ___ Ill. 2d ___, ___N.E.2d ___. In Crespo, the defendant stabbed his victim three times. Based upon these three stabs, thedefendant was charged with aggravated battery and armedviolence, with the armed violence charge predicatedupon the aggravated battery (great bodily harm). Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted andsentenced for both offenses. Crespo, slip op. at 2-3,___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___. The defendantargued that the aggravated battery charge must be vacated because it was based upon the same physical act(the three stabs) as the armed violence conviction. Crespo, slip op. at 3, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2dat ___. On appeal before the supreme court, the Stateargued for the first time that each stab was a separateact that could support a separate conviction. Crespo,slip op. at 4, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

The Illinois Supreme Court noted that each stab"could have" supported a separate conviction, and theState "could have argued the case to the jury thatway." (Emphases in original.) Crespo, slip op. at 7,___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___. The State,however, portrayed the stabs to the jury as a singleattack, and the State never argued to the jury thateach stab alone would be sufficient to sustain thecharge against defendant. Under those circumstances,the Illinois Supreme Court found that to apportion thecrimes among the various stabs for the first time onappeal would be "profoundly unfair." Crespo, slip op.at 6, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

In contrast, in the case sub judice, each countin the information charged defendant with aggravatedcriminal sexual assault and cited the specific conductprohibited in the relevant statutes. In addition, theState presented and argued the case to the jury asseparate acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Consequently, referencing the multiple sexual acts withspecificity to the counts charged would have addedsuperfluous information that did not need to be provedfor defendant to be convicted of the offenses charged. See Foley, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19, 565 N.E.2d at45.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trialcourt's judgment.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs.

COOK J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The majority opinion is contrary to the supreme court'srecent decision in Crespo.

"We emphasize that in Dixon, this court held that each separate blow of a mop handle could support aseparate conviction and that this remains a valid proposition of law.

Today's decision merely holds that in cases such as the one at bar, the indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained."

Crespo, slip op. at 8, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___N.E.2d at ___.

In Crespo, the supreme court pointed out that the counts chargingdefendant with armed violence and aggravated battery "do notdifferentiate between the separate stab wounds. Rather thesecounts charge defendant with the same conduct under differenttheories of criminal culpability." Crespo, slip op. at 6, ___Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___. The supreme court noted thelanguage in each count, "by stabbing Arlene Guerrero with saidknife," and "stabbed Arlene Guerrero with a knife," and commentedthat "[n]owhere in these charges does the State attempt toapportion these offenses among the various stab wounds." Crespo,slip op. at 6, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

The offenses in the present case are charged the sameway as the offenses in Crespo: count III, "in committing aCriminal Sexual Assault," count IV, "in committing a CriminalSexual Assault," and count V, "in committing a Criminal SexualAssault." Slip op. at 5. Nowhere in these charges does theState attempt to apportion these offenses among the variouspenetrations.

There was testimony in the present case that defendantforced the victim to engage in oral sex, anal sex, and sexualintercourse. In Crespo, however, there was testimony thatdefendant stabbed the victim three times. Crespo, slip op. at 2,___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___. That testimony alone wasnot sufficient to apportion the offenses among the various stabwounds. The same is true here.

Throughout the course of the trial, the prosecutorreferred to the penetrations collectively as "the sexual assault." The prosecutor's argument distinguished between thethree offenses only on the basis of the aggravating factor. "The[d]efendant caused bodily harm to [R.Y.]. That's one of thethree different ways." Slip op. at 8. "Whether the [d]efendantacted in a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of thevictim, another aggravated factor that makes it more serious thancriminal sexual assault. And the last one, committing it duringa home invasion." Slip op. at 8-9. Nowhere in the argument didthe prosecutor attempt to apportion the offenses among thevarious penetrations. "As to all three of those[,] you have toprove first the [d]efendant committed the act of sexual penetration; second, that he committed the act by the use of force orthreat of force; and then one of those different aggravatingfactors." Slip op. at 9. The argument was not that there were"acts" of penetration; according to the argument, the jury waspermitted to find that "the act of sexual penetration" occurred,accompanied by "one of those different aggravating factors." Slip op. at 9. There was no reference to different acts ofsexual penetration.

I do not understand the majority's argument that "theState presented and argued the case to the jury as separate actsof aggravated criminal sexual assault." Slip op. at 12. As themajority says elsewhere, "the jury was instructed without objection and returned verdicts on three separate crimes of criminalsexual assault: (1) by threatening the victim, (2) by causingbodily harm, and (3) by acting during a home invasion." Slip op.at 10. The only differentiation between the three counts was theaggravating factor. There was no attempt to apportion theseoffenses among the various penetrations. See Crespo, slip op. at8, ___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

The majority opinion raises several constitutionalproblems. Both the United States and Illinois Constitutionsrequire that a defendant in a criminal prosecution be informed ofthe nature and cause of the prosecution. Crespo, slip op. at 8,___ Ill. 2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___. If the majority iscorrect, defendant would not have known until the sentencinghearing that the State considered each of the penetrations to beseparate offenses and therefore would not have been able todefend the case accordingly. See Crespo, slip op. at 8, ___ Ill.2d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___; see also slip op. at 2 ("at thesentencing phase the State filed a sentencing memorandum recommending the trial court enter verdicts on each of the threeaggravated sexual assault counts based on three different acts ofpenetration").

I would affirm defendant's conviction and sentence forcount V. I would vacate defendant's convictions and sentencesfor counts III and IV.