JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

In April 2003, a jury convicted defendant, Ricky A.Patterson, of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2002)), arson(720 ILCS 5/20-1 (West 2002)), and concealment of a homicide (720ILCS 5/9-3.1 (West 2002)). In May 2003, the judge sentenced him to55 years in prison. He appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant was charged with the murder of Derrick Prout, adrug dealer. Prout's body was found in his burning Dodge Intrepid ina little-trafficked area of Lake County on Saturday, June 22, 2002,at about 8:50 a.m. Prout had been stabbed eight times and shottwice. His body was found in the trunk, partially wrapped in a whiteblanket with a distinctive blue pattern on it. The medical examinerwas unable to say when Prout had died.

In June 2002, defendant was living in a house on theoutskirts of Champaign with his girlfriend, Migdalia Rivera, andtheir young daughter. They were behind on their rent and had beentold to move out. As of June 17, defendant still lived in the housebut had told his landlord he would be moving out in a few days.

Prout drove his Dodge Intrepid to Champaign on June 17,where he arrived at the apartment of his girlfriend, Candice Johnson,at about 4 p.m. Prout brought with him a canvas bag full of cannabis. At about 8 p.m., defendant also arrived at Johnson's apartment. He spoke with Prout for a few minutes, then Prout retrieved thecanvas bag of cannabis and drove off in his Dodge Intrepid followedby defendant in his Blazer. Prout told Johnson he would be backsoon, but she never saw him again. Johnson called Prout's cellularphone numerous times the night of the 17th but got no response. Johnson and Prout's sister looked for him on the 18th. Prout'ssister spoke to defendant over the phone on the 18th and severaltimes on the 19th and finally met with him at about 8 p.m. Defendantwas late for the meeting and explained that he had found out hishouse was on fire and had to deal with that first.

On June 19, at about 3:19 a.m., the house rented bydefendant was discovered to be on fire. An arson investigator fromthe state fire marshal's office determined the fire had been setintentionally at five separate locations in the house. A blood-stained carpet was eventually discovered in the house, and adeoxyrybonucleic acid (DNA) match established that the blood wasProut's. The carpet had a strong odor of cleaning agents and had afoamy solution coming out of it. Investigators also found a roll ofundeveloped film in the kitchen containing pictures of defendant'sdaughter wrapped in a blanket. The blanket, blue with a distinctivewhite pattern, appeared to be the same blanket found wrapped aroundProut's body.

On June 23, after Prout's body was found in Lake County,two members of the Lake County sheriff's department drove to St.Louis to speak with defendant, who was being held by St. Louispolice. They arrived at about 3:30 a.m. Defendant stated that hewas in St. Louis because his house had burned up and he and hisfamily had lost everything, so they were doing some shopping andsightseeing. He said that he did not have a cellular phone or apager. He refused to give his questioners Rivera's cellular phonenumber. When asked whether he had any money, defendant respondedthat he was carrying his life savings of $8,500. Asked how he foundout about the fire, he responded that he had left Champaign at about10 p.m. the night before the fire for a court date in Chicago; whilehe was there, his family told him about the fire by telephone.

At trial, defendant testified to the meeting with Prout atJohnson's apartment on June 17. He testified he and Prout left inseparate cars and went to a car wash, where he gave Prout $16,000cash for 30 pounds of cannabis. After Prout left, defendant washedhis car, then went home, watched television, and went to bed. Thenext day, the 18th, he "bummed around the house" and then stopped byhis parents' home. He had a court date in Chicago on the 19th, so heand Rivera left Champaign on the 18th at about 8 p.m. They checkedinto the Rand Motel in Lake County at almost 11 p.m. The morning ofthe 19th, he had car troubles. He took his car to a mechanic around7 a.m. but had to wait until the shop opened. He was late for his 9a.m. court hearing, arriving at about 11 a.m., and was told to returnthe next day, the 20th. As he and Rivera traveled back to Champaign,he received a call from his brother, telling him about his housefire. After arriving in Champaign at about 6:30 p.m., he drovedirectly to the house, where he recovered a few items. He and Riverareturned to Chicago the morning of the 20th in time for hisrescheduled 9 a.m. court date.

Defendant testified that on June 21, he went to St. Louiswith Rivera and their daughter, arriving at about 10 p.m. They spentthe 22nd, the day Prout's body was found in Lake County, going to thezoo and sightseeing. At 5:30 p.m., as defendant was getting ready togo out to get dinner, the St. Louis police kicked in the door of thehotel room and arrested him.

Defendant used a cellular phone leased to Rivera. On the18th, Rivera's phone records show that calls were placed from thatphone at various locations in the Champaign area, the last call beingat 9:36 p.m. There were Champaign calls on the 19th, the first callbeing at 8:22 a.m. The timing of the calls indicates that it waspossible for defendant to kill Prout, set the house fire that wasdiscovered on June 19 at 3:19 a.m., and then drive the Dodge Intrepidwith Prout's body to Lake County, all before appearing in court inCook County on June 19 at 11 a.m. On cross-examination, defendantattempted to explain these calls: he inadvertently left the phone inthe car of his friend, Chris Smith, in Champaign at about 3:30 p.m.on the 18th. That night he sold Smith eight pounds of cannabis inSchaumburg but forgot to get the phone back. At about 2:30 p.m. onthe 19th, after defendant's missed court date, Smith returned thephone to him at the courthouse in Chicago.

In his opening statement, defendant's attorney said thatRivera would testify. She was issued a subpoena and was scheduled totestify but chose to invoke her right to remain silent. Overobjection, the State was allowed to present testimony that Riveragave to the grand jury in January 2003. Rivera told the grand jurythat she and defendant left Champaign on the 18th at about 8 p.m. andthat they stayed at the Rand Motel. Although defendant had a courthearing scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on the 19th, they did not leave themotel until 10:30 a.m. because of car trouble. They were in theChicago area until late afternoon when they headed back to Champaign. Rivera stated that she or defendant had the cellular phone registeredin her name with them the entire time. They first heard of the fireby phone as they were returning from Cook County.

On April 23, 2003, the jury returned guilty verdicts onall three charges against defendant. On May 29, defendant filed aposttrial motion, arguing that (1) he had not been proved guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court had erred inadmitting Rivera's grand-jury testimony. The court denied the motionand proceeded to sentence defendant to 50 years for first degreemurder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2002)); 5 years for concealing ahomicidal death (720 ILCS 5/9-3.1 (West 2002)), to be servedconsecutively with the murder sentence; and a concurrent 5-yearsentence on the arson charge (720 ILCS 5/20-1 (West 2002)). Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing that itwas excessive, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant renews arguments from his posttrialmotion and his motion to reconsider and raises several new arguments. He argues that (1) the State violated his right to a fair trial by(a) eliciting testimony about defendant's refusal to answer certainquestions when interviewed in St. Louis; and (b) pointing out thatthe DNA sample was available for defendant to perform his own DNAtest; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing tochallenge sufficiently the State's DNA expert. We consider thesearguments in turn.

We begin by considering defendant's challenge to theadmission of Rivera's grand-jury testimony. The trial court admittedthis testimony under section 115-10.2 of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.2 (West 2002)), which allowsinto evidence the prior statements of a witness when the witnessrefuses to testify despite being ordered by the court to do so. Under the statute, such statements may be admitted only when theymeet six requirements: (1) trustworthiness, (2) materiality, (3)probative value, (4) the interests of justice, (5) the declarant'sunavailability as a witness, and (6) notice. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2(West 2002); People v. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d 949, 961, 709 N.E.2d609, 618 (1999) (First District). Defendant does not dispute that hereceived adequate notice that the State would use the testimony.

Defendant objects that the admission of Rivera's testimony violated both section 115-10.2 and the confrontation clauseof the sixth amendment. That clause provides that "[i]n all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confrontedwith the witnesses against him." U.S. Const., amend. VI. This courthas said before that section 115-10.2 explicitly incorporatedconfrontation-clause standards, such that the use of evidenceproperly admitted under the statute could also withstandconstitutional scrutiny. See People v. Thomas, 313 Ill. App. 3d 998,1002, 730 N.E.2d 618, 623 (2000). In light of the recent UnitedStates Supreme Court case of Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. __, __L. Ed. 2d __, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), that view is no longer tenable.

In Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, the Court held that the testimonial statements of awitness who is unavailable at trial may be used against a criminaldefendant only where the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford thus rejected the approach of Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980),under which hearsay statements of an unavailable declarant could beadmitted against a criminal defendant if they (1) fell within afirmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) bore "particularizedguarantees of trustworthiness." The Roberts approach had left to thecourts the task of determining, from the totality of circumstances,whether particular statements were made under conditions renderingthem sufficiently reliable. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 111L. Ed. 2d 638, 655-56, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990). This led toconsiderable unpredictability, but its "unpardonable vice [was] ***its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements thatthe [c]onfrontation [c]lause plainly meant to exclude." Crawford,___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 1371, citingThomas, 313 Ill. App. 3d 998, 730 N.E.2d 618, as an example. Clearlysection 115-10.2, focusing as it does on a judicial determination oftrustworthiness, can no longer be said to incorporate the relevantconstitutional standard.

The application of Crawford in this case is clear. Crawford requires that a defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine a witness if the witness's testimonial statements are to beused against him. Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___,124 S. Ct. at 1374. Although the Supreme Court refrained from givinga complete definition of what "testimonial" means in this context,the term includes testimony given before a grand jury. Crawford, ___U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Riveratestified to the grand jury, and defendant had no opportunity tocross-examine her; the State's use of her testimony thereforeviolated the confrontation clause.

What we have said so far essentially moots any discussionof whether the trial court in this case properly applied section 115-10.2. Nevertheless, we note that we are troubled by the cursorymanner in which the court allowed Rivera's grand-jury testimony intoevidence. Despite the fairly detailed statutory requirements and theconfrontation-clause concerns raised by this type of evidence evenbefore Crawford, the court did not, so far as the record reveals,give any consideration to the substance of the testimony. Discussions at trial concerned whether Rivera was unavailable but notwhether her testimony would be probative evidence of any materialfact, both statutory requirements. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2(a)(1),(a)(2) (West 2002). Surely the fact that Rivera's testimony actuallycontradicts the State's theory of the case suggests that it is notparticularly probative of a material fact, at least not without somefurther explanation of what the State intended to prove with thetestimony. This deserved some inquiry.

Despite the trial court's error in allowing Rivera'sgrand-jury testimony into evidence, we find the error harmless beyonda reasonable doubt. See Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___ n.1, ___ L. Ed. 2dat ___ n.1, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 n.1 (explicitly declining to addresswhether lower court's error was harmless error). First, it isdifficult to understand how Rivera's testimony harmed defendant whenit basically repeated what he said himself when interviewed in St.Louis. In its closing argument, the State relied on evidence thatdefendant was the last person seen with Prout, that Prout's blood wasfound in defendant's house, and that Prout's body was found wrappedin defendant's blanket. The State also used the phone records toshow where Rivera's phone was at the relevant times. It is true thatRivera's testimony showed that she and defendant shared the phone,but other evidence also indicated that to be the case. In short, theState's case did not rely significantly on Rivera's testimony to thegrand jury, and exclusion of that testimony would not likely havemade a difference in the jury verdict.

In a related argument, defendant claims that his trialcounsel was ineffective because in his opening statement he told thejury that Rivera would testify at trial when counsel knew full wellthat she would not. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, adefendant must show that counsel's performance fell below anobjective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonableprobability that the result of the proceedings would have beendifferent absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). It is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel not toprovide promised testimony. People v. Manning, 334 Ill. App. 3d 882,892, 778 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (2002). Defendant cites two cases insupport of his argument (People v. Ortiz, 224 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 586N.E.2d 1384 (1992); People v Lewis, 240 Ill. App. 3d 463, 609 N.E.2d673 (1992)), but both are distinguishable. In both cases, counsel'sdefense strategy rested on the existence of another suspect whoallegedly committed the crime; counsel argued that evidence wouldshow that someone other than the defendant was guilty but failed toproduce any evidence of the supposed culprit. Ortiz, 224 Ill. App.3d at 1070-71, 586 N.E.2d at 1387-88; Lewis, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 468,609 N.E.2d at 677.

We find this case to be more similar to Manning, 334 Ill.App. 3d at 892, 778 N.E.2d at 1230, in which counsel told the jurythat the defendant would testify but the defendant never took thestand. Because nothing in the record suggests that the decision notto put the defendant on the stand was due to counsel's incompetence,the appellate court found no ineffective assistance of counsel. Manning, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 778 N.E.2d at 1231. Here, therecord shows that Rivera invoked her fifth amendment rights andrefused to testify, which is, of course, adequate reason not to callher as a witness. Nor does the record indicate that defense counselknew when he made his opening statement that Rivera would refuse totestify. We find no error in counsel's assistance on this issue.

The next issue defendant raises is whether law-enforcementofficials violated the scope of the search warrant when they seizedundeveloped film from the burned house. He has forfeited this issueby not raising it previously but argues that counsel was ineffectivefor failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence. He must thusshow a reasonable probability that the trial court would have grantedthe motion had counsel made one. See People v. Little, 322 Ill. App.3d 607, 611, 750 N.E.2d 745, 750 (2001). The search warrantauthorized seizure of the following:

"any and all items of physical evidence related to the commission of the offenses [sic] of [m]urder[,] including but not limited to:

*** indicia of occupancy or ownership of the above-described residence; insurance and financial records for the above-described property, its owners[,] or occupants; any items indicating the presence of Derrick A. Prout, in the above-described property; and photographs of the above-described items, and the residents." (Emphasis added.)

We agree with the State that the undeveloped film fellwithin the scope of the warrant. The warrant clearly authorized theseizure of photographs, and it is difficult to imagine any use forexposed but undeveloped film other than to develop it intophotographs. The film could thus be seized under the warrant, eitheras the "functional equivalent" of photographs or as a receptaclecontaining them. See United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 988 (5thCir. 1994) (whether evidence falls within warrant depends onsubstance of item seized, not the label applied by defendant); seealso People v. Kruger, 327 Ill. App. 3d 839, 844, 764 N.E.2d 138, 142(2002) (absent flagrant disregard for limitations of warrant, policemay seize potential receptacle of named evidence). Therefore, wefind no reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would havebeen granted, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel is shown.

Defendant also argues that his trial counsel wasineffective in failing to challenge effectively the State's DNAevidence. Generally, matters of trial strategy will not support aclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel failed toconduct any meaningful adversarial testing. People v. Guest, 166Ill. 2d 381, 394, 655 N.E.2d 873, 879 (1995). Defendant first arguesthat trial counsel should have challenged Kelly Gannon'squalifications as an expert. Defendant objects that Gannon (1)possessed only a bachelor's degree, (2) was only 25 years old, (3)had only two publications, and (4) had testified as an expert onlytwice before. These are doubtless relevant considerations, but trialcounsel did cross-examine Gannon on all of these issues, so itcertainly cannot be said that he failed to conduct meaningfuladversarial testing. In any event, whether a witness should bequalified as an expert is within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 186, 670 N.E.2d 721, 730 (1996). The expert's knowledge must be more than that of the average citizen,but no specific rules prescribe what experience, education, ortraining is required to gain this knowledge. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at186, 670 N.E.2d at 730. Defendant has not shown any reasonableprobability that a challenge based on Gannon's credentials would havesucceeded.

Defendant also argues that trial counsel should havechallenged more vigorously the DNA evidence itself, such as byretaining his own expert. The decision whether to call particularwitnesses and the manner and extent of cross-examination are mattersof trial strategy and thus will not ordinarily support anineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 53-54, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (1992). Counsel cross-examinedGannon extensively on many of the issues defendant raises now, suchas the deterioration of the DNA sample caused by exposure to theelements and to cleaning solutions. Defendant has not shown thatcounsel was incompetent in his approach to the DNA evidence.

Defendant next argues that he did not receive a fair trialbecause of two instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The Statepoints out that defendant has forfeited these two issues by failingto object at trial and raise them in his posttrial motion. SeePeople v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988). Even if we were to consider these issues, defendant would notprevail.

Defendant urges us to find prosecutorial misconduct firstin the State's questioning of the two law-enforcement officials whoquestioned him in St. Louis. They testified that defendant offeredto answer some questions but not others and specifically that herefused to tell them about his employment history and Rivera'scellular phone number. It is true, as defendant argues, that theprosecution may not impermissibly comment on the defendant's silencewhen he has invoked his right to remain silent (Doyle v. Ohio, 426U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976)). For support, defendant cites People v. Johnson, 170 Ill. App. 3d 828,833, 525 N.E.2d 546, 550 (1988), in which the testimony was that thedefendant had failed to provide the arresting officer with anexculpatory story. In addition, in that case, the State proceededwith the improper line of questioning in the face of multiple defenseobjections, and then in its closing argument reiterated that thedefendant had failed to provide an excuse to the police when he wasarrested. Johnson, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 833-34, 525 N.E.2d at 550. But ours is a very different case--one in which defendant had chosento speak with police. Under the circumstances present here, noproblem arises from the law-enforcement witnesses testifying to thesubstance of the conversation, including the questions defendantrefused to answer. See United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 504(1st Cir. 1977) (where the defendant waived Miranda (Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966))rights and spoke to police, and prosecutor permissibly adducedtestimony to entire conversation, including the defendant's refusalto answer two questions).

The other prosecutorial conduct challenged by defendantconcerns questions the State asked Kelly Gannon, its DNA expert, onredirect examination. The State asked her whether the DNA samplefrom the house was available to be retested and whether anyone hadsought to test the evidence. Defendant argues that this line ofquestioning impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him byimplying that he needed to present evidence to rebut the State's. Hepoints out that the prosecution may not make arguments that diminishthe presumption of innocence. See People v. Oliver, 306 Ill. App. 3d59, 69, 713 N.E.2d 727, 735 (1999) (First District). That iscertainly true, but a difference lies between arguments and evidence. Although the State did present this testimony, it made no argumentsuggesting that defendant needed to prove his innocence, or that heneeded to present evidence. The two questions to which objectionswere raised, as they were in the middle of several hundred pages'worth of testimony, cannot be said to have shifted the burden ofproof to defendant. This is particularly so because any possibleerror would have been cured by the instructions to the jury and bythe arguments given by both sides. In light of the above discussion,we also reject defendant's argument that his attorney's failure toobject to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct constitutedineffective assistance of counsel.

In an argument successfully preserved in his posttrialmotion, defendant next asserts that he was not proved guilty beyond areasonable doubt. A reviewing court will not overturn the factfinder's verdict unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable,and unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to thedefendant's guilt. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 661 N.E.2d287, 296 (1996). Defendant objects that the State's case consistedalmost exclusively of circumstantial evidence, most of which heargues is unreliable or inconclusive. Pointing out the lack ofdirect evidence, such as a murder weapon or an eyewitness, he arguesthat the circumstantial case is insufficient to prove his guilt. TheState may obtain a conviction, however, on the basis of whollycircumstantial evidence where "the entire chain of circumstancesleads to a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendantcommitted the crime." People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965,743 N.E.2d 689, 692 (2001). Here, even without the prohibited grand-jury testimony, more than enough circumstantial evidence provided thejury with a moral certainty that defendant committed the allegedcrimes. We find that the evidence was not so unreasonable,improbable, or unsatisfactory as to leave a doubt of defendant'sguilt.

Finally, defendant raises two issues concerning hissentence. He asserts first that his sentence for first degree murderis excessive. A trial court has wide discretion in sentencing andshould be reversed only when it abuses that discretion. People v.Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 258, 652 N.E.2d 322, 327 (1995). Therecord reflects that the court heard arguments concerning aggravationand mitigation, reviewed the presentence report and the letterswritten in support of defendant, considered all of this information,and arrived at a sentence. The sentence of 50 years is within thestatutory range of 20 to 60 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West2002). We find no abuse of discretion.

Defendant also objects that his sentence for concealment ofa homicide should have been ordered served concurrently rather thanconsecutively because it was part of a single course of conductduring which there was no substantial change in the nature of thecriminal objective. As the State points out, however, a consecutivesentence was mandatory here because one of the two offenses was firstdegree murder. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(i) (West 2002); People v.Jennings, 343 Ill. App. 3d 717, 730, 798 N.E.2d 1211, 1221-22 (2003).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant'sconvictions and sentence.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.