People v. Pitts
State: Illinois
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-97-0071
Case Date: 03/03/1998
NO. 4-97-0071
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
IAN E. PITTS, ) No. 96CF433
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Jerry L. Patton,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 1996, the State charged defendant, Ian E.
Pitts, with two separate counts of attempt (first degree murder)
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 1994); 9-1(a)(1); (West Supp. 1995)),
two separate counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West
1994)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1994)), aggravat-
ed vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 1994)), and
burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 1994)). In August 1996,
defendant pleaded guilty to both attempt (first degree murder)
counts and armed robbery, pursuant to the State's agreement to
dismiss the remaining charges. The parties had no agreement
regarding the sentence the trial court would impose.
In October 1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to
15 years in prison on each attempt (first degree murder) convic-
tion and six years in prison on the armed robbery conviction,
with all sentences to be served consecutively.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial
court stated its agreement with the prosecutor that defendant
would have to serve 85% of his prison sentences as a result of
the then-recently enacted "truth-in-sentencing" statute (730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995)), which modified section 3-6-
3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3(a)(2) (West 1994)) to limit good conduct credit to no more than
4.5 days per month for a prisoner serving a sentence of attempt
(first degree murder).
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his aggregate 36-
year prison sentence was excessive and constitutes an abuse of
the trial court's discretion; and (2) Public Act 89-404 (Pub. Act
89-404, 40, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306, 4323-
27)), which created the "truth-in-sentencing" statute, is uncon-
stitutional because (a) it violates the single subject rule of
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)), and
(b) it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States
and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, 2). We reject defendant's first argument but
agree that the "truth-in-sentencing" statute violates the single
subject rule of the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, we
affirm and remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
When defendant pleaded guilty in August 1996, the trial
court adopted the factual basis previously presented at codefen-
dant Jody Rinderer's guilty plea hearing. The parties also
stipulated that Amanda Jones, another codefendant, would testify
that the three male codefendants (defendant, Rinderer, and Jason
Gaddis) agreed ahead of time that they were going to kill Victo-
ria Bridgeman and steal her car. After the attack, defendant
admitted that he had stabbed Bridgeman.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court received
evidence from both parties, including a personality inventory
regarding defendant and a presentence report prepared by the
probation department. The court also heard arguments and sugges-
tions of counsel.
Information before the trial court at the sentencing
hearing revealed the following. Bridgeman met defendant through
a friend's neighbor and had known him for approximately two
years. Defendant subsequently introduced her to Gaddis and
Rinderer. On the evening of April 23, 1996, Bridgeman, defen-
dant, Gaddis, and Rinderer were together in Bridgeman's car,
which was parked "in the country." Bridgeman was seated in the
driver's seat, Gaddis was in the front passenger seat, and
defendant and Rinderer were in the back. Bridgeman testified
that Rinderer "had been acting like a creep all night," telling
her that she needed to respect him. After Bridgeman disagreed
with him, the three codefendants left the vehicle ostensibly to
use the bathroom.
Upon returning three to five minutes later, each of
them took a new position in the car, with defendant seated beside
Bridgeman and Gaddis behind her. Bridgeman and Rinderer contin-
ued arguing, and Bridgeman turned to "get input" from Gaddis. At
that point, Gaddis put a cord around her neck and began stran-
gling her. Defendant then turned toward Bridgeman, kneeling on
the front seat, and began punching her in the face. Bridgeman
described that initial portion of the attack as follows:
"I was trying to get a hold of [Gaddis].
They were all yelling, and I had my -- my
right hand underneath the cord trying to pull
it away from my neck, and [defendant] just
kept hitting me and hitting me. They kept
yelling 'Get her.'"
Bridgeman lost consciousness. When Bridgeman awakened,
her three assailants stood her up beside her car, and defendant
hit her in the head with a whiskey bottle. They then began
kicking her, yelling "Die bitch." Bridgeman once again lost
consciousness; when Bridgeman reawakened, her assailants were
trying to drag her into a ditch. She tried to fight them off and
"was stabbed a few times." Once in the ditch, they kicked her
and continued to yell "Die bitch." Bridgeman estimated that her
three assailants yelled "Die bitch" at least 100 times during the
attack. Bridgeman began pleading for her life, telling them to
leave her to "die in peace." At that point, someone kicked her
again, and they drove away in her car.
Bridgeman then stood up and tried "to head to safety."
She stated that she had not gotten far when she saw the car turn
around. She fell back to the ground on her stomach and heard
them get out of her car. (By this time, her eyes were swollen
shut.) One of the three walked up to her and felt for a pulse.
She then heard someone say, "She isn't dead. Finish her off."
After defendant and Gaddis prodded Rinderer to slash her throat,
Rinderer did so. In an attempt to get them "to leave when I was
dying," Bridgeman grabbed her throat and acted like she was
choking on her own blood. At that point, her three assailants
returned to her car, turned up the stereo, and left. After once
again losing and regaining consciousness, Bridgeman walked to
find help.
As a result of the attack (during which she was stabbed
at least 23 times), Bridgeman was hospitalized for one week, and
accumulated medical bills totalling $50,000. She has several
scars, including "a very big indentation" on her head, one on her
left eye, one across the bridge of her nose, one on her right
cheek and across her nose to her left cheek, "a very big slash"
on the right side of her throat, and others "all over" her upper
torso, including several scars on her breasts. Bridgeman de-
scribed the impact of the attack on her life, as follows:
"I don't trust anybody. I used to trust
absolutely everybody. Apparently not any-
more. I am scared to go to my car. I am
scared to be in the car. I cannot have any-
body sitting in the backseat for fear what
could happen if they do. And I can only be
pretty much in well-lit areas with somebody
like my sister and my mother."
Louis Pitts, defendant's father, testified on his
behalf that defendant had psychiatric problems growing up and had
previously been hospitalized and medicated for his "outburst
disorder." Defendant stopped taking his medications because they
caused side effects and were expensive, and he "seemed to be
doing pretty good."
The presentence report indicated that defendant, who
was 16 years old at the time of the offense, was a member of a
street gang, uses alcohol daily and drugs on a regular basis,
sells drugs, and has an "explosive disorder" that causes him to
become violent when angry. In September 1993, the trial court
adjudicated him delinquent for committing theft. Defendant
subsequently violated court supervision by committing the offens-
es of aggravated battery and battery. He was then sentenced to
probation, and after he violated several probation conditions,
the court ordered his probation terminated as unsuccessful. In
May 1995, defendant was again adjudicated delinquent for commit-
ting the offenses of battery and resisting a peace officer.
While in the juvenile detention center after his arrest in this
case, defendant committed 24 violations of detention rules, one
of which involved aggressive behavior.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Claim That His Sentence Was Excessive
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive prison sentence of an aggre-
gate of 36 years. Specifically, defendant contends that because
he was only 16 years old, had limited prior contacts with the
juvenile justice system, and had a history of mental and emotion-
al problems, the trial court "failed to fully appreciate the
extent of [defendant's] rehabilitative potential." We emphati-
cally disagree.
A trial court's discretion in sentencing a defendant is
entitled to great deference and weight, and this court will not
alter that sentence on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by
the trial court. People v. Williams, 287 Ill. App. 3d 262, 270,
678 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1997).
At the sentencing hearing of defendant and his accom-
plices, the prosecutor argued that "[t]his crime was devoid of
any mercy" and that the victim suffered at least 23 stab wounds
on her face, neck, torso, and hands. Throughout her ordeal, she
was addressed repeatedly with the cry of "Die bitch." When her
assailants realized they had not killed her, they lifted her up,
slit her throat, and then left her for dead. The prosecutor also
pointed out that defendant was a member of a street gang, has an
explosive temper, consumes whiskey daily until he passes out, and
sells cannabis to support himself.
In sentencing defendant, the trial court first stated
its essential agreement with the prosecutor's arguments and then
noted that the only thing worse the victim's assailants could
have done was to murder her, and "[t]hey came awfully, awfully
close in attempting to achieve that." The court concluded as
follows:
"In our society[,] we cannot and will not
tolerate this type of young men to be free
upon the streets. We don't need these peo-
ple. We don't need these types of crimes,
and somebody has got to protect the society.
In this particular case, it's the [j]udge.
It's the [c]ourt. And[,] therefore[,] I
intend to give each of these young men fairly
extensive sentences to protect the public."
We agree without reservation with the trial court's
conclusion, and in so holding, we reaffirm what we stated in
People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 565, 572, 634 N.E.2d 1285,
1290-91 (1994), as follows:
"People who commit crimes like this
forfeit their right to walk among us as mem-
bers of a free society. The courts must do
all they can to ensure that these terrible
crimes--and the suffering they caused this
innocent victim (perhaps for the rest of her
life)--never again be visited upon some other
innocent victim. By putting this vicious
criminal behind bars for this lengthy period,
the trial court fulfilled its obligation to
protect society, and we affirm the trial
court's sentence."
B. The "Truth-In-Sentencing" Statute
Defendant next argues that the "truth-in-sentencing"
statute violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Consti-
tution and is therefore invalid. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
8(d). Specifically, he asks this court to vacate the portion of
his sentencing order requiring him to serve 85% of the sentence
imposed and to clarify that he is to receive day-for-day credit
to which he was entitled pursuant to section 3-6-3 of the Code
prior to the enactment of the "truth-in-sentencing" statute. We
agree.
Article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Bills, except
bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or
rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d). In Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d
499, 514-18, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379-81 (1997), the Supreme Court
of Illinois recently discussed this provision--the so-called
single subject rule--at length when it held that the legislature
violated that rule in enacting Public Act 89-428 (Pub. Act 89-
428, eff. December 13, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4453)). In Johnson,
the court wrote as follows:
"The single subject rule is a substan-
tive requirement for the passage of bills and
is therefore subject to judicial review. ***
The term 'subject,' in this context, is
to be liberally construed and the subject may
be as broad as the legislature chooses.
[Citations.] Nonetheless, the matters in-
cluded in the enactment must have a natural
and logical connection. [Citations.] The
rule prohibits the inclusion of '"discordant
provisions that by no fair intendment can be
considered as having any legitimate relation
to each other."' [Citations.]" Johnson, 176
Ill. 2d at 514-15, 680 N.E.2d at 1379.
With these rules in mind, we examine Public Act 89-404,
effective August 20, 1995, which contains in one of its sections
the amendment to section 3-6-3 of the Code. Pub. Act 89-404,
40, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306, 4323-27) (amend-
ing 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 1994)). That amendment contains
the "truth-in-sentencing" provision of which defendant complains.
Public Act 89-404 contains 10 separate sections that
either amend or add to Illinois statutes. Defendant asserts that
Public Act 89-404 contains discordant provisions that have no
legitimate relation to each other and, accordingly, violate the
single subject rule of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois
Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d). Defendant is
partially correct in his assertion, but that is all that is re-
quired for this court to conclude that Public Act 89-404 is void
because it violates the Illinois Constitution.
The first nine sections (sections 5 through 45) of
Public Act 89-404 comply with the single subject rule when
liberally construed. Those sections deal with or concern the
following: (1) the authority of sheriffs (section 5) (Pub. Act
89-404, 5, eff. August 20, 1997 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306)); (2) the
authority of certain municipal police officers (section 10) (Pub.
Act 89-404, 10, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306)); (3)
a modification of the insanity defense (section 15) (Pub. Act 89-
404, 15, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306-07)); (4)
disbursement of proceeds from forfeitures under the Cannabis
Control Act (section 20) (Pub. Act 89-404, 20, eff. August 20,
1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4307-10)); (5) disbursement of proceeds from
forfeitures under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and
modifications of certain sentencing provisions under that act
(section 25) (Pub. Act 89-404, 25, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995
Ill. Laws 4310-20)); (6) the authority of a law enforcement
officer beyond that officer's jurisdiction (section 30) (Pub. Act
89-404, 30, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4320-21)); (7)
the prohibition of jury trials for certain forfeiture cases (sec-
tion 35) (Pub. Act 89-404, 35, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill.
Laws 4321-23)); (8) the "truth-in-sentencing" addition to section
3-6-3 of the Code, which is the subject of this appeal, as well
as the creation of a "truth-in-sentencing" commission, a require-
ment that trial courts explain the new "truth-in-sentencing"
provisions at the time of sentencing, and a modification of the
insanity defense procedures (section 40) (Pub. Act 89-404, 40,
eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4323-36)); (9) the inap-
plicability of homestead exemptions to drug asset forfeitures
(section 45) (Pub. Act 89-404, 45, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995
Ill. Laws 4336)); and (10) an amendment to the Hospital Lien Act
providing a mechanism for nonprofit hospitals and hospitals
operated by a unit of local government to file a lien upon claims
and causes of actions of injured persons who have been treated by
such hospitals for the payment of their treatment (section 50)
(Pub. Act 89-404, 50, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4336-
37)). Section 50 further (1) provides that such a hospital has
up to 30 calendar days to perfect and satisfy its lien; and (2)
addresses the situation in which the person treated at the
hospital obtains a verdict or judgment to be paid over time by
means of an annuity or otherwise.
As this description makes clear, the first nine sec-
tions of Public Act 89-404 (specifically, sections 5 through 45)
concern some aspect of the criminal justice system and thus fall
within the designation of one "subject" in the context of article
IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. To put
the matter another way, none of the first nine sections of Public
Act 89-404 is "discordant" with the others because all of them
can be fairly considered as having a legitimate relation to each
other. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515, 680 N.E.2d at 1380. Howev-
er, section 50, dealing with hospital liens, fails that test.
The State does not even attempt to claim that section
50 has some relationship to the other nine sections of Public Act
89-404, which all pertain in some fashion to criminal law or
procedure. Instead, the State contends that because the title to
Public Act 89-404 is "An Act in relation to governmental matters,
amending named acts," the 10 sections comprising Public Act 89-
404 need only relate in some fashion to governmental matters, and
the State asserts that they do. We disagree.
In our judgment, the State proposes an exception to the
single subject rule that would effectively swallow the rule and
render the supreme court's recent decision in Johnson a nullity.
Although the title of an act should be considered in an analysis
of whether it violates the single subject rule of article IV,
section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the title
cannot be dispositive; if we accepted the State's argument,
nothing would be left of the single subject rule beyond the
creativity of legislative drafters to make titles of acts as
broad as possible.
When the supreme court in Johnson spoke of the term
"subject" in the context of the single subject rule, that court
meant the substance of the legislative enactment at issue, which
is contained within the body of the act, namely, the sections
thereof. In this case, that means sections 5 through 50 of
Public Act 89-404. Accordingly, none of those sections can be
discordant to the others for that act to pass constitutional
muster. However, as we have demonstrated, section 50 is discor-
dant to the other sections. Thus, we hold that no matter how
liberally the single subject rule is construed, Public Act 89-404
violates that rule. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 516, 680 N.E.2d
at 1380.
As a last matter, the State argues that if this court
were to find that Public Act 89-404 was enacted in violation of
the Illinois Constitution, then we should view the subsequent
reenactment of the "truth-in-sentencing" provision of section 3-
6-3 of the Code in Public Act 89-462, effective May 19, 1996, as
"validating" section 40 of Public Act 89-404, which contained
that provision. We disagree.
The offenses defendant was convicted of occurred on
April 23, 1996. Public Act 89-462, which the State seeks to use
to "validate" the "truth-in-sentencing" provision, was enacted
May 29, 1996. Pub. Act 89-462, 280, eff. May 29, 1996 (1996
Ill. Laws 588, 655-58). We agree with defendant that giving
effect to Public Act 89-462 under these circumstances would
violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illi-
nois Constitutions. U.S. Const., art. I, 9, 10; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, 16. Viewing the "truth-in-sentencing" statute as
substantive is not very difficult when one realizes that, in this
very case, what is at stake for defendant is whether he must
serve 85%, or only 50%, of his 36-year aggregate prison sentence.
Because we hold that Public Act 89-404 violates the
single subject rule of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, we need not address defendant's other
argument that it also violates defendant's constitutional rights
to equal protection of the laws.
In so holding, we acknowledge the dissenting opinion of
our distinguished colleague, Justice McCullough, and the recent
decision of the Third District Appellate Court in People v.
Watford, 3-96-0315, slip op. at 2 (December 3, 1997) ____ Ill.
App. 3d ____, ____, ____ N.E.2d ____, ____, holding that a
defendant's challenge to the truth-in-sentencing provisions of
Public Act 89-404 cannot be brought on direct appeal but may only
be brought by filing an action in habeas corpus or mandamus. We
respectfully disagree with Watford and Justice McCullough for the
following reasons.
Although section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995)) may be self-executing as far
as the Department of Corrections is concerned, Public Act 89-404
does require a trial court (by the addition of subsection (c-2)
to section 5-4-1 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2) (West Supp.
1995)) to discuss in open court the question of how much good-
time credit the defendant being sentenced will receive. Further,
although it is true that this new subsection provides that a
trial court's error regarding this provisions "may not be relied
on by the defendant on appeal" (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2) (West Supp.
1995)), that statement addresses a different matter than the
constitutional question before us in this case. Here, the
question is not whether the trial court correctly stated--and
applied--the truth-in-sentencing provision; instead, the issue is
whether Public Act 89-404 can constitutionally require the trial
court to do anything regarding good-time credit.
Moreover, we agree with defendant that the decision in
Watford encourages piecemeal proceedings at the appellate level
because many defendants will pursue a direct appeal while saving
this issue to present in a subsequent petition for a writ of
mandamus or habeas corpus. If Public Act 89-404 is constitu-
tionally defective, as seems clear to us, then we see no policy
reason for not so holding at this point, when the issue has been
fully briefed and argued.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment and remand with directions that the trial court amend
the sentencing order to reflect that defendant is eligible for
day-for-day good-time credit as provided in section 3-6-3 of the
Code prior to any "truth-in-sentencing" amendments added thereto.
Affirmed and remanded with directions.
KNECHT, J., concurs.
McCULLOUGH, J., specially concurs in part and dissents
in part.
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
I agree that the trial court should be affirmed in the
imposition of sentences for defendant's armed robbery and two
attempt (first degree murder) convictions. Defendant's claim
that his sentence was excessive is waived for failure to file a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. People v. Economy, 291 Ill.
App. 3d 212, 683 N.E.2d 919 (1997).
I disagree that defendant is, in this appeal, eligible
for day-for-day good-time credit. The majority finds that the
defendant's argument that Public Act 89-404 violates the single
subject rule of the Illinois Constitution is well-taken. In the
posture of this case, the constitutionality of Public Act 89-404
should not be addressed.
The truth-in-sentencing provisions set forth in section
3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Code are self-executing. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996). The majority suggests that section 5-4-
1 of the Code imposes a requirement on the trial judge to state
at the sentencing hearing what good-time provision applies under
section 3-6-3. This suggestion is a bootstrap attempt to vali-
date the majority's determination that Public Act 89-404 is
unconstitutional.
Section 5-4-1(c-2) provides that the trial "judge shall
state on the record in open court the approximate period of time
the defendant will serve in custody according to the *** regula-
tions for early release found in Section 3-6-3." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-
1(c-2) (West 1996). But section 5-4-1(c-2) also provides: "This
statement is intended solely to inform the public, has no legal
effect on the defendant's actual release, and may not be relied
on by the defendant on appeal." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2) (West
1996). The purpose of the legislation appears to be a required
admonishment to the public and not to the defendant. Supreme
Court Rule 402 does not require the trial court to admonish a
defendant as to what good-time credit he may receive under the
provisions of article 6 of the Code. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West
1996). Section 5-4-1(c-2) makes it clear that "'[t]he actual
period of prison time served is determined by the statutes of
Illinois as applied *** by the Illinois Department of Correc-
tions and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board.'" (Emphasis
added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2) (West 1996).
With this background, I suggest the constitutionality
of Public Act 89-404 is not an appropriate issue to be raised by
defendant in this direct appeal. Defendant entered a guilty plea
and the State dismissed other charges. This issue was not raised
at sentencing or included in defendant's motion to reconsider his
sentence. The last sentence of Rule 604(d) is quite specific:
"Upon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion
to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and
vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived." (Emphasis added.)
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). The supreme court's language ought to be
followed. The issue is waived.
In People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454, 539 N.E.2d
1221, 1224 (1989), the supreme court stated a constitutional
issue may be raised at any time. In People v. Starnes, 273 Ill.
App. 3d 911, 913-14, 653 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1995), the appellate court
distinguished Bryant, finding that Bryant "prohibits waiver of a
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which a
defendant is convicted." The Starnes court then found that
pursuant to the reasoning in People v. Sales, 195 Ill. App. 3d
160, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (1990), waiver does apply to constitutional
attacks on a collateral statute.
As the State argues, the truth-in-sentencing provisions
are collateral to the statutes under which defendant was convict-
ed and sentenced. As pointed out heretofore, chapter III of the
Code concerns the Department of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-1-1
through 3-15-13 (West 1996). Section 3-6-3 is self-executing.
The credit for time served issue under article 6 of the Code is
not an issue to be properly addressed in direct appeal in this
case. Section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) provides that a prisoner serving a
sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder "shall receive
no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of
his or her sentence of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii)
(West Supp. 1995). Determining credit for time served is the
responsibility of the Department of Corrections, not the trial
court.
For the reasons stated above, it is not necessary to
address the State's argument concerning reenactment of the
legislation in Public Acts 89-428 and 89-462, or Public Act 89-
656 (Pub. Act 89-656, 15 eff. January 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws
3500-01)).
As in Watford, the issue of constitutionality is not
properly before this court. The trial court's orders should be
affirmed in their entirety.
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