JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 2002, defendant, Willie E. Purnell, an inmate at Illinois River Correctional Center, filed a habeascorpus petition. Later that month, the trial court dismissed Purnell's petition, finding that (1) it failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief and (2) if considered as a postconviction petition, the claims therein were barred by principles of forfeiture and res judicata.

Purnell appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing his habeas corpus petition without considering whether the petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim. We disagree and affirm.

In December 1999, the State charged Purnell with (1) possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (1 gram or more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999)) (count I) and (2) delivery of a controlled substance (less than 1 gram of a substance containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West Supp. 1999)) (count II). In April 2000, the State filed a third count against Purnell, which was later withdrawn. On August 7, 2000, two days before the start of Purnell's jury trial, the State filed an information containing a fourth count against him. That count alleged that in December 1999, Purnell, "while on a public way *** within 1[,]000 feet of the real property comprising a place used primarily for religious worship, *** knowingly and unlawfully possessed with the intent to deliver 1 gram or more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine" (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), 407(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999)) (count IV). The trial court's docket shows that Purnell was arraigned on count IV on August 7, 2000.

On August 10, 2000, a jury convicted Purnell of counts II and IV. In September 2000, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in prison on count IV. Purnell appealed, arguing only that the court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 15 years in prison. This court affirmed Purnell's conviction and sentence. People v. Purnell, No. 4-00-0854 (January 17, 2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

In April 2001, Purnell pro se filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2000)), alleging that he was denied (1) his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him (U.S. Const., amend. VI) when the State failed to call as a witness the individual to whom Purnell allegedly delivered cocaine; (2) his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) when the State did not show that individual's unavailability; and (3) his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of law (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) when the State called that individual as a witness at the trial of a person Purnell described as his "co[]defendant." In May 2001, the trial court dismissed Purnell's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)), upon finding that (1) the issues raised therein were barred by principles of forfeiture and res judicata and (2) the petition was not supported by affidavits or any other evidentiary documents.

In June 2001, Purnell pro se filed a second postcon-viction petition, which contained the same allegations as his original petition but to which he attached (1) portions of the trial transcript, (2) a memorandum of law, and (3) an excerpt from a federal criminal opinion. Later that month, the trial court dismissed Purnell's second postconviction petition, upon finding it to be frivolous and patently without merit (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)). Specifically, the court found that Purnell's claims were barred by principles of forfeiture and res judicata because the issues raised were virtually identical to those raised in his first postconviction petition and the proceedings on the first petition were not deficient in some fundamental way.

Purnell filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent him. OSAD filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal, and in July 2002, this court granted OSAD's motion and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Purnell's second postcon-viction petition. People v. Purnell, No. 4-01-0624 (July 23, 2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

In February 2002, Purnell filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that (1) the trial court committed plain error when it arraigned him at his initial court appearance in violation of his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV); (2) his fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amends. IV, V, XIV) were violated when he was arraigned and tried on count IV in the absence of an arrest warrant, a probable-cause hearing, and a grand-jury indictment and without his entering a plea; and (3) he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel (a) allowed him to be arraigned without a probable-cause determination, before an indictment had been returned, and without his entering a plea; (b) later allowed him to be arraigned and tried on count IV without a probable-cause determination and before an indictment had been returned; and (c) failed to file motions to dismiss.

In February 2002, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion dismissing Purnell's habeas corpus petition. In its memorandum opinion, the court first stated that under People v. Sturgeon, 272 Ill. App. 3d 48, 649 N.E.2d 1385 (1995), it was required to consider Purnell's habeas corpus petition as if it were a postconviction petition. The court then concluded that the issues Purnell raised in the petition were barred by principles of forfeiture and res judicata because (1) they were similar to those raised in Purnell's previous two postconviction petitions and (2) Purnell did not show that the proceedings on his prior postconviction petitions were fundamentally flawed.

The trial court then considered Purnell's petition under section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)), which sets forth the conditions under which habeas corpus relief may be granted. The court determined that Purnell's claims were not cognizable under that section of the Code.

This appeal followed.

Section 10-124 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2002)) sets forth seven specific instances that entitle a prisoner to habeas corpus relief. Those seven instances fall into two general categories--either the trial court lacked jurisdiction or there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release. People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1270 (2001). If neither of those two instances is applicable, habeas relief is not appropriate, even if the alleged errors involve a denial of constitutional rights. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d at 205, 792 N.E.2d at 1270.

Purnell does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred when it determined that he was not entitled to habeascorpus relief. We further note that although his petition sought habeas corpus relief, none of his claims (1) challenge the trial court's original jurisdiction to impose sentence or (2) suggest that some postsentencing occurrence entitles him to immediate release from prison. We thus conclude that the trial court properly determined that Purnell was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

B. Postconviction Relief

Purnell next argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition after considering it as a postconviction petition but failing to determine whether it stated the gist of a constitutional claim. We disagree.

Initially, we note that the trial court was mistaken in believing that it was required to consider Purnell's petition as a postconviction petition under Sturgeon because Sturgeon is no longer good law on that point.

In 1997, the General Assembly amended the Act through the passage of Public Act 89-609 (Pub. Act 89-609,