PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In October 2002, the State charged defendant, CharlesRamsey, with unlawful possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, unlawful possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine, and unlawfulpossession of methamphetamine. In December 2002, defendant fileda motion to suppress evidence. In March 2003, the trial courtgranted defendant's motion.

On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred ingranting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.I. BACKGROUND

In October 2002, the State charged defendant by information with one count of unlawful possession of a controlledsubstance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A)(West 2002)), alleging he knowingly and unlawfully possessed withintent to deliver more than 15 grams but not more than 100 gramsof a substance containing methamphetamine. The State alsocharged defendant with single counts of unlawful possession withintent to manufacture methamphetamine (720 ILCS570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)), unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)), and unlawfulpossession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West2002)). Defendant pleaded not guilty.

In December 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppressevidence, alleging he was unconstitutionally seized when thearresting officer asked him for consent to search his vehicle. In February 2003, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing onthe motion.

Logan County Sheriff's Deputy Aaron Pickett testifiedhe initiated a traffic stop of defendant's vehicle on October 8,2002, based on a broken windshield. Prior to stopping thevehicle, Pickett received a call regarding a motorist in need ofassistance. He then received "a message on the computer,"indicating a vehicle matching the description of the truck hadbeen seen in the area and "was possibly involved in methamphetamine production." A detective had indicated the vehicle hadbeen noticed "several times in the past weeks" and farmers hadcomplained about the vehicle in the area.

Pickett approached the vehicle, and defendant handedhim his driver's license and proof of insurance through a vent-glass window because the driver's-side window could not belowered. Deputy Pickett returned to his vehicle as he hadalready decided to write defendant a warning ticket. He also rana warrant check and confirmed defendant's driver information. Pickett wrote a warning ticket and approached defendant's vehicleagain. He then handed defendant his driver's license and insurance card, and defendant reached through the vent-glass window tograb the items. Picket also handed defendant the written warningand explained he had 45 days to comply with the warning ticketand fix the windshield.

Deputy Pickett testified that while he handed defendantthe warning, he asked him if he could "check" or "search" hisvehicle. Defendant responded, "'No problem.'" Defendant steppedout the passenger-side door because the driver's side was broken. As Deputy Pickett walked around the vehicle, he noticed a brokenwindow on the rear passenger side. Pickett "immediately noticedthe smell of ether" and saw a can of Prestone "starting fluidwith the cap off" behind the rear passenger compartment. Pickettpatted down defendant and then searched the interior of hisvehicle. Between the driver's seat and the center console,Deputy Pickett "pulled out a white plastic bag" that let off "awhite puff of smoke" that turned out to be methamphetamine. Heexited the vehicle and called the fire department for assistance.

The State played a videotape of the traffic stop takenfrom Deputy Pickett's squad car. Pickett testified he had beencertified in methamphetamine production and awareness. Whenasked if defendant exhibited any physical characteristics thatwere consistent with methamphetamine users, Deputy Pickettindicated defendant had a "concave face" and "rotten teeth." Healso stated defendant was "very skinny at the time of the stop."

On cross-examination by defense counsel, Deputy Picketttestified the only reason he stopped defendant's vehicle was forthe broken windshield. Based on the videotape, Pickett agreed heasked defendant if he had anything unusual in his vehicle anddefendant's answer was no. Pickett then asked if defendantminded if he searched the vehicle, and defendant consented. After he handed defendant the warning, his driver's license, andhis insurance card, Deputy Pickett stated defendant would havebeen free to leave. After receiving consent to search thevehicle, Pickett noticed the smell of ether and the can ofstarting fluid.

In March 2003, the trial court granted defendant'smotion to suppress. The court found Deputy Pickett had reasonable grounds to make the traffic stop based on the crackedwindshield. However, based on the totality of the circumstances,the court found that "once the officer handed over the ticket thepurpose of the stop had been completed." The court concludedthat anything beyond that "basically exceeds the scope of thestop" and granted the motion to suppress. The State filed acertificate of substantial impairment and appealed the court'sruling pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(a)(1)).II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred ingranting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

In reviewing a motion to suppress on appeal, we arepresented with mixed questions of law and fact. People v. Smith,214 Ill. 2d 338, 347, 827 N.E.2d 444, 450 (2005). A trialcourt's assessment of witness credibility and factual determinations will be reversed only if manifestly erroneous. People v.Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). However, the ultimate determination of whether the evidence issuppressed is entitled to de novo review. See People v. Gipson,203 Ill. 2d 298, 304, 786 N.E.2d 540, 543 (2003).

On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has theburden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful (725 ILCS5/114-12(b) (West 2002)). "'However, once the defendant makes aprima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burdenshifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion.'" People v. Reatherford, 345 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334, 802N.E.2d 340, 347-48 (2003), quoting People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App.3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000).

B. The Traffic Stop

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, theIllinois Constitution affords citizens with "the right to besecure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessionsagainst unreasonable searches[] [and] seizures." Ill. Const.1970, art. I,