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PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In June 1999, the State charged defendant, DarrenRansom, with attempt (murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West1998)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(1) (West 1998)), andarmed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1998)). In September1999, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts. In November1999, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in prison forhome invasion, 20 years for armed robbery (to run consecutivelyto the home invasion sentence), and 35 years for attempt (to runconcurrently with the armed robbery and home invasion sentences). On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial courterred by (a) denying his motion in limine seeking to bar theState from introducing evidence of his flight and (b) admittingcertain evidence; (2) the prosecutor made improper statementsduring closing argument; and (3) section 5-8-4(a) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West1998)) is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We affirm.

The evidence at defendant's jury trial showed thefollowing. On the night of May 15, 1999, the victim, Donna Hill,was out with her friend, Alexis Bell. At 11:30 p.m., Donnareturned to her home, which she shared with her mother, DeniseWilborn, her brother, Carl Hill, and her three sons. Her motherand youngest son were the only ones at home when she arrived. Around midnight, Wilborn invited Dewayne Bias and his sister,Diane, into the home to visit with Donna. Wilborn then went nextdoor to a friend's house. Dewayne and Diane stayed for about 15minutes. Around 3 a.m., Bell honked the horn of her car in frontof the home, and Donna talked to Bell out of her bedroom windowfor about 15 minutes.

Around 4 a.m., Donna's baby became fussy, and Donnastarted downstairs to prepare a bottle. Halfway down the stairs,she heard someone come in the front door. When she got to theliving room, she saw defendant with one foot in the living roomand one on the porch. Donna recognized defendant because he hadbeen at her home several times in the previous weeks to seeWilborn, who braided his hair. A week before, Donna and defendant had argued at Donna's home, and she told defendant not tocome there again.

Donna asked defendant to leave, and he left. Sheclosed the door but did not lock it. After fixing the bottle,she returned to her bedroom, fed the baby, and put him in bed. Donna then got undressed and lay down on her bed to watch television and count her rent money. As she was counting the money,she heard someone coming up the stairs.

Donna then saw defendant and another man, whom she didnot recognize, standing at her door, and she asked defendant toleave. Defendant had a hammer in his hand. Carl testified thata day before the incident, he and his cousin, Shantel Williams,had used a hammer to install a door on Donna's bedroom and hadleft it on the floor nearby. Defendant attacked Donna with thehammer, first striking her on the side of her face and then onher forehead. As she lost consciousness, the money fell out ofher hands.

When she regained consciousness, Donna went to herbedroom window and yelled for help. She then crawled down thestairs and tried to leave the house. She made it to the kitchen,where she lost consciousness again.

Later that morning, Donald McClain, a former boyfriendof Donna and the father of her oldest child, entered the home andfound Donna lying in the kitchen. He then went to his cousin'shouse where he called 911.

When Springfield police detective James Young, anevidence technician, arrived on the scene, he found blood on thebed and walls of Donna's bedroom that continued in a path to thekitchen, where a considerable amount of blood had collected onthe floor and walls. Young also found Donna's purse in thebedroom and its contents strewn on the floor. The hammer wasnever found.

During the night of May 15, 1999, and the early morningof May 16, James Jones and Monte Turner were at Mac's Lounge withdefendant. Around 1 or 1:30 a.m., Jones could not find defendant. Jones and Turner left the lounge and returned to theirhome. When Jones entered the home, he placed his car keys on topof his entertainment shelf.

Around 8 a.m., Jones and Turner were awakened bydefendant, who was knocking on the window and calling Jones'name. Turner testified that defendant knocked on the window andrepeated "let me in" in a "panicky, rushing, [and] hurrying"manner for 5 or 10 minutes. Eventually, Turner opened one doorand asked defendant what he wanted. Defendant offered $20 ifsomeone would open the door. Turner opened a second door and letdefendant inside. Jones and Turner did not notice any blood ondefendant. Defendant, carrying a black gym bag, asked Jones ifhe could drop defendant off at defendant's father's house andoffered him another $20. Jones denied defendant's request, andhe and Turner went back to sleep. Turner described defendant aspanicky, jumpy, and nervous that morning.

At 9:30 a.m., Turner's brother stopped by Jones andTurner's home to drop their child off and mentioned that Jonesand Turner's car was gone. Jones and Turner then noticed thatthe keys were missing from the entertainment shelf. Approximately one week later, the car was found in St. Louis, Missouri. When it was returned, the car did not contain any blood or tools.

On May 23, 1999, a St. Louis police officer arresteddefendant, and in June 1999, the State charged him as stated. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking toprohibit the State from offering any evidence of his flight. Thetrial court denied the motion, finding sufficient circumstantialevidence of defendant's flight.

At trial, the State sought to use a hammer similar tothe one used in the attack to illustrate that Donna's injurieswere consistent with those a hammer would cause. The trial courtoverruled defense counsel's objection to the use of the hammer.

The State also sought to show how Donna initiallyidentified defendant by using a book of mug shots, which contained arrest photographs of defendant and other individuals. Defense counsel made a motion in limine to prohibit the Statefrom introducing the mug shot book. The trial court denied themotion. However, the court directed the State not to refer tothe book as a "mug book" or "police book" and ruled that the bookwould not go back to the jury during deliberations.

Defense counsel made another motion in limine toprohibit the State from introducing evidence that Donna becamephysically ill upon seeing defendant's photograph. The trialcourt denied the motion, stating that the police officers couldtestify to what they observed when Donna saw the photograph.

At the trial's conclusion, the jury found defendantguilty of all counts. Defendant subsequently filed motions formerger and a new trial. Following a sentencing hearing, thetrial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial but neverruled on the merger motion. The court then sentenced defendantas stated. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State fromintroducing evidence of his flight. Specifically, he assertsthat no evidence showed or raised the inference that defendantknew he was a suspect in a crime or that the police were pursuinghim. We disagree.

Evidentiary rulings lie within the trial court's sounddiscretion, and this court will not disturb them unless the trialcourt abused its discretion. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458,476, 544 N.E.2d 715, 723 (1989). The fact of flight is a circumstance that a jury may consider as tending to prove guilt. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 349, 651 N.E.2d 72, 93 (1995). The inference of guilt that may be drawn from flight depends uponthe suspect's knowledge that (1) the offense had been committed,and (2) he is or may be suspected. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 349,651 N.E.2d at 93. Although evidence that a defendant was awarethat he was a suspect is essential to prove flight, actualknowledge of his possible arrest is not necessary to render suchevidence admissible where evidence exists from which that factmay be inferred. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 350, 651 N.E.2d at 93.

The State's evidence of flight consisted of Turner'stestimony that a few hours after the May 16, 1999, incident,defendant was at her home in a panicked state, trying to get aride. Defendant offered Turner $20 to enter her home and offeredJones $20 for a ride. After Jones refused to give defendant aride, his car keys and car turned up missing. The car was laterfound in St. Louis, where defendant was arrested. Moreover, theevidence showed that defendant would be motivated to flee becausehe had attacked a person who knew him and could identify him.

We conclude that based on the evidence presented, thejury reasonably could have inferred that defendant knew that hewas a suspect and he consciously avoided police. We thereforehold that the trial court did not err by denying defendant'smotion in limine.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred byallowing the State to (1) present testimony regarding (a) thebook of mug shots and (b) Donna's becoming physically ill whenshe viewed defendant's photograph, and (2) use a hammer asdemonstrative evidence. For the following reasons, we disagree. The admissibility of evidence at trial lies within thetrial court's sound discretion, and we will not overturn itsdecision absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Illgen,145 Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).

Defendant contends that the State's presentation ofevidence regarding the book of mug shots was prejudicial. Wedisagree.

At trial, Donna identified defendant's photograph inthe book and identified the book as the one police showed herwhen she was in the hospital following the incident. However,the trial court did not allow the State to refer to the book aseither a "mug book" or a "police book." Instead, the Statereferred to it as a "photo book." See People v. Ayers, 264 Ill.App. 3d 757, 759, 636 N.E.2d 600, 601-02 (1993) (trial court didnot abuse its discretion in allowing mention of "photos," "photographs," and "photo books" while admonishing the State not torefer to the defendant's prior arrest photo as a "mug shot" or"mug photo"). Further, the court did not allow the book to goback to the jury room during deliberations.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the State did notuse the book to suggest that he committed the instant crimebecause he had been previously arrested. Instead, the trialcourt took appropriate measures to prevent such prejudice fromoccurring. We therefore conclude that the court did not err byadmitting this evidence.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred bypermitting the State to use a hammer as demonstrative evidence. Specifically, he contends that the use of the hammer was (1)unnecessary because a hammer is a "familiar object" and (2)inflammatory.

In People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 252, 592 N.E.2d997, 1022 (1992), the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote the following on the use of demonstrative evidence:

"Courts look favorably upon the use ofdemonstrative evidence, because it helps thejury understand the issues raised at trial. 'The overriding considerations in admittingdemonstrative evidence are relevancy andfairness. [Citations.] The question of theadmissibility of such exhibits is a matterwithin the trial court's discretion and willbe disturbed only on a showing of clearabuse.'[Citation.]"

Here, the State's expert witness testified that Donna'sinjuries were consistent with those that would result from blowsinflicted by a hammer similar to the one the State presented. This testimony might have laid to rest any doubts the jury heldregarding whether Donna's description of the attack was consistent with the injuries she received. Given the other extensiveand sometimes gruesome evidence of the brutality of the attackand the injuries Donna suffered, we hold that the State's use ofthe hammer as demonstrative evidence was not so inflammatory asto unfairly prejudice defendant and the trial court did not abuseits discretion by allowing it.

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred byadmitting evidence that Donna became physically ill after viewingdefendant's photograph. Specifically, he claims this evidencewas not relevant. We disagree.

Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existenceof any fact that is of consequence to the determination of thecase more probable than it would be without the evidence. Lewis,165 Ill. 2d at 329, 651 N.E.2d at 83. However, even when evidence is relevant, the trial court may, in its discretion,exclude it if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs itsprobative value. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 329, 651 N.E.2d at 83.

The evidence of Donna's reaction to the photograph washighly probative of the identity of the attacker in that herviolent reaction makes it more probable that the person in thephotograph was her attacker. Accordingly, we conclude that thetrial court acted within its discretion by admitting the evidenceof Donna's reaction to defendant's photograph.

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made improperstatements during closing argument. We disagree.

A prosecutor is allowed a great deal of latitude inclosing argument and may comment on the evidence presented and onreasonable inferences arising therefrom, even if those inferencesare unfavorable to the defendant. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d401, 441, 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (1993). Because the trial court isin a better position than a reviewing court to determine theprejudicial effect of a given remark, determining the permissiblescope of closing argument lies within the trial court's discretion, and we will not disturb that determination unless a clearabuse of discretion occurred. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 441, 626N.E.2d at 178.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor made thefollowing statement:

"This isn't a case of maybe I'm mistakenabout who he is. She knows specifically whohe is[,] and she pointed to him[,] and sheknows that is who he is. For her to pointthe finger at him and say that he is the manthat's responsible for this with such certainty and with such definite--definitivenessin her testimony, if she's not to be believedit must mean that she's framing him for somereason, and don't you think we'd have heardsome cross[-]examination about a motivationfor her to lie about his--about his--aboutmotivation to lie? Excuse me because I didn't state that real well. Let me try again.Don't you think we would have heard somecross[-]examination if there were any reasonat all for her to make this up and to framehim?"

Defendant objected, and the trial court held a side-bar conference. After the conference, the trial court reminded the jurythat the State has the burden of proof.

The prosecutor later remarked:

"And we know not only that he fled toMissouri, but we know why. You heard a little bit of testimony about the fact there wasa second person in the house that day. Wewere never able to determine who it was because Donna said she didn't recognize theman, but the defendant committed this crime,beat her, leaving her for dead in front of awitness. That's the reason why he ran toMissouri, ladies and gentlemen."

Defense counsel also objected to this statement, and the trialcourt sustained the objection.

Finally, the prosecutor commented:

"At least twelve separate brutal, brutalhammer strikes to the face. The sheer brutality of this crime speaks volumes as towhat was in the defendant's mind at the timehe committed these offenses."

Defense counsel again objected, and the trial court told the juryto disregard any statements not based on facts.

When viewed in the context of the closing arguments asa whole and the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor'sremarks were neither improper nor substantially prejudicial todefendant. Defendant contends that the first comment, regardingDonna's identification of defendant, shifted the burden of proof. We disagree. The prosecutor commented on the absence of anyevidence that Donna was motivated to lie. Moreover, even if theprosecutor's remark misled the jury on the burden of proof, thetrial court cured the error by contemporaneously reminding thejury that the burden of proof remained with the State.

The second remark of which defendant complains was notimproper. As the State points out, the prosecutor was entitledto comment on the evidence of defendant's flight.

Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor'sreference to 12 blows of the hammer was not based on evidencebecause the State's expert witness did not testify that Donna hadsuffered 12 lacerations. In light of the evidence presented attrial, we conclude that this remark did not substantially prejudice defendant. The State's expert witness testified to theexistence of nine lacerations, with underlying depressed skullfractures beneath three or four of them. He also testified thatone laceration extended from Donna's forehead to the bridge ofher nose and that brain matter had come through one of thelacerations on the side of her head. In addition, the jury heardtestimony regarding the amount of blood discovered at the crimescene and a paramedic's description of Donna's condition immediately after she was discovered. Given that the jury heard thisextensive and graphic evidence on the severity of Donna's injuries and the brutality of the attack, the prosecutor's remarkthat defendant inflicted 12 blows was not substantially prejudicial. Again, the court instructed the jury to disregard anystatements not based on facts.

Last, defendant argues that the mandatory consecutivesentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code isunconstitutional under Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2dat 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, which was decided while defendant's case was pending on direct appeal. Specifically, hecontends that section 5-8-4(a) violates his right to due processand trial by jury. We disagree.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72(1998).

Section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)) provides as follows:

"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed aspart of a single course of conduct duringwhich there was no substantial change in thenature of the criminal objective, unless, oneof the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X felony or a Class 1felony and the defendant inflicted severebodily injury *** in which event the courtshall enter sentences to run consecutively. Sentences shall run concurrently unless otherwise specified by the court."

Thus, pursuant to section 5-8-4(a), a trial court must imposeconsecutive sentences when (1) the defendant commits multipleoffenses within a single course of conduct, (2) one of theoffenses was a Class X felony, and (3) the defendant inflictedsevere bodily injury. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998).

In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120S. Ct. at 2362-63, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than thefact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penaltyfor a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must besubmitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." TheCourt further explained:

"'[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislatureto remove from the jury the assessment offacts that increase the prescribed range ofpenalties to which a criminal defendant isexposed. It is equally clear that such factsmust be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, quotingJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53,143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332, 119 S. Ct. 1215,1228-29 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring).

Disagreement exists regarding the meaning of an "increase [in] the prescribed range of penalties" (Apprendi, 530U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363). Here,defendant asserts that the "increase" to which Apprendi refersincludes the aggregate years of imprisonment resulting from theimposition of consecutive sentences. For the following reasons,we conclude that Apprendi does not support defendant's argument.

The Apprendi decision clearly indicates that the Courtwas concerned only with increases in the sentencing range for asingle, discrete conviction--that is, the conviction for whichthe State sought an enhanced sentence. Apprendi focused solelyupon the increase in the sentencing range for a particularoffense and not the aggregate years of imprisonment to be servedas a result of a trial court's imposing consecutive sentences. Indeed, the Court recognized that the defendant in Apprendi couldhave received consecutive sentences. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___,147 L. Ed. 2d at 445, 120 S. Ct. at 2354. Consequently, thecumulative effect of a defendant's sentences, including consecutive sentences, is irrelevant under Apprendi.

Unlike the statute in Apprendi, section 5-8-4(a) doesnot actually increase any of defendant's individual sentences. Here, defendant was convicted of home invasion and armed robbery,both Class X felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c), 18-2(b) (West 1998)). The statutory maximum sentence for a Class X felony is 30 yearsin prison (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1998)). The trialcourt's sentences of 15 and 20 years respectively are clearlywithin the prescribed statutory range.

Section 5-8-4(a) merely addresses the manner in whichthe sentence for each individual offense is to be served. Thatsection has nothing to do with the length of each discretesentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998); see also People v.Primm, No. 1-97-3685, slip op. at 26 (December 29, 2000), ___Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, ____ N.E.2d ___, ___ (consecutive sentencing affects only the manner in which each sentence is to beserved and has nothing to do with the length of each sentence). Our supreme court made this clear in Thomas v. Greer, 143 Ill. 2d271, 278, 573 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1991), where it held that whensentences are "made consecutive to one another, a new singlesentence [is] not formed." The Thomas court supported itsholding by noting, in part, that "'[t]he term "consecutivesentences" means sentences following in a train, succeeding oneanother in a regular order, with an uninterrupted course ofsuccession, and having no interval or break.'" (Emphasis inoriginal.) Thomas, 143 Ill. 2d at 278, 573 N.E.2d at 817,quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law