______________________________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a June 2001 bench trial, the trial courtfound defendant, Brandon L. Rathbone, guilty of residentialburglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2000)). The court latersentenced him to five years' probation, subject to variousconditions, including that he participate in the TreatmentAlternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) drug-treatment program.

In January 2002, the State filed a petition to revokedefendant's probation. Following hearings in March and May 2002,the trial court revoked defendant's probation and sentenced himto nine years in prison.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abusedits discretion by (1) sentencing him for violating his probationrather than for the crime of residential burglary and (2)sentencing him to nine years in prison. We affirm.

After convicting defendant in a bench trial, the trialcourt sentenced him in August 2001 to five years' TASC probation. The court admonished defendant that if he did not comply with theterms of his probation, he would be resentenced to a prison term.

In January 2002, the State filed a petition to revokedefendant's probation. In February 2002, defendant failed toappear at the first scheduled hearing on the State's petition torevoke his probation, and the trial court issued a warrant forhis arrest. Defendant was present at the March 2002 hearing onthe State's petition, and the court found him in violation of theterms of his probation. Specifically, the court found that he(1) failed to report to the probation department in September2001 and January 2002, and (2) failed to attend, successfullycomplete, and obey all rules and regulations of the TASCtreatment program.

At the May 2002 resentencing hearing, no evidence waspresented in aggravation or mitigation. The trial courtconsidered the presentence investigation report (PSI), which hadbeen amended and updated since it was originally prepared inAugust 2001. According to the PSI, defendant reported that hedrank alcohol seven days a week, always drank to get drunk, andhad been drinking right before the burglary. A TASC evaluationcompleted in July 2001 diagnosed defendant as alcohol dependentand recommended residential substance-abuse treatment.

The PSI further showed that on October 19, 2001,defendant was placed on "jeopardy" status by TASC because hefailed to attend an appointment and tested positive for cocaine. He was referred to the Gateway Foundation for residentialtreatment, but was unsuccessfully discharged in late November2001 after he left Gateway against the advice of the staff onNovember 16, 2001. He also failed to attend TASC appointments onNovember 21 and 26, 2001. According to defendant, he leftGateway because he had a problem with his counselor. He did nothave an explanation for missing his TASC appointments.

In announcing defendant's sentence from the bench, thetrial court explained, in pertinent part, as follows:

"[I]n meting out the sentence I'm going toimpose today, I have considered all thethings required by statute, including thestatutory factors in aggravation andmitigation, the arguments of counsel, the[d]efendant's statement on his own behalf, inallocution, the evidence adduced at the trialof this case, the cost of incarceration ofthis [d]efendant upon the State of Illinoisshould I impose a prison sentence upon him,and all the other factors required bystatute.

* * *

***[Defendant], you knew exactly whatwould happen if you failed to comply with theterms of probation, and you chose forwhatever reason you have to violate theprobation terms in a number of ways. Themost significant of which to you is youfailed to complete your TASC requirements.

Now you seem to have a habit of notgetting along with people. Certainly whenyou go to prison, that's a habit you betterbreak or you are going to be in some trouble,but you know you can't blame everybody elsefor all of your problems. You chose not tocomplete TASC, nobody else did, and in thesame vein I think you have chosen prison hereover probation, because those were theoptions given to you, and it was totallywithin your control, not within mine or yourmother's or your probation officer's, it waswithin your control, so prison it is.

Although [defense counsel] told you thatand that's no surprise, the question is howmuch. I think we have seen, given yourdisregard for the law and the [c]ourt'sorders and everybody else since you have beenon probation, that a sentence to a minimumterm would be inappropriate here, as would asentence to the maximum term, I don't think[15] years would be appropriate either.

I agree with [the prosecutor's] number,nine years, that's what I am going tosentence you to here today, nine years inprison, to be followed by two years[']mandatory supervised release. I choose [9]years not just out of the air, but I chosethat because that's right in the middle ofthe range between [4] and [15], that's themiddle, I think that's appropriate for you,with credit for time served, which is 233days.

The net effect really will be, I think,a little over a three[-]year sentence foryou, so you are going to have to servesomewhere between three and four years."

Later in May 2002, defendant filed a motion toreconsider his sentence, asserting that (1) the sentence wasexcessive and disregarded defendant's rehabilitative potentialand lack of substantial criminal history; (2) the trial courterred in its consideration of factors in aggravation andmitigation; and (3) the court erred by disregarding defendant'ssubstance abuse as a mitigating factor. The court denied themotion, and this appeal followed.

Sentenced Him for His Conduct on Probation

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by sentencing him for violating the terms of hisprobation rather than for residential burglary. The Stateresponds that defendant has forfeited this issue by failing toraise it in his postsentencing motion. We agree with the State.

In People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d1124, 1130 (1988), the supreme court unequivocally held that foran issue to be preserved for review on appeal, the record mustshow that (1) a contemporaneous objection to the trial court'serror was made, and (2) the issue was contained in a writtenposttrial motion. In so holding, the court relied in part on themandatory language of section 116-1 of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 116-1 (now725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 2000))), noting that "the statute requiresthat a written motion for a new trial shall be filed by thedefendant and that the motion for a new trial shall specify thegrounds therefor." (Emphasis in original.) Enoch, 122 Ill. 2dat 187, 522 N.E.2d at 1130. In addition, the court reiteratedthe underlying rationale for the forfeiture rule that it hadpreviously stated in People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32,464 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1984):

"'Failure to raise issues in the trial courtdenies that court the opportunity to grant anew trial, if warranted. This casts aneedless burden of preparing and processingappeals upon appellate counsel for thedefense, the prosecution, and upon the courtof review. Without a post[]trial motionlimiting the consideration to errorsconsidered significant, the appeal is open-ended. Appellate counsel may comb the recordfor every semblance of error and raise issueson appeal whether or not trial counselconsidered them of any importance.'" Enoch,122 Ill. 2d at 186, 522 N.E.2d at 1130,quoting Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 464N.E.2d at 227.

In 1993, through the passage of Public Act 88-311 (Pub.Act 88-311, eff. August 11, 1993 (1993 Ill. Laws 2604, 2615)),the legislature added the following sentence to section 5-8-1(c)of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code): "Adefendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to anyaspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a writtenmotion filed within 30 days following the imposition ofsentence." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West 2000). In People v. Reed,177 Ill. 2d 389, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997), our supreme courtconsidered whether the 1993 amendment to section 5-8-1(c) of theUnified Code created a requirement that defendants file a writtenpost-sentencing motion in the trial court to preserve sentencingissues for appellate review and concluded that it did. In soholding, the court noted that the mandatory statutory language ofamended section 5-8-1(c) was nearly identical to the statutorylanguage at issue in Enoch. The Reed court further explained itsholding as follows:

"In addition, the policy considerationssupporting the requirement of a written post-trial motion to preserve trial error areequally applicable in the context ofsentencing. Requiring a writtenpost[]sentencing motion will allow the trialcourt the opportunity to review a defendant'scontention of sentencing error and save thedelay and expense inherent in appeal if theyare meritorious. Such a motion also focusesthe attention of the trial court upon adefendant's alleged errors and gives theappellate court the benefit of the trialcourt's reasoned judgment on those issues. We therefore agree with the appellate courtthat the plain language now contained insection 5-8-1(c) shows a clear legislativeintent to make a post-sentencing motion thefunctional equivalent of a post[]trial motionfor purposes of preserving issues forappeal." Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 394, 686N.E.2d at 586.

Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has forfeitedhis claim that the trial court sentenced him for his conduct onprobation rather than for his original offense. In soconcluding, we note that defendant's claim is precisely the typeof claim the forfeiture rule is intended to bar from review whennot first considered by the trial court. Had defendant raisedthis issue in the trial court, that court could have answered theclaim by either (1) acknowledging its mistake and correcting thesentence, or (2) explaining that the court did not improperlysentence defendant based on his conduct on probation. If thecourt did not change the sentence, then a record would have beenmade on the matter now before us, avoiding the need for thiscourt to speculate as to the basis for the trial court'ssentence.

Citing People v. McCormick, 332 Ill. App. 3d 491, 499,774 N.E.2d 392, 399 (2002), defendant contends that despite hisfailure to raise this issue in his postsentencing motion, weshould review it as plain error because it constitutes a"misapplication of the law." We acknowledge that a number ofappellate court cases, including McCormick, assert that allegedsentencing errors are reviewable as plain error when they involvea misapplication of law because the right to be sentencedlawfully is substantial in that it affects a defendant'sfundamental right to liberty. McCormick, 332 Ill. App. 3d at499, 774 N.E.2d at 399; People v. Keene, 296 Ill. App. 3d 183,186, 693 N.E.2d 1273, 1275 (1998); People v. McMann, 305 Ill.App. 3d 410, 414, 712 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1999); see also People v.Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1050, 735 N.E.2d 720, 722 (2000)("Sentencing issues are regarded as matters affecting adefendant's substantial rights and are thus excepted from thedoctrine of waiver"); People v. Ryan, 336 Ill. App. 3d 268, 274,783 N.E.2d 187, 192 (2003) ("Although defendant did not object tothe trial court's comments during the sentencing hearing and didnot move to reconsider the sentence, we may review as plain errora court's reliance on an improper factor in aggravation insentencing because it affects a defendant's fundamental right toliberty"); People v. Kopczick, 312 Ill. App. 3d 843, 852, 728N.E.2d 107, 115 (2000) ("a trial judge's reliance upon animproper factor in sentencing impinges upon defendant'sfundamental right to liberty"). However, we disagree with thesecases to the extent that they deal with the principles offorfeiture and plain error without applying the analysis thatgranting exceptions to the forfeiture rule ordinarily requires.

We reject this approach because it is not consistentwith (1) the rule of law set forth in Reed, (2) its underlyingprinciples, or (3) the intent of the legislature. If all mattersrelated to a "misapplication of law" at sentencing affect adefendant's fundamental right to liberty and are thus reviewableas plain error, then the plain error exception essentiallyswallows the forfeiture rule, rendering meaningless therequirement contained in section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Code andenforced by the supreme court in Reed.

We do not mean to suggest that misapplications of lawat sentencing are never reviewable as plain error. Instead, wehold that it is not a sufficient argument for plain error reviewto simply state that because sentencing affects the defendant'sfundamental right to liberty, any error committed at that stageis reviewable as plain error. Because all sentencing errorsarguably affect the defendant's fundamental right to liberty,determining whether an error is reviewable as plain errorrequires more in-depth analysis.

In People v. Baker, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1090, 794N.E.2d 353, 359 (2003), this court addressed the limitedavailability of plain error review when we wrote as follows:

"'The plain error rule may be invoked ifthe evidence at a sentencing hearing wasclosely balanced[] or if the error was soegregious as to deprive the defendant of afair sentencing hearing.' [Citation.] Thesecond prong of the plain error rule shouldbe invoked only when the possible error is soserious that its consideration is '"necessaryto preserve the integrity and reputation ofthe judicial process." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The rule is not a general savingclause for alleged errors but is designed toredress serious injustices."

Moreover, our supreme court has "consistently emphasized thelimited nature of the plain error exception." People v. Easley,148 Ill. 2d 281, 337, 592 N.E.2d 1036, 1061 (1992). Plain errorexists only when the essential fairness of a trial has beenundermined, and this "occurs only in situations which 'revealbreakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished from'typical trial mistakes.'" People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17,660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (1995), quoting P. Wangerin, "Plain Error"and "Fundamental Fairness"; Toward a Definition of Exceptions tothe Rules of Procedural Default, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 753, 778(1980). Plain errors are those that affect something that is"'fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process.'" Keene,169 Ill. 2d at 17, 660 N.E.2d at 910, quoting People v. Green, 74Ill. 2d 444, 456, 386 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1979) (Ryan, J., speciallyconcurring); see also People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 103, 792N.E.2d 1163, 1196 (2001) (reiterating that plain error is "alimited and narrow exception" to the waiver rule). Accordingly,before declaring that an alleged sentencing error raised for thefirst time on appeal is reviewable as plain error, the reviewingcourt should consider whether the evidence was closely balancedand whether the error was sufficiently grave that the defendantwas deprived of a fair sentencing hearing. People v. Fuller, 205Ill. 2d 308, 343, 793 N.E.2d 526, 548-49 (2002).

In this case, defendant has not asserted that (1) theevidence at sentencing was closely balanced or (2) the errordeprived him of a fair sentencing hearing. Instead, he merelycontends that the trial court committed plain error when itsentenced him based on an improper factor--namely, his conduct onprobation. However, when resentencing after a revocation ofprobation, trial courts are entitled to consider the defendant'sconduct on probation. People v. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d 130,142, 485 N.E.2d 443, 450 (1985) ("[t]he manner in which adefendant conducts himself or herself while on probation is anappropriate consideration in any sentencing hearing"). Thus,although defendant asserts that he was sentenced based on animproper factor, a more accurate characterization of his claim isthat the trial court gave a proper factor undue weight. Such aclaim addresses the trial court's exercise of its discretion, notthe fairness of the proceedings or the integrity of the judicialprocess. Defendant's claim thus does not warrant plain errorreview.

In so concluding, we note that the proposition statedin the above-cited McCormick line of cases--that is, thatsentencing errors involving a misapplication of law arereviewable as plain error--is traceable to People v. Martin, 119Ill. 2d 453, 458, 519 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1988). We disagree thatMartin provides authority for dispensing with plain erroranalysis. In Martin, the supreme court reviewed the defendant'sclaim after it determined that the evidence at the defendant'ssentencing hearing was closely balanced. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at458-59, 519 N.E.2d at 886-87. In addition, Martin was decidedbefore the 1993 amendment to section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Codeand the supreme court's enforcement of that section in Reed. Moreover, the proposition stated in Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d at1050, 735 N.E.2d at 722--namely, that "[s]entencing issues areregarded as matters affecting a defendant's substantial rightsand are thus excepted from the doctrine of waiver"--is traceableto People v. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d 386, 634 N.E.2d 717 (1994), acase construing section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Code prior to the1993 amendment.

B. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Abused Its

Discretion by Sentencing Him to Nine Years in Prison

Last, defendant argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by sentencing him to nine years in prison. Wedisagree.

We afford the trial court's sentencing decisionsubstantial deference and weight and will not disturb itsdecision absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Campbell, 325Ill. App. 3d 569, 571, 758 N.E.2d 504, 505 (2001). We recognizethat it is the function of the trial court to balance therelevant factors and make a reasoned decision as to theappropriate sentence, and we will not substitute our own judgmentfor that of the trial court. People v. Richmond, 341 Ill. App.3d 39, 53, 791 N.E.2d 1132, 1143 (2003).

At defendant's resentencing hearing, the trial courtstated that it had considered all of the statutory factors inaggravation and mitigation, counsels' arguments, defendant'sstatement, the evidence adduced at trial, and the cost ofincarceration. The record shows that the court also considereddefendant's age, his alcohol abuse, his conduct on probation, andthe underlying offense of which he was convicted. The availablesentencing range for defendant's Class 1 felony was between 4 and15 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2000). Reviewing theevidence in accordance with the applicable standard of review, weconclude that the court did not abuse its discretion bysentencing defendant to nine years in prison.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.