JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1998, defendant, John Reed, pleaded guiltyto residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 1998)) and,because of his prior criminal history, the trial court sentencedhim to 10 years in prison, with sentence credit for 84 daysserved, and ordered him to pay a $100 reimbursement fee for theservices of the public defender pursuant to section 113-3.1 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/113-3.1 (West1998)) and a $40 fee under the Crime Victims Compensation Act(740 ILCS 45/1 through 20 (West 1998)). The Illinois Departmentof Corrections was ordered to withhold 50% of defendant's monthlyincome and remit that amount to the Ford County circuit clerk tobe applied to outstanding fees and costs.

Defendant filed neither a motion to reconsider sentencenor a direct appeal. Instead, in March 2000, he filed a pro sepostconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act(725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2000)). The petitionalleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately investigate and prepare defendant's case for trialresulting in defendant having no choice but to plead guilty. After appointing counsel to represent defendant and hearingarguments, the trial court dismissed defendant's petition.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial courterred by ordering him to pay the $100 reimbursement fee withoutfirst conducting a hearing to determine his ability to pay, (2)ordering him to pay a fee under the Crime Victims CompensationAct, (3) ordering the Department of Corrections to withhold 50%of his wages for court fees and costs, and (4) failing to givehim the proper sentence credit. We affirm.

The State contends both that the issues raised onappeal by defendant are not matters of substantial deprivation ofconstitutional rights cognizable in postconviction proceedingsbut matters of statutory right only and defendant has forfeitedthe issues raised on appeal by not raising these matters untilthis appeal from the court's denial of his postconviction petition. We agree.

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act permits defendants tofile postconviction petitions to establish "a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights." People v.Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 464, 737 N.E.2d 169, 184 (2000). Postconviction proceedings are not meant to be a screening mechanismto correct any and all mistakes not previously corrected. Theissues raised by defendant all involve rights or matters createdby statute involving the assessment or payment of fees and thecredit allowed on a prison sentence. We have consistently heldsuch issues are statutory only and not of constitutional magnitude and, thus, not subject to scrutiny under the Post-ConvictionHearing Act. People v. Griffin, 321 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428, 748N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (2001) (failure to hold hearing in regard todefendant's financial ability to reimburse state for appointedcounsel's fee violates statutory law but does not constitute anydeprivation of constitutional rights, much less a "substantial"one); People v. Guerrero, 311 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 725 N.E.2d783, 784-85 (2000) (denial of $5-per-day credit against fineimposed does not establish substantial deprivation of federal orstate constitutional rights; nevertheless the court awardedcredit); People v. Bates, 179 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709, 534 N.E.2d1019, 1021 (1989) (issue of two days' sentence credit not ofconstitutional stature).

Additionally, none of defendant's objections to hissentence were presented previously, either in a motion to reconsider sentence, a direct appeal, or in his postconviction petition. Statutory rights are subject to waiver where they couldhave been raised in the trial court or on direct appeal but werenot. Bates, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 709, 534 N.E.2d at 1021. Defendant's contentions of error, even if they were of constitutional magnitude, are forfeited. As we have previously stated, "[d]efendant does not cite, nor are we aware of, any case inwhich the [Post-Conviction Hearing Act] has been construed aspermitting a defendant to raise on appeal from the dismissal of apostconviction petition an issue he never raised in that petition. This court will not be the first to so hold." Griffin,321 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 748 N.E.2d at 1238.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

COOK and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.