JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Charles Reeves was convicted by a jury ofpossession of drug paraphernalia, a crack pipe, in violation ofthe Drug Paraphernalia Control Act (Act) (720 ILCS 600/1 et seq.(West 2000)). Defendant was acquitted, however, of possession ofcannabis. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding theverdict on the drug paraphernalia count, arguing the State didnot present sufficient evidence on each element necessary forconviction. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse.

The question presented in this case is whether, in aprosecution for possession of drug paraphernalia, the prosecutionmust prove that the possessed item was "marketed for use" ingrowing, producing, storing, or ingesting drugs, as is requiredby section 2(d) of the Act, which defines "drug paraphernalia." 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000). Because the interpretation of astatute is a question of law, our review is de novo. People v.Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001).

Defendant was charged with knowingly possessing "anitem of drug paraphernalia, namely: a clear tube with 'filteringagent' with the intent of using it in inhaling a controlledsubstance into the human body," in violation of section 3.5 ofthe Act. Section 3.5 provides:

"(a) A person who knowingly possesses an item of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or a controlled substance into the human body, or in preparing cannabis or a controlled substance for that use, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor ***.

(b) In determining intent under sub-section (a), the trier of fact may take into consideration the proximity of the cannabis
or controlled substances to drug paraphernalia or the presence of cannabis or a controlled substance on the drug paraphernalia." 720 ILCS 600/3.5 (West 2000).

Under section 3.5, it is not enough to possess an itemwith the intent of using it to ingest a controlled substance. Under section 3.5, the item possessed must be "drug paraphernalia." "Drug paraphernalia" is defined as "all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are peculiar to and marketedfor use in" growing, producing, storing, or ingesting cannabis ora controlled substance. 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000).

Section 3.5, dealing with possession of drug paraphernalia, is a recent addition to the Act. The original section wassection 3, which deals with the sale or delivery of drug paraphernalia. A prior version of section 3 provided there was aviolation if the person knew the item to be drug paraphernalia"or under all of the circumstances reasonably should have known"the item to be drug paraphernalia. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 561/2, par. 2103(a). To the extent that the prior version purported to allow convictions based on the constructive knowledgeof the seller, the supreme court held the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 305, 515N.E.2d 42, 45 (1987). "Drug paraphernalia statutes are frequently challenged on vagueness grounds because of the inherentdifficulty in proscribing certain articles only in regard totheir illicit functions." Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 305, 515 N.E.2dat 45. Such vagueness objections can be overcome, however, byrequiring scienter. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 305, 515 N.E.2d at45. Although a pipe may be peculiar to drug use, that pipe isnot "drug paraphernalia" if the seller or marketer of the pipedoes not market the pipe with the intent that the pipe be used toingest drugs. People v. Feld, 267 Ill. App. 3d 56, 61, 641N.E.2d 924, 929 (1994) ("The State must prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that the items at issue are 'peculiar to' drug use and thatthe defendants 'marketed' those items as drug paraphernalia"(emphasis in original)).

Where one is charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, it should logically not be necessary to prove that anyperson marketed the item with the intent that the item be used toingest drugs. Rather, it should only be necessary to prove thatthe person possessed the item "with the intent to use it iningesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or acontrolled substance into the human body." 720 ILCS 600/3.5(a)(West 2000). Nevertheless, the definition of "drug paraphernalia" which applies to sale and delivery cases also applies topossession cases: items "which are peculiar to and marketed foruse" (emphasis added) in growing, producing, storing, or ingesting. 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000).

There is no question, and defendant does not contest,that defendant possessed the crack pipe in question in this case. Nor is there any question that the crack pipe, a glass tube witha brillo pad as a filtering agent, is "peculiar to" drug use. The presence of cocaine on the crack pipe supports the jury'sfinding that defendant intended to use the crack pipe to ingestor inhale drugs. See 720 ILCS 600/3.5(b) (West 2000). The onlyquestion is whether the crack pipe was "marketed" for use withdrugs. The plain meaning of the statute seems to be that homemade items which have never been marketed cannot constitute drugparaphernalia. While this may be a legislative oversight, we arenot allowed to ignore the clear language of the statute. Peoplev. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 198-99, 613 N.E.2d 740, 745 (1993).

The trial court, during the conference on jury instructions, observed there was no evidence that the item was marketed. "If anything, from what I heard of the testimony[,] it sounds tome like this is a homemade contraption that wasn't marketed byanybody for anything but rather put together by someone." Thetrial court's finding, as a matter of law, that the Act did notrequire, in this case, a showing that the item was "marketed" wasin error. The trial court should have granted defendant's motionfor judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Based upon our ruling in this case, we need not addressdefendant's argument that the trial court should have granted hismotion to suppress.

Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction.

Reversed.

MYERSCOUGH and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.