JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 2004, defendant, Thomas V. Ryburn, filed apetition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), seeking to set aside his multipleOctober 1999 guilty pleas. In August 2004, the trial court suasponte dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous and withoutmerit.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his guilty pleasare void because the trial court's imposition of certain finesviolated the guilty-plea agreement and (2) the court erred by suasponte dismissing his section 2-1401 petition. We disagree andaffirm.

In October 1998, the State charged defendant with fourcounts each of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminalsexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS5/12-14(a)(1), 12-13(a)(1), 12-16(d) (West 1998)). Following aFebruary 1999 stipulated fitness hearing, the trial court founddefendant fit to stand trial.

At defendant's October 1999 guilty-plea hearing,defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant hadagreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated criminalsexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 1998)). In exchange, the State agreed (1) to dismiss the remaining nine countsand other unrelated charges against defendant, (2) to recommendan aggregate sentence totaling no more than 60 years, and (3)that the court would not impose a fine on defendant.

The State provided the following factual basis fordefendant's guilty pleas. On September 8, 1998, defendantappeared at the victim's residence and asked to use the telephone. The victim, who was acquainted with defendant, allowedhim to come inside. After looking through a telephone book for afew minutes, defendant sneaked up behind the victim, held a knifeto her throat, and repeatedly sexually assaulted her.

The trial court accepted the State's factual basis. The court also fully admonished defendant, outlined the terms ofthe plea agreement, and determined that he was knowingly andvoluntarily pleading guilty. The court then accepted defendant'sguilty pleas.

In November 1999, the trial court sentenced defendantto 20 years in prison on each count of aggravated criminal sexualassault, with those sentences to be served consecutively (730ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)). The court also ordered thatdefendant pay the statutorily mandated $100 sexual-assault fine(730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.7(b)(1) (West 1998)). That same day, thecircuit clerk imposed the statutorily mandated $25 fine under theViolent Crime Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West1998)).

In December 1999, defendant filed a motion to withdrawhis guilty pleas, alleging that he did not enter them knowinglyand voluntarily. Following a February 2000 hearing, the trialcourt denied the motion.

Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) section 5-8-4(a)of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West1998)), requiring the imposition of consecutive sentences in hiscase, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); (2) the trialcourt erred by finding him fit to plead guilty; and (3) the $25fine imposed under the Victims Assistance Act was improperbecause the circuit clerk, not the trial court, imposed it.

This court affirmed defendant's convictions and 60-yearaggregate sentence, vacated the $25 Victims Assistance Act fine,and remanded for the trial court to impose that fine. People v.Ryburn, No. 4-00-0117 (June 22, 2001) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). In January 2002, the trial court enteredan order imposing a $25 fine under the Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 1998)).

In June 2002, defendant pro se filed a petition forrelief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1through 122-8 (West 2002)). The petition raised the followingconstitutional claims: (1) defendant received ineffectiveassistance of guilty-plea counsel in that counsel (a) failed toraise a speedy-trial claim, (b) failed to call certain alibiwitnesses, (c) failed to present evidence to corroborate thepurported alibi, (d) failed to obtain police records that allegedly showed that the victim had a motive to fabricate her complaint against defendant, and (e) stipulated that defendant wasfit to plead guilty; and (2) he received ineffective assistanceof appellate counsel because counsel failed to raise on appealthe aforementioned issues. Later in June 2002, the trial courtdismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without meritunder section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)(West 2002)). Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and the trialcourt appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD)to serve as his counsel. In March 2003, OSAD moved to withdrawas counsel. (This court later granted OSAD's motion to withdrawas counsel on appeal of the trial court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and affirmed that court's judgment. People v. Ryburn, No. 4-02-0552 (July 29, 2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).)

Also in March 2003, defendant filed a "Petition for aNew Trial," in which he alleged that he should not have to serve85% of his 60-year aggregate prison sentence because the sentencewas based on "tainted/perjuried [sic]" testimony in an unrelatedcase. Later that month, the trial court dismissed the petition,upon determining that the court lacked jurisdiction to considerit.

In April 2003, defendant filed a motion entitled"Petition to Chief Administrative Judge for Rehearing En Bancwith Substitution of Judge and Conduct Review of Judges." Laterthat same month, the trial court dismissed the petition asfrivolous, upon finding, inter alia, that defendant had been"engaging in a pattern of filing frivolous pleadings withoutfactual or legal merit[,] all with the apparent end of obtainingrelief from his convictions and sentences in [McLean County caseNo. 98-CF-1062]."

In July 2004, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), seeking to set aside his October1999 guilty pleas on the following grounds: (1) he receivedineffective assistance of guilty-plea counsel in that counsel (a)"fraudulently concealed [the trial court's] violation of theguilty plea" agreement when the court imposed fines and orderedthat defendant pay restitution, (b) violated several rules ofprofessional conduct, (c) did not consult with him about whatissues he wanted to raise in his motion to withdraw his guiltypleas, (d) filed a Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(d)) certificate that was "suspect," (e) "fraudulently concealed" defendant's medical records, mental-health history, andcertain exculpatory evidence, (f) failed to argue that hisconsecutive sentences were improper, and (g) failed to arguedefendant's "legal innocents [sic]" in his motion to withdraw hisguilty pleas; (2) the trial court violated several supreme courtrules by failing to provide him with a free transcript of proceedings; and (3) his consecutive sentences violated Apprendi,530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348.

In August 2004, the trial court sua sponte dismisseddefendant's section 2-1401 petition, upon finding that it wasfrivolous and without merit. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that his guilty pleas are voidbecause the trial court's imposition of the statutorily mandatedfines totaling $125 violated the plea agreement. Defendantfailed to raise this issue in his section 2-1401 petition. However, a void judgment can be challenged at any time, eitherdirectly or collaterally. People v. Mathis, 357 Ill. App. 3d 45,51, 827 N.E.2d 932, 938 (2005). We thus address the merits ofdefendant's argument and, for the following reasons, reject it.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "when theprosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed pleaagreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, andhence his conviction cannot stand." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.504, 509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984); see People v. Caban, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1087, 743 N.E.2d 600,604 (2001) (citing Mabry). Thus, "[a] prosecutor's unfulfilledpromise of a reduced sentence, or a misrepresentation by thetrial judge as to the sentence to be imposed, invalidates a pleaof guilty." People v. Washington, 38 Ill. 2d 446, 449-50, 232N.E.2d 738, 740 (1967).

At the October 1999 guilty-plea hearing, the trialcourt outlined the terms of defendant's plea agreement. Inparticular, the court informed defendant that there would not be"any fine," but further stated that the court could imposecertain fees and court costs. The court also explained, inpertinent part, what the potential penalties would be, if not forthe plea agreement:

"THE COURT: Each of these [aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault counts] is what'scalled a [C]lass X felony. Now, the penaltyfor each [C]lass X felony is as follows: Theminimum term is a penitentiary term in theIllinois Department of Corrections [(DOC)] ofsix years, and the maximum is a 30[-]year DOCsentence. There's a possible fine of up to$25,000, and there is a three[-]year mandatory supervised release term in addition toany penitentiary sentence. That's what usedto be known as parole.

THE DEFENDANT: Right." (Emphasisadded.)

Reviewing the guilty-plea proceedings in their totality, weconclude that the no-fine provision in the plea agreement referred to the potential $25,000 fine under section 5-9-1(a)(1) ofthe Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(1) (West1998)), not the statutorily mandated fines that totaled a paltry$125. Indeed, by definition, because a fine is statutorilymandated, a trial court does not possess the authority to declineto impose it, even if the parties agreed that it not be imposed. Because we presume trial courts and counsel to understand andfollow the law, we will construe their actions in a manner thatis consistent with their doing so--such as concluding that here,the trial court and counsel did not intend to disregard a statutorily mandated fine--as long as the record before us providesany basis for our doing so. Here, it does. Accordingly, wereject defendant's argument that his guilty pleas are void basedon the trial court's imposition of $125 in fines.

Even accepting defendant's contention that the terms ofthe plea agreement specifically referred to the statutorilymandated fines, defendant's contention that the trial court'simposition of those fines renders his guilty pleas void isridiculous. Defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for the State'sagreeing (1) to dismiss nine other serious felony counts andother unrelated charges against him, (2) to recommend an aggregate sentence totaling no more than 60 years (30 years less thanthe maximum potential aggregate sentence), and (3) that the courtwould not impose any fines, including a potential $25,000 finefor each of the three felony counts. In light of the significantbenefits defendant received from that agreement, his claim thatthe promise not to impose a mere $125 in fines renders his guiltypleas void defies logic and reason. See Machibroda v. UnitedStates, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473, 478, 82 S. Ct. 510,513 (1962) (in which the United States Supreme Court held that"[a] guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which depriveit of the character of a voluntary act, is void" (emphasisadded)); see also Washington, 38 Ill. 2d at 450, 232 N.E.2d at740 (quoting Machibroda). Because nothing in the record suggeststhat the promise to not impose $125 in mandatory fines depriveddefendant's guilty pleas "of the character of a voluntary act,"we reject defendant's argument that the trial court's impositionof those fines, even if in violation of the plea agreement,rendered his guilty pleas void.

B. The Trial Court's Sua Sponte Dismissal of

Defendant's Section 2-1401 Petition

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by suasponte dismissing his section 2-1401 petition. Defendant acknowledges that in People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (2004), this court held that a trialcourt may sua sponte dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if itfinds that the petition is frivolous and without merit. Defendant asks this court to reconsider our holding in Bramlett. Wedecline to do so.

In reaching the above holding in Bramlett, we relied onMason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842, 774 N.E.2d 457, 464(2002), in which this court held that a trial court has theauthority to sua sponte dismiss a mandamus petition, upon findingit frivolous and without merit. In particular, we concluded thatthe following reasoning set forth in Mason also applied tosection 2-1401 petitions:

"'[T]he trial courts, which have theinherent authority to control their courtrooms and their dockets, have the corollaryauthority to utilize their discretion indealing with "professional litigants" whoinappropriately burden the court system withnonmeritorious litigation, stemming fromtheir unhappiness as DOC inmates.'" Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 472, 806 N.E.2dat 1254, quoting Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at842, 774 N.E.2d at 463-64.

We recognize that some of our sister appellate courtdistricts have reached an opposite conclusion as to the trialcourt's authority to summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition. In People v. Pearson, 345 Ill. App. 3d 191, 197, 802 N.E.2d 386,391 (2003), the Second District held that the trial court commitserror requiring reversal when it dismisses a section 2-1401petition without providing the defendant notice and an opportunity to respond, which are necessary for due process. See alsoPeople v. Anderson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 934, 942, 817 N.E.2d 1000,1006-07 (2004) (in which the First District agreed with Pearsonthat it is unfair to a defendant, when faced with the proposeddismissal of his section 2-1401 petition, to be deprived ofnotice and an opportunity to respond); People v. Edwards, 355Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1099-1100, 825 N.E.2d 329, 336-37 (2005) (inwhich the Third District followed Pearson and Anderson and heldthat a trial court may not summarily dismiss a section 2-1401petition).

We decline to follow the decisions of the First,Second, and Third Districts and, instead, reaffirm our holding inBramlett. In so doing, we note that this case provides a perfectexample of why trial courts should have the inherent authority tosua sponte dismiss section 2-1401 petitions that are frivolousand without merit. As the trial court found in its three-pagewritten order dismissing defendant's section 2-1401 petition, allof defendant's claims were totally lacking in merit. Defendantasserts that he is not a "vexatious or frivolous litigator"because he raised one meritorious claim in the section 2-1401petition--that is, his claim that his guilty pleas are void. However, as earlier discussed, that claim was neither raised indefendant's section 2-1401 petition nor meritorious.

In addition, defendant's assertion that he is not avexatious litigant who inappropriately burdens the court systemwith nonmeritorious litigation is belied by (1) the sheer numberof pleadings he has filed since his October 1999 guilty pleas inthis case and (2) the trial court's explicit finding in its April2003 order that defendant had been "engaging in a pattern offiling frivolous pleadings without factual or legal merit[,] allwith the apparent end of obtaining relief from his convictionsand sentences in [McLean County case No. 98-CF-1062]." Defendantcontinued his practice of filing frivolous pleadings when hefiled his July 2004 section 2-1401 petition now before us. Indeed, this defendant could be the "poster boy" for why trialcourts should have the inherent authority to sua sponte dismisssection 2-1401 petitions that are frivolous and without merit. Denying trial courts this authority would require them to squander scarce judicial resources. Accordingly, we conclude that thetrial court appropriately exercised its authority by sua spontedismissing defendant's petition.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.

COOK, P.J., dissents.

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the First,Second, and Third Districts that trial courts should not suasponte and summarily dismiss section 2-1401 petitions as frivolous and without merit. It would be wonderful if trial courtscould predict, the day cases are filed, whether they will ultimately be successful, and dismiss those which will not. Ourrules of civil procedure, however, have long recognized theimpossibility of that task and required that cases go forwardeven when the trial court has doubts about them. A motion todismiss may be granted only when the plaintiff has failed tostate a cause of action, and leave to amend must be grantedunless plaintiff can never state a cause of action. A motion forsummary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuineissue of material fact.

We should not make a radical change in our rules ofcivil procedure simply to deal with the problems of inmatelitigation. Unless we limit the change to inmate litigationcases, we create tremendous uncertainty for all future civilcases. Even if we were the legislature, contemplating a specialrule for inmate litigation, questions remain. Is all inmatelitigation frivolous and without merit? If it is, why do we notsimply bar it all? If it is not, how does a trial judge determine merit sua sponte before the parties are even allowed torespond? Premature attempts to dismiss meritless cases oftenresult in increased, not reduced, litigation.