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JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 2003, a jury convicted defendant, David L.Savage, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance withintent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2002)). Thetrial court later sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment andimposed a street-value fine totaling $96,070. Prior to defendant's conviction and while he was incarcerated and awaitingtrial, defendant filed a motion for relief from prosecutorialmisconduct of Macon County jail officials who conducted a shakedown of jail cells with the intention of confiscating policereports held in the possession of inmates.

The shakedown was conducted after the Macon CountyState's Attorney's office informed the sheriff's department andjail officials that Supreme Court Rule 415(c) (134 Ill. 2d R.415(c)) requires an attorney to keep pretrial discovery in his orher exclusive custody. The trial court denied defendant'sprosecutorial-misconduct motion, and he was convicted and sentenced as stated.

Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erredwhen it denied his motion for relief from prosecutorial misconduct, (2) the enforcement of Rule 415(c) against only indigentand incarcerated defendants violates equal protection, (3) he isentitled to a $1,405 credit against his street-value drug finepursuant to section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2002)),and (4) the court's written judgment order should be amended toreflect that he was convicted pursuant to section 401(a)(2)(D) ofthe Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Controlled SubstancesAct) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2002)) and not section402(a)(2)(D) (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(D) (West 2002)). We affirmthe court's judgment as modified and remand with directions.

In December 2002, defendant was charged with unlawfulpossession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2002)) and unlawful possession of acontrolled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(D) (West 2002)). InApril 2003, while he was incarcerated in the Macon County Correctional Center and awaiting trial, correctional officers conductedsearches of inmate cells and confiscated the State's pretrial-discovery answers (specifically police reports) found in thepossession of inmates. That same month, defendant filed a motionfor relief from prosecutorial misconduct.

Defendant's motion alleged the search of inmate cellsand the confiscation of the State's pretrial-discovery answersand police reports was improper because it impaired his abilityto be effectively represented by his counsel and constituted aninterference with the attorney-client relationship. Specifically, he maintained the actions taken were improper because (1)Rule 415(c) does not prohibit defense counsel from transferringcustody of the State's answers to pretrial discovery to a client;(2) the State's Attorney's office had no authority to direct orrequest that the jail conduct a shakedown and confiscate theState's pretrial-discovery answers; and (3) documents including"notes, attorney correspondence, legal research, and otherprivate papers" were confiscated during the shakedown.

Testimony at the hearing on defendant's motion indicated that sometime prior to the shakedown, the State's Attorney's office became aware that defense attorneys in Macon Countywere providing copies of the State's pretrial-discovery answers,and specifically police reports, to their clients. Immediatelyprior to the search and seizure at issue, they also became awareof instances of witness intimidation that they suspected werebased upon information contained in police reports in the possession of jail inmates. The State's Attorney's office interpretedSupreme Court Rule 415(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 415(c)) as prohibitingdefense attorneys from giving pretrial-discovery materials, suchas police reports, to their clients and requiring instead thatthey remain in the exclusive possession of counsel.

The State's Attorney's office sent letters to defenseattorneys believed to be violating the Rule 415(c). The lettersrequested the attorneys retrieve police reports that had beenleft in the possession of their clients in violation of Rule415(c). They also entered into discussions with individuals fromthe sheriff's department and the jail to decide how to deal withinmate possession of police reports and the State's pretrial-discovery answers in general. Through these discussions it wasdecided that a shakedown of the jail would be conducted duringwhich such documents would be confiscated along with othercontraband. Testimony indicated shakedowns occurred at the jailregularly, two to three times a month. When the documents herewere confiscated, it was time for a shakedown to be conducted.

Assistant State's Attorneys Jack Ahola and TamaraWagoner were present for the shakedown but did not enter into anyinmate cells. During the shakedown, correctional officers wentinto the cells and searched for police reports and contraband ingeneral. When the officers had questions about whether a particular document should be seized, they directed their inquiries ateither the assistant jail superintendent or one of the assistantState's Attorneys. These three individuals only conductedcursory inspections of the documents they were shown and did notread any of what was written on them. Once material was seizedfrom a cell, it was put into a manila envelope with the inmate'sname written on the outside. The envelopes were then signed bythe assistant jail superintendent and given to Ahola and Wagoner. Approximately 250 to 260 inmates were in the jail when thisparticular shakedown occurred and roughly 40 of them had documents confiscated.

The confiscated documents were held in the State'sAttorney's office. The envelopes containing the confiscateddocuments were only opened at the request and in the presence ofdefense attorneys who wanted to inspect their contents. Shortlyafter the shakedown, defense attorneys were informed they couldobtain their client's seized materials by signing a statementacknowledging the requirements of Rule 415(c) and agreeing not toreturn the seized documents to their respective clients. Someattorneys complied, signed the document, and received theirclient's confiscated documents back. Other attorneys, includingdefendant's counsel, refused, and the confiscated documents werenot returned.

Finally, several individuals who were incarcerated whenthe shakedown occurred testified as to what documents had beentaken from them. Besides the State's pretrial-discovery answersand police reports, the witnesses testified that other seizeditems included notes taken in preparation of defense, letters orpaperwork from their attorneys, legal papers in general, andlegal research. Further, some of the confiscated police reportsor pretrial-discovery items had inmates' notes on them. Additionally, one witness testified that another inmate's policereport was taken from his cell. Defendant has not alleged thatanything other than discovery answers and police reports weretaken from his cell.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trialcourt denied defendant's motion. In a lengthy docket entry, thecourt concluded "[i]t is a violation of [Rule] 415(c) for defensecounsel to give copies of discovery to his client (or others) andto not keep them in his exclusive custody." Further, it statedmaterials other than discovery were only confiscated inadvertently and as a result of defense counsels' violation of Rule415(c) and efforts by the State's Attorney's office and jailofficials to avoid invading the attorney-client privilege by onlyconducting cursory inspections of the seized documents. Finally,the court stated that even if the seizure was improper, it wasnot "such a deliberate intrusion upon the confidential attorney-client relationship to justify any sanction more severe thanattribution of delay occasioned thereby to the State." The courtthen held that based upon the circumstances, such a delay wouldnot be attributable to the State.

In July 2003, defendant's jury trial was held and hewas convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substancewith intent to deliver pursuant to section 401(a)(2)(D) of theControlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West2002)). In August 2003, defendant filed a motion for judgment ofacquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing, inrelevant part, that the trial court erred by denying his pretrialmotion for relief from prosecutorial misconduct.

In September 2003, the trial court denied defendant'sposttrial motion and sentenced him to a term of 25 years' imprisonment and imposed a street-value fine of $96,070. Additionally,the court ordered defendant be given credit for 281 days previously served from November 29, 2002, to September 5, 2003. OnSeptember 8, 2003, the court's written judgment order was filedstating defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of acontrolled substance pursuant to section 402(a)(2)(D) of theControlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(D) (West2002)).

On September 30, 2003, defendant filed a postsentencingmotion, arguing only that his sentence was excessive. In December 2003, the trial court denied defendant's postsentencingmotion.

This appeal followed.

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred indenying his motion for relief from prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he contends he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel when the State's Attorney's office (1)usurped the role of the trial court by imposing its own interpretation of Supreme Court Rule 415(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 415(c)) andcoordinated a shakedown of the jail to seize, as contraband,police reports and other items of the State's pretrial-discoveryanswers and (2) seized and held in its possession privilegedattorney-client communications. The State contends its actionswere proper; however, in the alternative, it argues defendant hasfailed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by any improper action.

Since the facts of this case are not disputed and thisissue involves only questions of law, our review is de novo. People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270, 821 N.E.2d 253, 256(2004).

1. Interpretation of Rule 415(c)

Defendant first contends it was error for the State'sAttorney's office to unilaterally interpret Supreme Court Rule415(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 415(c)) and then seek to enforce thatinterpretation by coordinating a jail shakedown. On appeal,defendant does not argue that the State's interpretation of Rule415(c) was necessarily incorrect; instead, he maintains thatdeterminations regarding the interpretation and enforcement ofthe rule should have been reserved for the trial court.

Supreme Court Rule 415(c), entitled "Custody of Materials," provides as follows:

"Any materials furnished to an attorneypursuant to these rules shall remain in hisexclusive custody and be used only for thepurposes of conducting his side of the case,and shall be subject to such other terms andconditions as the court may provide." 134Ill. 2d R. 415(c).

Further, the committee comments for Rule 415(c) state:

"If the materials to be provided were tobecome, in effect, matters of public availability once they had been turned over tocounsel for the limited purposes which pretrial disclosures are designed to serve,the administration of criminal justice wouldlikely be prejudiced. Accordingly, thisparagraph establishes a mandatory requirementin every case that the material which anattorney receives shall remain in his exclusive custody. While he will undoubtedly haveto show it to, or at least discuss it with,others, he is not permitted to furnish themwith copies or let them take it from hisoffice." 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(c), CommitteeComments at 357. A State's Attorney has several powers and duties,including acting as an attorney and legal advisor for countyofficials with respect to all official-business matters. Ashtonv. County of Cook, 384 Ill. 287, 297, 51 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1943). Section 3-9005(a)(7) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(7)(West 2002)) specifically provides that "[t]he duty of eachState's [A]ttorney shall be *** [t]o give his opinion, withoutfee or reward, to any county officer in his county, upon anyquestion or law relating to any criminal or other matter, inwhich the people or the county may be concerned."

Additionally, the Illinois Administrative Code (Administrative Code) provides for "[r]andom, unannounced, irregularlyscheduled shakedowns of [county jail] detainees and their quarters *** to detect the presence of weapons and other contraband." 20 Ill. Adm. Code