People v. Snow

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People v. Snow

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-09-0924 Rel

Case Date: 08/18/2010

Preview:Filed 8/18/10

NO. 4-09-0924 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GERALD R. SNOW, Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from Circuit Court of Livingston County No. 09DT33 Honorable Robert M. Travers, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Gerald R. Snow, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He refused to submit to chemical testing and, as a result of his refusal, the State notified him that his driver's license would be suspended pursuant to the implied-consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2008)) for a minimum of 12 months. Defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension on the basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to conduct the traffic stop which led to defendant's arrest. After considering the evidence at the rescission hearing, which included testimony from defendant himself in support of his petition, the trial court denied defendant's requested relief. Prior to the start of defendant's criminal trial, the State notified the trial court that it would be presenting portions of defendant's testimony from the rescission hearing as part of its case in chief. Defendant objected. The court ultimately concluded that the State was prohibited from presenting defendant's testimony from the prior hearing as

substantive evidence in the criminal trial. The State filed a certificate of impairment and a notice of appeal. After considering the issue within the applicable constitutional framework, we reverse the court's judgment. I. BACKGROUND On March 28, 2009, defendant was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) pursuant to section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11501(a)(2) (West 2008)). He was notified that his one-year statutory summary suspension would begin on May 13, 2009. On May 29, 2009, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, initially alleging four grounds but, after withdrawing three, he pursued rescission on the sole basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. Defendant claimed he "did not improperly use his turn signal and his trailer ball and hitch did not obstruct his license plate" so as to justify being stopped by the officer. Defendant withdrew the allegations relating to the propriety of his arrest. On June 11, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's petition. Defendant testified on his own behalf and the State called the arresting officer, Illinois State Police Trooper Nathaniel Lunt. (We will reiterate only the testimony from this civil hearing that is relevant to the issues in this appeal, i.e., the testimony that the State sought to introduce in defendant's criminal trial, as designated for us by the State as highlighted testimony in the verbatim transcript.) Defendant testified that at approximately 9 p.m. on March 28, 2009, he left Scotty's tavern in Pontiac after having "a beer or two." After driving a short distance, for approximately four minutes, he was stopped by Trooper Lunt. -2-

On cross-examination, defendant testified he was at Scotty's for approximately 45 minutes to an hour with Alan Goetsch, Goetsch's wife, and Cheri and Dale Lambert. Before arriving at Scotty's, defendant had one beer at The Corner Junction, a nearby tavern. Before that, defendant had five to six beers at Chumps and Bones tavern over the course of five hours. There he had eaten peanuts and "stuff on the bars." Defendant said he had not noticed the police officer's squad car behind him until the officer activated his overhead lights. Defendant answered each of the State's questions without asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant's counsel objected to several questions on relevancy, beyond-the-scope-of-direct-examination, and asked-and-answered grounds. The trial court overruled each. After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied defendant's petition to rescind, finding the officer had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle based upon an obstructed rear license plate, a violation of section 3413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2008)). (The court was presented with photographic evidence of the alleged violation.) On December 7, 2009, the trial court convened the parties for defendant's criminal jury trial. At the start of the trial, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to introduce defendant's testimony from the rescission hearing. The testimony would be used as substantive evidence, not for impeachment purposes, during the State's case in chief. Defendant objected and moved to bar the State's use of the testimony. The court initially indicated it would allow the State to offer defendant's civil-proceeding testimony. However, after affording defendant's counsel time to research the issue, the court entertained the parties' respective arguments. Thereafter, the court reversed its initial -3-

ruling and barred the use of the testimony, stating as follows: "All right. I don't see as a distinguishing factor the fact that the defendant chose to take the stand in the rescission hearing, and then, over objection, was required to answer questions posed to him by the State. I see that as a nonfactor. However, I do believe that there is an element of compulsion here by way of the State taking an individual's life through the--or not life, but license through the summary suspension proceeding. It basically puts him in a position where he is the best witness for his side, having been there, obviously and been arrested for the offense. Then he has to make that election of whether he is going to testify, subject himself to the possibility of the use of that testimony at the DUI proceeding, or simply let it go and suffer the loss of his privileges, or at least increase the chance for the loss of his privileges. Although there is no case on point, and certainly there is no Fourth District Appellate case that has been handed up, I believe that the better rules [sic] of law is that proposed in Tilden [(Village of Algonquin v. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d 332, 780 N.E.2d 832 (2002))]. And I will bar the use of the defendant's testimony from the summary suspension proceeding for substantive evidence in this proceeding. I will -4-

not, however, bar the use of it for impeachment purposes or if for some other reason, through some other rule of law, the testimony could be allowed in. So I reverse my earlier ruling having been given the opportunity to review the case law on the subject." The prosecutor asked for a recess to determine whether the State would be proceeding with the trial. When the parties reconvened, the prosecutor indicated the State would be filing a certificate of impairment and notice of appeal. On December 8, 2009, the State did so. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS The State appeals, claiming the trial court erred by barring the use of defendant's testimony given at the rescission hearing as substantive evidence in the subsequent criminal proceeding. This appeal is, in effect, a review of the court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. Generally, we would review a court's suppression order under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. However, because there is no factual or credibility dispute, only a question of law, we review the issue de novo. See People v. Leighty, 362 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260-61, 838 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (2005). The issue before us is whether the constitution prohibits the State from introducing defendant's testimony, given in the civil statutory-summary-suspension hearing, in his subsequent criminal DUI prosecution. Or, more precisely, whether defendant's testimony in the rescission hearing was considered compelled in violation of his constitutional rights. For the following reasons, we answer both questions in the negative and reverse the court's judgment. The primary focus of this case rests on the fifth amendment of the United -5-

States Constitution, which provides as follows: "No person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., amend. V. Similarly, our state constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

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