When you talk about possessory interest and the State has continued to argue that [RR] has a possessory interest inthis, it is not a possessory interest. *** They have attempted in this poorly worded document to retain some sort ofinterest. At best some sort of reverter interest. That's not a possessory interest. The plain language says 'that thisdefendant is the new owner.' The plain language says 'he is the adopter,' which means he's the owner. Not only is hethe owner, but he's the possessor of the dog. *** We are trying to take this vaguely worded agreement and say this isour dog, we have a current possessory interest in it, and therefore, Mr. Soliday cannot do anything we don't like. Andif we don't like what he does then we will charge criminal damage to property[.] *** [W]e are taking this well beyondwhat would appear the intent of the law is. We are trying to bootstrap this writing into some sort of possessoryinterest and it just doesn't appear that way."

The court then stated that it would not "formally" dismiss the case but would allow the State to file a motion forreconsideration, an appeal to the appellate court, or a different charge against defendant.

In July 1998, the State appealed the dismissal, and in June 1999, this court dismissed the appeal because the trial court'sorder did not have the substantive effect of dismissing the charge. People v. Soliday, No. 4-98-0551 (June 14, 1999)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In August 1999, the State moved for entry of a final appealable order,and in September 1999, the trial court dismissed the charge and discharged defendant from his recognizance bond. Thisappeal followed.

Although defendant did not file a brief with this court, the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that we candecide this appeal on the merits without the aid of an appellee brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. TalandisConstruction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).

II. ANALYSIS

The State first argues that dismissal of its charge was improper because (1) the information met the pleading requirementsset forth in section 111-3 of the Procedural Code (725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 1998)), and (2) the trial court granteddefendant's motion to dismiss based on the court's assessment of the sufficiency of the State's evidence (and, in particular,how defendant's agreement with RR defeats the State's case) rather than on the sufficiency of the charge. We agree with theState's first argument.

Defendant sought, and was granted, dismissal of the State's charge based on evidence he presented that RR was not theowner of Tritan. Such evidence, if deemed credible by the trier of fact at trial, would defeat an element of the chargedoffense, namely, that the domestic animal injured be "of another" (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(d) (West 1998)).

Although defendant's motion to dismiss asserted, in part, that the allegations contained in the information the State filedagainst defendant "do not state an offense," the real gist of that motion was contained in its reference to RR and itsattachment of defendant's written agreement with RR. At the hearing on the motion, defendant never claimed that theinformation did not state an offense (which is understandable, given that the information tracked the statutory language andotherwise met all the requirements of section 111-3 of the Procedural Code), but instead argued that the information shouldbe dismissed because the defendant's agreement with RR showed that RR was not Tritan's owner.

Section 114-1(a) of the Procedural Code sets forth 11 separate grounds upon which a trial court may dismiss a charge. Thelegislature intended this section to constitute a comprehensive list of sufficient reasons for dismissing a charge, and thereasons vary from a defendant's not having been placed on trial in compliance with the speedy trial act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(West 1998)) to a defendant's having received immunity from prosecution for the offense charged (725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(1),(a)(3) (West 1998)). Although a trial court possesses the inherent authority to dismiss a charge for reasons other than thoselisted in section 114-1(a), the supreme court has cautioned that a trial court's use of this extraordinary power "'be exercisedonly when failure to do so will effect a deprivation of due process or result in a miscarriage of justice.'" People v. Fassler,153 Ill. 2d 49, 58, 605 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1992), quoting People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 31, 273 N.E.2d 380, 389 (1971).

One of the grounds enumerated in section 114-1(a) of the Procedural Code upon which a trial court can dismiss a charge iswhen the charging instrument does not state an offense (725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(8) (West 1998)). However, when addressing adefendant's motion to dismiss a charge under section 114-1(a)(8), a trial court is strictly limited to assessing the legalsufficiency of the indictment, information, or criminal complaint and may not evaluate the evidence the parties mightpresent at trial.