JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

An Adams County jury found defendant, Kevin W.Stanbridge, guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS5/12-16(d) (West 2002)), and the circuit court sentenced him toseven years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trialcourt erred in finding that his attorney's opening statementopened the door to the State's presentation of other-crimesevidence. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The information charging defendant alleged that hecommitted an act of sexual penetration with J.R.E., a minor, byplacing his mouth on J.R.E.'s penis on or about November 27,1999. J.R.E. was 14 years old.

Defendant, a 35-year-old truck driver, was friends withRobert Eddy, J.R.E.'s father. In November 1997, when defendantwas living in Quincy with his wife and children, Eddy and J.R.E.came to stay with him. They stayed for almost a year. Eddy andJ.R.E. stayed with defendant and his family a second time, fromJanuary to June 1999.

Defendant and Eddy maintained contact thereafter,periodically meeting for beer. On Friday, November 26, 1999,defendant called Eddy to ask if he and J.R.E. would like to cometo defendant's house for a barbecue. Defendant's wife had by nowdivorced him, but their three children were staying with defendant on this particular weekend. He and Eddy left the childrenwith J.R.E. while they went to a bar. Defendant and Eddy eachconsumed several beers before returning to defendant's home ataround 9 p.m., accompanied by a friend named Jeff Warner.

At defendant's home, the three adults and J.R.E. beganwatching a movie in the living room. Eddy went to sleep inanother room, leaving defendant, Warner, and J.R.E. When J.R.E.began to fall asleep on the couch, defendant told him to go todefendant's bedroom so he could sleep there. Defendant thendragged J.R.E. by the ankles into defendant's bedroom and toldhim to take his clothes off. After J.R.E. stripped down to hisunderwear, he got into defendant's bed, and defendant returned tothe living room to continue watching the movie.

J.R.E. testified that he went to sleep but during thenight awoke to the feeling of defendant rubbing his crotch. J.R.E. told him to stop and elbowed him in the head. Defendantstopped, and J.R.E. dozed off. Later he was again awakened, thistime by defendant performing oral sex on him. Defendant deniesany sexual contact between him and J.R.E.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine toexclude evidence of (1) an October 24, 1989, conviction forcriminal sexual abuse (P.F.) and (2) an uncharged sexual offensefrom 1981 (A.B.). At the hearing on this motion, the State alsoraised a third incident, another uncharged offense from 1987. The State wished to use these prior incidents to prove modusoperandi and absence of mistake. The trial court found thatthere was a significant risk of prejudice in allowing the Stateto use any of this evidence at trial and granted the motion as toall three incidents.

On the morning of the first day of trial, the Statefiled its own motion in limine. The State sought to bar defendant from using any reference to his heterosexuality as part ofhis defense. Defendant had commented to a police investigatorthat he was not a homosexual and did not like little boys. Theassistant State's Attorney (ASA) asserted that defendant shouldnot be allowed to "argue that statement in support of his assertion that he is heterosexual."

The trial court denied the State's motion but in doingso warned defendant against opening the door to this topic. Thecourt stated that "if there are references, solicitations, [or]evidence presented, then the State would be permitted, contraryto my earlier ruling, to bring in the testimony of the otherconduct to rebut that[,] and it would be completely appropriate." The court warned defendant's attorney that he would be on "a veryslippery slope in this regard."

In his opening statement, defense counsel began withsome background information, stating that "[m]y client is at thistime--at the time of the incident in November of 1999 *** he wasa father of [three]. He had an 11-month-old daughter, 2 sons, 4and 6 years old. He's a veteran." A little later, counseldiscussed the relationship between defendant's and J.R.E.'sfamilies, relating that "in November of 1997[,] [J.R.E.] and RobEddy lived with [defendant]. Moved out sometime in August of1998, lived there for, oh, almost a year period. The facts willindicate that all during this period of time there is [sic] nosimilar allegations. They also move back in some[]time inJanuary of '99. They moved out sometime May or June of '99." (Emphasis added.)

As soon as defense counsel finished his opening statement, the State moved to reconsider the rulings on both of themotions in limine. Although his argument is not clear, the ASAapparently thought that when defense counsel stated that defendant was a father and a veteran, he intended to raise an inference of heterosexuality. The trial court asked the ASA tocomment on the statement regarding "similar allegations," and theASA responded by saying that the defense had "burst through thatdoor" such that the motions in limine should be reversed.

The trial court was troubled by defendant being described as a father and a veteran but more worried about theremark that there were no similar allegations during the timedefendant and J.R.E. lived in the same household. The courtdeclared the "door to have been opened" and that the State shouldbe allowed to present evidence of defendant's 1989 conviction andthe uncharged incident from 1987.

In its case in chief, the State called as witnesses thetwo young men involved in these incidents. P.F. testified thatin August 1989, when he was 14, he was playing pool in a barwhile waiting for his mother when defendant asked him if hewanted some beer. The two got into defendant's truck, went tobuy some beer, and then drove to an isolated area near a stonebridge in South Park. There, defendant laid his head in P.F.'slap and then started rubbing P.F.'s crotch until P.F. escaped outof the truck. Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual abuse,a Class A misdemeanor.

The testimony of A.B., defendant's cousin, was in someways similar. In the autumn of 1987, when he was 12 years old,A.B. was supposed to go hunting in Liberty with defendant. Defendant picked him up in his truck but instead of taking him toLiberty, defendant bought beer and drove to the stone bridge inSouth Park. Defendant stretched out across the truck's seat andattempted to lay his head in A.B.'s lap, but A.B. moved to getout of the way. A.B.'s testimony was very emotional. A.B. didnot report the incident until 2001, and defendant was nevercharged.

The ASA began his closing argument by citing a dictionary definition of the word "predator" and stating that "[w]hatwe have here now today is a [']predator,['] a predator of teenageboys to put it bluntly." He followed this with an extensivecomparison of the charged crime with the two previous incidentsbefore moving on to discuss the other evidence.

Defendant was convicted, and his motion for a new trialwas denied. The State correctly asserts that the motion for newtrial was filed late and argues that defendant has thereforeforfeited the issue raised. Forfeiture, however, is a two-waystreet--the State chose to argue the untimely motion on themerits and thus forfeited the issue of untimeliness. See Peoplev. Raibley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 692, 698, 788 N.E.2d 1221, 1227-28(2003).

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial courterred in finding that defense counsel's opening statement had"opened the door" to the admission of evidence about the twoprior incidents. Although defendant presents his argument as oneissue, this case really presents two separate questions. Thefirst is whether the evidence of a prior crime and a prioruncharged incident was admissible on its own; the second iswhether the court properly admitted it in response to defensecounsel's opening argument. We review the court's decision forwhether it was an abuse of discretion. People v. Manning, 182Ill. 2d 193, 211, 695 N.E.2d 423, 431 (1998).

The State sought to admit the evidence to show modusoperandi and absence of mistake, but neither of these uses forthe evidence applies here. Although the trial court initiallyexcluded the evidence because of its possible prejudicial effect,it apparently accepted the State's two rationales for admission. We should therefore clarify why both are incorrect.

Evidence of other crimes is not usually admitted toshow propensity, i.e., to show that the defendant is the type ofperson who would have committed the crime charged. People v.Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170, 788 N.E.2d 707, 714 (2003). Thistype of evidence is considered dangerous because a jury mightconvict the defendant for being a bad person rather than forhaving actually committed the crime he is currently charged with. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 170, 788 N.E.2d at 714. Nevertheless,courts allow evidence of prior crimes to prove a number of thingsother than propensity, such as modus operandi and absence ofmistake, provided the prejudicial effect of the evidence does notsubstantially outweigh its probative value. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2dat 170, 788 N.E.2d at 714-15.

Evidence of modus operandi, or mode of operation, isuseful when the identity of the perpetrator is in dispute. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill. App. 3d 116, 123, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479(1995). If two crimes are committed in such a distinctive mannerthat they are recognizable as the work of a single individual,and if we know that the defendant committed one of the crimes,then it makes sense to use that evidence to prove that he alsocommitted the other. See Biggers, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 123, 652N.E.2d at 478. This rationale makes sense when the only proofthat the defendant committed the second crime is that it was verysimilar to another crime that we know he committed. Our case isvery different. Here, defendant and J.R.E. were in defendant'sbedroom alone together. The only disputed issue is whetherdefendant committed an act of sexual penetration on J.R.E. inthat room. The identity of the perpetrator is not in issue; theissue is whether the crime occurred at all. The relevance ofdefendant's prior bad acts in this case is to show that heprobably committed another crime here, i.e., propensity.

The State also argued that the evidence showed what iscalled "absence of mistake." Proving the absence of a mistake isnecessary where the defendant's physical actions are undisputedbut his state of mind is in issue. As an example, where thedefendant in a murder case claims he shot his wife by accident,evidence that he had previously abused her is relevant to showthat he shot her intentionally. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d353, 366, 583 N.E.2d 515, 520 (1991). Perhaps a better exampleis a sexual-abuse case where the defendant admits physicalcontact with the victim but claims that it was an accident. Insuch a case, evidence that the defendant had abused others wouldbe relevant to show that this incident was not an innocentmistake. But again, our case is different. Defendant's conductinside the bedroom is what is in issue. He does not admit thephysical acts alleged and try to put an innocent "spin" on them. Rather, he denies the acts themselves. The only relevance to theState's evidence is therefore that defendant was the type ofperson who is likely to have performed those acts that he denies.

In a new wrinkle to the well-established principlesregarding propensity evidence, the Code of Criminal Procedure of1963 now allows prior offenses to be used even as propensityevidence in prosecutions of certain sex crimes. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2002); Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176, 788 N.E.2d at 718. Despite holding that the statute allows the use of prior offenseevidence to prove propensity, the Supreme Court of Illinois has"urg[ed] trial judges to be cautious in considering the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to show propensity by engaging ina meaningful assessment of the probative value versus the prejudicial impact of the evidence." Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186, 788N.E.2d at 724.

The State did not argue at trial that the prior incidents should be admitted to prove defendant's propensity tocommit the charged crime. Defendant's prior conviction waspotentially admissible under section 115-7.3 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(West 2002)), but only if the requirements of the statute,including a weighing of prejudice and probative value, were met(Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176, 788 N.E.2d at 718). In initiallyconsidering the evidence, the trial court did find that itpresented a high probability of prejudice if admitted, a conclusion with which we agree. The prior conviction was from 10 yearsprior to defendant's trial, which is relevant to the statutoryfactor of proximity in time. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c)(1) (West2002). This interval weighs against admissibility. The statutealso requires a court to consider the similarity between theprior offense and that with which a defendant stands accused. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c)(2) (West 2002). In light of the supremecourt's admonition that courts should remain cautious aboutadmitting other-crimes evidence to show propensity, we concludethat the evidence was inadmissible. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186,788 N.E.2d at 724.

Although the evidence was inadmissible in its ownright, the trial court nevertheless admitted it in response todefendant's opening statement. Under the doctrine of "curativeadmissibility," if a party "opens the door" by raising a particular issue, the trial court may allow the other party to presentotherwise inadmissible evidence if doing so is necessary toprevent undue prejudice. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d at 216, 695 N.E.2dat 433. But curative admissibility "is merely protective andgoes only as far as is necessary to shield a party from adverseinferences." Manning, 182 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 695 N.E.2d at 434.

The State first argued at trial that defense counsel'sdescription of defendant as a veteran and a father of three hadopened the door to the disputed evidence. We disagree. TheState claimed that these comments necessarily implied thatdefendant was heterosexual and that therefore the State should beallowed to prove his prior sexual misconduct with boys. But asthe State points out in its brief before this court (citing Statev. Smart, 26 Kan. App. 2d 808, 811, 995 P.2d 407, 411 (1999)), adefendant may tell the jury background information such as familysize or prior military service so long as he does not try tocreate an impression of a blemish-free life. Contrary to theState's assertions, defense counsel did not "cross the line" tocreate an impression of a blemish-free life. In addition, giventhat the State's own opening statement had already alludedseveral times to defendant's children, the fact that defensecounsel described defendant as a father is unremarkable. Norshould counsel's comment that defendant was a veteran have beenused to allow the State to introduce inadmissible evidence.

Defendant makes the additional argument that even ifhis opening statement had implied that he was heterosexual, theState should not have been allowed to try to counter that implication because heterosexuals are just as likely as homosexuals toabuse children sexually. See M. Becker, The Abuse Excuse andPatriarchal Narratives, 92 N.W. U. L. Rev. 1459, 1466-67 (1998). We express no opinion on this issue but note that trial courtsshould take into account the high likelihood of prejudice in thistype of case when the State is allowed to emphasize defendant'ssexual preference.

The State's second argument for curative admissibilitywas that the evidence would respond to defense counsel's statement that during the first of the two periods when defendanthosted J.R.E. and his father there were "no similar allegations." The State asserts that this implied that defendant had never beenfaced with similar allegations and that it was proper to allowthat implication to be rebutted. The State's contention isespecially unpersuasive in light of the fact that the ASA attrial did not even notice the comment until the trial courtpointed it out to him. Read in context, defense counsel'scomment was not an attempt to portray defendant as having anunblemished past but was rather part of setting out the relationship between defendant's and J.R.E.'s families.

Given the highly prejudicial nature of the State'sevidence, the trial court erred in admitting it as part of theState's case in chief, not as a response to the evidence presented by defendant. Courts must use curative admissibilitycautiously and should employ it to allow parties to respond onlyto unduly prejudicial inferences raised by the other side. SeeManning, 182 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 695 N.E.2d at 433-34. Althoughan opening statement can clearly open the door to otherwiseinadmissible evidence (see People v. Whiters, 146 Ill. 2d 437,442-43, 588 N.E.2d 1172, 1174-75 (1992)), courts should beparticularly hesitant to allow the State to use highly prejudicial evidence in its case in chief. See Terry v. State, 332 Md.329, 338-39, 631 A.2d 424, 428-29 (1993) (allowing evidence ofprior crimes "to counter a rather innocuous albeit impropersuggestion made by defense counsel in an opening statement istantamount to killing an ant with a pile driver"). Even assumingdefense counsel's statement was improper, the State's and thecourt's response was excessive. The court could easily havewaited until the State's rebuttal evidence to decide whether theopening statement was an isolated incident or was reinforced bydefendant's evidence.

Although there was some circumstantial evidence, thecrux of this case is who should be believed about what happenedin defendant's bedroom. Where the determination of a defendant'sguilt or innocence depends on the credibility of the defendantand the accuser, error is particularly likely to be prejudicial. People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 561-62, 568 N.E.2d 895, 901(1991). We find that to be the case here.

In light of the foregoing, we reverse the jury verdictand remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

APPLETON, J., concurs.

McCULLOUGH, J., dissents.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's determination of error by the trial court in admitting evidence presentedby the State.

The trial court was correct in finding the defensecounsel's opening statement was clear and did permit the evidenceto be used as evidence of modus operandi. The opening statementof defendant as highlighted by the State in its brief states:

"What he means by facts, there's other thingsin dispute. My client is at this time--atthe time of the incident in November of 1999,here we are almost 2 years later, but at thetime he was a father of 3. He had an 11-month-old daughter, 2 sons, 4 and 6 yearsold. He's a veteran. He is working at thetime as an over-the-road truck driver andsupporting his children at the time. *** Thefacts will indicate that all during thisperiod of time there is [sic] no similarallegations."

The court referred to the statement of the father and threechildren and linking his experience as a veteran but, moreimportant, defendant's reference that nothing happened between1997 and 1999 and that there were no similar occurrences. Thecourt did continue its ruling not permitting the State to introduce the evidence of the 1981 occurrence.

The standard of review is whether the ruling was anabuse of discretion. The majority states that modus operandi isused in proving identity of the perpetrator. I conclude Biggers,Illgen, and Donoho support the trial court's ruling.

The trial court made clear the basis for its ruling. Ido not believe the court committed error and would affirm thecourt's order based upon the jury's verdict.