JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant, Ronnie K. Stites, ofcriminal trespass and unlawful restraint. The trial courtsentenced defendant to 2 years' imprisonment for unlawfulrestraint (720 5/10-3(a) (West 2000)) and 90 days for criminaltrespass to state-supported land (720 5/21-5(a) (West 2000)) andordered defendant to pay $570 in restitution for property damage. Defendant appeals the restitution order. We affirm.

On November 17, 2000, the State charged defendant withdomestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2000)), unlawfulrestraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2000)), and criminal trespassto state-supported land (720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2000)). InJanuary 2001, the trial court conducted a jury trial. Theevidence revealed that while investigating a reported domesticbattery involving defendant, the Quincy police departmentreceived a report that defendant was in the Lampe high-riseapartments, property of the Quincy housing authority. Despitethe fact that defendant had been previously banned from the high-rise apartments, he was reportedly within his mother's Lampeapartment. Two Quincy police officers went to the apartment andknocked several times on the door. They received no response. With the assistance of a Quincy housing officer, the officersentered the apartment and found Evelyn Stites, defendant'smother, seated alone with the lights turned off.

When asked, Evelyn told the officers that defendant wasnot in the apartment. An officer asked Evelyn for permission tosearch the apartment. She denied his request. With thepermission and assistance of the Quincy housing authorityofficer, the officers insisted and led Evelyn out of theapartment.

In their search for defendant, the officers forcedtheir way into the bedroom by kicking down the door. As aresult, the Quincy housing authority had to replace the bedroomdoor and lock. During the course of the presentenceinvestigation, defendant completed a "subject's statement." Thisstatement allows the defendant to state what he wishes the courtto consider in determining his sentence.

In the present case, defendant wrote the following:

"I ask that you please give *** me one yearin the Adams County [j]ail. Preform [sic]public service hours on swap the whole yearthat I'm here in the jail. Impose a largefine. Restitution for the damage of theapartment at Lampe-Hi-Rise [sic]. Of thedoor and wall the officers kicked in to tryto find me." (Emphasis added.)

The jury found defendant guilty of unlawful restraint (720 ILCS5/10-3(a) (West 2000)) and criminal trespass to state-supportedland (720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2000)). The trial court sentenceddefendant as stated and ordered defendant to pay $570 inrestitution for the damage to the apartment. This appealfollowed.

Defendant now argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion when it ordered him to pay restitution for damagescaused by the police officers. We disagree and affirm.

On appeal, the court should reverse a trial court'srestitution order only where the trial court has abused itsdiscretion. In re M.Z., 296 Ill. App. 3d 669, 673, 695 N.E.2d587, 589 (1998).

Defendant argues that the trial court improperlyordered him to pay restitution for the property damage done tohis mother's apartment. Illinois law allows restitution forproperty damage occurring as a result of the criminal acts of thedefendant. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2000). The statute states:

"In all convictions for offenses inviolation of the Criminal Code of 1961 inwhich the person received any injury to theirperson or damage to their real or personalproperty as a result of the criminal act ofthe defendant, the court shall orderrestitution as provided in this [s]ection." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West2000).

Because the damage was not directly caused by defendant's act, defendant argues that ordering restitution was not permitted bythe statute. We agree the damage to the door occurred when theofficers forced entry to the bedroom, but we disagree withdefendant's argument that the statute does not authorizerestitution under these circumstances. The statute does notrequire the damage to have been directly caused by an act of thedefendant. Rather, the damage must be a result of the criminalact of the defendant. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2000). Here, thedamage to the door occurred as a result of defendant's criminaltrespass on state-supported land. Had defendant not eluded theofficers by hiding in the bedroom, they would not have had toforce entry. The trial court did not abuse its discretion inordering defendant to pay restitution for the damage occurring asa result of his criminal acts.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sorder requiring defendant to pay restitution.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.