JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant, Jesse Tokich, of firstdegree murder in the circuit court of Sangamon County. The trialcourt sentenced him to a term of 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. He appeals his conviction, contending (1)the trial court erred by declaring one of the State's witnessesunavailable and allowing a videotaped evidence deposition of thatwitness under supreme Court Rule 414 (134 Ill. 2d R. 414); (2)the trial court deprived him of due process when it failed todefine "reasonable doubt" upon a specific jury request to do so;and (3) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt. We affirm.

On the morning of December 6, 1997, Katherine Hopwood was strangled to death in her home with a pair of her own slacks. She was 83 years old. Defendant was arrested for her murder inJanuary 1998. The State charged defendant with one count ofintentional first degree murder, two counts of felony firstdegree murder, and one count each of robbery and home invasion inviolation of sections 9-1(a)(1), 9-1(a)(3), 18-1(a), and 12-11(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),(a)(3), 18-1(a), 12-11(a)(1) (West 1996)). After several continuances the trial date was set for September 21, 1998.

Less than a week before trial, the State filed a motionfor an evidence deposition. It alleged Springfield policeDetective Timothy Young, one of the lead investigators on thecase, would be unavailable to give live testimony at trial. Detective Young was scheduled to be out of the country for theadoption of a child in China. He would be gone from September 22to October 4 and was unable to change his plans. The Staterequested it be allowed to take a videotaped evidence depositionof Detective Young pursuant to Rule 414.

At a hearing on the merits of the motion, the defenseobjected, presenting several arguments. First, if DetectiveYoung testified on a television screen the jury would be lessable to assess his credibility than if he were testifying live.Second, defendant contended Detective Young's testimony was notthat crucial to the case because, although he did take more thanone statement from defendant and interviewed many of the witnesses in the case, Detective Pat Ross was with Young for almostall of the interviews and would be able to testify to those sameinterviews, making Young's testimony merely cumulative. Finally,if the State were permitted to present Detective Young's testimony by videotaped deposition, it would have the benefit of thetestimony while defendant would not have the benefit of Young forpossible impeachment purposes if the State's witnesses whom heinterviewed happened to change their stories during their in-court testimony. Defendant did not argue Detective Young'sreasons for being unavailable did not fit the requirements ofRule 414.

The State countered by stating its willingness tostipulate to Detective Young having taken statements from anywitnesses who change their stories and further stipulate that if Young were called he would testify to what their stories originally were. The prosecutor also argued while he could callDetective Ross for many of the same purposes as Detective Young,the State's concern was if Young were not called as a witness atall, the defense would be able to argue two detectives tookstatements from the defendant but the jury had only heard fromone. This would permit the defense to query: Where was theother detective and why was he not called as a witness? TheState did not want to leave itself open to such a charge.

The trial court noted its chief concern was the unavailability of Detective Young for use by defendant in impeaching witnesses who changed their stories. With the State'swillingness to stipulate to what Young would have testified inthat regard, the court granted the State's motion. DetectiveYoung's testimony was videotaped and ultimately played to thejury at trial.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused itsdiscretion in granting the State's motion to take a videotapedevidence deposition of Detective Young because he was not "unavailable" in the sense contemplated by Rule 414. Defendant alsocontends the State could have continued the trial for the 13 daysDetective Young was in China and still have begun the trialwithin the time allotted under the speedy trial rules. Defendantalso notes while Detective Ross testified at trial he did nottestify to the interviews of defendant to which Detective Youngtestified and, therefore, the State set itself up for the argument it wished to avoid: two detectives interviewed defendant butthe jury only heard from one.

The State contends Detective Young's absence from thecountry at the time of trial fit any definition of "unavailable." He had been waiting for two years to adopt his child and wouldhave missed the opportunity to adopt if he had not gone to Chinaat that time. The State maintains Rule 414 does not contemplatethe testimony of a witness must be forever unavailable in orderto use the provisions of the rule but only the witness be unavailable on the date of trial.

Rule 414 provides:

"(a) If it appears to the court in whicha criminal charge is pending that the deposition of any person other than the defendantis necessary for the preservation of relevanttestimony because of the substantial possibility it would be unavailable at the time ofhearing or trial, the court may, upon motionand notice to both parties and their counsel,order the taking of such person's depositionunder oral examination or written questionsfor use as evidence at a hearing or trial." 134 Ill. 2d R. 414(a).

The use of videotaped depositions, as opposed totranscribed depositions, is within the discretion of the trialcourt but the exercise of that discretion "presupposes that theRule 414 standards for the utilization of any deposition asevidence have been satisfied." (Emphasis in original.) People v.Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d 501, 507-08, 517 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1987). The court in Johnson noted Rule 414 was intended to strike abalance between the need to preserve evidence and a criminaldefendant's right to have the witnesses against him testifybefore the jury so demeanor and credibility could be observed andjudged. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 508, 517 N.E.2d at 1074. Face-to-face live testimony should be the rule and any exceptions mustbe narrowly drawn and only upon a showing of special circumstances such as the unavailability contemplated by Rule 414. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 508, 517 N.E.2d at 1074.

The Johnson court found the definition of "unavailability" included in Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (see28 U.S.C. app. Fed. R. Evid. 804 (1994)) to be instructive. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 509, 517 N.E.2d at 1074. Under Rule 804,acceptable reasons for unavailability include privilege, persistent contemptuous refusal to testify, failure of memory, death,or illness of the witness. The Johnson court found the conceptof "unavailability" to be a narrow one, subject to a rigorousstandard. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 509, 517 N.E.2d at 1074.

Defendant argues the reason for Detective Young'sabsence, while commendable, did not measure up to the highstandards contemplated by Rule 414 as noted by Johnson. This,coupled with the possibilities of either having Detective Rosstestify to the same things Young would have or of continuing thetrial for a mere 13 days until Young's return, did not outweighhis right to have live testimony against him.

The State relies upon the case of People v. Lobdell,172 Ill. App. 3d 26, 525 N.E.2d 963 (1988), to support itsargument Detective Young was "unavailable" within the definitionof that term as contemplated by Rule 414. In Lobdell, the trialcourt approved the use of an evidence deposition where thecomplaining witness was going to be in Wisconsin during the trial for the start of fishing season and the starting date ofthe trial conflicted with a previously set appointment for afurnace repair in the witness' fishing cabin there. Lobdell, 172Ill. App. 3d at 28, 525 N.E.2d at 964-65.

Defendant rightly urges us not to accept such a broadinterpretation of unavailability as the Lobdell court, but wenote other cases in which unavailability was found for purposesof Rule 414 and which are not as seemingly frivolous as that inLobdell. They include People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 73, 604N.E.2d 275, 290 (1992) (where the witness cited a lack of memoryeven though the State argued it was feigned); People v.McClendon, 197 Ill. App. 3d 472, 481, 554 N.E.2d 791, 797 (1990)(where the witness had a heart attack one week before trial); andPeople v. Rocha, 191 Ill. App. 3d 529, 539, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1342(1989) (where a child witness was either unwilling or unable totestify).

Detective Young's expected absence was not merely forhis own convenience, such as the witness in Lobdell. Livetestimony is preferred, as noted in Johnson, but the Staterepresented that Detective Young could not alter his planswithout losing the child he was to adopt. The trial court didnot abuse its discretion in allowing the videotaped depositionunder these circumstances.

Defendant next argues the trial court deprived him ofhis due process rights under the United States Constitution whenit failed to define "reasonable doubt" upon the jury's request. In response to the jury's request, the trial court gave thisadmonition: "You have received all the instructions you willreceive in this case, please continue deliberations." Defendantacknowledges this court previously declined to hold a trial courtmust provide a definition of reasonable doubt upon a specificjury request to do so. People v. Failor, 271 Ill. App. 3d 968,970-71, 649 N.E.2d 1342, 1343-44 (1995). Defendant contendsother states are moving toward requiring a trial court to definereasonable doubt upon a jury's request.

Initially, the State argues defendant has forfeitedthis issue on appeal because he did not object to the trialcourt's response to the jury's request. Generally, a defendantforfeits any error in response to a jury's questions when hefails to make a timely objection to the trial court's intendedresponse. People v. Kinney, 294 Ill. App. 3d 903, 906, 691N.E.2d 867, 869 (1998). Defendant forfeited the issue here. According to the record, at the time the jury requested adefinition of reasonable doubt, not only did defendant fail toobject, but he specifically agreed to the trial court's response. When a defendant acquiesces in the trial court's answer to thejury's question, he cannot later complain the trial court abusedits discretion. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38, 554 N.E.2d174, 179 (1990). Also, defendant never submitted a definition of"reasonable doubt" he wished to be given to the jury. Whenjurors raise a question during deliberations, counsel shouldsubmit, in writing, the specific response counsel wants the courtto give the jury. Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,291 Ill. App. 3d 165, 173, 683 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1997).

Even if we were to review this issue on its meritsunder the doctrine of plain error, we would affirm. The law inIllinois on this subject is clear. Neither the trial court norcounsel should define reasonable doubt for the jury. People v.Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 374, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1992);People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52, 61, 150 N.E.2d 806, 811(1958). We have previously been asked to find an exception tothis rule when a jury specifically requests a definition but wehave declined to do so. People v. Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d 245,255, 701 N.E.2d 178, 185 (1998), reversed on other grounds inPeople v. Waters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999);Failor, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 970-71, 649 N.E.2d at 1343-44. Again, we decline. We conclude the trial court properly refusedto define reasonable doubt upon the jury's request.

Finally, we consider defendant's contention that,because no physical evidence linked him to the crime, the Statefailed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because thewitnesses for the State lacked credibility and the evidence didnot exclude the possibility the offense had been committed bysomeone other than defendant.

When the sufficiency of the evidence to convict ischallenged on appeal, the question is whether, taking all theevidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the elements of the offense provedbeyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305,336, 651 N.E.2d 72, 87 (1995). This standard applies even wherethe evidence of guilt is circumstantial. People v. Holmes, 234Ill. App. 3d 931, 948-49, 601 N.E.2d 985, 995 (1992).

The victim, Katherine Hopwood, lived on the first floorof what had been her single-family home but had been convertedinto a duplex with a separate outside entrance leading to anupstairs apartment. The upstairs apartment also had an entranceleading from a bedroom in the first-floor apartment. Hopwoodlived in the home with her daughter Nancy. Nancy was out of townat the time of the murder. Kathy Tokich, defendant's mother, anadmitted crack cocaine addict and convicted thief, lived in theupstairs apartment. Defendant previously lived with his motherin the upstairs apartment but was not living there on December 6,1997.

On the morning of her murder, Hopwood had been to thedrive-through window of three different banks and cashed threechecks totaling $1,312. The bank tellers' testimony establishedsomeone else was driving the car with Hopwood. Other testimonyestablished Hopwood did not usually cash checks in these amountsbecause the three checks exceeded the total value of all checksshe had written for cash for the previous four months. Inaddition, Hopwood was not in the habit of loaning large amountsof money to anyone.

Physical evidence from the crime scene includedcigarette butts, hair, and fibers. Two cigarette butts wererecovered from just outside the duplex building near the stepsleading to the upstairs unit. Ten cigarette butts were recoveredfrom the ashtray of Hopwood's car. All the cigarette butts andhair and fiber evidence were sent to crime labs for analysis. Comparison analysis was performed on the hair and fiber evidence. Every hair tested was dissimilar to the hair standards taken fromdefendant. Hair standards were not requested of any otherindividual from which to make further comparisons.

DNA analysis was performed on some of the cigarettebutts. Of the cigarette butts in Hopwood's car, only Nancy's DNAwas found. Of the cigarette butts found outside the building,one revealed the presence of DNA originating from defendant. Theother revealed DNA inconsistent with both defendant and Nancy. DNA from this cigarette butt was not compared with the DNA of anyother individuals. The crime lab was unable to determine howlong the cigarette butts had been at their point of recovery.

Technicians also dusted the scene for fingerprints. Ofthe identifiable fingerprints, none matched defendant, includingthose from within Hopwood's car. The fingerprints lifted werenot compared with those of anyone else.

Kathy Tokich testified for both the State and thedefense. On the morning of December 6, she went down toHopwood's apartment about 6 a.m. to see if Hopwood would cash acheck for her so she could get some crack cocaine. Hopwoodagreed to cash the check but indicated she had no money and wouldhave to go to the bank later to get some. Kathy went backupstairs with a friend of hers, Bobby Dixon. Kathy heard Hopwoodleave her house about 8 a.m. Kathy and Dixon left to cashKathy's check at a gas station and bought crack cocaine. Theyreturned to her apartment around 8:45 a.m. with two men,identified only as two black males, and proceeded to "get high."

Around 9 a.m. all three men left. Kathy heardHopwood's door slam. Around 9:30 or 9:45 she heard the door slamagain. Kathy went downstairs and knocked on the back door butgot no answer. She saw Hopwood's car in the driveway. She didnot see defendant that morning.

When she was called as defense witness, Kathy statedthat in addition to two black men and Dixon, her friend DaleKrell was with her in her apartment on the morning of December 6. This time she stated all four men were in her apartment when shewent to see if Hopwood would cash her check. She told the menHopwood would have to go to the bank first. The two black menleft between 7:30 and 8, stating they would return but they neverdid. Kathy testified Dixon and Krell left around 9 a.m.

Richard Strum passed by Hopwood's house several times aday going to and from his job at a car wash near her home. Between 10:30 and 11 on the morning of December 6, he saw anadult-sized bicycle leaning against the front steps of Hopwood'sresidence that was gone later that afternoon.

In the mid-afternoon of December 6, Hopwood's daughterDorothy and Dorothy's husband discovered her body. Hopwood'shome was in disarray with papers strewn about the living anddining rooms but no sign of forced entry. They called police andparamedics.

Dr. Travis Hindman conducted an autopsy on Hopwood'sbody and testified her time of death was between 9:30 a.m. and

3 p.m. On cross-examination, Dr. Hindman noted he calculated thetime of death, based upon fluid drawn from Hopwood's eye, to be

10 a.m.

Ann Willett testified defendant came to her house withPat Crowder during the evening of December 5 looking for crackcocaine. She arranged to buy $50 worth of the drug several timesduring that evening. She smoked crack with defendant and Crowderuntil they ran out of money around midnight. Crowder anddefendant then left. Defendant returned about an hour later withmoney he said he had borrowed from his girlfriend, JenniferSteffen, and had Willett buy him another $40 worth of crack. Willett and defendant got high until about 5:30 a.m. on December6. As defendant had run out of money, he left and Willett wentto bed.

Defendant returned to Willett's house again about 10a.m. on December 6. At that time, he showed approximately $1,000in cash to Willett's two sons. Defendant had Willett buy him two"eight balls" of crack cocaine, paying $445 for them. NeitherWillet nor Crowder had ever seen defendant with that much moneybefore.

Jennifer Steffen, defendant's ex-girlfriend at the timeof trial, testified that on December 6 defendant showed her a sumof money, including money he had set aside to pay fines he owedand a $100 bill as well as some fifties and twenties. He claimedto have gotten it by driving someone to Chicago. Defendant gaveSteffen $50 to buy some new clothes. Steffen denied givingdefendant any money on the night of December 5 or 6 and stateddefendant asked her to lie to the police and say she had givenhim $200.

Cuong Luu testified he was a gang member who ran intodefendant, Steffen, and another couple on the evening of December6 in a Springfield nightclub. Defendant told him he was "goingup" because "he just killed somebody the other day" and asked Luuto hook him up in a gang for his safety. Luu refused but didaccept defendant's offer to smoke crack with him.

Defendant told Crowder on December 8 he had found twoenvelopes in a car each holding $500.

Detectives Young and Ross interviewed defendant aboutHopwood's murder several times after they discovered, viatelephone records, someone had called Hopwood's home shortlybefore 5 a.m. on December 6 from Willett's residence. Willetttold them defendant had made the call.

Defendant admitted making the telephone call but statedhe was looking for Hopwood's daughter Nancy, who was his friend. In his statements to police defendant gave varying explanationsfor where he got a large sum of money on December 6. He firsttold them he had gotten several hundred dollars from Steffen. Later, he told them Steffen had not given him any money, but hehad been paid over $200 by his employer, the Sunrise Café. Theowner of the Café testified, however, defendant was paid only$67.37 on December 5 and $77.64 on December 12.

Defendant initially denied being at Hopwood's house onDecember 6 or going to a bank with her that day. However, laterhe admitted to going to a bank with her and that she had loanedhim $500 to give a friend for bond money. Defendant could nottell the detectives the name of the friend who needed the money.

In addition to the money taken from Hopwood's bankaccounts, a ring was discovered missing from her home followingthe murder. The ring, which had been her late husband's, waskept in a box in Hopwood's bedroom and was never taken out. Defendant sold the ring at a pawnshop on December 15. When hewas asked about the ring, defendant twice denied having ever seenit. However, when he was informed the pawnshop owner identifiedhim as the seller of the ring, defendant then stated he had seenthe ring lying on a kitchen counter several weeks earlier when hevisited Nancy and he took the ring at that time.

Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt. He contends no physical evidencelinked him to Hopwood's murder and the witnesses produced by theState were admitted thieves and drug dealers and users. He didnot confess to the murder, although testimony suggested thepolice twice had Crowder wear a concealed wire to attempt toobtain his confession. Defendant argues the men in his mother'sapartment had also been smoking crack cocaine the night and earlymorning before the murder and had just as much motive as he did,obtaining more money for more crack, and were in closer proximityto the scene.

Based upon the evidence, however, the jury could havereasonably found defendant was guilty of Hopwood's murder. Byhis own admission, he was with Hopwood shortly before she waskilled. He did not have any money around 5:30 or 6 on themorning of December 6 but was in possession of around $1,000 by10 a.m. This was about the same amount of money that Hopwoodreceived from her trips to the bank. Defendant gave severalconflicting stories regarding his possession of the money. Thejury could reasonably infer he had taken Hopwood's money andkilled her to prevent her from identifying him.

Luu testified defendant also made a statement to him,which, although not a confession, at least referred to a recentmurder committed by defendant. The jury need not speculatedefendant may have been speaking of another murder he hadcommitted, nor was it required to speculate regarding thepossibility the crime was committed by any of the other people inclose proximity to Hopwood's house on the morning of her death. The jury was not required to find an explanation compatible withinnocence and use it to create a reasonable doubt. People v.Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 37, 687 N.E.2d 836, 853 (1997).

Instead, based on defendant's possession of largeamounts of money following Hopwood's death, corresponding to theamounts taken from her bank accounts, his inconsistentexplanations for his possession of this money, his admission hehad recently killed someone, and his admissions he had calledHopwood's house the morning of her murder and had gone to thebank with her a short time before her death, the jury was free toconclude defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ofHopwood's murder.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment ofthe circuit court.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN and GARMAN, JJ., concur.