JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Danny Travis appeals the trial court'srefusal to allow his request for DNA testing of certain evidencepreviously appearing in his criminal case. He also argues thatcertain of his sentences were unconstitutionally imposed. Weaffirm.

A full recitation of the facts of this case can befound in People v. Travis, 170 Ill. App. 3d 873, 525 N.E.2d 1137(1988). On February 24, 1987, Travis was convicted of murder,home invasion, residential burglary, and aggravated criminalsexual assault in connection with the strangulation of an elderlywoman in her home. The victim, found on October 30, 1985, hadsuffered severe injuries to her head; a bloodstained rubbermallet lay about one foot away. The victim had also sufferedsevere vaginal injury; a bloodstained flashlight was found at herfeet. Among other damage to the victim's home, a telephone hadbeen pulled off the wall.

Testimony at the trial indicated that, while underarrest for another murder, Travis confessed to the crimes forwhich he was eventually convicted. Travis directed police to thescene of the crime and described the method he and an accompliceused to gain entry into the home (through a basement window). Healso described shoving a flashlight into the victim's vagina,although he claimed to have done so only after she was dead.

A semen stain had been present on the sheet where thevictim was found. According to Travis, another semen stain wasfound on the victim's body, but this sample was too small to betested in any manner. Hair was also found at the scene, as wellas a fingerprint on the telephone. The evidence at trial established that the semen on the sheet did not come from Travis orhis accomplice. The hair found at the scene did not come fromTravis or his accomplice; nor did the fingerprints on the telephone match either those of Travis or his accomplice. Other thantestimony regarding the nature of the victim's injuries anddeath, no other forensic evidence appears to have been introducedat the trial.

On February 26, the jury found defendant qualified forthe death penalty, but it was unable to unanimously agree thatthere were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Sentencing was continued to March 30,1987. The trial court found the murder was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty, and it sentenced Travis to a term of natural-lifeimprisonment. The court also found his conduct qualified Travisfor an extended-term sentence on the other convictions andsentenced him to 60 years' imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion offenses, and 30 years'imprisonment on the residential burglary offense, with all 4sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, we reduced thesentence on the residential burglary offense to 15 years butotherwise affirmed all of Travis' convictions and sentences. Travis, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 525 N.E.2d at 1149.

On March 22, 1999, Travis filed both a petition forpostconviction relief, asserting an Apprendi issue (see Apprendiv. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348(2000)) and requesting the performance of deoxyribonucleic acid(DNA) testing. On the same date, Travis also filed a separatemotion for DNA testing pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)). After a hearing and arguments of counsel, the trial court deniedboth motions.

Because the Apprendi issue is without merit, we neednot consider whether Travis' petition for postconviction reliefwas timely filed. Travis' Apprendi challenge is without merit. Travis argues that his sentence of natural life for murder andthe extended-term portion of his other sentences must be vacatedbecause they were predicated upon the trial court's finding thatthe crime was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinousbehavior. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b), 1005-8-2(a), 1005-5-3.2(b)(2). The short answer isthat this claim is not cognizable in postconviction proceedings. People v. Helton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 420, 424, 749 N.E.2d 1007,1010 (2001). As to Travis' request for DNA testing, this claimis fairly encompassed within his separate petition for the same,which we address next; therefore, we affirm the denial of hispostconviction petition.

Travis also moved in the trial court to have DNAtesting done on previously untested evidence. Travis' motion isnot specific as to the evidence he wishes to have tested; presumably (and as considered by the trial court) he would like to testthe semen found on the victim and the blood found on the malletand the flashlight.

Section 116-3 states:

"(a) A defendant may make a motion be-fore the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which resulted inhis or her conviction, but which was not subject to the testing which is now requested because the technology for the testingwas not avail-able at the time of trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State. (b) The defendantmust present a prima facie case that: 

(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her con-viction; and (2) the evidence to be tested has beensubject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered inany material aspect. (c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State'sinterests in the in-tegrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that: (1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materiallyrele-vant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence; (2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientificcommunity."

725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998).

This section is relatively new; hence, there is notmuch case law discussing such proceedings. Initially, manycourts, including our own (see People v. Stevens, 315 Ill. App.3d 781, 785, 733 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (2000)), required the defendant to demonstrate that testing carried the possibility oftotally exonerating him of the crime. That view has recentlybeen rejected by the supreme court as overly restrictive.

In People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 756 N.E.2d 804(2001), the 19-year-old victim and her 14-year-old brother werefound dead in their home. The defendant, also 14 years old, wasquestioned about a week later. He eventually confessed to thecrimes and was convicted of two counts of murder. However, thedefendant's confessions were later held inadmissible by theappellate court and his convictions were reversed. Savory, 197Ill. 2d at 205-06, 756 N.E.2d at 806.

At the defendant's second trial, the State introduceddefendant's admissions to several of his friends that he hadkilled the victims. The State also introduced statements made topolice, prior to confession, regarding certain facts surroundingthe scene, such as what the victims had prepared for dinner andthe fact that a television had been moved from its usual position. Finally, the State introduced physical evidence connectingthe defendant to the offense, including evidence that hairsconsistent with the defendant's were found in the bathroom sinkand tub, that a knife from the defendant's home had blood on it,and that a bloodstain found on a pair of trousers recovered fromthe defendant's home was of the same blood type as one of thevictims. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 207, 756 N.E.2d at 807. At theconclusion of the trial, the defendant was again convicted of thecrimes.

The defendant later sought to have DNA testing done onthe bloodstained trousers pursuant to section 116-3. The circuitcourt denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that testing pursuant to section 116-3 is available onlyin cases where the proposed testing will, by itself, completelyvindicate a defendant. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 209, 756 N.E.2d at808.

The specific issue before the supreme court was therequirement of section 116-3(c)(1) that "the result of thetesting has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumula-tive evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion ofactual innocence." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (West 1998). Thesupreme court rejected the appellate court's narrower interpretation, holding instead that "evidence which is 'materially relevant' to a defendant's claim of actual innocence is simplyevidence which tends to significantly advance that claim." Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213, 756 N.E.2d at 810-11.

The court then went on to consider the application ofsection 116-3 to the case. It stated "whether the evidence atissue in this case is 'materially relevant to the defendant'sassertion of actual innocence'" "cannot be determined in theabstract. Rather, it requires a consideration of the evidenceintroduced at trial, as well as an assessment of the evidencedefendant is seeking to test." Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 214, 756N.E.2d at 811. The court affirmed denial of the motion. In sodoing, it paid particular attention to the closing arguments ofboth the State and the defendant. It found that the State hadnot relied on the bloodstained trousers to a significant degree,that "testimony regarding the possible source of the bloodstainon the pair of trousers was only a minor part of the State'sevidence"; but, rather, the State had relied on the defendant'sadmissions to the crime and his particular knowledge of the crimescene. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 214, 756 N.E.2d at 811.

Inspection of the record in the present case revealsthat the trial court applied the incorrect standard. However, wewill affirm if we find that the result would have been the samehad the trial court applied the correct standard. We so find. The evidence against Travis in this case was compelling. He madea confession to police, a confession that was corroborated by hisdetailed knowledge of the crime scene. Further, the jury wastold that the semen found at the scene did not come from Travisor his alleged coconspirator. Per Savory, DNA testing in thepresent case does not have the potential to significantly advanceTravis' claim of actual innocence.

Defendant directs our attention to the Hockenberry andRokita cases, where DNA testing was allowed. People v.Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d 752, 737 N.E.2d 1088 (2000); Peoplev. Rokita, 316 Ill. App. 3d 292, 736 N.E.2d 205 (2000). Rokita,however, was the classic sole perpetrator case; if the DNA wasnot that of the defendant, the defendant did not commit thecrime. In Hockenberry, there was a suggestion at trial that thesemen which was present was that of the defendant (that defendantcould not be eliminated as the possible source). Hockenberry,316 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 737 N.E.2d at 1092. The key case isSavory, itself, where the more important evidence (as opposed tothe "minor" physical evidence) "includes defendant's inculpatorycomments made to several friends only hours after the murdersoccurred" and "statements made by defendant to police in whichdefendant revealed a knowledge of the crime scene." Savory, 197Ill. 2d at 216, 756 N.E.2d at 812. We have all of that in thiscase plus more, a confession that apparently defendant makes noattempt to disavow. There was a confession in Savory, but it washeld to be inadmissible.

For future reference, we note the parties engaged insome dispute over chain-of-custody issues before the trial court. The court did predicate dismissal on these grounds; indeed, thecourt evinced a willingness to allow Travis some limited amountof discovery on the issue, all else being equal. We find thiscourse to be a sound one. It asks too much to require petitioning defendant in these cases to plead and prove proper chain ofcustody at the outset, for the evidence at issue will undoubtedlyhave been within the safekeeping of the State, not the defendant. The trial court may allow limited discovery in an appropriatecase.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuitcourt's judgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.