JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Thomas J. Power and R.J. Power Plumbing & Heating (PowerPlumbing), and against defendant Robert L. Smith, on the basisthat Smith was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. Smithappeals. Because we conclude that any misrepresentation was nota misrepresentation of fact, but a mere statement of opinion, wereverse.

Power is the owner of Power Plumbing. Smith previouslyowned Smith Construction, which did water and sewer jobs inCalifornia. Smith and Power met in 1995 while Smith and PowerPlumbing were doing work on a construction project inTaylorville. Smith and Power entered into a verbal agreementunder which Power Plumbing bid on a number of jobs, Smith received an hourly wage for his work, and the remaining profitswere divided equally between Smith and Power.

Smith and Power then formed T.R. Equipment, Inc., asubchapter S corporation, to do water and sewer jobs. Each was a50% shareholder. Smith would do the work on the jobs and be paidan hourly wage. T.R. Equipment did not have a bonding license,and consequently, Smith and Power agreed that Power Plumbingwould submit bids for water and sewer jobs to be performed byT.R. Equipment. Power Plumbing would do the administrative workon the projects. There was no written agreement between T.R.Equipment and Power Plumbing, and there was some dispute as tohow profits and losses would be divided among the various entities and individuals.

Power testified that he and Smith met at Power Plumbingto review and discuss the bid on a job called the South Fork job. He and Smith reviewed and discussed the bid in detail, line itemby line item. Smith was then to rewrite the bid so that it wouldbe more legible, then take it to Power Plumbing the next day tobe typed by the office manager, Debbie Aiken, and to be signed byPower's brother, Dennis Power, the vice president of PowerPlumbing. Smith, however, testified that he and Power discussedthe bid over the telephone and he was not aware that Power wouldbe out of town when the bid was typed.

Power testified he returned to work on the Mondayfollowing the Friday they were awarded the South Fork job. Atthat time, Power learned the bid had been changed from the one hehad approved. According to Power, Smith had changed several ofthe line items, and the bid submitted was $207,188.90 less thanthe bid approved by Power. Power immediately called Smith, whocame to his office. According to Power, Smith admitted that hehad changed the bid, but assured Power that the job would make aprofit. Smith said he had made the change because he was positive that they could lay 300 feet of pipe per day, instead of 200feet as previously discussed.

Smith testified that he and Power discussed only thefact that the bid they had submitted was significantly lower thanany of the other bids. The bid was $280,783.40 less than thenext lowest bid. The bid, however, was close to the estimatesprepared by the South Fork Sanitary District engineers. Smithdenied changing the bid for the project and denied there was anyconversation about the bid being different from that to whichSmith and Power had agreed. Smith may have told Power that hewas sure that they could make a profit on the South Fork job onthe bid which had been submitted.

Power testified that he relied on Smith's assurancesthat the job would make a profit as it was bid; consequently,Power did not consider withdrawing the bid, seeking legal advicewhether the bid could be withdrawn, or bringing up to the SouthFork Sanitary District the fact that the bid had been changedwithout his knowledge.

Smith was paid $52,500 in hourly wages for working onthe South Fork job. Smith's father, Cloyce Smith, was paid$38,512.06, plus $29,883 for sand, for working on the South Forkjob. Smith's cousin, Danny Vidmar, was paid $48,050 for workingon the South Fork job.

Power's count V, the count that went to trial, charged Smith with fraud, in that Smith stated to Power that he had theexpertise to determine a price for the project which would coverall expenses for the job and allow a profit, that "in reliance onSmith's statements Power agreed to allow Smith to determine thebid price," and that after Smith determined the bid price Smithwithout the knowledge or consent of Power reduced the bid priceby approximately $200,000. Count V alleged that Smith's statements were false statements of fact in that he knew he did nothave the expertise to determine a bid price, he knew the price hedetermined was not sufficient, he did not intend to supervise theproject to completion, he did not intend to have the necessaryequipment, and "he intended to determine the bid price so that aprofit could not be made on the project."

Power's theory of fraud is not entirely clear. At somepoints he appears to be accusing Smith of incompetence. At otherpoints he appears to be accusing Smith of intentional harm. Count V alleges "false statements of fact" made by Smith, butchanging the bid is not alleged to be one of those statements. Count V does not contain the allegation that Power, in decidingto go ahead with the project, relied upon Smith's assurances. Cf. Prime Leasing, Inc. v. Kendig, 332 Ill. App. 3d 300, 309, 773N.E.2d 84, 92 (2002) (facts that constitute an alleged fraud mustbe pleaded with specificity and particularity, including whatmisrepresentations were made).

Following a bench trial, the court found:

"The testimony of Thomas Power and Debbie Aiken is more credible than that presented by[d]efendant. Specifically, the [c]ourt finds Robert L. Smith did change and submit the bid on the South Fork job without Thomas Power's knowledge. The[c]ourt further finds that Smith's subsequent statements to Power that the job would still be profitable are misrepresentationsof fact upon which Power relied in going through with the job."

The court, concluding that Power was entitled to the benefit ofhis bargain, awarded him $78,489.55 damages. That award suggeststhat the parties lost about $60,000 on the project by submittinga bid $207,188.90 less than that to which they agreed.

To succeed on a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, plaintiffs had to prove (1) that defendant made afalse statement of material fact, (2) that defendant knew wasfalse, (3) with the intent that the statement induce plaintiffsto act, (4) plaintiffs relied on the statement, and (5) suffereddamages as a result. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d482, 496, 675 N.E.2d 584, 591 (1996). These elements must beproved by clear and convincing evidence (Los Amigos Supermarket,Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 115, 127,713 N.E.2d 686, 695 (1999)), and a reviewing court will notdisturb such a finding unless it is against the manifest weightof the evidence. In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill. App. 3d 630,640, 603 N.E.2d 37, 44 (1992). Further, the trier of fact is ina superior position to determine the credibility of the witnessesand the weight to be given their testimony. Aetna Insurance Co.v. Amelio Brothers Meat Co., 182 Ill. App. 3d 863, 865, 538N.E.2d 707, 709 (1989). The ultimate question, however, whetherthe misrepresentation was one of fact, is a question of law.

On appeal, Power argues that two types of fraud areapplicable to this case, fraudulent concealment and fraudulentmisrepresentation. The fraudulent concealment theory is based onthe fact that Smith changed the bid without Power's knowledge orconsent. We accept the trial court's finding that Smith changedthe bid without Power's knowledge. It is difficult to acceptPower's arguments, however, that Smith knew the price he submitted was not sufficient and that Smith intended to submit a bidprice such that a profit could not be made on the project. Although Smith and his relatives might make some money even on alosing project, Smith would make more money on a profitableproject. There was an incentive for Smith to submit a successfulbid, but no incentive to submit a losing bid. Power's argumentthat Smith was not concerned with a losing bid is inconsistentwith Power's argument that Smith was responsible for half of anylosses.

In any event, the major problem with Power's fraudulentconcealment theory is that Power, with full knowledge of thefacts, chose to go ahead with the project. Although the trialcourt found that Smith "did change and submit the bid on theSouth Fork job without Thomas Power's knowledge," the trial courtalso found that Power chose to go ahead with the job.

Power argues that his choosing to go ahead did not barrecovery, that he was allowed to perform the contract afterdiscovery of the fraud and still seek damages, citing VancePearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 408 N.E.2d 782(1980). In Vance Pearson, the defendant agreed to install a setof truck scales on plaintiff's farm by a certain date but did notintend to meet that date. The court held that the plaintiff wasnot required to seek rescission after discovery of the fraud butwas allowed to stand by the contract and seek damages. VancePearson, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 1112, 408 N.E.2d at 787. In thepresent case, however, Power is not seeking damages from theparty with whom he contracted, the South Fork Sanitary District. Rather, Power is seeking damages from his business partner. InVance Pearson, rescission would not have done the plaintiff anygood. The plaintiff still would have had to find someone else toinstall his truck scales, and he still would have sustaineddamages by not having the scales at harvest time. In the presentcase, Power certainly would not have suffered any loss if the bidhad been withdrawn. Power would not have received any profits ifthe bid had been withdrawn, but perhaps there were other projectsavailable on which profits would have been made. Perhaps all thebids on the South Fork project would have been rejected if PowerPlumbing's low bid had been withdrawn and Power and Smith wouldthen have had the opportunity to rebid at a new bid-letting. Itis not clear that the bid agreed to by Power and Smith, which wasso far out of line with the engineers' estimates, would have beensuccessful if it had been submitted.

Power's theory of fraudulent misrepresentation is that once Power discovered that the bid had been changed, Smithassured and promised Power that the job would make a profit atthe submitted bid price and that Smith represented to Power thathe had walked the streets of Tovey, where the work would be done,and that he had personally checked the figures against hisobservations. These representations are said to constitute afalse statement of material fact.

Generally a mere expression of opinion will not supportan action for fraud. Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d483, 489, 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (1981). Sometimes, however, theexpression of an opinion may carry with it an implied assertionthat the speaker knows facts that justify it. Such an assertionis to be implied where the defendant holds himself out or isunderstood as having special knowledge of the matter that is notavailable to the plaintiff, so that his opinion becomes in effectan assertion summarizing his knowledge. "'Thus the ordinary manis free to deal in reliance upon the opinion of an expert jeweleras to the value of a diamond.'" Duhl, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 490,429 N.E.2d at 1273, quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law ofTorts