JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)(735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002)) governs postjudgment motions innonjury cases. Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1)) governs appeals from final judgments in civil cases andprovides that if a party timely files a posttrial motion directedagainst the judgment, the notice of appeal may be filed within 30days of the entry of the order disposing of that postjudgment motion,rather than within 30 days of the court's initial entry of judgment. The issue this case presents is whether the postjudgment motion filedby plaintiff, R&G, Inc., met the requirements of section 2-1203(a)and Rule 303(a)(1) so as to permit the filing of the notice of appealmore than 30 days after the trial court's initial entry of judgment. Because we conclude that the motion did not meet those requirements,we must dismiss this appeal.

R&G is a company engaged in the excavation and water andsewer distribution business. Defendant, Midwest Region Foundationfor Fair Contracting, Inc. (Midwest Region), is a nonprofit corporation that monitors work sites for compliance with relevant federaland state labor laws.

In December 2001, R&G filed a complaint against MidwestRegion, alleging, in pertinent part, that (1) Midwest Region monitored R&G's work sites using certain methods, such as video recording, still photography, and audio recording; (2) Midwest Regionmonitored R&G's work sites to gather certain information regardingthe activities, affiliations, and transactions of R&G, its agents,and its employees; and (3) Midwest Region was acting as an unlicensedprivate detective under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, PrivateSecurity, and Locksmith Act of 1993 (Act) (225 ILCS 446/1 through 299(West 2000)). R&G requested that the trial court enjoin MidwestRegion from monitoring R&G's work sites.

In July 2003, R&G filed a motion for leave to file anamended complaint, which the trial court later granted. R&G's August2003 amended complaint more closely tracked the language of the Actand further alleged that Midwest Region engaged in the business ofprivate investigation for fees or other valuable consideration.

In September 2003, Midwest Region filed a motion todismiss R&G's amended complaint, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) ofthe Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002)). Midwest Region arguedthat the Act, as construed and applied by R&G, (1) is unconstitutionally overbroad, (2) is void for vagueness, (3) improperly frustratesfederal congressional intent, and (4) improperly usurps the role ofthe Illinois Department of Professional Regulation.

Following a hearing, on September 25, 2003, the trialcourt entered a docket order, which stated, in its entirety, asfollows:

"[Midwest Region's] [s]econd [m]otion to dismiss argued and granted. Court treats motionas [a motion for j]udgment on the [p]leadings. Said ruling is final and appealable. CLERKDIRECTED to send a copy of this docket entry to[the parties' attorneys]."

On October 10, 2003, R&G filed a document entitled, "Motion forClarification." The body of that document read, in its entirety, asfollows:

"NOW COMES [R&G], by and through its attorneys, GATES, WISE, & SCHLOSSER, P.C., andfor its [m]otion for [c]larification, states asfollows:

1. This [c]ourt's docket entry of September 25, 2003, granted [Midwest Region's][s]econd [m]otion to [d]ismiss. The [c]ourt'sdocket entry stated that the [c]ourt wastreating the motion as a [motion for j]udgmenton the [p]leadings.

2. [Midwest Region's] [s]econd [m]otionto [d]ismiss raised at least four differentarguments: (1) [Midwest Region] argued thatthe Act, as construed and applied by [R&G], isunconstitutionally overbroad; (2) [MidwestRegion] argued that the Act, as construed andapplied by [R&G], is unconstitutionally vague;(3) [Midwest Region] argued that the Act, asconstrued and applied by [R&G], frustrates the[c]ongressional intent of federal labor law;and (4) [Midwest Region] argued that the Act,as construed and applied by [R&G], improperlyusurps the role of the Illinois Department ofProfessional Regulation.

3. It is not clear from the [c]ourt's[o]rder whether the [c]ourt granted the[m]otion to [d]ismiss based on argument[] 1, 2,3, or 4 as set out above. In the event anappeal is deemed advisable, the legal basis ofthe final order will be critical.

WHEREFORE, [R&G] requests that this[c]ourt clarify its September 25, 2003, [o]rderto resolve the uncertainty described above."

Later in October 2003, the court conducted a hearing, and its docketentry shows it granted R&G's motion. In that same docket entry, thecourt also ordered R&G to "submit a proposed order to clarify theissues for appeal." R&G apparently complied, and on November 4,2003, the court entered a written order, which stated, in its entirety, as follows:

"For all of the reasons argued by [MidwestRegion in its September 2003] [m]otion to[d]ismiss, [Midwest Region's] [m]otion is[g]ranted. The [c]ourt treats the [m]otion asa [motion for] a [j]udgment on the [p]leadings. Said ruling is final and appealable."

On November 5, 2003, R&G filed a notice of appeal.

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Midwest Region has moved to dismiss R&G's appeal, arguingthat (1) this court lacks jurisdiction because R&G's motion forclarification did not constitute a postjudgment motion under SupremeCourt Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)) or section 2-1203 of theCode (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2002)), and therefore, (2) R&G'sNovember 5, 2003, notice of appeal was not timely filed within 30days of the entry of the trial court's September 25, 2003, judgment,as required by Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)). We agree andconclude that this appeal must be dismissed.

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), which governs appeals fromfinal judgments in civil cases, states, in pertinent part, asfollows:

"(1) *** [T]he notice of appeal must befiled with the clerk of the circuit courtwithin 30 days after the entry of finaljudgment appealed from, or, if a timelypost[]trial motion directed against thejudgment is filed, whether in a jury or anonjury case, within 30 days after the entry ofthe order disposing of the last pendingpost[]judgment motion." 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1).

In addition, section 2-1203(a) of the Code, which governspostjudgment motions in nonjury cases, provides as follows:

"In all cases tried without a jury, anyparty may, within 30 days after the entry ofthe judgment or within any further time thecourt may allow within the 30 days or anyextensions thereof, file a motion for arehearing, or a retrial, or modification of thejudgment[,] or to vacate the judgment[,] or forother relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West2002).

Our supreme court has held that the "other relief" referred to insection 2-1203(a) must be similar in nature to the other forms ofrelief specified in that section. Marsh v. Evangelical CovenantChurch, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461, 563 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1990).

"[T]he character of a motion should be determined from itscontent, and a court is not bound by the title of a document given bya party." Savage v. Mui Pho, 312 Ill. App. 3d 553, 559, 727 N.E.2d1052, 1057 (2000). Thus, a court should examine the substance of adocument to determine how it should treat the document. Silversteinv. Brander, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1005, 740 N.E.2d 357, 360-61(2000).

R&G relies on this court's decision in Knapp v. City ofDecatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 498, 503, 513 N.E.2d 534, 536 (1987), tosupport its position that the motion to clarify constituted apostjudgment motion. For the reasons that follow, we overrule Knapp.

In Knapp, this court concluded that a "motion forfindings" constituted a postjudgment motion under section 2-1203(a)of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1203(a) (now 735ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002))). In that case, the plaintiffs filed acomplaint against the defendants for injuries suffered by one of theplaintiffs. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs'complaint. In May 1986, the trial court granted the motions andallowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 21 days. The plaintiffs did not do so but later requested leave to file anamended complaint. The court later granted the plaintiffs leave tofile an amended complaint. The defendants filed motions to dismissthe amended complaint for failing to allege a duty. On November 7,1986, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss in a docketentry, which provided as follows: "'Arguments having been heard on[m]otions to [d]ismiss, finding plaintiff [sic] has failed to state acause of action. Plaintiff's [sic] complaint dismissed. Causeordered stricken.'" Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 513 N.E.2d at535.

The plaintiffs then filed a document entitled "Motion forFindings," in which they requested that the trial court indicatewhether (1) the court had granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave tofile an amended complaint, (2) their first amended complaint had beenfiled, (3) the court had dismissed the original complaint or amendedcomplaint, and (4) the court dismissed the cause with prejudice. Following a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion, the court entered adocket entry, which stated, in pertinent part, as follows: "'Findingleave was granted to file amended complaint and that arguments heardwere addressed to that amended complaint. Finding the cause wasdismissed with prejudice.'" Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 513N.E.2d at 536.

On appeal, this court concluded that the plaintiffs'motion for findings, which "requested certain specific findings notstated by the court in the November 7 ruling," qualified as apostjudgment motion under section 2-1203 of the Code. Knapp, 160Ill. App. 3d at 503, 513 N.E.2d at 537. In so concluding, wereasoned that the motion for findings constituted a motion for "otherrelief" similar to a motion to modify judgment because the motioneffectively requested a change in the original judgment "to reflectthe actual action taken." Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 513 N.E.2dat 537.

Upon further reflection, we conclude that the "motion forfindings" in Knapp was not directed against the trial court'sNovember 7, 1986, judgment and did not seek a modification of thatjudgment. Instead, it appears the plaintiffs were merely requestingthat the court put in writing and make explicit certain "findings"that were already encompassed by the November 7, 1986, docket entry. For instance, the record in Knapp clearly indicated that (1) thetrial court had already (a) dismissed the plaintiffs' initialcomplaint and (b) granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amendedcomplaint; (2) the plaintiffs' amended complaint had been filed; and(3) the defendants' second motions to dismiss addressed the amendedcomplaint. In addition, the language of the November 7, 1986, docketentry suggested that the cause was dismissed with prejudice. SeeKnapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 513 N.E.2d at 535-36. Thus, no realquestion existed as to the actual action the court had taken. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for findings did not seek "otherrelief" similar to a modification of the judgment. See HayesMachinery Movers, Inc. v. REO Movers & Van Lines, Inc., 338 Ill. App.3d 443, 446-47, 788 N.E.2d 259, 261-62 (2003) (disagreeing withKnapp).

In this case, R&G's motion to clarify the trial court'sSeptember 25, 2003, order was not a "motion directed against thejudgment" under Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)). Themotion obviously did not challenge the court's judgment. Instead,the motion requested only that the court provide the legal basis orbases for its order dismissing R&G's amended complaint. In addition, as R&G conceded at oral argument, its motion toclarify did not explicitly request a rehearing, a retrial, or anorder vacating the trial court's September 25, 2003, order. Nor didthe motion request "other relief" similar in nature to those forms ofrelief. R&G's request that the court provide the legal basis orbases for its order dismissing the amended complaint is clearly notsimilar to a request that the court grant a rehearing or a retrial orthat the court vacate its prior judgment.

Further, R&G's motion to clarify does not constitute arequest for modification of the trial court's September 25, 2003,judgment or "other relief" similar to a request to modify thatjudgment. To modify an item is to change it. Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 1452 (1981); Hayes, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 446-47, 788 N.E.2d at 261. R&G's motion did not seek a change in thecourt's September 25, 2003, order. Instead, as noted above, themotion requested only that the court provide the legal basis or basesfor its order dismissing R&G's amended complaint. See Hayes, 338Ill. App. 3d at 446, 788 N.E.2d at 261 ("A motion which merelyrequests that the court articulate the findings of fact and law uponwhich its prior judgment is predicated does not request a change inthe judgment"). Simply stated, regardless of the court's decision onR&G's motion to clarify, the court's judgment dismissing the amendedcomplaint would remain unchanged.

Thus, having examined the content of R&G's motion toclarify, we conclude that it (1) is not directed against thejudgment, pursuant to Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)) and(2) does not constitute a postjudgment motion under section 2-1203(a)of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002)). Accordingly, we mustdismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because R&G's November5, 2003, notice of appeal was not timely filed within 30 days of theentry of the trial court's September 25, 2003, judgment.

In support of this conclusion, we note that R&G'sinterpretation of Rule 303(a)(1) would effectively amend that rule bydeleting an important phrase--namely, "directed against the judgment"(155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)). Rule 303(a)(1) requires a notice ofappeal to be filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgmentunless "a timely post[]trial motion directed against the judgment isfiled" (emphasis added) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)). R&G'sinterpretation would render any posttrial motion sufficient to complywith the requirements of Rule 303(a)(1), regardless of whether thatmotion was "directed against the judgment." However, we must acceptthe supreme court rules as written, and we lack the authority to readout of them--in the guise of interpretation--important qualifyingphrases.

We express some sympathy for R&G's position. In thatregard, we reaffirm what this court wrote in Sizer v. Lotus Grain &Coal Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 739, 741-42, 388 N.E.2d 1274, 1276-77(1979):

"Here, the [party's] counsel was faced with asituation where the trial court disposed of thepost[]trial motion (and the motion for directedverdicts) with a docket entry of less thanthree full sentences. At that point, counselwas faced with deciding whether or not toundergo the time, effort, and expense ofappeal, without a scintilla of guidance as tothe basis or reasons for the trial court'sruling. If counsel decided to pursue anappeal, he would then be compelled to takeshots in the dark--to speculate on the legaltheories or concepts to rely upon before thiscourt.

Only a portion of the vitality of oursystem of jurisprudence is derived from thecompetence and ability of our trial courts. The rest comes from the faith and respect ofthose--be they attorneys or litigants--who areinvolved in our adversarial system. The law asit is applied must be relied upon, and theattorney, much less the common man, cannot doso when the reasons for a trial court's rulingare hidden from inspection by the public or thescrutiny of an appellate court. It is truethat trial courts are not required to state thereasons for their rulings, more's the pity. Ifthey were, not only would it dissipate the needfor a large number of appeals, but it wouldalso help alleviate any potential scepticism ofthe judiciary's actions."

We note that since Sizer, we have--in a case in which we hadjurisdiction--vacated a dismissal order where the trial court gave noexplanation for its ruling when presented with 10 possible grounds. Muck v. Van Bibber, 223 Ill. App. 3d 830, 836, 585 N.E.2d 1147, 1152(1992). In Muck, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 835-36, 585 N.E.2d at 1151-52,we discussed the difficulty faced by a reviewing court when the trialcourt provides no rationale for its ruling. A reviewing court mustexpend its time (and waste limited judicial resources) when forced toconsider each potential basis for a trial court's ruling. We thusonce again urge trial courts to state with clarity not only whataction they are taking but why they are taking it.

Notwithstanding our sympathy for R&G's plight, we cautionparties to be extremely careful in drafting postjudgment motions soas to avoid losing the ability to appeal by filing motions that (1)are not directed against the judgment under Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1)) and (2) do not constitute postjudgment motions undersection 2-1203(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002)). This court has no choice but to dismiss appeals when we lackjurisdiction. See Department of Central Management Services v.American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 182 Ill.2d 234, 238, 695 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1998) (reviewing courts have anindependent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction is proper andmust dismiss the appeal if jurisdiction is lacking); see also Bell v.Hill, 271 Ill. App. 3d 224, 227, 648 N.E.2d 170, 172 (1995) ("It isincumbent upon an appellate court to dismiss an appeal wherejurisdiction is lacking"). However, as discussed above, once wepossess jurisdiction, we have the authority to vacate a trial court'sorder when that court provides no rationale for its ruling. Indeed,had R&G timely filed an appeal from the September 25, 2003, order ofdismissal, thereby vesting this court with jurisdiction, we may verywell have taken the same action we did in Muck--namely, vacating theorder of dismissal and remanding for an explanation of the basis orbases thereof.

As a final matter, we recognize that this decisionreasonably could be criticized for setting up a situation in whichall counsel need do to avoid the jurisdictional hurdle at issue hereis to add a tag line to the motion to clarify requesting a rehearing. Nonetheless, we conclude that dismissal of this appeal is required bythe plain language of Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)) andsection 2-1203(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002)).

For the reasons stated, we dismiss R&G's appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

KNECHT, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.