filed:  January 24, 2002

On January 7, 1999, plaintiff, Bruce A. Rice, filed acomplaint against defendants, the Board of Trustees of AdamsCounty, Illinois (Board), and the County of Adams, Illinois(County), and an amended complaint on May 18, 1999, alleging afailure by the Board to comply with the Open Meetings Act (Act)(5 ILCS 120/1 through 6 (West 1998)). Plaintiff sought an ordervoiding a resolution adopted by the Board. The resolutionprovided for an alternative benefit program for elected countyofficers (ECO) pursuant to section 7-145.1 of the IllinoisPension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-145.1 (West 1998)). Plaintiff anddefendants filed motions for summary judgment. On May 10, 2000,the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, declaring the actions of the Board in adopting the resolutionnull and void. On March 16, 2001, the trial court entered anorder denying defendants' motion for reconsideration. Defendantsappeal the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff. We affirm.

The entry of summary judgment is appropriate wherethere are no questions of fact and judgment can be entered as amatter of law. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands,L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 550-51, 723 N.E.2d 256, 260 (1999),quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). The interpretation ofa statute is a matter of law for the court and properly decidedby summary judgment. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 551, 723N.E.2d at 260. Courts of review consider the entry of summaryjudgment de novo. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 551, 723 N.E.2dat 260.

It is the intent of the Act to protect the citizen'sright to know. The Act requires an agenda for each regularmeeting of a public body, the agenda to be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the location where themeeting is to be held and at least 48 hours in advance of theholding of the meeting. 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998). Theportion of the Act at issue in the present case provides that"[t]he requirement of a regular meeting agenda shall not precludethe consideration of items not specifically set forth in theagenda." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998).

The agenda in the present case, dated November 10,1998, provides for 34 items, 25 of which appear to be the reportsof various individuals. Item No. 32 references "NEW BUSINESS." We find also in the record agendas dated September 8, 1998, andOctober 13, 1998. They are, in appearance, nearly identical tothe agenda dated November 10, 1998.

The minutes of the meeting held November 10, 1998,provide that, under "NEW BUSINESS," a Mr. Heidbreder stated"there is another resolution to present." The resolution, providing for an alternative benefit program for ECO pursuant tosection 7-145.1 of the Illinois Pension Code, was read aloud, andMr. Heidbreder "moved to adopt." A discussion was had andsufficient affirmative votes carried the motion.

Defendants acknowledge that the alternative benefitprogram for ECO was not specifically set forth in the agenda. Defendants argue, however, that pursuant to section 2.02 of theAct, "the consideration of" an item not specifically set forth inthe agenda references an opportunity for action by the publicbody. 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998). We disagree. In Countyof Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263, the supreme courtopined:

"The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. A court first looksto the words of the statute. The language ofthe statute is the best indication of thelegislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. In interpreting a statute, it is never properfor a court to depart from plain language byreading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with theclearly expressed legislative intent."

The Act, in setting forth the policy, provides:

"It is the public policy of this Statethat public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and that thepeople have a right to be informed as to theconduct of their business. In order that thepeople shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and declares that it is the intentof this Act to ensure that the actions ofpublic bodies be taken openly and that theirdeliberations be conducted openly.

The General Assembly further declares itto be the public policy of this State thatits citizens shall be given advance notice ofand the right to attend all meetings at whichany business of a public body is discussed oracted upon in any way." 5 ILCS 120/1 (West1998).

The Act references the "actions of public bodies" and,in a separate reference, "their deliberations," and also "business *** discussed" and, in a separate reference, business "actedupon." We find "the consideration of" items not specifically setforth in the agenda to be in the nature of deliberations anddiscussion and not actions taken.

We do not find the item "NEW BUSINESS" to providesufficient advance notice to the people of a resolution providingfor an alternative benefit program for ECO. We note also areference in the minutes of the meeting held November 10, 1998,that "several years ago this was discussed," contrary to theBoard's assertion of "new" business.

Defendants also argue that the ECO who chose to participate in the alternative benefit program are not bound by thejudgment declaring the actions of the Board, in adopting theresolution, null and void because they were not made parties tothe suit. On May 10, 2000, the trial court held that defendants'actions, "in adopting the resolution approving the ECO Plan, astaken on November 10, 1998, are herewith declared null and void." The "pension rights" referenced by defendants have no force,binding power, or validity.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trialcourt's judgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.