December 5, 2001

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 2001, plaintiff, Anthony E. Robinson, aninmate at Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), filed a pro sepetition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that defendant,James M. Schomig, the Pontiac warden, had violated his dueprocess rights in numerous disciplinary proceedings over severalyears. In February 2001, the trial court dismissed the petition,upon finding that it did not state a proper habeas corpus claim. Robinson appeals, and we affirm.

In January 2001, Robinson filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus, alleging that (1) he was being unlawfully restrained in punitive segregation, and (2) his continued incarceration after July 27, 2002, would be unlawful. Specifically, healleged that the procedures under which punitive segregation andrevocation of his good-time credit were imposed violated both therules of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) (see 730ILCS 5/3-8-7(d) (West 1998)) and minimum due process requirementsunder the United States and Illinois Constitutions. He furtheralleged that (1) he did not receive written statements from theadjustment committee (committee) as to evidence the committeerelied upon and reasons for disciplinary actions taken (730 ILCS5/3-8-7(e)(5) (West 1998)); (2) he was not afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence; and (3) the committee's findings were not supported by the evidence.

On February 20, 2001, the trial court ruled on Robinson's habeas corpus petition as follows:

"The court having considered the submissions of [Robinson] and having further considered the request for reconsideration madeby [Robinson], finds that his complaintsrelate to his disagreement [with] certaindisciplinary decisions reached on many occasions at the Pontiac Correctional Center fromAugust 2, 1996, and extending over many episodes to July 24, 2000. The court finds thatthe remedy of habeas corpus is an impropervehicle with which to raise the concerns of[Robinson]. The court further finds that hiscomplaints *** are also untimely. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed."

This appeal followed.

Robinson first argues that habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle for restoring his good-time credits and obtainingrelease from punitive segregation. We disagree.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used toreview proceedings that do not exhibit one of the defects setforth in section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CivilCode) (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)), even if an alleged errorinvolves a denial of constitutional rights. Barney v. PrisonerReview Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998). Section 10-124 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"If it appears that the prisoner is incustody by virtue of process from any courtlegally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the followingcauses:

1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter,place, sum[,] or person.

2. Where, though the originalimprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission[,] orevent which has subsequently takenplace, the party has become entitled to be discharged.

3. Where the process is defective in some substantial formrequired by law.

4. Where the process, thoughin proper form, has been issued ina case or under circumstances wherethe law does not allow process toissue or orders to be entered forimprisonment or arrest.

5. Where, although in properform, the process has been issuedin a case or under circumstancesunauthorized to issue or executethe same, or where the person having the custody of the prisonerunder such process is not the person empowered by law to detain himor her.

6. Where the process appearsto have been obtained by falsepretense or bribery.

7. Where there is no generallaw, nor any judgment or order of acourt to authorize the process ifin a civil action, nor any conviction if in a criminal proceeding. No court, on the return of a habeascorpus, shall, in any other matter,inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted." 735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 1998).

See also Hughes v. Kiley, 67 Ill. 2d 261, 267, 367 N.E.2d 700,702 (1977) (a writ of habeas corpus is available only to obtainthe release of a prisoner (1) who has been incarcerated under ajudgment of a trial court that lacked jurisdiction of the subjectmatter or the person of the prisoner, or (2) where there has beensome occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction thatentitles him to release).

In his habeas corpus petition, Robinson contends thathis due process rights under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974), were violated in numerousdisciplinary proceedings in which Schomig failed to follow DOCrules. Robinson thus claims he has been unlawfully deprived offive years' good-time credit and his continued incarcerationafter July 27, 2002, would be unlawful. However, his petitiondoes not claim any of the grounds for relief listed in section10-124 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 1998)). Hedoes not even claim that he is currently being held beyond thetime that he may legally be detained. See Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at431, 704 N.E.2d at 351 ("Habeas corpus does not lie if the personis in custody by virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court,or of any proceeding for the enforcement of such judgment, unlessthe time during which such party may be legally detained hasexpired"). Thus, Robinson is not entitled to habeas corpusrelief, and the trial court did not err by dismissing his petition.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.