JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2002, plaintiff, Roland Machinery Company(Roland), filed a complaint against defendant, James S. Reed,seeking a declaratory judgment determining the parties' rightsunder a purchase agreement, pursuant to which Reed had purchaseda $175,400 bulldozer from Roland. In response, Reed filed amotion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), alleging thatRoland's complaint did not state a cause of action for declaratory relief. Following a July 2002 hearing, the trial courtgranted Reed's motion and dismissed Roland's complaint.

Roland appeals, arguing that the trial court erred bydismissing its declaratory judgment action. We reverse andremand.

Roland's June 2002 complaint for declaratory judgmentalleged the following: (1) Roland is in the business of selling,servicing, and repairing heavy equipment out of its facility inSpringfield; (2) on August 6, 2001, Roland and Reed entered intoa purchase agreement, pursuant to which Reed agreed to purchasefrom Roland a new Komatsu D61EX12 Crawler Dozer (the dozer); (3)sometime after August 6, 2001, the dozer was delivered from itsmanufacturer to Roland's Springfield facility; (4) pursuant tothe terms of the purchase agreement, and as per Reed's request,Roland equipped the dozer with (a) "sweeps," (b) a fuel tankguard, and (c) a rear screen heater; (4) on September 27, 2001,Reed took possession of the dozer and paid Roland $157,078 (thebalance due after adding sales tax and subtracting the value ofReed's trade-in); (5) prior to February 16, 2002, the dozer wasdelivered to Roland's Springfield facility for work requested byReed; (6) on February 16, 2002, Reed inspected the dozer and re-took possession of it; (7) later that day, Reed came back toRoland's Springfield facility to return a "soft cab" that waspreviously installed by Roland; (8) sometime after purchasing thedozer, Reed alleged that the paint on the dozer was defective;(9) on or about March 4, 2002, Reed attempted to revoke hisacceptance of the dozer; (10) on May 29, 2002, Reed demanded thatthe purchase be rescinded and Roland refund the entire purchaseprice and retake possession of the dozer; and (11) Roland deniedthat Reed is entitled to rescission or revocation of acceptanceof the dozer. Roland sought a declaratory judgment with respectto the rights of the parties and for such other relief as may bejust and equitable.

Later in June 2002, Reed filed a motion to dismissRoland's complaint under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), alleging that Roland's complaint did not statea cause of action for declaratory relief because (1) it sought adeclaration of nonliability for past conduct; and (2) the controversy involved rights and obligations under contract law and theUniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1-101 through 13-103 (West2000)), which would be asserted by Reed in an action at law andwere not proper subjects for a declaratory judgment proceeding.

Following a July 2002 hearing, the trial court dismissed Roland's complaint, upon finding that Roland was seeking ajudicial declaration of nonliability for past conduct, which isnot a function of the declaratory judgment statute. In October2002, the court denied Roland's motion to reconsider. Thisappeal followed.

Initially, we must clarify the standard of review,which Reed erroneously describes as follows: "The granting ordenying of declaratory relief rests within the sound discretionof the trial court, and the appellant must affirmatively show anabuse of discretion." In Alderman Drugs, Inc. v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 398 N.E.2d 984, 987(1979), the First District Appellate Court discussed the appropriate standard when reviewing a trial court's dismissal of aplaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment as follows:

"While it is true *** that the [trial]court in its discretion may refuse to grantdeclaratory relief, the court has no discretion to refuse to entertain the action asagainst a motion to dismiss where the complaint states a cause of action. [Citations.] When confronted with a motion todismiss, the trial court must sustain thecomplaint unless it clearly appears that noset of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle the plaintiff tosome type of relief. [Citations.] A complaint for declaratory judgment which recitesin sufficient detail an actual and legalcontroversy between the parties and prays fora declaration of rights and, if desired,other legal relief, states facts sufficientto state a good cause of action. [Citations.]"

We review de novo a trial court's decision granting or denying asection 2-615 motion to dismiss, and we accept all well-pleadedfacts in the complaint as true. Thomas v. Hileman, 333 Ill. App.3d 132, 136, 775 N.E.2d 231, 234 (2002); see also Beahringer v.Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (2003) (setting forth the de novostandard of review that applies to a trial court's grant of asection 2-615 motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action).

B. Declaratory Judgments

Section 2-701(a) of the Code states, in pertinent part,as follows:

"The court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights,having the force of final judgments, whetheror not any consequential relief is or couldbe claimed, including the determination, atthe instance of anyone interested in thecontroversy, of the construction of any statute, municipal ordinance, or other governmental regulation, or of any deed, will, contract[,] or other written instrument, and adeclaration of the rights of the partiesinterested. The foregoing enumeration doesnot exclude other cases of actual controversy." 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2000).

Our supreme court recently set forth the followinggeneral principles on declaratory judgment actions:

"The essential requirements of a declaratoryjudgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with alegal tangible interest; (2) a defendanthaving an opposing interest; and (3) an actual controversy between the parties concerning such interests. [Citations.]

The declaratory judgment procedure allows '"'the court to take hold of a controversy one step sooner than normally--that is,after the dispute has arisen, but beforesteps are taken which give rise to claims fordamages or other relief. The parties to thedispute can then learn the consequences oftheir action before acting.'"' [Citation.] 'The declaratory judgment procedure was designed to settle and fix rights before therehas been an irrevocable change in the position of the parties that will jeopardizetheir respective claims of right. [Citation.] The remedy is used to afford securityand relief against uncertainty so as to avoidpotential litigation.' [Citations.]

A declaratory judgment action is purelystatutory and is to be liberally construed. However, the provisions of the statute mustbe strictly complied with. [Citations.] Ininterpreting the Illinois declaratory judgment statute, Illinois courts may look to thedecisions of other states in interpreting theUniform Declaratory Judgments Act (12 U.L.A.309 (1996))." Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d at372-73.

See also Eyman v. McDonough District Hospital, 245 Ill. App. 3d394, 396, 613 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1993) ("The central purpose of thedeclaratory judgment procedure is to allow the court to address acontroversy one step sooner than normal after a dispute hasarisen, but before steps are taken which would give rise to aclaim for damages or other relief").

Roland first argues that its declaratory judgmentaction should not have been dismissed because an actual controversy existed. Reed responds that Roland's action was prematurebecause when it was brought, Reed had not "returned the dozer anddemanded his money back." We agree with Roland.

The statutory requirement that an "actual controversy"exists is intended "merely to distinguish justiciable issues fromabstract or hypothetical disputes and is not intended to preventthe resolution of concrete disputes" that lend themselves to adefinitive and immediate determination of the rights of theparties. Alderman Drugs, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 803-04, 398 N.E.2dat 987. In Beahringer, the supreme court explained that theexistence of an "actual" controversy does not require that awrong be committed and an injury inflicted. Rather, an actualcontroversy exists when the underlying facts and issues of thecase are neither moot nor premature such that they would requirethe trial court to "'pass judgment on mere abstract propositionsof law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as tofuture events.'" Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d at 374-75, quotingUnderground Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371,375, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1977); Miller v. County of Lake, 79Ill. 2d 481, 487, 404 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1980); see also St. JosephHospital v. Corbetta Construction Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 931,316 N.E.2d 51, 56 (1974), quoting Trossman v. Trossman, 24 Ill.App. 2d 521, 531-32 (1960), quoting 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments