Plaintiff, Rothers Construction, Inc., a subcontractor,brought an action in the circuit court of Piatt County to foreclose a mechanics lien against defendants, O'Malley Grain, Inc.,the owner of a construction project, and Centurion Industries,Inc., d/b/a A-Lert Construction Services (A-Lert), the generalcontractor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant tosection 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000)). The trial court found plaintifffailed to perfect its mechanics lien pursuant to section 24 ofthe Mechanics Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000)). Plaintiff appeals, contending (1) the trial court erred indismissing its mechanics lien foreclosure complaint on thegrounds it was not properly perfected under section 24 of the Actand (2) the trial court erred when it failed to find defendantswere equitably estopped from asserting the failure to perfect thelien under section 24 of the Act. We affirm.

I. STATUTES AT ISSUE

The Act provides for different ways to perfect amechanics lien depending on the circumstances. Section 24 of theAct provides in pertinent part:

"[A] [s]ub[]contractor *** may at any timeafter making his or her contract with thecontractor, and shall within 90 days afterthe completion thereof, or, if extra or additional work or material is delivered thereafter, within 90 days after the date of completion of such extra or additional work orfinal delivery of such extra or additionalmaterial, cause a written notice of his orher claim and the amount due *** to be sentby registered or certified mail, with returnreceipt requested *** or personally served onthe owner of record or his agent ***." 770ILCS 60/24 (West 2000).

Section 25 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

"In all cases where the owner, agent, architect[,] or superintendent cannot, upon reasonable diligence, be found in the county inwhich said improvement is made, or shall notreside therein, the sub[]contractor *** maygive notice by filing in the office of therecorder against the person making the contract and the owner a claim for lien ***." 770 ILCS 60/25 (West 2000).

II. BACKGROUND

A-Lert entered into a contract with defendant O'MalleyGrain, Inc., to build grain bins and material handling systems onits property in Piatt County and then, on December 31, 1999,subcontracted some of the work on the project to plaintiff,Rothers Construction, Inc., a corporation headquartered inMinnesota. On June 8, 2000, plaintiff completed constructionservices at O'Malley Grain's plant in Piatt County. On September5, 2000, plaintiff recorded a mechanics lien on O'Malley Grain'sproperty in Piatt County in the amount of $97,182.50.

On April 20, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint againstboth defendants. Attached to the complaint as exhibit A was acopy of the recorded mechanics lien. Attached to the complaintas exhibit B was a notice of mechanics lien claim, addressed toO'Malley Grain, dated April 12, 2001.

On September 25, 2001, plaintiff filed its amendedcomplaint. Attached to this complaint was only an exhibit A, therecorded mechanics lien. On October 15, 2001, both defendantsfiled a joint motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant tosection 2-619(a)(9) of the Code. In the portion of the motionaddressing count I of the amended complaint, O'Malley Graincontends, among other things, plaintiff failed to allege it fileda notice of mechanics lien pursuant to section 24 of the Act (770ILCS 60/24 (West 2000)) and its lien was not perfected.

On November 19, 2001, plaintiff filed a written response to the motion to dismiss and contended that section 25 ofthe Act applied, not section 24, and that it complied withsection 25. In support of this contention, plaintiff provided anexhibit to its response showing O'Malley Grain's registered agentto be located in Cook County.

Alternatively, plaintiff contended if compliance withsection 24 of the Act was necessary for perfecting a mechanicslien in this case, O'Malley Grain was equitably estopped fromarguing section 25 was improper because the mechanics lien claimwas drafted by the attorney for O'Malley Grain, with instructionson how to file it with the recorder. This contention was supported by the affidavit of James A. Rothers, plaintiff's vice-president, who stated plaintiff was referred to this particularattorney by the president of O'Malley Grain, Robert P. O'Malley.

On November 21, 2001, the trial court heard argumentson defendants' motion to dismiss count I. The trial court foundplaintiff did not meet all of the requirements of equitableestoppel but denied defendants' motion to dismiss as to count Ion the grounds that O'Malley Grain was a resident of Cook Countyfor purposes of the Act based on the case cited by plaintiff,Hollembeak v. National Starch & Chemical Corp., 95 Ill. App. 3d309, 420 N.E.2d 172 (1981), and, therefore, perfection of themechanics lien was proper under section 25.

On December 20, 2001, O'Malley Grain filed a motion toreconsider the trial court's ruling. Attached to the motion wasthe affidavit of Robert P. O'Malley, chief executive officer ofO'Malley Grain, Inc. In his affidavit, O'Malley stated he was aresident of Piatt County, was the agent in charge of the construction project at issue in Piatt County, and was present atthe construction site three to four times per week during construction.

Plaintiff filed a motion to strike O'Malley's affidaviton January 17, 2002, and filed a response to the motion toreconsider on January 29, 2002. The response did not mention theequitable estoppel arguments it had made in response to theoriginal motion to dismiss. O'Malley Grain filed a response tothe motion to strike its affidavit on January 29, 2002.

On January 30, 2002 the trial court heard arguments onplaintiff's motion to strike and O'Malley Grain's motion toreconsider. The trial court allowed O'Malley Grain to fileO'Malley's affidavit. During argument, plaintiff raised theequitable estoppel argument and O'Malley Grain asked the court toconsider it as untimely raised since more than 30 days had passedsince the trial court found the argument unpersuasive at theoriginal motion to dismiss hearing.

The trial court found section 24 notice was not servedon O'Malley Grain but plaintiff did file a section 25 notice. The trial court noted O'Malley stated in his affidavit he was theagent in charge of the grain-handling-system construction projectand had complete authority over the project. He further statedhe visited the jobsite at least three or four times per weekduring most of the construction project and when he did so, hewould inspect the facility and discuss the project with thecontractors and subcontractors working at the jobsite. He wasavailable to speak with the representatives of the generalcontractor and the subcontractors, including plaintiff, on afrequent basis during the construction project. The trial courtfound O'Malley was the agent of O'Malley Grain and, thus, section24 notice should have been served on O'Malley. The trial courtdid not rule on the equitable estoppel issue.

On February 28, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion forreconsideration of the trial court's ruling of January 30, 2002,and for other relief. Plaintiff specifically asked the trialcourt to reconsider its "January 30, 2002," ruling that equitableestoppel did not apply in this case. Plaintiff also asked for afinding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a))in order to appeal should the trial court not reconsider itsprior rulings. On March 25, 2002, O'Malley Grain filed a response to plaintiff's motion to reconsider and objected toplaintiff raising the equitable estoppel argument, contending itwas untimely raised.

The trial court heard arguments on plaintiff's motionto reconsider on March 27, 2002. O'Malley Grain argued plaintiff's request for reconsideration of the November 21, 2001,equitable estoppel denial was not timely made. Plaintiff arguedthe estoppel argument was timely made because it did not become"germane" until the trial court ruled the mechanics lien, whichthe trial court had originally ruled was properly perfected undersection 25, was not properly perfected. The trial court deniedplaintiff's motion to reconsider and allowed its ruling ofJanuary 30, 2002, to stand. As to the equitable estoppel argument, the trial court stated as follows:

"As far as equitable estoppel, that issue hasbeen raised, has been argued. The [c]ourt isconcerned that the plaintiff has a right toretain its own attorney. Could he adequatelyand properly rely on O'Malley's counsel? These are now adverse parties, not necessarily at the time that O'Malley's counsel wasused by [plaintiff]."

The trial court made a finding there was no just reasonfor delaying appeal under Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) andthis appeal followed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Did the Trial Court Err in Dismissing Plaintiff's
Mechanics Lien Foreclosure Complaint Because the Lien Was Not
Properly Perfected Under Section 24 of the Act
(770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000))?

O'Malley Grain moved to dismiss count I of plaintiff'scomplaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000)) on the grounds the claim for lien was notproperly perfected. O'Malley Grain argues perfection of amechanics lien in this case was only appropriate under theprovisions of section 24 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000)),and plaintiff argues perfection of its mechanics lien claim wasappropriate under Section 25 of the Act. 770 ILCS 60/25 (West2000).

The standard of review for the granting of a defendant's section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss is de novo. Henrichv. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 386, 712 N.E.2d298, 301 (1998).

Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code permits dismissal where"the claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matteravoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000). When ruling on a motion to dismiss,the trial court must interpret all pleadings and supportingdocuments in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The court should grant the motion only if the plaintiff can proveno set of facts that would support a cause of action. Henrich,186 Ill. 2d at 386, 712 N.E.2d at 301.

Statutes creating mechanics liens are in derogation ofcommon law and must be strictly construed. Suddarth v. Rosen, 81Ill. App. 2d 136, 139, 224 N.E.2d 602, 603 (1967).

"Mechanic's lien statutes afford extraordinary remedies to certain classes of contractors and subcontractors and it is not unreasonable to expect them to conform to therequirements of the law that creates thoseremedies. Obviously, without a mechanic'slien statute, the plaintiff would have noredress against the owners of the property ortheir lending institution. The General Assembly has seen fit to grant to a subcontractor, such as the plaintiff, a potent deviceto secure payment of his improvement of realproperty by its provision that a lien can beplaced against the property so improved. However, the legislature has required thatthe subcontractor adhere to certain technicalprocedures to effectuate his lien and hisfailure to do so means simply that he has notavailed himself of the remedy extended andthat he has no lien." Suddarth, 81 Ill. App.2d at 139-40, 224 N.E.2d at 603.

Section 24 of the Act provides a subcontractor shall,within 90 days after completion of work, cause a written noticeof claim to be sent by registered or certified mail to or servedpersonally upon "the owner of record or his agent or architect,or the superintendent having charge of the building or improvement." 770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000).

Section 25 of the Act provides where the owner, agent,architect, or superintendent either cannot be found in or doesnot reside in the county where the work is done, the subcontractor may give notice by filing a claim for lien in the countyrecorder's office against the real property upon which the workwas completed. 770 ILCS 60/25 (West 2000).

Plaintiff argues the interpretation of section 25 foundin Hollembeak supports its argument service was appropriate undersection 25. In Hollembeak, the owner of a factory in MorganCounty (National) was a Delaware corporation licensed to dobusiness in Illinois with its registered agent located in CookCounty. It had a plant manager who worked at the site in MorganCounty. Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 309-10, 420 N.E.2d at173. When National decided to make improvements to its plant, itemployed a Pennsylvania corporation to draw the plans. There wasno architect on the job. There was no superintendent on the jobeither, and construction work was handled by a foreign corporation and its subsidiaries and subcontractors, who were alsoforeign corporations. Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 420N.E.2d at 173. Hollembeak entered into an oral contract with oneof the subcontractors to deliver concrete which, when it was notpaid, later filed notice of its mechanics lien under section 25. Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 420 N.E.2d at 173.

The Hollembeak court found section 25 begins with adisjunctive provision: "If the owner or agent cannot be foundupon reasonable diligence, or is a nonresident of the county,then the recording procedure may be employed." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 311, 420 N.E.2d at174. The court then noted the "residency" provisions of thevenue provisions of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979,ch. 110, par. 6) are different from the notice provisions of theAct whose purpose is to confine the extraordinary remedy of themechanics lien to the county in which the property is located. Accordingly, the court found a Delaware corporation with itslocal registered office in Cook County was not a resident ofMorgan County for purposes of the Act. Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App.3d at 311, 420 N.E.2d at 174.

The plant manager was also found not to be the "agent"referred to in section 25 for service of the notice of mechanicslien because he, along with the owner, architect, or superintendent, must be connected to the building project. This requirement serves to confine the claim process to those who have directknowledge of the transactions. As the plant manager had noauthority over the construction project, he was not the properperson to be served with a mechanics lien. Hollembeak, 95 Ill.App. 3d at 312, 420 N.E.2d at 174. Therefore, since the ownerwas a nonresident and no agent in charge of construction was aresident of Morgan County, all being foreign corporations,proceeding under section 25 was proper. Hollembeak, 95 Ill. App.3d at 312, 420 N.E.2d at 174.

Plaintiff argues Hollembeak stands for the propositionsection 25 applies when any one of the owner, agent, architect,or superintendent does not reside in the county where the work islocated or if any one of them cannot be found there. This is amisreading of what Hollembeak says about section 25. Underplaintiff's theory, if the owner, agent, and superintendent allresided in the county where the work is located, but the architect lived in an adjacent county, then the claimant would bejustified in using section 25. Section 25 does not state if anyone of the named entities cannot be found or does not reside inthe county where the work is located mechanics liens may beperfected by recording. Rather, if any one of the entities canbe found in the county, personal service under section 24 must beused. Sections 24 and 25 do not make sense together otherwise.

Notice to the owner as required by statute is the basison which a mechanics lien is predicated and is necessary tocreation of the lien. The owner's actual notice of the claimfrom some source other than those listed in section 24 does notcreate a lien. Suddarth, 81 Ill. App. 2d at 140, 224 N.E.2d at604. Service of the 90-day notice pursuant to section 24 is acondition precedent to the cause of action, the creation of thelien. Caruso v. Kafka, 265 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313, 638 N.E.2d663, 665 (1994). No lien attaches when the owner does notreceive timely written notice. Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A.Borenstein Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 648, 654-55, 655 N.E.2d 1065,1070 (1995).

Reading sections 24 and 25 together, we find section 24provides for the notice that is required to perfect a claim formechanics lien. Since the owner is the person who is entitled tonotice under the Act, the others listed in section 24, theowner's agent or architect or the superintendent of the construction project, are surrogates for the owner. Only where none ofthe entities designated for service of notice of the claim formechanics lien in person or by registered mail in section 24 areresidents of the county where the construction is located, orupon reasonable diligence cannot be found therein, is resort tosection 25 perfection of the lien by filing a notice of the claimwith the recorder of deeds appropriate. Section 25's enumerationof the entities set forth in section 24 should be read as a groupand not individually. Therefore, if the group as a whole is notresident in the county or cannot be reasonably found therein,section 25 perfection applies.

Here, O'Malley Grain had a representative at thejobsite, Robert P. O'Malley, a resident of Piatt County, whovisited the site three to four times per week during constructionand was in charge of overseeing the project for the owner. Thus,he was available for service of notice under section 24 uponreasonable diligence on the part of plaintiff. As the agent ofO'Malley Grain, the owner, O'Malley would then be responsible fornotifying O'Malley Grain that plaintiff had not yet been paid forits work by A-Lert and O'Malley Grain should not settle with A-Lert until all the subcontractors' claims had been addressed. Section 24 notice was required in this case, and the trial courtdid not err in dismissing plaintiff's mechanics lien foreclosurecomplaint as not properly perfected.

The better practice to avoid the issues raised in thiscase would be to use both sections 24 and 25. Section 25 noticeof a mechanics lien claim is not the most expeditious method asupplier or subcontractor could use for getting paid since mostowners of property do not check with the recorder of deeds on adaily basis and it might be awhile before the owner actuallyrealizes a notice of claim has been made and payment is stilldue. Using section 24 notice would cause an owner to have promptnotice its property was about to be encumbered by a lien andcould not then be easily sold, forcing it to take action to helpthe subcontractor settle its claim.

B. Did the Trial Court Err When It Failed To Find Equitable
Estoppel Barred Defendant From Asserting the Failure To Perfectthe Lien Under Section 24 (770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000))?

Alternatively, plaintiff alleges O'Malley Grain isestopped from raising the notice requirement of section 24 of theAct because plaintiff requested, and O'Malley Grain's attorneyprovided, a form and instructions to plaintiff on how to file aclaim for mechanics lien in Illinois. In support of its allegation, plaintiff filed an affidavit, from its vice president,James A. Rothers. In his affidavit, Rothers avers plaintiffcompleted its work on the construction project in early June 2000and rendered a final bill to A-Lert but was not paid. In lateAugust 2000, Rothers had a conversation with Robert P. O'Malley,president and part owner of O'Malley Grain. In that conversation, Rothers told O'Malley plaintiff had yet to be paid by A-Lert. O'Malley advised Rothers he needed to file a mechanicslien against A-Lert. When Rothers told O'Malley he did not knowhow to file such a lien in Illinois, O'Malley suggested hecontact Bruce Gammage, an attorney who represented both himselfand O'Malley Grain.

Rothers then contacted Gammage concerning the mechanicslien question with regard to the unpaid bill with A-Lert. OnSeptember 1, 2000, Gammage faxed to Rothers at plaintiff'soffices a form for a mechanics lien claim, partially filled outand addressed to O'Malley Grain, with a legal description of itsproperty and the amount claimed by plaintiff. Included with theclaim form were these hand-written instructions:

"Here are Illinois lien claim forms. Youmust have on file before 90 days from thelast day work was done. You will need tosend money order payable to the Piatt CountyRecorder, Courthouse, Monticello, Illinois[,]61856--you should overnight mail to make sureit is recorded before the ninety days is up. You will need to complete what work you did,whether oral or written contract, and whenyou were done and have it signed by companypresident and attested by company secretarywith seal affixed. (I have included the$12,000 for the crane.) Recording fee is$18. You need to put what State you areincorporated in." (Emphasis in original.)

Rothers, relying on the guidance and instructions ofGammage, completed the documents he provided, executed, notarized, and recorded them with the Piatt County recorder of deeds. Rothers further averred if the instructions given him by Gammagewere erroneous, he had no knowledge of same.

A few weeks later, Gammage advised Rothers that,because he represented O'Malley and O'Malley Grain, he would havea conflict of interest in representing plaintiff in this matterand suggested several other attorneys. Prior to this referral byGammage, plaintiff was not represented by counsel. Gammage didnot bill Rothers or plaintiff for any services rendered.

The affidavit of Rothers was filed on November 19,2001, as an exhibit to plaintiff's response to O'Malley Grain'smotion to dismiss. O'Malley Grain filed no affidavits at thetime of the hearing on its motion to dismiss; and later, when itdid file O'Malley's affidavit in connection with its motion toreconsider on December 20, 2001, O'Malley did not deny hisreferral of Rothers to Gammage.

Plaintiff argues should this court find its mechanicslien was not properly perfected under section 25 of the Act (770ILCS 60/25 (West 2000)), then O'Malley Grain should be equitablyestopped from asserting the failure of proper perfection becauseits attorney, at its suggestion, drafted the lien claim forplaintiff and instructed plaintiff in how to perfect the claim. It is this specific method of perfecting the claim that O'MalleyGrain now asserts is deficient.

O'Malley Grain argues the equitable estoppel issue wasnot preserved for appeal because a motion to reconsider must befiled within 30 days of entry of the final judgment. ArcherDaniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538, 470 N.E.2d290, 291 (1984). O'Malley Grain contends since no written orderwas required, the order denying plaintiff's equitable estoppeldefense was entered orally by the trial court at the hearing onthe motion to dismiss held November 21, 2001. Plaintiff had 30days from that date to file a motion to reconsider the court'sruling on its equitable estoppel claim and did not do so. Plaintiff did not raise the equitable estoppel argument until itfiled its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's rulingof January 30, 2002, granting the motion to dismiss. This wasnot filed until February 28, 2002. Therefore, the issue was notpreserved for appellate review.

After plaintiff raised the issue of equitable estoppelin its motion to reconsider the trial court's grant of O'MalleyGrain's motion to dismiss, the issue was argued and the courtmentioned the argument in its oral ruling on March 27, 2002, whenit denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider. The court then madeits written order and included the finding under Supreme CourtRule 304(a) allowing plaintiff to proceed with its appeal onApril 22, 2002.

Plaintiff won its argument at the initial hearing onNovember 21, 2001, that it could proceed under section 25,although it also raised the alternative argument of equitableestoppel for which the trial court had found plaintiff had notmet all of the requirements. Therefore, there was no reason forit, as the winning party, to request the trial court reconsiderthe alternative grounds for defeating the motion it had alreadywon. Only after O'Malley Grain filed its motion to reconsider onDecember 20, 2001, did the issue of equitable estoppel become, inplaintiff's words, "germane." The argument was raised by plaintiff at the hearing on the motion to reconsider on January 30,2002, but was not mentioned by the trial court in its ruling.

Plaintiff then raised the equitable estoppel argumentin its motion to reconsider filed on February 28, 2002, andargued it to the court on March 27, 2002. Bringing the issue tothe trial court's attention is the purpose of a motion to reconsider (see Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 213 Ill. App.3d 622, 627, 572 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1991)), and plaintiff fulfilled this purpose at all hearings. Thus, we elect to addressthe merits of plaintiff's contention O'Malley Grain is equitablyestopped from asserting plaintiff failed to perfect its mechanicslien under section 24.

The general rule of equitable estoppel is that where aperson, by his or her statements and conduct, leads a party to dosomething the party would not have done but for such statementsand conduct, that person will not be allowed to deny his or herwords or acts to the damage of the party. Geddes v. Mill CreekCountry Club, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 302, 313, 751 N.E.2d 1150, 1157(2001). The court in Geddes goes on to define equitable estoppelas follows:

"the effect of the person's conduct wherebythe person is barred from asserting rightsthat might otherwise have existed against theother party who, in good faith, relied uponsuch conduct and has been thereby led tochange his or her position for the worse."  Geddes, 196 Ill. 2d at 313, 751 N.E.2d at 1157.

To establish equitable estoppel, the party claimingestoppel must demonstrate that (1) the other person misrepresented or concealed material facts, (2) the other person knew atthe time he or she made the representations that they wereuntrue, (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know that therepresentations were untrue when they were made and when theywere acted upon, (4) the other person intended or reasonablyexpected that the party claiming estoppel would act upon therepresentations, (5) the party claiming estoppel reasonablyrelied upon the representations on good faith to his or herdetriment, and (6) the party claiming estoppel would be prejudiced by his or her reliance on the misrepresentations if theother person is permitted to deny the truth thereof. Geddes, 196Ill. 2d at 313-14, 751 N.E.2d at 1157. A party seeking to claimestoppel has the burden of proving it by clear and unequivocalevidence. Geddes, 196 Ill. 2d at 314, 751 N.E.2d at 1157.

In this case, the person taking the actions and making representations to plaintiff was Gammage and not O'Malley Grain,but an attorney's errors and misconduct are attributable to hisclients on a theory of agency and the clients, being the principals, are bound by the deeds of their agent. Horwitz v. Holabird& Root, 312 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195, 726 N.E.2d 632, 635 (2000).

However, even if Gammage was the agent of O'MalleyGrain under the circumstances present here, which is doubtful,plaintiff did not provide enough evidence of equitable estoppelto make out an affirmative defense. Plaintiff did not claim ordemonstrate Gammage knew his representations about how to perfectplaintiff's mechanics lien were untrue. Further, it was notreasonable for plaintiff to rely on Gammage's advice once heforwarded the form to plaintiff. That form identified O'MalleyGrain as the entity against whom the lien was to be sought andyet plaintiff asserts it believed Gammage was O'Malley Grain'sattorney. The trial court did not err in failing to find O'Malley Grain was equitably estopped from asserting plaintiff'sfailure to perfect its mechanics lien under section 24 of the Act(770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2000)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs.

McCULLOUGH, J., dissents.

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Section 25 of the Act should beapplied.

At the time notice was given, plaintiff knew O'MalleyGrain was a corporation and that its registered agent was locatedin Cook County, Illinois. In late August 2000, O'Malley was madeaware that plaintiff had not been paid. O'Malley, himself, advisedplaintiff he needed to file a mechanics lien notice. Nothing inthe record indicates O'Malley Grain or its chief executive officer,Robert P. O'Malley, notified or told plaintiff he was the person incharge of the construction project. The first notice to plaintiffwas the motion of December 20, 2001, with the attached affidavitshowing Robert P. O'Malley to be the agent. This court should notgive credence to the self-serving, after-the-fact, affidavit.

I also disagree with the majority's discussion as to theimport of a recorded notice. The purpose of the recording is, asit states, giving notice of record.

I conclude that section 25 does apply to the factspresented. The provisions of section 25 were followed, andplaintiff properly followed its dictates. To give credence to theaffidavit in support of the motion to dismiss encourages abuse indefending mechanics lien actions.

The trial court's grant of defendants' motion to dismissshould be reversed.