JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In August 1998, plaintiffs, Russell and Patti Ruble(Rubles) and Charles and Denise Booth (Booths) (hereinafter collectively plaintiffs), filed suit against defendants, K.J. Sturhahn andthe City of Pittsfield, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding theconstitutionality of the zoning reclassification of real property inplaintiffs' residential subdivision. On August 30, 1999, plaintiffsfiled an amended complaint also alleging that Sturhahn violatedrestrictive covenants and provisions in the Plat Act (765 ILCS205/0.01 through 14 (West 1998)). In October 1999, the trial courtdismissed the portions of plaintiffs' complaint alleging Sturhahnviolated restrictive covenants and the Plat Act. On March 30, 2000,the court granted summary judgment in favor of Sturhahn, finding thezoning reclassification constitutional. On June 14, 2000, the courtdenied plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. On appeal, this courtaffirmed the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment,finding the rezoning classification constitutional, and reversed thetrial court's dismissal of counts II and III, finding plaintiffs hadalleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action under the PlatAct and to state a cause of action that Sturhahn violated an impliedrestrictive covenant. We remanded the cause for further proceedings. Ruble v. Sturhahn, No. 4-00-0616 (August 24, 2001) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23) (hereinafter Ruble).

On October 10, 2002, the trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of Sturhahn on counts II and III. Plaintiffsappeal, arguing the trial court erroneously granted summary judgmentin favor of Sturhahn. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remandfor further proceedings.

In 1955, the City of Pittsfield approved and adoptedOrdinance 543, which established a planning commission to prepare acomprehensive plan for guidance of the development and direction ofthe growth of the city and its contiguous territory. City ofPittsfield Ordinance No. 543 (adopted September 6, 1955). In 1982,as part of this plan, the City of Pittsfield approved and adoptedOrdinance 1013, annexing the tract of land that became thesubdivision containing plaintiffs' real property and the 13-acretract of land later purchased by Sturhahn. City of PittsfieldOrdinance No. 1013 (adopted October 19, 1982). Plaintiffsall own residential lots in the Pittsfield residential neighborhoodplatted and recorded as Rolling Meadows Third Addition. In 1987, theRubles purchased one lot immediately to the south of the property indispute and built a house thereon. In 1993, the Booths purchased twoseparate, but adjoining, lots southeast of the real property indispute. No restrictive covenants were recorded in plaintiffs'deeds.

In 1998, Sturhahn purchased the 13-acre tract of landpresently in dispute (hereinafter Sturhahn's property). At thattime, the entire subdivision, including Sturhahn's property, waszoned as R-2 (family residence) strictly for residential use. Afterhis purchase, Sturhahn sought and obtained a zoning change from thezoning commission, which reclassified Sturhahn's property as B-3(highway business district) and enabled Sturhahn to construct acommercial building to serve as a large animal veterinary clinic. Thereafter, Sturhahn vacated the plat to the subdivision andreplatted the 13 acres that he purchased into a new subdivisioncalled Sturhahn Timber Creek, containing 11 lots, each being inexcess of one-half acre. Plaintiffs' ingress and egress wasunaffected by Sturhahn's new plans.

The property adjacent to the entire northern boundary ofSturhahn's property is zoned B-3 and is presently used for severalcommercial purposes. Adjacent to the Sturhahn property in thenorthwest corner is a Wal-Mart store. Directly to the west of Wal-Mart, across the street, is a grocery store. Adjacent to theSturhahn property, in the northeast corner, is an outdoor live animalauction business. On the eastern edge of Sturhahn's property is thePike County Housing Authority, which is zoned R-3 (multifamilyresidence). Along the southern boundary of Sturhahn's property isthe remainder of Rolling Meadows Third Addition, in which plaintiffs'houses are located and which is still zoned R-2.

In August 1998, plaintiffs filed a single-count complaintfor declaratory judgment objecting to the zoning reclassification ofreal property purchased by Sturhahn in plaintiffs' residentialsubdivision. Plaintiffs' original complaint asked the trial court todeclare the zoning ordinance to be "spot-zoning, arbitrary,capricious, unconstitutional, and thus invalid."

In August 1999, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motionfor leave to file an amended complaint in which plaintiffs added twoadditional counts, arguing that (1) the trial court should enjoin thezoning reclassification as an improper vacatur of the existing platin violation of the Plat Act (765 ILCS 205/0.01 through 14 (West1998)) and (2) such zoning reclassification violates the impliedrestrictive covenant requiring owners to use property owned withinthe Rolling Meadows Third Addition subdivision for residentialpurposes. In October 1999, defendant City of Pittsfield filed amotion to dismiss counts II and III of plaintiffs' amended complaint. That same month, the trial court dismissed counts II and III of theamended complaint.

In November 1999, Sturhahn filed a motion for summaryjudgment as to count I, which defendant City of Pittsfield adopted. In December 1999, the trial court conducted a hearing on Sturhahn'smotion for summary judgment. On March 30, 2000, the trial courtgranted the motion for summary judgment. On April 27, 2000,plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the granting of summaryjudgment and the dismissal of counts II and III. On June 14, 2000,the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. Plaintiffsappealed.

On appeal, plaintiffs argued the trial court erroneouslygranted summary judgment in favor of Sturhahn and dismissed counts IIand III of plaintiffs' complaint. We affirmed the trial court'sjudgment granting summary judgment, finding that no genuine issue ofmaterial fact remained and the trial court did not apply the lawincorrectly. We reversed the trial court's dismissal of counts IIand III and remanded the cause for further action. As to count II,we found that plaintiffs' claim that they purchased their lots, andimproved their lots with residences, in reliance on therepresentations in the plat that (1) they would be surrounded byother residences and (2) Sunset Drive and Hackney Lane would belocated as platted, preventing access to the commercial areas to thenorth, was sufficient to state a cause of action under the Plat Act. Ruble, slip order at 18. As to count III, we found that all thedeeds at issue contained some reference to the subdivision and/orplat. As such, plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to state a causeof action for the violation of implied restrictive covenants. Ruble,slip order at 20.

On September 5, 2002, Sturhahn filed a motion for summaryjudgment on counts II and III of plaintiffs' amended complaint. OnOctober 10, 2002, a hearing was held on Sturhahn's motion. OnDecember 19, 2002, in an order, the trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of Sturhahn, finding no genuine issues of materialfact remained as to count II or count III. Specifically, as to countII, violations of the Plat Act, the court found that plaintiffs didnot show any violation of the Plat Act as they were not specially orpeculiarly injured by vacation of a portion of the Rolling MeadowsThird Addition plat. Further, the court found that plaintiffs didnot suffer any deprivation of their legal rights and privileges orshow that any public streets had been closed adjacent to theirproperty affecting access of ingress and egress to their property. As to count III, violations of restrictive covenants, the court foundthere was no general plan of development or implied covenants createdin Rolling Meadows Third Addition, no restrictions in deeds given toany lot owner in the Rolling Meadows Third Addition subdivision, norestrictive covenants filed of record against any lot, or anyprohibitions placed on the face of the plat restricting the type ofland use in the subdivision. On January 15, 2003, plaintiffs filed amotion to reconsider. On April 23, 2003, the trial court deniedplaintiffs' motion. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by granting summaryjudgment in favor of Sturhahn because the court incorrectlyinterpreted and applied the law.

"Summary judgment is appropriate where 'the pleadings,depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,517, 732 N.E.2d 528, 542 (2000), quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1992). "Accordingly, two questions are presented on review from anorder granting summary judgment. The first is whether any genuineissues of material fact remain. The second is whether the trialcourt correctly interpreted the law." Farmers Automobile InsuranceAss'n v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698, 722N.E.2d 1228, 1231-32 (2000). This court reviews the entry of summaryjudgment de novo. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325,333, 662 N.E.2d 397, 402 (1996). We consider anew the facts and lawrelated to the case to determine whether the trial court was correct. Bank One, Springfield v. Roscetti, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054, 723N.E.2d 755, 759 (1999).

In the present case, the parties agree as to the materialfacts. Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the trialcourt correctly interpreted and applied the law in granting summaryjudgment to Sturhahn on count II. We find the trial court did notcorrectly interpret and apply the law.

Plaintiffs argue Sturhahn vacated the original platwithout their consent in violation of sections 6 and 7 of the PlatAct (765 ILCS 205/6, 7 (West 1998)).

Section 6 of the Plat Act states in pertinent part:

"Any plat may be vacated by the owner ofthe premises at any time before the sale of anylot therein, by a written instrument to which acopy of the plat is attached, declaring it tobe vacated. *** When lots have been sold[,]the plat may be vacated in the manner providedin this [s]ection by all the owners of lots inthe plat joining in the execution of thewriting." 765 ILCS 205/6 (West 1998).

Section 7, in turn, states:

"Any part of a plat may be vacated in themanner provided in the preceding section, andsubject to the conditions therein prescribed: Provided, such vacation shall not abridge ordestroy any of the rights or privileges ofother proprietors in such plat: And, provided,further, that nothing contained in this sectionshall authorize the closing or obstructing ofany public highway laid out according to law." 765 ILCS 205/7 (West 1998).

Section 6 "prescribes when, by whom[,] and how an entire plat may bevacated," whereas section 7 prescribes the procedure for vacatingonly a portion of the plat. Sheldon v. Rockford & Interurban Ry.Co., 288 Ill. 576, 578, 123 N.E. 549, 550 (1919) (discussing apredecessor to the current section). Therefore, an owner whopurchases all the lots in the part of a plat sought to be vacated hasthe authority to vacate that part of the plat provided such actiondoes not violate the rights of other proprietors in the plat or causepublic highways to be closed or obstructed. Sheldon, 288 Ill. at578, 123 N.E. at 550; see also Chicago Anderson Pressed Brick Co. v.City of Chicago, 138 Ill. 628, 632, 28 N.E. 756, 756 (1891).

Plaintiffs argue Sturhahn violated their rights in theplat in that (1) he sought and obtained a zoning change allowing himto alter the nature of the plat from residential to commercial, and(2) his new plat altered the configuration of certain streetsdepicted in the original plat. We agree with plaintiffs' secondargument.

Plaintiffs argue they have a right to maintain theresidential nature of their neighborhood. They contend this rightstems from (1) zoning representations set forth in the plat, (2) Cityof Pittsfield Ordinance 1013 annexing the property described in theplat as R-2, single-family residential, and (3) oral representationsmade by the author of the plat that the area was to remainresidential. As such, Sturhahn violated the Plat Act when he failedto seek the consent of plaintiffs, whose rights would be injured bythe vacation of the plat.

Although plaintiffs' plight is sympathetic, they havefailed to cite any authority, and we have found none, for theproposition that one who purchases land in reference to a platacquires the absolute right to maintain the original zoning of theplat. Rather, zoning is primarily a legislative function. La SalleNational Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46, 145N.E.2d 65, 68 (1957). "Counties have a right and a duty to maintaintheir land use through zoning regulations." Shipp v. County ofKankakee, 345 Ill. App. 3d 250, 253, 802 N.E.2d 284, 287 (2003). Azoning regulation or ordinance is valid unless a plaintiff proves byclear and convincing evidence that, as applied with respect to theirproperty, the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonableand bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, orgeneral welfare. La Salle, 12 Ill. 2d at 46, 145 N.E.2d at 68. Wehave previously held that plaintiffs failed to meet this burden. Ruble v. Sturhahn, No. 4-00-0616 (August 24, 2001) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23). Therefore, plaintiffs are withoutrecourse as to the rezoning of a portion of the plat from residentialto commercial.

Plaintiffs also argue they have a right to have theintegrity of the streets and roads depicted in the original platmaintained. Sturhahn counters that he was within his right to vacatethese streets and roads under the Plat Act because plaintiffssuffered no special or peculiar damage to their legal rights, nopublic streets were closed, and no public infrastructure was affectedupon vacation of the plat. We disagree.

A party who purchases land in a subdivision with referenceto a recorded plat acquires a right to have the streets and alleysremain open to all who would use them. Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill.App. 3d 796, 805, 473 N.E.2d 78, 85 (1984). Our supreme courtsummarized the law regarding the rights of property owners in thestreets, alleys, and public places laid out in a public subdivisionas follows:

"No law is better settled in this [s]tatethan that which controls this case. Where theowner of land lays it out in lots and blocksand makes and exhibits a plat thereof showingstreets and alleys and sells some of the lotswith a clear reference to the plan, the purchaser acquires as appurtenant to the lots every easement, privilege[,] and advantage whichthe plan represents as belonging to them as apart of the platted territory. This privilegeis not limited to the purchaser, but is a rightvesting in the purchaser that all persons whosoever, as their occasion may require, may usethe streets, alleys[,] and other public placesaccording to their appropriate purposes. Thesale and conveyance of lots according to a published plat implies a grant or covenant to thepurchaser that streets, alleys[,] and otherpublic places indicated as such upon the platshall be forever open to the use of the public,free from all claim of interference of the proprietor inconsistent with such use." Wattlesv. Village of McHenry, 305 Ill. 189, 192, 137N.E. 114, 116 (1922).

These rights, which one acquires when purchasing property withreference to a plat, are private rights. Welter v. Eaton, 366 Ill.143, 147, 7 N.E.2d 855, 857 (1937). Therefore, even if no especialinconvenience or loss is shown, one who purchases in reference to aplat is entitled, under the law, to demand that, as between him andthe author of the plat, and those claiming under the author, therepresentations made by the plat as to the streets thereon be preserved. Corning & Co. v. Woolner, 206 Ill. 190, 199, 69 N.E. 53, 57(1903). This rule equally applies to platted streets and roads notyet in existence. See Zearing v. Raber, 74 Ill. 409 (1874) (discussing applicable principles in 2 Smith's Leading Cases 154 (7th Am.ed.)).

In arguing that plaintiffs have suffered no deprivation oftheir legal rights, Sturhahn fails to recognize the distinctionbetween vacation of a plat by a public authority and vacation by theauthor of a plat and his privies. With the former, a plaintiff whodoes not own land abutting the street sought to be vacated, who isnot a party to the proceeding to vacate, and who has only suchinterest as is possessed by all other members of the public residingin the vicinity, cannot maintain an action to prevent vacation of theplat absent a showing that he will suffer special damages not commonto the general public. Eaton, 366 Ill. at 145-46, 7 N.E.2d at 856. Conversely, an owner of land who purchases in reference to a platacquires a private right in the plat's representations, which may notbe abridged or destroyed by the author of the plat or his privies. Such is the case even if no special damages to the owner of the landhave been shown.

In this case, the trial court erred in granting summaryjudgment in favor of Sturhahn, finding plaintiffs had not proved anydeprivation of private rights. Plaintiffs bought their property withreference to the original plat. Therefore, plaintiffs have acquiredprivate rights in the streets portrayed in the original plat and areentitled to have those streets preserved. In addition, the undisputedfacts show that Sturhahn vacated the original plat and then replattedhis property. In doing so, he removed the cul-de-sac at the end ofHackney Lane and reconfigured the layout of Sunset Drive. In addition, Hackney Lane no longer connected to Sunset Drive, only a streetoption was left open to connect the two. Each of these proposedchanges alters the nature of the streets depicted in the originalplat. As such, plaintiffs' rights in preserving the integrity of theoriginal plat have been sacrificed, and Sturhahn has violated thePlat Act in not seeking the consent of plaintiffs before vacating theplat.

Plaintiffs argue that a general plan of developmentexisted as to the platted land. Therefore, plaintiffs contend,Sturhahn violated implied restrictive covenants in altering andabandoning streets represented in the original plat and in changingthe nature of the subdivision from residential to commercial. Sturhahn responds that (1) no general plan of development existed,and (2) he was free to replat the streets depicted in the originalplat and to use his land for commercial purposes consistent with itsrezoning. We have already held that because of the implied covenantcreated by the plat, Sturhahn is not free to alter the integrity ofthe streets in the original plat without plaintiffs' consent. However, we agree with the trial court's decision that a general planof development did not exist as to the residential nature of thesubdivision.

Again, the case presents no disputed factual issues. Therefore, the only question is whether the trial court correctlyfound, as a matter of law, that no implied restrictive covenantsexisted, and therefore, no general plan of development was proved.

"A court may enjoin the owners of property from a proposeddevelopment on the grounds of an implied restrictive covenant if ageneral plan of development was instituted at the time of subdivision." Krueger v. Oberto, 309 Ill. App. 3d 358, 370, 724 N.E.2d 21,30 (1999). A trial court appropriately finds the existence of ageneral plan of development "where a tract is subdivided into lotsconveyed to separate purchasers subject to identical conditionsdesigned to operate as inducements to the purchase of the lots and tocreate reciprocally enforceable rights in the nature of an 'easementof incorporeal hereditament' in the other lots of the subdivision." Krueger, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 724 N.E.2d at 30-31, quotingPasulka v. Koob, 170 Ill. App. 3d 191, 205, 524 N.E.2d 1227, 1236(1988). "However, restrictions that interfere with the free use ofproperty are not favored in law, and all doubts must be resolved infavor of the free use of property without restrictions." Krueger,309 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 724 N.E.2d at 31. In determining whether ageneral plan exists, a trial court should evaluate whether (1) therestrictions are included in all deeds to the subdivision; (2) therestrictions have been previously violated; (3) the burdens imposedare generally equal and for the mutual benefit and advantage of alllot owners; and (4) notice of the restrictions is given in therecorded plat of the subdivision. Krueger, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 370-71, 724 N.E.2d at 31.

In this case, no restrictive covenants appear on the faceof plaintiffs' deeds. At best, plaintiff Booth's deed shows that the"conveyance [was] made subject to all restrictions as shown by theplat of said subdivision." The face of the plat itself does notcontain any restriction that seeks to maintain the residential natureof the plat. Further, it is unclear if the notation on the plat,"with ordinance," even refers to Ordinance 1013, which states thatthe plat is zoned R-2 residential. City of Pittsfield Ordinance No.1013 (adopted October 19, 1982). In addition, no restrictive covenants were filed against any lot in the plat. This evidence is notsufficient to establish plaintiffs' property was conveyed with therestriction that the property only be used for residential purposes.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment granting summary judgment in favor of Sturhahn as to countIII of plaintiffs' complaint and reverse the trial court's judgmentgranting summary judgment in favor of Sturhahn as to count II ofplaintiffs' complaint. We remand the case to the trial court forfurther proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

KNECHT, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.